Thinking Atlas · An attempt to map the world of thinking

The Information Architecture of Thought

What is thought? How does thinking happen, why do we think, and how have our ways of thinking changed? What is changing as artificial intelligence becomes part of that activity?

İLKER ARABACI, CLAUDE FABLE 5.1, CHATGPT ASTRA 6

This experimental study approaches thinking through the relationships between body, brain, language, meaning, society, sacred texts and tools. Each brings a different question into view. Putting them together helps us see where their explanations meet and where they leave something unresolved.

Our point of departure is Martin Heidegger’s question, What Is Called Thinking? The path has taken us beyond the caves and into silicon chips, through territory we are still learning to describe.

The atlas offers several ways into each subject. An opening passage and a small diagram introduce the question. In brief gives an accessible first account; Explanation develops the argument; In depth considers objections and questions that remain open. Three questions at the end leave room for a response of your own.

These levels offer different depths of reading, rather than a ranking of readers. You can follow a question across the atlas or return to a source when a claim needs closer attention.

English edition in progress. The first seventeen sections are available here: the opening, Method, Heidegger, the four layers, the concept tree, concept clusters, the seven-language matrix, word histories, material traces, the explanation of the thinking being, a genealogy of thinking, pioneers, sacred texts, working with artificial systems, hypotheses, research records and Appendix A. Later atlas sections, Appendices B–F, the Turkish bibliography and the verification notes are currently available in Turkish. Türkçe giriş

Language and meaningScience and experimentPhilosophy and beingMethod and the wider picture

01Purpose and five questions
02Method
03Heidegger
04Four layers
05Concept tree
06Concept clusters
07Seven languages
08Etymology
09Material traces
10Abstract line
11History
12Pioneers
13Sacred texts
14Artificial intelligence
15Hypotheses
16Research records
17Appendix A

Sections marked “Turkish” are not yet available in English; their links open the Turkish atlas.

01Method and the wider picture

Purpose: five questions to think with

How this atlas began

This atlas began with conversations about thinking in a university office, in the company of two teachers I deeply respect. Towards the end of the hour we had been given, one of them asked, “How is our thinking changing in the age of artificial intelligence?” That question stayed with me. Much of what I have written and drawn since, including the work you see here, grew out of trying to follow it.

In philosophy, a question often takes us further than an answer. As I read across biology, philosophy and other fields concerned with intelligence, mind and consciousness, I kept finding different accounts of what seemed to be the same activity. Before I could attempt a synthesis, I needed to gather those sources and understand what each account was trying to explain. The atlas grew out of that need.

I hope it will be useful to others who spend time with these questions, as it has been to me. It remains a collection to return to and revise as time, reading and the responses of others allow.

The question that started those conversations opens into five more:

What is thought? How does thinking happen? Why do we think? How have thought and our ways of thinking changed through history? And what is changing in the age of artificial intelligence, as new tools become part of how we think?

We start with short answers to make the questions easier to approach. Their brevity can make them sound more settled than they are. The sections that follow examine the distinctions behind each answer, the sources it draws on and the objections that might lead us to change it.

We already have a modest example close at hand. When we look at a note on the refrigerator to recall a recipe, remembering draws on our body, what we have learned, the words on the paper and our use of them. We can see that the note helps. Whether it has become part of the thinking itself is a further interpretation, one we return to below.

Even the question of how many thoughts pass through a day depends on what we count as one thought. In 2020, Julie Tseng and Jordan Poppenk used brain scans to identify transitions between patterns of activity that they proposed as indirect markers of changes in thought. Extrapolating their observed rate across a waking day gave an estimate of more than six thousand. They did not count the content of every thought someone had throughout the day.¹⁰

What interests us here is the attempt to make a difficult boundary available for investigation: how might we identify the point at which one thought gives way to another? The estimate is tentative; the question it opens is worth keeping.

I suggest using these pages as a map: somewhere to place a question, follow a connection and find a route back to the source.

The diagram shows where the five questions are developed and how they relate. From there, we take up the first: what do we mean by thought?

Reading the diagram. Solid lines connect each question to the same subject of inquiry. Dashed lines connect neighbouring questions without indicating a direction or a cause. The smaller labels name the sections where each question is developed.

In brief

Remembering a recipe can involve a note on the refrigerator, the language we read and a history of preparing food. The brain is central to that activity, but describing what happens inside it does not yet describe the whole situation. This atlas brings body, memory, language, other people and tools into the same inquiry. How we should draw the boundary of thinking within that situation remains one of its questions.

Explanation

What is thought?

We will work with the following definition, keeping its limits in view. Here, a cognitive system means a system considered in terms of capacities such as perceiving, remembering and drawing conclusions:

Thought is a changing pattern in which a living being or cognitive system brings perceptions, memories, concepts, values, purposes and possibilities into relation as it engages with its own condition or the world around it.

Four layers help us unpack that sentence. Body asks what physically carries the activity. In human thinking, that includes the nervous system and its relationship with the rest of the body. Meaning asks how we make distinctions: words such as “perception”, “value” and “purpose” belong to a language, and another language may draw the boundaries differently.

Processes asks how the activity works. Perception draws on memory, memory matters to evaluation, and a conclusion can lead to action. Life asks where this happens and what it means to those involved: at a table, in a classroom, in prayer or in front of a screen. Human thinking serves purposes and is also lived from within. Keeping these questions separate helps us relate them without expecting one account to do all their work.

Three distinctions make the definition easier to use. First, thinking is an activity, while a thought can also be what we arrive at through that activity. Turkish makes this distinction with düşünmek and düşünce. English allows a similar distinction between “thinking” and “a thought”. We will need both senses.

Second, thinking includes more than an inner conversation. Finding our footing on the stairs involves judging space and movement; recognising a melody draws on memory for sound; noticing danger can precede the words we use to describe it. Third, language and thinking are closely related without being identical. A review of evidence about the brain’s language network, the regions especially involved in processing language, argues that many demanding thinking tasks do not require that network in the same way that language tasks do. This leaves room to ask how language shapes thought; it does not settle everything that thinking without language involves.¹

Wittgenstein’s remark in the Tractatus, “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”, gives us another way to approach that relationship. His later attention to how words are used, in Philosophical Investigations, changes the questions we ask about meaning. Neither philosophical account is a prediction of the brain evidence. Reading them alongside it helps us notice that the limits of meaningful expression and the mechanisms used for a task are different questions.²

The definition also leaves difficult cases at its edges. A reflex may seem too immediate to count as thinking; a calculator’s answer may seem detached from any engagement with a world. Those impressions help us locate a question, but they do not decide it. We would still have to explain what relation or capacity is missing, rather than relying on how the example looks to us.

A paragraph produced by a language model brings the difficulty closer. There is a physical system, a process and a use of words. What those establish about understanding, purposes or experience needs a further argument. The definition gives us a way to ask about those features; including “cognitive system” in its wording does not demonstrate that a particular model has them. Section fourteen develops that question.

Two questions remain deliberately open. One concerns what thinking feels like to the one who thinks. A description from outside does not by itself give us that experience. The other is the question associated here with Kant: what must already be possible for something to count as an experience for us?³ These are questions about the reach of our account, rather than items that a definition can simply cross off. We return to them in the four-layer discussion and in the readings of sacred texts.

The refrigerator note helps us see why the distinction matters. We can observe someone consulting it to recall a recipe. The further claim that the paper becomes part of the thinking belongs to the extended mind approach, which allows some external resources to form part of a cognitive system under particular conditions. Other approaches describe the note as an aid used by that system.⁴ The help it provides is common ground; the boundary we draw around the thinking is what needs an argument.

How does thinking happen?

To investigate how thinking happens, we need to follow relations between activities rather than assign all of them to one place. Perception, attention, memory, evaluation, imagining, inference and the control of action interact in changing patterns. Holding information briefly while we use it is called working memory; noticing and assessing our own thinking is part of metacognition. Naming these activities helps us distinguish their roles, but it does not turn them into a fixed sequence.⁵

In the atlas’s terms, Body concerns the physical system and Processes concerns how its activities are organised. One family of models explains perception through predictions that are compared with incoming information and revised when they differ. This is called predictive processing. We use it as an influential explanatory framework, while keeping open the question of how far it reaches.⁶

Explaining conscious experience raises further disputes. A joint test published in 2025 examined specified predictions from two prominent theories. Its results challenged parts of both accounts; it did not establish a single complete explanation of consciousness.⁷ The cycle diagrams later in the atlas help us follow possible relations between activities. Their order is a reading aid, rather than a timetable of events in the brain.

Why do we think?

At least three kinds of answer belong here. An evolutionary account asks what thinking makes possible: anticipating danger, trying out actions before taking them, learning and coordinating with others. An account from within a life asks what moves us to think: curiosity, a search for meaning, a difficulty we cannot leave alone. Heidegger directs attention to another question, that of what calls for thought and how we respond to it.⁸

These answers differ in what they try to explain. A capacity’s usefulness does not tell us everything about why a particular question matters to someone; a description of that concern does not replace an account of the capacity. Body, Processes and Life help us keep those differences visible. Heidegger’s question also presses us to ask whether our explanatory framework has already narrowed what we are willing to notice.

What has changed through history?

A history of thinking has to follow more than changes in the brain. It also concerns changes in what people think about, the practices through which they learn and the resources available to them: stone tools, carved marks, figures, clay tablets, alphabets, books, printing, experimental instruments, computers and now generative artificial systems.

One recurring development is that tools allow parts of remembering and reasoning to be carried out beyond the individual. Yet that does not make history a single ascent from heart to brain or from myth to science. Older ways of understanding human life continue alongside newer ones. When someone speaks of knowing something “in their heart”, they are drawing on a way of speaking about human understanding that a newer technical vocabulary has not simply erased. The atlas’s timeline places such accounts alongside one another so that we can ask what changed, what persisted and in which setting.

What is changing with artificial intelligence?

Search, summarising, drafting, generating alternatives, coding and classification can now be delegated more readily to external systems. That changes the work around the output as well: choosing a question, checking a claim, tracing a source and deciding what should be done with a result. A survey of people using generative artificial intelligence at work found an association between greater confidence in the system and less reported critical thinking effort. It was a survey of people’s accounts of their work, not an experiment establishing that the technology caused a loss of ability.⁹

Artificial intelligence therefore appears across the four layers of this atlas. Body includes its physical hardware; Processes includes its interaction with a person’s activity; Meaning includes how words and concepts are used; Life includes the questions of who contributed, who decides and who is responsible. The question “Can a machine think?” remains open to argument, but pursuing it already asks us to distinguish intelligence, thinking, understanding, consciousness and agency, the capacity to act towards a purpose. Those distinctions are part of the work, rather than answers supplied by the label “artificial intelligence”.

The atlas’s central proposal is a way of investigating these relationships. We ask what carries an activity, how it works, what distinctions give it meaning and how it belongs within a life. History lets us follow changes in those relationships. Keeping the four questions in view makes a synthesis possible without making every kind of explanation answer to the same test.

In depth: where does this definition fall short?

Our working definition describes thinking mainly through what it does: it relates, evaluates and engages. An objection from lived experience asks what such an account leaves out of how thinking feels. Nagel and Chalmers help us formulate that problem; describing a function does not by itself settle the question of experience.¹¹¹²

A different objection concerns the language of the definition. When we speak of “relating” or “engaging”, have we explained an activity, or merely named an unseen process? Ryle’s criticism of treating the mind as a hidden entity gives us a reason to examine that question.¹³ The objection does not make observation irrelevant, or settle in advance which explanations are possible. It asks us to show what our terms help us understand.

There is also a consequence in our choice of “cognitive system”: the wording leaves artificial systems within the scope of inquiry. Keeping that possibility open carries no verdict about any particular system. The definition earns its place if it helps us make a distinction, examine an objection and revise an account when the evidence calls for it. That brings us to the next question: how do we compare sources that are doing such different kinds of work?

Questions to think through

Can you recall a moment of thinking that did not involve putting something into words, such as finding a route, recognising a face or keeping a rhythm? What makes you describe that activity as thinking?
Which of the five answers leaves you least convinced? What evidence or argument would make a difference to your judgment?
When asked why we think, would you first explain what thinking helps us do, what moves us personally or what deserves our attention? Would putting one answer first tell us something about the question, or about the way you approached it?

Sources and reading notes

Note numbers match the Turkish atlas, which is why the first note cited in this opening is number 10.

1 Evelina Fedorenko, Steven T. Piantadosi and Edward A. F. Gibson, “Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”, Nature 630 (2024), 575–586. Publication. A review of evidence concerning language and thought, not a claim that language never contributes to thinking. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposition 5.6, C. K. Ogden translation, Project Gutenberg transcription; and Philosophical Investigations (1953), translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. The quotation belongs to the former work. The contrast with the later work is an interpretive reading, not a result about the brain. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
3 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787). The question here concerns the conditions of experience. It is not presented as another experimentally identified stage in a processing sequence. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30
4 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58(1) (1998), 7–19. Publication. The refrigerator note is our explanatory example. Assistance alone does not establish that an external resource is a constituent of a cognitive system. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21
5 Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna, Jonathan Smallwood and R. Nathan Spreng, “The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1316(1) (2014), 29–52. Publication. This review provides a route into component processes; the atlas’s diagrams are explanatory arrangements. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
6 Karl Friston, “The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11 (2010), 127–138. Publication. A theoretical framework, not a settled account of every aspect of thinking. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
7 Cogitate Consortium and colleagues, “Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness”, Nature 642 (2025), 133–142. Publication. The test concerns particular predictions from two theories; its outcome is not a verdict on all possible theories of consciousness. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19
8 Martin Heidegger, Was heißt Denken? (1954); English: What Is Called Thinking?, translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (1968). The question that inspired this study concerns what calls for thinking and how we respond to it. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30
9 Hao-Ping (Hank) Lee and colleagues, “The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers” (2025). Publication. Associations in self-reports do not establish a causal change in ability. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25
10 Julie Tseng and Jordan Poppenk, “Brain meta-state transitions demarcate thoughts across task contexts exposing the mental noise of trait neuroticism”, Nature Communications 11 (2020), 3480. Publication. The daily estimate extrapolates an observed transition rate; it is not a direct count of someone’s thoughts over a whole day. ↩1 ↩2
11 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, The Philosophical Review 83(4) (1974), 435–450. Publication. Used here to frame the question of what an experience is like for its subject. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
12 David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3) (1995), 200–219. Used here to distinguish an account of functions from the further question of experience. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19
13 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949). The question about explanatory language is our reconstruction of a challenge relevant to the definition, not a quotation or an imagined statement by Ryle. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

02Method and the wider picture

The study’s method

Why we need a method

Two tables in an engineering study might carry the same heading, “Count”, while one records complaints and the other records transactions. If we combine the figures before asking what they stand for, we may produce an orderly table and a misleading conclusion. The problem begins before the calculation, in what has been counted.

The same difficulty appears when we bring sources together. A dictionary traces the history of a word; an experiment measures what happens during a particular task; a philosopher asks what a concept includes and whether we are using it consistently. Each can help us investigate thinking. Placing them alongside one another does not yet show how their answers are related.

Our method starts by asking what each source can support, and where a further argument would be needed. That gives us a way to return to the question at the end of the opening section: how do we compare explanations that are doing different kinds of work? As we move through the atlas, we want the grounds for a claim to remain available for examination, including when the claim is our own.

What each line can support

Line of inquiry	Sources of support	Limit of the conclusion
Language and meaning	Historical dictionary entries and dated texts	Word history does not determine a concept’s essence or its present meaning.
Science and experiment	Measurements, studies and research syntheses	A conclusion depends on the participants, task and comparison; brain activity alone does not identify a unique mental process.
Philosophy and being	Arguments, objections and counterexamples	An argument can clarify what needs explaining without becoming an experimental finding.

Read across the lines: keep connections and disagreements visible.

Reading the matrix. The rows show three lines of inquiry. The columns identify their sources of support and the limits of the conclusions we can draw. Body, Meaning, Processes and Life are a different organising scheme and are not rows in this matrix. The dashed box marks our work of reading across the lines; it does not show that one causes another. Strength of support is a separate question, not a score encoded by the diagram.

In brief

A word’s history can tell us something about how people have understood thinking. It does not, on its own, explain how a brain makes a decision. An experiment can help us investigate a mechanism, while leaving open what counts as understanding or a good reason. We read language research, scientific studies and philosophical arguments together so that their contributions can inform one another without silently changing the question each has addressed.

Explanation

Three lines of inquiry, four layers

The atlas follows three main lines of inquiry. In Language and meaning, we examine word histories, translations and changing uses. In Science and experiment, we consider measurements and models of bodily functions, the nervous system, mental activities such as memory and attention, and computing. In Philosophy and being, we compare arguments about thought, soul, self, consciousness, free will and truth. The atlas also uses Method and the wider picture as a navigation category for the work that brings these inquiries together. It is not a fourth source of evidence parallel to the three.

These lines tell us how material enters the inquiry. The four layers introduced in the opening section tell us which aspect of thinking we are considering: its physical bearer, its meanings, its processes or its place within a life. Those are different ways of organising the same material.

A memory experiment belongs to the scientific line and may concern both Body and Processes. An argument about responsibility belongs to the philosophical line and may address a question considered under Life. Keeping the two schemes distinct lets us follow a connection without mistaking a research method for a part of the mind.

For the grounds a line of inquiry accepts, and the ways it evaluates them, we use the phrase standards of evidence. The question behind the phrase is straightforward: what gives us a reason to accept this claim, and what would give us a reason to question it? These standards, and the atlas built around them, remain open to revision. A new study or a strong objection may change more than the judgment attached to one record.

What supports a claim about language and meaning?

Here we turn to historical dictionaries, dated texts and choices made in translation. The Arabic root written ʿ-q-l, from which ʿaql is formed, has uses associated with binding and restraint in Lane’s lexicon.¹⁴ These uses help us examine the images through which people have spoken about intellect or reason. They give us a route into the history of the language.

That route does not establish that the essence of reason is restraint. A word’s earlier uses do not determine everything it can mean now.¹⁵ Treating an origin as the final explanation of a present meaning is called the etymological fallacy. Knowing the origin matters; so does noticing where its explanatory reach ends. We keep that distinction in view when reading Heidegger’s questions about language.

What supports a claim in science and experiment?

When a study rests on observations or measurements, we ask how the information was collected, who took part, what task they faced and what the comparison allowed the researchers to conclude. Experiments, observations, surveys, reviews and studies that try to reproduce a finding answer different questions. A study of misleading explanations presented as generated by artificial intelligence, for example, can tell us about diagnostic answers given by medical students under the conditions of that study.¹⁶

It cannot establish that every user will be affected in the same way by every system in every task. To judge how far a result travels, we look at the participants, the task and the comparison rather than extending the conclusion through the name of the technology.

A brain image asks for similar care. Suppose a region becomes active during a task involving memory. Seeing that region active on another occasion is not enough to conclude that the person is remembering: the region may also be active during other processes. Reasoning from the activity back to a mental process is called reverse inference. Its value depends partly on how selectively that activity is associated with the process and how plausible the process was in the task being studied. The chance of seeing an activity when a process occurs is different from the chance that the process occurred when we see that activity.¹⁷

What supports a philosophical claim?

When reading a philosophical argument, we examine its starting claims, or premises, whether its conclusion follows from them, what it explains and how it responds to a case that challenges it. Such a challenging case is a counterexample. An argument can help us see that a familiar distinction is doing less work than we assumed, or that a conclusion needs another premise.

Searle’s Chinese Room makes the issue concrete. In this thought experiment, a person follows rules for handling Chinese symbols without understanding Chinese. Searle asks whether manipulating symbols according to rules is sufficient for understanding. One reply shifts attention from the person to the whole system; Searle argues against that reply as well.¹⁸ The disagreement concerns what would count as understanding and where we would look for it. Naming the thought experiment does not settle that disagreement.

A philosophical argument can therefore change what we decide to measure, or what we are entitled to call the result, without becoming an experiment itself. A metaphysical claim about what exists or could exist, such as the soul surviving bodily death, also calls for its reasons and objections to be examined. If we propose a test through observation or experiment, we first have to say which observation would count for or against the claim. Until that connection is specified, a laboratory result cannot simply be assigned the task of confirming or refuting it.

What do we gain by reading across the lines?

A word history, an argument and an experiment may all contribute to the same question. Their resemblance can suggest a connection worth investigating. It does not give us three independent confirmations. Two interpretations influenced by the same author share part of their history; two traditions using similar images do not, on that basis alone, have a common origin. Our method keeps both connections and disagreements visible, while asking what supports each proposed link.

Why separate the kind of support from its strength?

We need two pieces of information about a record: what kind of support it offers, and how well that support bears on the particular claim. A strong dictionary witness and a strong experimental result can both be valuable. Putting them on a single ladder, however, would suggest that one could answer in place of the other. Their value depends on the question we are asking.

By kind, we mean what the record rests on: a historical dictionary entry, an author’s own text, an experiment, an observation or a survey. We distinguish experiments conducted in everyday settings, reviews that bring earlier research together, meta-analyses that combine findings statistically, and replication projects that test a finding again. Theoretical accounts, technical evaluations, philosophical arguments, theological traditions and contributions to public debate provide other kinds of material. Naming a kind tells us how to start examining the record; it does not finish the evaluation.

By strength, we mean how well that material supports the stated claim under the standards appropriate to it. The atlas uses five qualitative labels: none, preliminary, limited, moderate and strong. These are judgments requiring reasons, rather than numerical measurements. Support from word history and support from an experiment remain separate entries; we do not add them into one total score.

A label such as “strong” should lead us back to the claim and the reasons for the assessment. Strong support for what, under which conditions? We do not turn these labels into percentages, and “none” is not another word for “disproved”. Keeping the judgment visible makes it possible for a reader to question it rather than accept the label as the end of the inquiry.

How do we use and record sources?

A publication’s title does not stand in for its findings. We distinguish records checked against the source text from those for which only an abstract was available. Nor do we assume that every claim in the atlas has been independently checked again: the verification notes identify the scope of the work actually done. A publication date, the period in which a study was conducted and the date on which we accessed it are different pieces of information.

For sacred texts, the wording taken from the identified source and our interpretation occupy separate fields. Essays and social media posts can help us understand a public discussion; that does not turn them into experimental findings. An inaccessible source is not evidence that its claim is false. Recording what we could not check, and which version a check concerned, leaves a useful starting point for the next reading.

In depth: can we question these distinctions too?

We can. The three lines are ways of conducting the present inquiry; they need not be permanent boundaries between possible explanations. A naturalistic approach, seeking to explain thinking within the natural world, may expect closer connections between accounts that we currently read separately. A reductive proposal may seek to explain one account in terms of another.

Paul M. Churchland raises a further possibility: that a developed neuroscience could replace some familiar concepts used to explain mental life, rather than preserve all of them in a new vocabulary.¹⁹ His proposal is more radical than a straightforward reduction. We therefore take it seriously as a challenge to the categories in use, without attributing the same position to every naturalistic or reductive approach.

Our distinction concerns how claims are justified: in that sense, it is epistemic, a matter of what we can know and on what grounds. It does not divide thinking itself into three separate kinds of reality. Such a claim would be ontological, a claim about what exists. We use the lines because different questions currently call for different methods. If stronger connections between the explanations become available, the method should be able to change with them.

The assessment of strength presents a challenge of its own: we are making a judgment. Hiding that judgment behind a label would make the atlas harder to question. Showing the source, the reasons for our assessment and what remains uncertain lets a reader reach a different conclusion. We began with the problem of two orderly tables telling us something misleading. The same check belongs here: before we combine the records, we ask what each can actually support. That is the method we take into the next section, where Heidegger’s question calls for a particular kind of reading.

Questions to think through

How would you describe the support for a claim you trust? What new information would change your confidence in it?
If art or practical expertise formed a separate line of inquiry, how would you judge whether an account within it was well supported?
When you learn an older meaning of a word, how does it affect your understanding of its present use? Which part of that change comes from the source, and which part comes from your interpretation?

Sources and reading notes

14 Edward William Lane, An Arabic–English Lexicon (1863–1893), entry for the root ʿ-q-l. Electronic transcription of the entry. The binding and restraint uses belong to the lexical record; they do not establish a single essence of reasoning. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43 ↩44 ↩45 ↩46 ↩47 ↩48 ↩49 ↩50 ↩51 ↩52 ↩53 ↩54 ↩55 ↩56 ↩57 ↩58 ↩59 ↩60 ↩61 ↩62 ↩63 ↩64 ↩65 ↩66 ↩67 ↩68 ↩69 ↩70 ↩71 ↩72 ↩73 ↩74 ↩75 ↩76 ↩77 ↩78 ↩79 ↩80 ↩81 ↩82 ↩83 ↩84 ↩85 ↩86 ↩87 ↩88 ↩89 ↩90 ↩91 ↩92 ↩93 ↩94 ↩95 ↩96 ↩97 ↩98 ↩99 ↩100 ↩101 ↩102 ↩103 ↩104 ↩105 ↩106 ↩107 ↩108 ↩109 ↩110 ↩111 ↩112 ↩113 ↩114 ↩115 ↩116 ↩117 ↩118 ↩119 ↩120 ↩121 ↩122 ↩123 ↩124 ↩125 ↩126 ↩127 ↩128 ↩129 ↩130 ↩131 ↩132 ↩133 ↩134 ↩135 ↩136 ↩137 ↩138 ↩139 ↩140 ↩141 ↩142 ↩143 ↩144 ↩145 ↩146 ↩147 ↩148 ↩149 ↩150 ↩151 ↩152 ↩153 ↩154 ↩155 ↩156 ↩157 ↩158 ↩159 ↩160 ↩161 ↩162 ↩163 ↩164 ↩165 ↩166 ↩167 ↩168 ↩169 ↩170 ↩171 ↩172 ↩173 ↩174 ↩175 ↩176 ↩177 ↩178 ↩179 ↩180 ↩181
15 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (1916), edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. The source provides a route into questions of linguistic meaning. The methodological warning here does not treat an older sense as the final authority over present use. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
16 Da Teng and colleagues, “Impact of AI misinformation on diagnostic accuracy and confidence calibration in novice medical students”, npj Digital Medicine 9 (2026), 356. Publication. The comparison concerns explanations presented to junior medical students in a knowledge-testing setting. It is not evidence of an identical effect in every use of artificial intelligence, or a measurement of clinical outcomes in patients. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13
17 Russell A. Poldrack, “Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(2) (2006), 59–63. Publication; Journal PDF copy. The inference depends on selectivity and the task context; reverse inference is not dismissed as invariably worthless. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
18 John R. Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3) (1980), 417–424, target article. Publication; Electronic text copy. The Chinese Room and the systems reply concern different proposed locations of understanding. This thought experiment is not presented as an empirical test of every artificial system. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20
19 Paul M. Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes”, The Journal of Philosophy 78(2) (1981), 67–90. Publication; Scanned article copy. The opening distinguishes replacing familiar psychological categories from reducing them while preserving those categories. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15

03Philosophy and being

Our starting point: Heidegger and What Is Called Thinking?

Why this section is here

We can obtain a summary of a study, a set of options or the objections to an argument in seconds. That help matters. Yet before choosing an answer, we may still be unsure what we need the answer for. Which question is worth pursuing? What would knowing change in our lives? And who will answer for the decision we make with it? Working with artificial intelligence makes this gap between producing an answer and understanding our purpose harder to overlook.

Heidegger’s What Is Called Thinking? was the starting point for this work because it places another question beside how thinking happens: what calls for thought? We begin looking beyond the operations of a mind to the matter that draws us into thinking. A concern, an encounter or something we cannot yet explain may oblige us to reconsider what we thought we knew.

We first unpack the title and its four connected questions, then follow the discussion through language, science and craft. Along the way we explain where Heidegger helps us and where we object. This will not give us his entire philosophy. It should make his particular use of thinking clearer, so that we can compare it with the atlas’s other accounts without treating them as interchangeable.

How to read the diagram: the arrows show two approaches to a question, not one kind of thinking causing another in the brain. The dashed connection marks a comparison, not a necessary opposition. Denken, Danken and Gedanc are connected through linguistic history and philosophical interpretation; the connection does not prove that interpretation.

In brief

We can calculate how to move traffic through a city faster. We can also ask why people must travel so far and what kind of city we want to inhabit. This everyday comparison helps us approach Heidegger’s distinction: finding how to accomplish a task and reconsidering its purpose and assumptions are different activities. We may need both.

Explanation

What question does the book open?

The lectures Heidegger gave at Freiburg in 1951–1952 appeared as Was heißt Denken? in 1954; the English translation followed in 1968.⁸ The atlas also records Rıdvan Şentürk’s Turkish translation with Paradigma. Its publication year and exact coverage of the lectures remain unverified against the edition itself, so we do not assign a definite year to it here.

Near the beginning we encounter this sentence:

Das Bedenklichste in unserer bedenklichen Zeit ist, daß wir noch nicht denken.
What most calls for thought in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.
Heidegger, Was heißt Denken? English rendering here is ours, not a quotation attributed to the published English translation.

Read without that context, the sentence can sound like a denial of everything we ordinarily call thinking. Heidegger is reserving the word for a particular activity. He distinguishes calculating, collecting information and reaching correct results from questioning how we approach what concerns us and what it asks of us. The provocation brings that distinction into view; reserving the whole name of thinking for one side is also what makes it contestable.

Two questions in the title

German heißen can concern naming or meaning, but also calling or bidding. Heidegger draws on this range to hold two questions together: what does thinking mean, and what calls us to think? The English title preserves something of that double movement. In Turkish, the familiar title foregrounds meaning, so the question of a call needs to be drawn out in reading.

The second question makes it harder to treat thought only as a procedure we initiate at will. Sometimes we choose what to consider; sometimes an encounter makes our usual explanation inadequate. This everyday comparison helps us approach the call, while leaving Heidegger’s question of being broader than curiosity or a need to solve problems.

Four connected questions

Across the lectures, Heidegger connects these questions:

What do we mean by thinking?
How does logic approach thinking?
What do we need in order to learn to think?
What calls us to think?

The last question directs his inquiry. It turns towards the relation between something’s being and how it becomes intelligible to us. We are asked to examine the understanding of the world within which a question can arise, as well as the correctness of an answer. At this point the direction of inquiry changes; we have not acquired an easy solution.

The two approaches in the diagram

By calculative thinking we mean comparing options and seeking results for a specified task. Meditative thinking questions what that task serves, what it assumes and what it brings us up against. Our diagram also draws on Heidegger’s later distinction between das rechnende Denken and das besinnliche Denken.²⁰ It is therefore a reading aid drawing on more than these lectures, rather than their exact outline.

The two need not be enemies. Planning a city may require calculations while also reconsidering their purpose. The dashed connection makes room for that comparison. Arrows indicate approaches to a shared question, not a neural mechanism producing one from the other. Remembrance and gratitude enter as linguistic connections through which Heidegger develops the second approach.

Thinking, remembrance and gratitude

In connecting denken, danken and the older gedanc, Heidegger brings thinking, remembering and thanking into the same discussion. Attending to something, before converting it immediately into a use or explanation, becomes part of what thinking asks of us. The historical relationship between English think and thank and German denken and danken supplies the linguistic side of the discussion.²¹

That relationship does not prove that gratitude is the essence of thought. We retain the distinction made in Method: an origin may illuminate a concept’s history without deciding what it must mean now.¹⁵ Heidegger’s further step is philosophical interpretation. Arabic tadhakkur and Turkish anmak help us compare other relations between thinking and remembering; a similar use does not establish common linguistic descent.

How should we read “science does not think”?

Taken to mean that scientists cannot think, the sentence would be indefensible. Scientists develop concepts, revise methods and question their disciplines’ assumptions. Heidegger is distinguishing work within a scientific method from philosophical inquiry into the understanding of being on which that method rests.⁸

We can use the distinction without reserving thinking for its philosophical side. Investigating the conditions of an explanation or designing an experiment are important forms of thought too. We therefore read the sentence as a challenge concerning the reach of scientific explanation, not as the atlas’s verdict on science.

A continuation sometimes attributed to Heidegger describes this as science’s advantage rather than its defect. The atlas’s existing record has not verified that wording in the primary text. It is not presented here as a direct quotation.

Nietzsche’s desert image, the last human being and release from revenge shape the first part of the lectures; Parmenides’s relation between thinking and being becomes prominent in the second. Hölderlin’s poetry also enters the inquiry. These texts help Heidegger develop the question rather than decorate it. His interpretation should still be distinguished from what each earlier author meant.

Why bring craft into this discussion?

Heidegger relates thinking to craft and to a hand that writes, gestures, gives and participates in a human relation to the world. His claim that an ape has a grasping organ but no hand in this sense belongs to that philosophical account.⁸

We cannot pass that claim on as an anatomical finding. It assigns a particular significance to the human hand rather than denying an animal’s bodily organ. The boundary he draws between humans and other animals remains open to criticism.

This is where a comparison with toolmaking research becomes useful. Stout and colleagues investigate the organisation of actions and accompanying neural activity in making stone tools.²² Heidegger asks about a relation of meaning between craft and thought. Different questions are being addressed through the same activity. The measurements do not verify the interpretation, and interpretation cannot replace measurement. Reading them together lets us ask what a purely mechanical account of skill might leave out.

Where do we learn from him, and where do we object?

Heidegger’s attention to language opens connections we might otherwise overlook. When he moves from a historical word relationship to a necessary philosophical conclusion, however, that step needs an argument of its own. Linguistic testimony and philosophical interpretation do different work.

His political commitments belong within this reading too. His involvement with National Socialism prevents us from assuming that philosophical depth carries sound moral judgement with it. Studying a conceptual contribution does not require setting aside its author’s politics. The atlas’s eighth hypothesis, concerning thinking and responsibility, has to take this separation seriously.

We also need restraint when comparing traditions. Kant’s Verstand and Vernunft, theoretical and practical intellect in Islamic philosophy, and dual-process theories in psychology all distinguish activities of thought.³²³ They do not make Heidegger’s distinction. A resemblance can help us compare what different tasks require without becoming independent confirmation of a single theory.

What does this let us ask about artificial intelligence?

Heidegger did not know generative artificial intelligence. Instead of crediting him with anticipating it, we bring his question to our present work. A model may produce many answers while leaving us to explain why we need one of them.

Suppose we ask a model to accelerate a course. We need to measure whether its suggestions work, and also ask what students should learn and which practice the acceleration removes. The second question helps establish what the calculation is for. This is our present comparison, rather than an artificial intelligence thesis extracted from Heidegger. It leads to the next section: how can we examine the same activity from several directions without confusing their explanations?

In depth · How far should we follow Heidegger’s Parmenides?

Parmenides’s third fragment, connecting thinking and being, admits different translations and interpretations. Heidegger emphasises their belonging together; other readings emphasise a constraint on what can be thought.²⁴ Translating a few words does not settle the philosophical issue.

We therefore distinguish a productive reading from an uncontested philological result. Heidegger’s argument has to be assessed on its own grounds. The same care applies to Nietzsche and Hölderlin: drawing a worthwhile question from a text and recovering its historical meaning are different achievements.

This is why our argument records keep Heidegger and Parmenides separate. The thinker’s claim, an objection and our assessment should remain distinguishable voices. A reader may value the connection and still identify the step that fails to persuade them. The unresolved B3/B6 lecture-order decision is not settled by this translation.

For your own judgement

In a problem you recently solved, how did finding a solution relate to understanding why the problem mattered?
When does a thinker’s political position matter to assessing their philosophy? How would you connect the two judgements?
Can you recall an encounter that made you reconsider a familiar explanation? What had that explanation failed to account for?

04Method and the wider picture

Four layers of thinking

Why this section is here

We read a news item and try to decide whether to believe it. As we follow the sentences, we recall what we already know and interpret the words being used. We may consult another source or ask a friend. By the end, we might accept the report, remain doubtful or decide that we still lack enough information to judge.

An account confined to brain processes would leave out the language of the report and the setting in which it circulates. An account confined to that social setting would leave us asking how attention and memory entered our assessment. Building this atlas has repeatedly brought us back to the need to examine one event from several directions.

We call these directions Body, Meaning, Processes and Life. A layer names a set of questions about the same activity, rather than one of four compartments into which a mind is divided. The purpose is to see what an explanation helps us understand and what it still leaves unanswered.

These layers differ from Method’s lines of inquiry. Language research, experiment and philosophy describe ways of investigating and supporting claims. Layers describe the aspect of thinking to which a claim relates. We first open that distinction, then use ten more detailed headings to examine connections the four broad names cannot show on their own.

How to read the diagram: four boxes present four questions about one thinking event. Their order is neither a timeline nor a hierarchy of beings or control. Arrows indicate relations to investigate, not established causality. The dashed arrow at the side belongs to the historical time scale.

In brief

When we use a shopping list, our body sees and moves, we understand words, attention and memory help us use them, and the list organises an everyday task. Body, Meaning, Processes and Life name these four aspects. The same piece of paper participates in all of them. The layers help us ask what it does, rather than seal objects into separate boxes.

Explanation

What do the four layers distinguish?

Body concerns the physical conditions of thinking: the brain and nervous system, senses, movement, feelings from within the body, sleep and metabolism. We can also examine an artificial system’s processors, physical memory and data-transfer hardware under this heading. Bringing them into one comparison does not make a biological body and computing hardware the same kind of thing.

Meaning concerns words, concepts and the distinctions we make through them. A report saying proved makes a different claim from one saying an association was found. Comparing thought, intellect, mind and consciousness across languages also belongs here. Meaning includes context, use and reference, rather than only a list of words.

Processes concerns how perception, attention, memory, learning, inference and decisions happen. Comparing a news item with prior knowledge or checking the reasons for its conclusion belongs here. We can also examine a model’s computational organisation, input processing and output generation. A shared task name does not establish a shared mechanism in humans and machines.

Life concerns what the activity contributes to a person’s or community’s life. Why does the report matter? Who might be affected if we share it? Who decides, and who bears the consequences? Education, science, work, worship and everyday relationships provide settings for these questions. A person’s hesitation, curiosity or concern also belongs in this inquiry.

Within Life, we distinguish publicly observable practices and institutions from how an experience feels to the person living it. We may observe a student’s work without gaining the same access to what understanding or confusion feels like to them. Keeping both aspects in view does not make them identical.

How should we read the diagram?

Body, Meaning, Processes and Life run from bottom to top to help us read the page. This is not a sequence in which an operation starts in the body, passes through meaning and finishes in life. Nor does the arrangement make one layer more valuable or place it in command of the others.

The arrows ask us to investigate connections. Their presence does not certify a causal relation. We need the relevant record, measurement or argument to assess a particular connection. A goal may direct attention, for example, while limits of attention affect how we can pursue that goal. We can study both directions within the same event.

Choosing a period in the wider picture changes the concepts and accounts displayed across the four layers. Ancient, Classical Islamic and Latin, Modern, Contemporary and Today are broad reading intervals, not a universal ladder through which every tradition advances. Different approaches can coexist within any interval.

Tomorrow separates trends observed in current research and practice from positions we propose in response. Work on a brain–machine interface is a research development; deciding which cognitive work to delegate requires a further argument. Neither should be turned into a single prediction about the future.

Purple marks elements associated with artificial intelligence. It does not show that an entire layer has changed or that the marked element belongs exclusively to these systems. We use the marks to show where existing questions reopen, rather than inventing an additional layer.

The wider picture

4 · LifePractices, institutions, tools and experience

Social and distributedPhenomenal experienceExternal tools in practiceNew arrangements of agency

Concepts

Culture History External tool Agency Wisdom Self Free will Institution Action Joint attention Critical thinkingLived experienceTeachingNew arrangements of agency

Today

Generative systems draft, summarise and write code. Depending on arrangements, people ask, select and check. Findings about productivity, learning and critical thinking vary with conditions.

Pioneers of this period

Floridi2019 · Distributed agency

Malone; Sharotmultiple works/periods · Superminds and interaction

Wang and colleagues2026 · Field experiment

Zhao and colleagues2026 · Randomised experiment

Jain and colleagues2026 · Comparative experiment

Zhu and colleagues2026 · Observational survey

Bender and colleagues2021 · Form and meaning

open ▾

3 · ProcessesProcesses, cycles and applying standards

Cognitive operationsApplying standardsExternal tools in useMachine cycle

Concepts

Perception Attention Memory Imagination Emotion Will Inference Conception and assent Metacognition Bias Verification Predictive processing DecisionHuman cycleLarge language modelMachine cycle

Today

Human processes beside language-model generation. Performance remains distinct from understanding and consciousness; delegation of monitoring is a question for investigation.

Pioneers of this period

Fedorenko2024 · Language network

Vaswani and colleagues2017 · Transformer

Malone; Sharotmultiple works/periods · Superminds and interaction

Wang and colleagues2026 · Field experiment

Zhao and colleagues2026 · Randomised experiment

Jain and colleagues2026 · Comparative experiment

Zhu and colleagues2026 · Observational survey

open ▾

2 · MeaningWords, histories, concepts and counterparts

Symbolic and semanticMetaphysical and theological vocabularyNew shared vocabulary

Concepts

Thought Reason (akıl)Intelligence Mind Consciousness Language Meaning Knowledge Nous Logos Intellectus Qalb (heart in apprehension)Tafakkur Lev Nefesh ContextPrompt

Today

Cognitive vocabulary is prominent and older distinctions may narrow in translation. Shared human–machine terms include prompt, context, weight and hallucination.

Pioneers of this period

Bender and colleagues2021 · Form and meaning

open ▾

1 · BodyBodies and physical substrates

Neural and bodily conditionsPhysical implementation

Concepts

Nervous system Brain Neuron Synapse Neural plasticity Embodied cognition Interoception Movement MetabolismSensesHormones and sleepSilicon substrate

Today

Brain networks and synaptic plasticity; language networks dissociate from some thinking tasks; consciousness theories face adversarial tests. Silicon provides another physical substrate.

Pioneers of this period

Fedorenko2024 · Language network

Vaswani and colleagues2017 · Transformer

COGITATE Consortium2025 · Adversarial testing

open ▾

Diagram key: dashed chips are proposed concept nodes (listed in Appendix D of the Turkish atlas); purple marks artificial intelligence; a double band marks phenomenal experience, meaning what an experience is like from within. A dashed person card marks a secondary layer. At first each layer shows its first six concepts; the remaining concepts, bands and pioneers appear when a band is opened. Standards, history and governance remain cross-cutting headings in the ten-heading table. Arrows retain the limited meaning stated above.

Static counterpart · Four layers across six periods

Layer	Ancient	Classical Islamic and Latin	Modern	Contemporary	Today	Tomorrow
4 · Life	Memorisation, conversation, teaching circles and prayer; thinking carried through bodies and communities. Writing provides external records; Plato questions its effects.	Madrasas, monasteries, libraries and codices; commentaries organise shared work on texts. Al-Ghazālī writes about doubt; Augustine about inner life.	Printing, essays, salons and journals; experiment and measurement gain authority. Calculators and telegraphs accelerate work; division of labour distributes it.	Computers, networks and search; knowledge work and the attention economy. Engelbart develops augmentation, Licklider symbiosis; Weizenbaum and Dreyfus question limits.	Generative systems draft, summarise and write code. Depending on arrangements, people ask, select and check. Findings about productivity, learning and critical thinking vary with conditions.	Trend: delegation continues, with verification and provenance discussed as teachable skills. Position: make delegation a choice, retaining responsibility for questions, evaluation and decisions.
3 · Processes	Syllogism and rhetoric; Aristotle’s distinctions among perception, imagination and memory; Stoic assent; the art of memory.	Ibn Sīnā’s internal senses; al-Fārābī’s intellect distinctions; al-Ghazālī’s inquiry into certainty; al-Bīrūnī’s observation and comparison; Augustine’s memory.	Method, induction and association; Kant’s faculties; Boole’s logic; experimental psychology, forgetting and the stream of consciousness; formal logic and Turing’s machine.	Cognitive research on capacity, attention, working memory, heuristics, biases, metacognition, cognitive load, connectionism and predictive processing.	Human processes beside language-model generation. Performance remains distinct from understanding and consciousness; delegation of monitoring is a question for investigation.	Trend: drafting, summarising and checking are being divided between people and tools in different ways. Position: retain active monitoring and teach verification as a habit.
2 · Meaning	Logos, nous, dianoia and psychē; correctness of names; Aristotle on words, thought and things; Pāṇini’s grammar.	ʿAql, qalb, tafakkur, tadabbur, naẓar and baṣīra; Arabic dictionaries, Kāshgharī’s Turkish witnesses, Yunus’s Turkish; intellectus and ratio; philosophical terminology.	Cogito and clear ideas; ideas and words; Kant’s categories; comparative linguistics; Frege’s sense and reference; Saussure’s signifier and signified.	Meaning and use; universal grammar; indeterminacy of translation; prototypes and conceptual metaphor; language of thought; Qur’anic semantics; Clauson’s dictionary.	Cognitive vocabulary is prominent and older distinctions may narrow in translation. Shared human–machine terms include prompt, context, weight and hallucination.	Trend: shared vocabulary is expanding; whether it accelerates semantic change has not been measured here. Position: explicitly record which older distinctions translation should preserve.
1 · Body	Heart or brain as the organ of thought: Alcmaeon and the Hippocratic tradition emphasise the brain; Aristotle the heart; Galen examines nerves and ventricles.	Ibn Sīnā locates internal senses in ventricles; Ibn al-Haytham examines mental contributions to vision; al-Rāzī develops clinical observation; Ibn al-Nafīs revises circulation.	Anatomy, animal electricity, language-related lesions, neuron doctrine, synapses, conditioning, brain waves and Hebbian cell assemblies.	Action potentials, visual cortex, split-brain research, molecular memory, emotion circuits, readiness potentials, neural correlates, global workspace and free energy accounts.	Brain networks and synaptic plasticity; language networks dissociate from some thinking tasks; consciousness theories face adversarial tests. Silicon provides another physical substrate.	Trend: direct brain–machine interfaces are researched, with effects on thinking still open. Position: performance alone does not establish consciousness; changing substrate leaves further questions.

Where does artificial intelligence enter the four layers?

A model-generated news summary can be examined in the same way. Its processor and physical memory belong to Body; its words, concepts and context to Meaning; its input processing and generation to Processes. Why we requested the summary, how we use it and what sharing it may do are questions for Life.

Model weights are learned numerical parameters. They are stored in physical memory, but their computational role differs from the hardware storing them. An attention mechanism belongs to computational organisation, rather than being a physical organ like a processor or cable.²⁵ A prompt both conveys meaning and supplies an input. We should specify the aspect being examined rather than force each item into one layer.

Impressive output does not by itself establish that a model has conscious experience. The user’s experience of a conversation is also distinct from experience attributed to the model. The former is a person’s experience; the latter remains a scientific and philosophical claim under discussion.

Looking more closely: ten headings

Ten more detailed headings help preserve distinctions that four broad layers cannot show alone. Some sit more naturally within one layer; others cut across several. They provide a working arrangement, not a finding that thought consists of exactly ten parts.

Heading	Which question does it open?	Everyday example	Relation to the four layers	Dominant line
Embodied infrastructure	What physical conditions support the activity?	Struggling to attend to a text after poor sleep.	Body.	Science and experiment
Cognitive operations	What is done with information?	Comparing a bus departure with walking time.	Processes.	Science and experiment
Phenomenal experience	What is the experience like for the person?	Trying to describe how a sound feels to us.	A distinct experiential aspect within Life.	Philosophy and being
Symbolic and semantic	Which concepts and signs do we use?	Expressing an unseen magnitude mathematically.	Meaning, and Processes in its use.	Language and meaning
Social and distributed	How do other people participate?	Another person’s question helps us see a solution.	Life, and shared operations in Processes.	Science and experiment
Epistemic and normative	What counts as true, justified or valuable?	Checking a report’s support and the consequences of sharing it.	Standards cutting across layers.	Method and the wider picture
Metaphysical and theological	What do we claim about soul, freedom, death and truth?	Considering personal existence in the face of death.	Vocabulary in Meaning; interpretation and practice in Life. Placement does not decide truth.	Philosophy and being
External and artificial cognition	How do tools participate in memory and reasoning?	Consulting a list, calculating or requesting a suggestion.	Hardware in Body; representation in Meaning; use in Processes and Life.	Science and experiment
History and genealogy	How have concepts and practices changed?	Encountering an older sense of a familiar word.	Comparing all four layers through time.	Method and the wider picture
Governance	How do we track contribution, reliability and responsibility?	Stating a summary’s source and who checked it before sharing.	Accountability arrangements across layers.	Method and the wider picture

Relations among these headings can be investigated, but each needs support of its own. A dominant line of inquiry names the approach contributing most directly to a heading; it is not a score for the strength of evidence.

Phenomenal experience means what an experience is like to the person having it. Epistemic concerns knowledge, reasons and evidence; normative concerns standards for what we should accept or do. These terms earn their place by making distinctions clearer, rather than serving as impressive labels.

One decision, several questions

Consider a hypothetical doctor assessing a diagnosis suggested by an artificial system. Their bodily condition may affect attention. Memory and medical concepts help them compare the suggestion with the patient’s history. A patient, relative or colleague may contribute information. Assessing the evidence and considering what the decision means for the patient belong to the same encounter.

These are not ten successive steps, and every heading need not carry the same weight in every decision. Views about death or soul may matter in one case without becoming explicit in another. Responsibility may also extend beyond the person reading the screen to the institution, developers and arrangements governing use.

A study of misleading artificial explanations and medical students’ diagnostic judgements is one relevant record.¹⁶ It does not test our ten-heading arrangement or prove that weakening one layer collapses the whole structure. Its task and participant group must remain distinct from our interpretative framework.

People, institutions and tools around us

The person-and-environment diagram opens the relations gathered under Life: physical surroundings, language and culture, other people, institutions, records and tools, and artificial systems. Evaluating news may draw on memory, a newspaper’s reputation and another person’s judgement. Knowing where a claim came from can matter as much as knowing what it says.

Influence does not run only inwards. People change languages, institutions and tools too. A double arrow makes that question available without asserting that every relation is equally strong or always reciprocal. Its actual direction and conditions need to be explained through examples and sources.

How to read these connections: two-way arrows indicate possible reciprocal relations, not equal force or continuous influence in both directions.

The human thinking cycle brings together perception, attention, working memory, long-term memory, valuation, inference, decision, action and feedback. Crossing a street may involve noticing traffic, recalling experience, judging distance and adapting movement. Some of this happens together; we do not necessarily perform every operation consciously or one after another.

Working memory means temporarily holding information available and working with it.²⁶ Metacognition concerns evaluating and regulating our own thinking. Placing it at the centre does not introduce a separate manager continuously inspecting every stage. We notice some errors and miss others, while many operations proceed without explicit self-assessment.

The circle shows how information following an action can enter the next assessment. Predictive processing offers an account of comparing expectations with incoming information.⁶ It is not treated here as the accepted mechanism of all thought. Our nine-stage drawing is an explanatory model, not an invariant sequence. The proposed experiment asking whether it adds explanatory value remains a proposal, not a completed study.

Ready. You can step through it.

Human thinking cycle. Explanatory order; processes may overlap. Feedback informs the next assessment.

Static counterpart · Human thinking cycle

Perception: outside and within the body
Attention: what stands out
Working memory: information currently in use
Long-term memory: prior experience and knowledge
Valuation: emotion and significance
Inference: expectations and conclusions
Decision: choosing
Action: affecting the world
Feedback: information entering perception again

Metacognition: evaluating and regulating our thinking, without assuming uninterrupted monitoring at every stage.

Physical structures and levels of explanation

A neuron is a physical structure; a theory of how its activity contributes to learning is an explanation. Keeping these kinds of description apart avoids picturing neural and symbolic processes as two machines with separate sets of gears.

Hebb’s proposal concerns how changes in connections among active cells might contribute to learning.²⁷ It is not itself another physical component. Word histories, concepts and inference rules describe an activity from other directions. Their use has physical conditions, yet describing the neural activity carrying a sentence does not, by itself, explain its meaning.

Artificial systems likewise call for distinctions among hardware, mathematical and computational organisation, representations, and purposes of use. Changing parameters, changing a prompt and changing verification steps are different interventions. Which helps depends on the problem. Distinguishing fatigue from conceptual confusion is useful, though an error need not have only one cause.

Organising the work of knowing

We call the skill of framing a question, selecting tools and sources, comparing results and arranging checks epistemic orchestration. Obtaining a model’s output is one part of it. Assessing the tool’s contribution and explaining which decisions remain ours belong to the same work.

Level of explanation	Examples	Distinction to retain
Physical substrate	Neurons, synapses and bodies; processors, physical memory and data transfer.	A structure differs from an explanation of how it works.
Processes and computation	Network dynamics, error signals and predictive models; weight matrices, attention mechanisms, inference rules and heuristics.	Theories, algorithms and parameters are implemented or stored physically, but are not hardware parts.
Meaning and representation	Word histories, concepts, prompt content, references; tradition-specific terms such as emanation and degrees of intellect.	Representational form, what it represents and its context require distinct questions.
Use and evaluation	Managing context, choosing sources, arranging checks and using results.	Technical limits do not replace questions about choice and responsibility.

What supports the connections between layers?

The connections view asks which source and reason support a line. A theory proposes a relation; an observation may show variables changing together; an experiment investigates an intervention under specified conditions. Philosophical argument offers another form of justification. A drawn line does not turn any of these into established causality.

Research comparing adults with different literacy histories investigates relations between reading experience and visual and language networks.²⁸ Toolmaking research compares task-related networks.²² Neither comparison alone directly establishes long-term changes caused by training. A review of language networks likewise discusses dissociation from some thinking tasks, not the absence of every relation between language and thought.¹

Plato’s concern about writing and experiments on computer-stored information can open related questions.²⁹³⁰ An experiment does not thereby verify Plato’s philosophy. Nor does an unsuccessful replication refute every experiment in the original paper: we need to identify the task and outcome actually retested.

Lee and colleagues investigate an association between trust in artificial intelligence and reported critical effort.⁹ This is not an experiment showing that using a tool reduces everyone’s capacity to think. Joint testing of consciousness theories also addresses specified predictions; it does not resolve every consciousness question or establish an unconditional winner.⁷

Source-type and replication badges help us read those distinctions, but cannot finish the assessment. We still need to ask whether the source supports this particular relation. A result, our interpretation and an untested proposal should remain distinguishable. The 23 connections here and the concept tree’s cross-relations have been translated, not all independently reverified.

Period:

Select a connection from the list on the left.

Solid line: changes. The source reports or proposes that one affects the other.

Dashed: uses. One draws on the other as a tool or material.

Dotted: proposes an explanation. A theory offered to account for the other.

Thin dash-dot: associated with. The two are seen together; the record does not show which affects the other.

Double line: constrains. One objects to the other or marks its limits.

The first badge identifies experimental, observational, review, theoretical or philosophical support. Observational association does not establish causation; a review synthesises other work; a proposal may remain untested; philosophical argument supports claims through reasons rather than a measurement. The replication badge records what is known about retesting. Neither badge authorises the diagram to claim more than the source supports.

Static counterpart · 23 connections

From	To	Type of connection	Who, when	What the study did, what we infer	Basis and confidence
Synapse	Memory	proposes an explanation	Hebb, 1949	Hebb’s 1949 book proposed that repeated joint activity could strengthen connections between nerve cells. This was a theoretical proposal, not an experiment reported here. Connection: A proposed explanation of learning through changes in synaptic connections.	theoretical proposal 27 Theoretical proposal. Later experimental support belongs to separate sources not recorded here.
Language network	Language	constrains	Fedorenko, 2024	Fedorenko and colleagues reviewed imaging research showing that the language network is often relatively inactive during some nonlinguistic thinking tasks. Connection: A limit on the tasks attributed to the language network, not a denial of every relation between language and thought.	review 1 Review, not a new experiment; it does not rule out language shaping thought.
Literacy	Visual cortex	associated with	Dehaene, 2010	Brain responses to visual and linguistic tasks were compared across literate, illiterate and formerly illiterate adults. Connection: Reading experience is associated with differences in these responses; the comparison alone does not establish the effect of an educational intervention.	observational 28 Comparative functional imaging, not a before-and-after intervention; replications are not separately recorded here. Scope: Brazil and Portugal; 63 adults.
Toolmaking	Brain networks	associated with	Stout, 2008	Experienced stone toolmakers were scanned while using two techniques; task-related networks were compared. Connection: The findings concern demands of toolmaking tasks.	experimental 22 Small task-comparison imaging study with three participants; not direct proof of long-term brain change or evolutionary causality. Scope: Three expert toolmakers.
Concept	Inference	uses	Aristotle, 350 before the common era	Aristotle developed syllogistic inference through relations among terms and propositions. Connection: Concepts or terms participate in inference in this logical account.	philosophical argument 31 A foundational philosophical and logical account, not an experimental law of all cognition.
Concept	Inference	uses	Rosch, 1975	Participants rated category examples and performed timed tasks; some examples were treated as more typical than others. Connection: Typicality helps explain concept use in specified tasks, not every form of inference.	experimental 32 Experimental literature; the inherited record reports repeated support but does not list replications separately.
Concept	Inference	uses	Kahneman and Tversky, 1974	Descriptions resembling occupational stereotypes affected probability judgements. Connection: Conceptual resemblance can bias probability judgements through the representativeness heuristic.	experimental 33 Experimental findings in laboratory tasks; the scope is not every judgement.
Practice and use	Meaning	constrains	Wittgenstein, 1953	Philosophical Investigations examines meaning through what people do with words. Connection: Use constrains accounts of meaning and can change it as practices change.	philosophical argument 2 Philosophical argument, not a measured causal effect. The qualification of the original passage should be retained.
Writing and books	Memory	uses	Plato, 370 before the common era	In Phaedrus, Plato distinguishes reminding from remembering and questions the appearance of wisdom without learning. Connection: Writing makes information available outside individual memory.	philosophical argument 29 A philosophical warning, not an experiment; a later study asking a related question does not verify Plato’s whole position.
Writing and books	Memory	uses	Sparrow, 2011	Participants entered facts into computers; expecting later access affected memory for content and storage location in the reported tasks. Connection: Expected access can shift what is remembered towards where information is stored.	experimental · The first experiment was not reproduced in 2018; the third and fourth were not tested by that result. 30 34 Experiments with students. The 2018 replication did not reproduce the first experiment; the third and fourth experiments relied on here were not thereby either verified or refuted. Scope: University students; laboratory tasks.
Teaching and institutions	Attention	changes	Sweller, 1988	Students solved mathematics and physics problems under different goal conditions; conventional goal-directed search could impose greater demands and impair learning in the studied tasks. Connection: Instructional design can affect demands on attention and working memory.	experimental 35 Experiments with narrow tasks; later cognitive load research has not been checked study by study here.
Teaching and institutions	Attention	changes	Tomasello, 1999	Tomasello’s synthesis links children’s shared attention with cultural learning and contrasts human and nonhuman development. Connection: Joint attention provides a framework for discussing teaching and institutions; the institutional connection is an interpretation.	review 36 Book-length synthesis and theory, including the author’s experiments; classified here as a review.
Emotion circuits	Decision	changes	Damasio, 1994	Damasio describes patients with frontal damage whose decision difficulties were not captured by conventional reasoning tests alone. Connection: Emotion and bodily signalling may contribute to decision-making; the cases do not establish that every rational decision requires every emotion.	observational 37 Clinical observation and the somatic marker hypothesis; later gambling-task experiments are separate. This English wording narrows the inherited categorical claim.
Working memory	Teaching and institutions	changes	Baddeley and Hitch; Bjork, 1974 and 1994	Baddeley and Hitch investigated limited, multicomponent working memory; Bjork discussed difficulties that may improve later retention despite making practice harder. Connection: These accounts inform instructional questions; transfer to teaching is an interpretation and not every difficulty is beneficial.	experimental 26 38 Distinct experimental programmes; application to teaching requires further argument.
Conception (taṣawwur)	Assent (taṣdīq)	uses	Ibn Sīnā, 1027	Ibn Sīnā distinguishes apprehending something, taṣawwur, from assenting to a judgement, taṣdīq. Connection: In this account, judgement requires an apprehension.	philosophical argument 39 A distinction in the logical tradition, not an experimental law of every cognitive process.
Heart vocabulary	Reflective practice	proposes an explanation	al-Tirmidhī, ninth century	Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī describes sadr, qalb, fuʾād and lubb through different degrees of knowing. Connection: Heart vocabulary provides a framework for interpreting reflective and spiritual practice.	philosophical argument 40 A Sufi interpretative account; the relation proposes an explanation rather than establishing a physiological mechanism.
Machine cycle	Critical thinking	associated with	Lee and colleagues, 2025	A survey asked 319 knowledge workers about their use of artificial intelligence and reported critical effort. Connection: Greater trust was associated with less reported critical effort; causal direction is not established.	observational 9 Observational self-report survey, not a causal experiment. Scope: 319 knowledge workers; 936 examples of use.
Silicon substrate	Machine cycle	associated with	Vaswani and colleagues, 2017	Vaswani and colleagues proposed an attention-based transformer and evaluated translation performance. Connection: A computational architecture implemented on silicon, not the discovery of hardware or evidence of consciousness.	experimental 25 Technical benchmark evaluation; no finding of consciousness or understanding.
Prompt and context	Machine cycle	constrains	Bender and colleagues, 2021	Bender and colleagues’ position paper criticises approaches learning linguistic form without the relevant relations to meaning. Connection: The role of prompts and context in generation is an interpretation here, not an experimental effect measured by this paper.	philosophical argument 41 Conceptual critique and position paper, not an experiment measuring prompt effects.
Neural correlate	Experience	constrains	Nagel, 1974	Nagel asks what it is like to be a bat and considers limits of objective description. Connection: Finding a neural correlate does not automatically settle the question of subjective perspective.	philosophical argument 11 A philosophical argument; not an experiment proving what no future science can explain.
Neural correlate	Experience	proposes an explanation	COGITATE Consortium, 2025	The COGITATE collaboration preregistered predictions of two theories and tested them in 256 participants using three methods. Connection: Selected predictions were challenged; the study does not settle every theory or the question of phenomenal experience.	experimental 7 Preregistered experimental testing of theories, not a complete solution to experience. Scope: 256 participants.
Brain networks	Conscious access	proposes an explanation	Dehaene, 2017	Dehaene, Lau and Kouider synthesise research through accounts of global availability and self-monitoring. Connection: A theoretical account connecting conscious access with broad information sharing and monitoring; not a completed explanation of phenomenal experience.	review 42 Review, not a new experiment; the framework is contested and was not wholly confirmed by the 2025 test.
Soul and mind	Experience	constrains	Descartes, 1641	Descartes’s Meditations develops an account of the thinking thing and its distinction from body. Connection: The first-person standpoint and substance dualism are distinguishable claims; using one does not require accepting the other.	philosophical argument 43 Philosophical argument. The first-person question can remain even when substance dualism is rejected.

In depth · Are there really four layers?

We are not claiming to have discovered four separate things. We have arranged questions about the same thinking event. Researchable relations among bodily conditions, conceptual distinctions and social use do not establish that four is the necessary number of layers.

A reader might give emotion its own heading or distinguish institutions more sharply from lived experience. We can judge such a revision by what it explains better and what it hides. Our reason for retaining four layers is practical: they help keep this material readable without merging questions that need different answers.

The relations among layers remain open to debate. Paul M. Churchland’s eliminative materialism suggests that scientific development may revise or abandon some everyday mental explanations.¹⁹ It does not follow that language, institutions or every higher-level account will disappear. Strong emergence, by contrast, holds that some properties cannot be reduced to lower-level accounts. Choosing a diagram cannot settle these positions.

For now, we keep track of which explanation carries which question. This arrangement alone neither reduces one layer to another nor establishes an impassable division between them.

What the diagram does not answer

Kant’s question about the conditions making experience possible differs from our act of classification.³ Naming senses, concepts and operations does not yet explain how experience is possible. Adding a fifth layer would not solve that transcendental question.

Placing soul, heart, nefesh or logos under Meaning, or reflection, remembrance and worship under Life, does not decide the truth of religious or metaphysical claims. The passages, translations and interpretations need to be read separately, with their own sources.

Likewise, giving phenomenal experience a place under Life does not explain it. Neural correlates and personal reports can be investigated while leaving questions about experience from within. A location on our map names work still to do. In the concept tree, we turn to the vocabulary through which we can make those questions more precise.

For your own judgement

Consider a recent decision through the four layers. Which details become clearer, and which important detail remains outside the arrangement?
How does an account of memory, a word or a tool help explain that decision? Where does it become insufficient on its own?
What would you need to know before accepting a line in the diagram as a causal relation?

05Language and meaning

The concept tree: a horizontal map of thinking

Why this section is here

One text speaks of intellect, another of mind, a third of intelligence. Sometimes different words approach the same question; sometimes the same word carries different claims. As we compare texts, asking what a word means is only a beginning. We also need to see which distinction it enables in that particular passage.

A list would make the words easy to find but leave many of those relations hidden. We have therefore arranged the atlas’s concepts in a tree, with thinking at the centre and eight main branches around it. A branch offers a place to begin reading, along with routes towards related concepts and disagreements.

The previous section examined one thinking event through Body, Meaning, Processes and Life. Here we compare the concepts used to ask those questions. A branch and a layer convey different information. Metacognition appears under Thinking with artificial systems, for example, without belonging exclusively to artificial intelligence use.

We explain how the tree is arranged, what a record contains and what the lines mean. The aim is to make it possible to find a definition and then ask which connections support it, where it is useful and where it remains contestable.

How to read the tree: a solid line marks placement under a heading, not necessarily a species–genus relation or a cause. Branch colour indicates the dominant line of inquiry, not truth or evidential strength. A stronger outline marks selection. Branch and layer remain separate information.

In brief

Search for metacognition or follow its branch, then read the definition alongside its example, language forms, history and layers. Its position is a starting point rather than an exclusive home. Other connections are part of the record too.

Explanation

What do the eight branches gather?

Each branch gathers a group of questions used in this work: core concepts; processes of thinking; language, knowledge and inference; body and shared world; inner apprehension and soul vocabulary; languages of intellect theories; sacred texts and questions of being; and thinking with artificial systems.

These need not be separate domains. One question can be opened through several branches. We choose a starting place for each record, then show its further relations, rather than multiplying copies that could drift apart as they are edited.

One record, different uses

Each concept has one identifier. Selecting it on the map or opening it in the text tree should therefore lead to the same record. A corrected example must not remain outdated in another view merely because it looks like a separate card.

One record does not compress every sense of a word into one definition. Heart can name a physical organ or participate in an account of apprehension and spiritual life. Our Qalb record sits within al-Tirmidhī’s rings under inner apprehension. It does not answer every anatomical question about the heart.

Memory can be approached through processes and then connected with remembrance. Verification appears under artificial systems, although the need to verify did not begin with them. The branch tells us where we first encounter a concept; relations let us continue towards other questions.

What is in a concept record?

The definition states how we use the concept in this work; the example makes that use concrete. Neither should be read as a meaning accepted without dispute in every tradition. Broader or narrower uses need to remain visible in the explanation.

Language fields show Turkish, Ancient Greek, Latin, English, German, French and Arabic forms. Seven fields do not imply seven exact equivalents. A modern technical term may have no ancient counterpart with the same use. Approximate equivalence, historical translation and misleading similarity are different matters. We do not fill an empty cell by inventing a plausible-looking word.

Word history also differs from the history of a concept or technical term. A modern term built from old components is not thereby an ancient technical concept. Metacognition’s formation and the history of monitoring one’s own thought are related but distinct questions.

Layer labels indicate the aspect emphasised here without forbidding other inquiries. A memory study’s physical conditions can be examined through Body, its operations through Processes and a person’s remembering through Life. Restricting the concept to one label would undo the distinction we have just developed.

What do lines and colours mean?

A solid tree line records which heading contains an entry in this arrangement. Contains means organised under. It need not describe a natural division or a relation between a kind and its species.

Cross-relations go beyond the tree. Translation equivalent, shared origin, similar image, misleading equivalent, objection and proposed explanation name different relations. A connection does not make two concepts interchangeable or establish that one causes the other. Its type, reason and source need to be read together.

Comparing qalb with Hebrew lev or Greek kardia requires asking whether a line represents similar use in a passage or a translation choice. Similar use is not a common linguistic origin. Translation alone does not show that two traditions hold the same account of human beings.

Branch colour identifies an emphasis among the lines of inquiry; the outline identifies selection. Layer labels answer another question. None is a scale from true to false or strong to weak. A relation may have a direction without every line carrying the same meaning of an arrow.

Using map, record and text tree together

The map helps locate a branch within the whole; branch and layer filters narrow the view. Selecting a name opens its record. The expandable text tree offers another route through the same data, which is useful when we want to read carefully rather than inspect the overall arrangement.

Filtering hides entries without deleting them or declaring them irrelevant to everything outside the selected layer. If a concept seems missing, searching its name or clearing the filter may reveal the existing record before we create a duplicate.

The map, detailed record and text tree serve different reading tasks, but must agree on their contents. A polished display can still mislead if one view carries an older definition. The map, the records and the text tree below are generated from the same English records.

Show cross-relations

Layer:

Map key: Thinking connects to eight branch headings; choose a branch or a concept to follow its place in the classification. Solid lines show placement, not causality. Cross-relations are listed with their distinct types and reasons rather than drawn all at once. Layer filters use the same records. Colour identifies a reading emphasis, not the strength of a claim.

Language and meaningScience and experimentPhilosophy and beingMethod and the wider picture

Drag with a finger and pinch with two fingers to zoom. The + on a branch opens its child concepts; selecting a concept’s name opens its record. For a wider view, use the full-screen button above.

Expandable concept tree

The text tree and map use the same 227 records. Each record includes its definition, example, period where supplied, word or term history, seven language forms, related concepts and cross-relations. Missing or misleading equivalents remain part of the information. Nine supplementary concepts follow the main tree. This English edition does not imply that their sources have all been rechecked.

Search the tree

8 child records

Thinking

Definition. A changing pattern relating perception, memory, concepts, values and purposes in engagement with the world; the central working concept here.

Example. At a fork in the road, we remember, anticipate, weigh options and choose.

Period. Old Turkic

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Turkish düşün- with the action-noun suffix -mA. Kubbealtı proposes Old Turkic tüşe- “dream, imagine” > tüşen- > tüşün-, marking the derivation as uncertain; see Thinking (activity). 45 44

Seven language fields

Turkish	düşünme
Ancient Greek	νόησις (noēsis), διάνοια (dianoia)
Latin	cogitatio
English	thinking
German	Denken
French	pensée
Arabic	تفكير (tafkīr)

≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.

Child concepts. Core concepts of thinking, Processes of thinking, Language, knowledge and inference, Body and shared world, Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary, Languages of intellect theories, Sacred texts and questions of being, Thinking with artificial systems

Near concepts. Thought, Understanding (faculty), Mind

Record class: working definition. Sources: 8 1

6 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking

Definition. The principal terms through which we distinguish thought, reason, intelligence, mind, consciousness and self.

Example. A teacher asks how being reasonable differs from being intelligent.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational heading, not a historical technical term.

Seven language fields

Turkish	çekirdek kavramlar
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work; ancient equivalents were not sought.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work; ancient equivalents were not sought.
English	core concepts
German	Grundbegriffe
French	concepts fondamentaux
Arabic	—— An organising heading used in this work; ancient equivalents were not sought.

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work; ancient equivalents were not sought.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Thought, Reason (akıl), Intelligence, Mind, Consciousness, Self

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

3 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Thought

Definition. The content or product of thinking; an event relating perception, memory, concepts and purposes.

Example. “I forgot my key” is a thought; noticing it and returning to the door involves thinking.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives düşünce from düşün- + -ce. German Gedanke and denken belong to the same Germanic family; Heidegger reads this family through remembrance and gratitude. 45 48

Seven language fields

Turkish	düşünce, fikir
Ancient Greek	≈διάνοια (dianoia), ἔννοια (ennoia), νόημα (noēma) dianoia, ennoia and noēma are three distinct words; none coincides exactly with Turkish düşünce.
Latin	cogitatio
English	thought
German	Gedanke
French	pensée
Arabic	فِكْر، فِكْرَة (fikr, fikra)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Core concepts of thinking

Child concepts. Thinking (activity), Idea (fikir), Content

Near concepts. Thinking (activity), Idea (fikir), Content

Equivalence caution. Equating thought with conscious inner speech excludes visual and motor thinking.

Cross-relations

partly dissociates: Language. Research investigates dissociations between language networks and some thinking tasks. It does not establish that language contributes nothing to thought or that all tasks dissociate alike. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 1
may affect: Literacy. Ong and Havelock argue that literacy changes habits of thought; the scope is disputed. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 46 47

Record class: working definition. Sources: 1 8

↑ parent: Core concepts of thinking

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Thought › Thinking (activity)

Definition. Forming, testing and changing relations, and connecting them to action.

Example. Assessing whether we can repay a debt brings figures, past months and concern together.

Period. Old Turkic

Word and term history Proposed derivation; marked uncertain

The card cites Kubbealtı’s uncertain derivation from Old Turkic tüşe-, and Clauson’s tüş, tüşe- and tüşün-. Neither full entry was rechecked in the inherited review; the explanation is not a settled etymology. French penser is associated with Latin pensare, with senses of weighing and evaluating. 44 45

Seven language fields

Turkish	düşünmek, tefekkür etmek
Ancient Greek	νοεῖν (noein), διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)
Latin	cogitare
English	think
German	denken
French	penser
Arabic	فَكَّرَ، تَفَكَّرَ، عَقَلَ (fakkara, tafakkara, ʿaqala)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thought

Near concepts. Thought, Tafakkur, Thought thinking itself

Equivalence caution. An unsupported alternative derivation is not a verified rival. Similar images across languages do not establish common descent.

Cross-relations

similar image: Vision. Images of seeing, such as naẓar and baṣīra, are used to name thinking. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 44 45 21

↑ parent: Thought

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Thought › Idea (fikir)
Definition. A thought or view about a particular subject.
Example. “I have an idea” introduces a proposal that may not yet have been tested.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Arabic fikr, from f-k-r, “thinking, thought”. Kubbealtı notes that the older thinking sense survives especially in compounds such as fikretmek. Tefekkür shares the root. 14 45
Seven language fields
Turkish fikir
Ancient Greek ἔννοια (ennoia)
Latin notio
English idea, notion
German Einfall, Idee
French idée
Arabic فِكْرَة (fikra)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Thought
Near concepts. Tafakkur
Equivalence caution. Do not equate a personal idea with Plato’s independently existing Form.
Cross-relations
- shared root: Tafakkur. The terms share the root f-k-r. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14
↑ parent: Thought

Turkish	fikir
Ancient Greek	ἔννοια (ennoia)
Latin	notio
English	idea, notion
German	Einfall, Idee
French	idée
Arabic	فِكْرَة (fikra)

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Thought › Content

Definition. What a thought represents or is about.

Example. A thought that rain is coming concerns the weather.

Period. twentieth-century language reform

Word and term history Modern term history

Kubbealtı derives içerik from içer- + -(I)k during Turkish language reform. English content derives from Latin contentum, “contained”. 45 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	içerik
Ancient Greek	—— No single Ancient Greek term for mental content; noēma is related but acquired a technical sense after Husserl.
Latin	contentum (geç dönem)
English	content
German	Inhalt
French	contenu
Arabic	مُحْتَوًى (muḥtawā, modern)

Note on empty counterparts: No single Ancient Greek term for mental content; noēma is related but acquired a technical sense after Husserl.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thought

Near concepts. Representation, Intentionality

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thought

4 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Reason (akıl)

Definition. A family of capacities for giving reasons, relating things, seeking consistency and regulating behaviour.

Example. Rereading an angry message before sending it exercises regulation.

Period. Qur’anic period (seventh century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic ʿ-q-l includes binding and restraint; ʿiqāl names a camel hobble. Classical explanations connect reason with restraint from inappropriate action. In the Qur’an this root occurs in verbal forms. 14 54 55

Seven language fields

Turkish	akıl, us
Ancient Greek	≈νοῦς (nous), λόγος (logos) nous and logos are two separate concepts; akıl lies between them.
Latin	ratio, intellectus
English	≈reason, intellect reason and intellect: Turkish akıl covers both, English separates them.
German	Vernunft, Verstand
French	raison, entendement
Arabic	عَقْل (ʿaql)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Core concepts of thinking

Child concepts. Understanding (faculty), Reason (principle), Self-control, Us (Turkish reason)

Near concepts. Nous, Intellectus, Reason in Kant, Self-control

Equivalence caution. Intelligence concerns learning and problem-solving capacity; reason also involves justification and self-regulation.

Cross-relations

translation equivalent: Nous. Arabic philosophical translations used ʿaql for nous. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53
misleading equivalent: Intelligence. Akıl and zekâ overlap in some uses; the distinction depends on context. We do not define one everywhere as calculation and the other everywhere as control. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
conceptual association: Self-control. The binding image in ʿaql evokes self-control; this is not experimental support. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
similar image: Nuhā. Nuhā and ḥijr also carry an image of restraint. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 54
shared root: Taʿaqqul. The terms share the root ʿ-q-l. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 55

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 54 55

↑ parent: Core concepts of thinking

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Reason (akıl) › Understanding (faculty)
Definition. The capacity to grasp, form concepts and organise objects under categories.
Example. A child groups cats, dogs and horses as animals.
Period. Kant (eighteenth century)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
The distinction follows Kant’s Verstand/Vernunft distinction, where Turkish and Arabic may use one word. French entendement derives from entendre, “hear, understand”, and translates Verstand. 50 48
Seven language fields
Turkish akıl, us
Ancient Greek νοῦς (nous)
Latin intellectus
English intellect, understanding
German Verstand
French entendement
Arabic عَقْل (ʿaql)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Reason (akıl)
Near concepts. Understanding, Nous
Equivalence caution. A Kantian reading should not be imposed on every use of the term.
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Understanding. A Turkish rendering of Verstand must be located in its Kant translation. Using akıl does not remove the distinction from Vernunft. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 49
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 3 49
↑ parent: Reason (akıl)
Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Reason (akıl) › Reason (principle)
Definition. Reason seeking principles and the highest unity of concepts; in some traditions, an ordering principle of the universe.
Example. After checking a calculation, asking why its result must follow.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Latin ratio relates to reor, “calculate, think”, and carries calculation/proportion senses. German Vernunft relates to vernehmen, “perceive, hear”. Arabic nuṭq, from speaking, was used to translate the speech/reason range of logos. 51 48 14
Seven language fields
Turkish akıl, mantık
Ancient Greek λόγος (logos), λογισμός (logismos)
Latin ratio
English reason
German Vernunft
French raison
Arabic نُطْق، مَنْطِق (nuṭq, manṭiq)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Reason (akıl)
Near concepts. Logos, Reason in Kant, Ratio
Equivalence caution. Nuṭq does not exhaust reason; Vernunft and the active intellect are not interchangeable forms of one principle.
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Reason in Kant. The rendering of Vernunft must be tracked in the chosen edition. Where both terms receive the same Turkish word, the German terms should also be shown. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 49
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 3 49 14
↑ parent: Reason (akıl)
Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Reason (akıl) › Self-control
Definition. Regulating impulses, attention and action towards a purpose.
Example. Walking past a tempting dessert without taking it.
Period. Aristotle (before the common era fourth century); twentieth century
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Greek enkrateia means power over oneself; Aristotle contrasts it with akrasia, weakness of will. Turkish öz denetim is a twentieth-century compound. 52
Seven language fields
Turkish öz denetim
Ancient Greek ἐγκράτεια (enkrateia)
Latin temperantia
English self-control
German Selbstkontrolle
French maîtrise de soi
Arabic ضَبْط النَّفْس (ḍabṭ an-nafs)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Reason (akıl)
Near concepts. Reason (akıl), Metacognition, Executive control
Opposing view. Impulsiveness
Equivalence caution. Self-control does not exhaust reason, which also includes giving reasons.
Cross-relations
- conceptual association: Reason (akıl). The binding image in ʿaql evokes self-control; this is not experimental support. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 26 14
↑ parent: Reason (akıl)

Turkish	akıl, mantık
Ancient Greek	λόγος (logos), λογισμός (logismos)
Latin	ratio
English	reason
German	Vernunft
French	raison
Arabic	نُطْق، مَنْطِق (nuṭq, manṭiq)

Turkish	öz denetim
Ancient Greek	ἐγκράτεια (enkrateia)
Latin	temperantia
English	self-control
German	Selbstkontrolle
French	maîtrise de soi
Arabic	ضَبْط النَّفْس (ḍabṭ an-nafs)

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Reason (akıl) › Us (Turkish reason)

Definition. A Turkish word for reason revived during language reform.

Example. Us dışı is used for irrational.

Period. Old Turkic; Middle Turkic; twentieth-century language reform

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı connects us with Middle Turkic/Oghuz us, discrimination. Common in Old Anatolian Turkish, it was displaced by Arabic akıl and later revived. Old Turkic evidence requires Clauson. Usçuluk, rationalism, belongs to the revival. 45 44

Seven language fields

Turkish	Tus Middle Turkic (Oghuz) “capacity for discrimination”; replaced by Arabic akıl and recalled in the language reform.
Ancient Greek	νοῦς (nous)
Latin	ratio
English	reason
German	Vernunft
French	raison
Arabic	عَقْل (ʿaql)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Reason (akıl)

Near concepts. Reason (akıl)

Equivalence caution. Us and akıl are not synonymous in every context; usluluk has other everyday meanings.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 45

↑ parent: Reason (akıl)

4 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Intelligence

Definition. The capacity to learn, discriminate, solve problems and adapt to unfamiliar situations.

Example. A child opens an unfamiliar lock after several attempts.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic ḏakāʾ concerns sharpness and mental quickness; related uses concern fire flaring up. Latin intelligentia relates to intellegere, choosing between; Greek anchinoia denotes quick apprehension. 14 51 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	zekâ
Ancient Greek	σύνεσις (synesis), ἀγχίνοια (anchinoia)
Latin	intelligentia
English	intelligence
German	Intelligenz
French	intelligence
Arabic	ذَكَاء (ḏakāʾ)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Core concepts of thinking

Child concepts. Learning, Problem solving, Adaptation, Hebbian learning

Near concepts. Learning, Problem solving

Equivalence caution. Intelligence is not identical to consciousness or wisdom.

Cross-relations

misleading equivalent: Reason (akıl). Akıl and zekâ overlap in some uses; the distinction depends on context. We do not define one everywhere as calculation and the other everywhere as control. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 51

↑ parent: Core concepts of thinking

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Intelligence › Learning
Definition. A lasting change in behaviour or an internal model through experience.
Example. After learning to ride a bicycle, balancing no longer requires deliberate attention.
Period. Old Turkic
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Kubbealtı proposes Old Turkic ögren- < *ögre-n- < ög, understanding, with uncertainty; Clauson also records ög for mind/thought. Mathematics derives through Greek mathēsis. 45 44 52
Seven language fields
Turkish öğrenme
Ancient Greek μάθησις (mathēsis)
Latin disciplina
English learning
German Lernen
French apprentissage
Arabic تَعَلُّم (taʿallum)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Intelligence
Near concepts. Neural plasticity, Desirable difficulty
Equivalence caution. Success with assistance does not demonstrate an unaided skill.
Cross-relations
- may affect: Cognitive offloading. In Bastani’s field experiment, use of an unguarded tool was associated with a disadvantage in the unaided examination. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 56
Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 56 38
↑ parent: Intelligence

Turkish	öğrenme
Ancient Greek	μάθησις (mathēsis)
Latin	disciplina
English	learning
German	Lernen
French	apprentissage
Arabic	تَعَلُّم (taʿallum)

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Intelligence › Problem solving

Definition. Finding a sequence of operations from an initial state to a goal.

Example. Planning how to dismantle and reassemble a faulty tap.

Period. twentieth century

Word and term history Modern term history

Established in twentieth-century cognitive psychology; Newell and Simon modelled problems as search spaces. Greek problēma originally concerns an obstacle put forward. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	problem çözme
Ancient Greek	—— No ancient compound term; problēma exists but is not the name of this cognitive process.
Latin	—— No ancient compound term; problēma exists but is not the name of this cognitive process.
English	problem solving
German	Problemlösen
French	résolution de problèmes
Arabic	حَلّ المُشْكِلات (ḥall al-muškilāt)

Note on empty counterparts: No ancient compound term; problēma exists but is not the name of this cognitive process.

Layer. Processes · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Intelligence

Near concepts. Inference, Planning

Equivalence caution. Problem solving does not exhaust intelligence.

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 57

↑ parent: Intelligence

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Intelligence › Adaptation

Definition. Adjusting behaviour to changed conditions.

Example. Changing a walking route when rain starts.

Period. twentieth-century language reform

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives uyum from uy- + -(U)m during language reform. Adaptation derives from Latin adaptare, fit; its biological technical use developed after Darwin. 45 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	uyum
Ancient Greek	—— No established term with this technical sense in Ancient Greek or Classical Latin.
Latin	adaptatio (geç)
English	adaptation
German	Anpassung
French	adaptation
Arabic	تَكَيُّف (takayyuf)

Note on empty counterparts: No established term with this technical sense in Ancient Greek or Classical Latin.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Intelligence

Near concepts. Learning

Equivalence caution. Distinguish evolutionary adaptation from an individual’s learning.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 21

↑ parent: Intelligence

Turkish	Hebb kuralı
Ancient Greek	—— A proper name.
Latin	—— A proper name.
English	Hebbian learning
German	Hebbsche Lernregel
French	règle de Hebb
Arabic	قاعدة هب (modern)

3 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Mind

Definition. An umbrella concept for perception, thought, emotion, memory, intention and consciousness.

Example. “My mind is scattered” can concern attention, memory and emotion together.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic ḏihn denotes understanding or mental capacity. English mind traces to Old English gemynd, memory/thought, related to Latin mens and Sanskrit manas through *men-, think. 14 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	zihin
Ancient Greek	≈νοῦς (nous), διάνοια (dianoia) nous is closer to reason, dianoia to deliberation; both are near but not overlapping counterparts for mind.
Latin	mens, animus
English	mind
German	Geist
French	esprit
Arabic	ذِهْن (ḏihn)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Core concepts of thinking

Child concepts. Representation, Operation, Intentionality

Near concepts. Representation, Consciousness, Brain

Equivalence caution. Geist is not always mind: Hegel’s use includes historical and social spirit.

Cross-relations

misleading equivalent: Consciousness. Some accounts use mind for both conscious and nonconscious functions. In those accounts it is not equivalent to consciousness; the framework must be stated. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 62

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 21 14

↑ parent: Core concepts of thinking

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Mind › Representation

Definition. An internal or external structure standing for something and carrying information about it.

Example. A blue line on a map represents a river.

Period. Kant (eighteenth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic tamṯīl derives from m-ṯ-l, likeness; Latin repraesentare means making present again. Kant’s Vorstellung is often translated into Turkish as tasarım. 14 51

Seven language fields

Turkish	temsil
Ancient Greek	—— No single Ancient Greek technical equivalent; phantasma, image, is related but narrower.
Latin	repraesentatio
English	representation
German	Vorstellung, Repräsentation
French	représentation
Arabic	تَمْثِيل (tamṯīl)

Note on empty counterparts: No single Ancient Greek technical equivalent; phantasma, image, is related but narrower.

Layer. Processes · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Mind

Near concepts. Content, Intentionality

Equivalence caution. Not every mental state is an inner picture; enactivism challenges that assumption.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 58 51

↑ parent: Mind

Turkish	işlem
Ancient Greek	—— No ancient term naming this mental operation.
Latin	operatio
English	process, computation
German	Verarbeitung
French	traitement
Arabic	عَمَلِيَّة (ʿamaliyya)

Turkish	yönelimsellik
Ancient Greek	——
Latin	intentio
English	intentionality
German	Intentionalität
French	intentionnalité
Arabic	قَصْدِيَّة (qaṣdiyya, modern)

4 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Consciousness

Definition. The dimension of experience concerning what it is like for a subject; access and phenomenal senses are distinguished.

Example. Compare waking from sleep with emerging from anaesthesia.

Period. twentieth-century language reform; eighteenth century

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives bilinç from bilin- + -ç during language reform, glossing it as şuur. Latin conscientia means knowing together; French conscience includes consciousness and conscience. German Bewusstsein became established around Christian Wolff in the eighteenth century. 45 50 48

Seven language fields

Turkish	Tbilinç, şuur bilinç was formed from the verb bilin- in the language reform; before that, Arabic şuur was used.
Ancient Greek	!συνείδησις (syneidēsis) Historical uses include awareness and conscience. It should not be treated as an exact equivalent of the modern concept of consciousness; the translation is judged by the meaning of the passage concerned.
Latin	≈conscientia conscientia, “knowing together”: both consciousness and conscience; the modern sense comes after the late seventeenth century.
English	consciousness
German	Bewusstsein
French	conscience
Arabic	وَعْي، شُعُور (waʿy, šuʿūr)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Core concepts of thinking

Child concepts. Access consciousness, Phenomenal consciousness, The hard problem, Awareness

Near concepts. Access consciousness, Phenomenal consciousness, Syneidēsis

Equivalence caution. Ancient syneidēsis is not simply modern consciousness, but its awareness uses should not be erased by translating it only as conscience.

Cross-relations

calque and semantic change: Syneidēsis. Syneidēsis and conscientia raise questions of historical transmission and semantic change. Conscience, awareness and modern consciousness require distinct textual witnesses. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52 50
misleading equivalent: Mind. Some accounts use mind for both conscious and nonconscious functions. In those accounts it is not equivalent to consciousness; the framework must be stated. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 62
misleading equivalent: Syneidēsis. The role of syneidēsis in a particular passage differs from modern uses of consciousness. One Turkish equivalent cannot carry every historical sense. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 12 62 50

↑ parent: Core concepts of thinking

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Consciousness › Access consciousness

Definition. Information being available for reasoning, report and action.

Example. Naming a colour we see and acting on it.

Period. 1995

Word and term history Modern term history

Ned Block’s 1995 distinction established the modern term; global workspace theory seeks to explain this kind of availability.

Seven language fields

Turkish	erişim bilinci
Ancient Greek	—— A modern technical term; ancient equivalents were not sought.
Latin	—— A modern technical term; ancient equivalents were not sought.
English	access consciousness
German	Zugangsbewusstsein
French	conscience d'accès
Arabic	وَعْي الوُصُول (modern çeviri)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern technical term; ancient equivalents were not sought.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Consciousness

Near concepts. Phenomenal consciousness, Global neuronal workspace

Equivalence caution. Access consciousness is not the whole question of consciousness.

Cross-relations

proposes an explanation: Global neuronal workspace. Global neuronal workspace theory offers an account of access. The joint test evaluates selected predictions, not the whole theory in one final verdict. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 7

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 63 42

↑ parent: Consciousness

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Consciousness › Phenomenal consciousness

Definition. The subjective quality of experience: what undergoing it feels like.

Example. A coffee’s temperature can be measured; how it tastes to someone is another question.

Period. twentieth century

Word and term history Modern term history

Phenomenal derives from Greek phainomenon, what appears. The compound became established in late twentieth-century philosophy of mind. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	fenomenal bilinç
Ancient Greek	—— No established Arabic equivalent was found; translations use varying terms.
Latin	—— No established Arabic equivalent was found; translations use varying terms.
English	phenomenal consciousness
German	phänomenales Bewusstsein
French	conscience phénoménale
Arabic	—— No established Arabic equivalent was found; translations use varying terms.

Note on empty counterparts: No established Arabic equivalent was found; translations use varying terms.

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Consciousness

Near concepts. The hard problem, Qualia

Equivalence caution. Do not equate it simply with emotion.

Cross-relations

proposes an explanation: Integrated information theory. Integrated information theory relates experience to intrinsic causal structure. The tested version and prediction must be specified. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 7

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 11 12

↑ parent: Consciousness

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Consciousness › The hard problem

Definition. Whether explaining brain functions also explains why those functions are accompanied by experience.

Example. A machine may distinguish red; whether seeing red feels like anything remains a different question.

Period. 1974–1995

Word and term history Modern term history

Named in Chalmers’s 1995 paper; related questions extend through Nagel’s 1974 bat paper and Leibniz’s mill analogy.

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilincin zor problemi
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term without ancient equivalents.
Latin	—— A modern term without ancient equivalents.
English	hard problem of consciousness
German	schweres Problem des Bewusstseins
French	problème difficile de la conscience
Arabic	المشكلة الصعبة للوعي (modern çeviri)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term without ancient equivalents.

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Consciousness

Near concepts. Phenomenal consciousness, Functionalism

Opposing view. Illusionism: challenging the formulation of the problem

Equivalence caution. It is not a solved theorem or experimental proof of a soul.

Cross-relations

objects to: Functionalism. Chalmers argues that functional explanation does not explain experience. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 12
objects to: Eliminative materialism. Eliminativism and illusionism are not identical. Objections to the formulation of the hard problem must be distinguished by author and work. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 19 64

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 12 11 64

↑ parent: Consciousness

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Consciousness › Awareness

Definition. Something being present to attention or consciousness.

Example. Noticing breathing now when we were not attending to it a minute ago.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

Fark derives from Arabic f-r-q, separate. Kubbealtı supplies no etymology for farkındalık; fark-ın-da-lık is an apparent formation and no independent witness for its spread was obtained. Awareness traces to Old English gewær, watchful. 45 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	farkındalık
Ancient Greek	—— No exact term in Ancient Greek or Latin.
Latin	—— No exact term in Ancient Greek or Latin.
English	awareness
German	Gewahrsein
French	prise de conscience
Arabic	إِدْرَاك، وَعْي (idrāk, waʿy)

Note on empty counterparts: No exact term in Ancient Greek or Latin.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Consciousness

Near concepts. Attention, Consciousness

Equivalence caution. Awareness is not always mindfulness as used in meditation traditions.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 21

↑ parent: Consciousness

4 child records

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Self

Definition. The “I” experienced as the owner of experiences.

Example. On waking, feeling continuous with the person who went to sleep.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı gives no derivation for benlik; ben + -lik is the apparent formation. English self traces to Germanic *selbaz. Arabic ḏāt, essence, and nafs, person/life, have distinct ranges. 45 21 14

Seven language fields

Turkish	benlik, öz
Ancient Greek	ἑαυτός (heautos)
Latin	ego, ipse
English	self
German	Selbst, Ich
French	soi, moi
Arabic	ذَات، نَفْس (ḏāt, nafs)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Core concepts of thinking

Child concepts. Subject, Identity, Self-consciousness, Non-self

Near concepts. Subject, Identity, Nafs

Equivalence caution. Nafs cannot always be translated as self; its role in moral struggle differs.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 65 21

↑ parent: Core concepts of thinking

Turkish	özne
Ancient Greek	ὑποκείμενον (hypokeimenon)
Latin	subiectum
English	subject
German	Subjekt
French	sujet
Arabic	ذَات، فَاعِل (ḏāt, fāʿil)

Turkish	kimlik
Ancient Greek	ταυτότης (tautotēs)
Latin	identitas
English	identity
German	Identität
French	identité
Arabic	هُوِيَّة (huwiyya)

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Self › Self-consciousness

Definition. Awareness directed towards oneself and one’s own states.

Example. Seeing a mark in a mirror and touching our own face.

Period. Kant (eighteenth century)

Word and term history Modern term history

German Selbstbewusstsein became established in eighteenth-century philosophy and central with Kant’s apperception and Hegel. The Turkish term translates it.

Seven language fields

Turkish	öz bilinç, özbilinç
Ancient Greek	—— No single Ancient Greek term; Aristotle’s discussion of perceiving that we perceive is related.
Latin	conscientia sui
English	self-consciousness
German	Selbstbewusstsein
French	conscience de soi
Arabic	الوَعْي بالذَّات (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: No single Ancient Greek term; Aristotle’s discussion of perceiving that we perceive is related.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Self

Near concepts. Metacognition, Self

Equivalence caution. Distinguish this from self-consciousness meaning embarrassment.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 3

↑ parent: Self

Thinking › Core concepts of thinking › Self › Non-self

Definition. Accounts denying a permanent, unchanging self; anattā in Buddhism.

Example. Distinguish “that was not like me” after anger from “I never existed”.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

Pāli anattā and Sanskrit anātman mean not-ātman. The Turkish label is descriptive here. Comparisons include Hume’s bundle of perceptions and Dennett’s narrative centre of gravity.

Seven language fields

Turkish	benliksizlik
Ancient Greek	—— The source languages are Pāli and Sanskrit; there is no single established equivalent across these seven languages.
Latin	—— The source languages are Pāli and Sanskrit; there is no single established equivalent across these seven languages.
English	no-self
German	Nicht-Selbst
French	non-soi
Arabic	—— The source languages are Pāli and Sanskrit; there is no single established equivalent across these seven languages.

Note on empty counterparts: The source languages are Pāli and Sanskrit; there is no single established equivalent across these seven languages.

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Self

Near concepts. Self, Process ontology

Opposing view. A substantial self

Equivalence caution. Buddhist schools do not all assert one identical no-self thesis.

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 65 64

↑ parent: Self

6 child records

Thinking › Processes of thinking

Definition. Interacting roles of perception, attention, memory, imagination, emotion and will.

Example. Crossing a road involves noticing a car, listening, recalling similar situations, feeling concern and moving.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational reading heading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilişsel süreçler
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	cognitive processes
German	kognitive Prozesse
French	processus cognitifs
Arabic	العمليات المعرفية (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Perception, Attention, Memory, Imagination, Emotion, Will

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

4 child records

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Perception

Definition. Forming a meaningful world from sensory information.

Example. Briefly mistaking a coat in a dark hallway for a person.

Period. twentieth-century language reform

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives algı from al- + -gI during language reform; it also records an older same-form word for a poppy-milk spoon. Comparable taking images occur in percipere and wahrnehmen. Aesthetics derives from aisthēsis. 45 51 48 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	algı, idrak
Ancient Greek	αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)
Latin	perceptio
English	perception
German	Wahrnehmung
French	perception
Arabic	إِدْرَاك، حِسّ (idrāk, ḥiss)

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Processes of thinking

Child concepts. Vision, Hearing, Interoception, Predictive processing

Near concepts. Predictive processing, Attention

Equivalence caution. Perception includes interpretation; it is not identical to sensation.

Cross-relations

proposes an explanation: Predictive processing. Predictive processing models perception through prediction and error; it has not been established as the sole valid mechanism. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 6
similar use: Sensibility. Sensibility concerns the capacity to receive what is given, rather than perception as such. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 49

Record class: working definition. Sources: 6

↑ parent: Processes of thinking

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Perception › Vision
Definition. Perception of shape, colour, depth and movement through light.
Example. Recognising a face in a crowd.
Period. Old Turkic
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Turkish gör- is attested from Old Turkic. Arabic baṣar, seeing, and baṣīra, insight, share a root, important to Cluster A. 44 14
Seven language fields
Turkish görme
Ancient Greek ὄψις (opsis)
Latin visus
English vision, sight
German Sehen
French vue
Arabic بَصَر (baṣar)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Perception
Near concepts. Baṣīra, Naẓar
Equivalence caution. A scriptural eye of the heart is not physiological sight.
Cross-relations
- similar image: Thinking (activity). Images of seeing, such as naẓar and baṣīra, are used to name thinking. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
- shared root: Baṣīra. Baṣar and baṣīra share an Arabic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
Record class: working definition. Sources: 14
↑ parent: Perception

Turkish	görme
Ancient Greek	ὄψις (opsis)
Latin	visus
English	vision, sight
German	Sehen
French	vue
Arabic	بَصَر (baṣar)

Turkish	işitme
Ancient Greek	ἀκοή (akoē)
Latin	auditus
English	hearing
German	Hören
French	ouïe
Arabic	سَمْع (samʿ)

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Perception › Interoception

Definition. Sensing the body’s internal condition.

Example. Noticing a tightening stomach before an examination.

Period. Ibn Sīnā (eleventh century); 1906

Word and term history Modern term history

Interoception became established through Sherrington’s 1906 classification, using Latin inter and receptio. Avicenna’s internal senses concern faculties such as imagination and memory, a different classification.

Seven language fields

Turkish	iç duyum
Ancient Greek	—— A modern physiological term.
Latin	—— A modern physiological term.
English	interoception
German	Interozeption
French	intéroception
Arabic	الإحساس الداخلي (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern physiological term.

Layer. Body · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Perception

Near concepts. Emotion, Somatic marker

Equivalence caution. Do not equate it with Avicenna’s internal senses.

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 66 37 61

↑ parent: Perception

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Perception › Predictive processing

Definition. Accounts in which predictions are compared with incoming information and differences guide further processing.

Example. Stumbling when an expected final stair is absent.

Period. nineteenth century; 2000

Word and term history Modern term history

The family draws on Helmholtz’s nineteenth-century unconscious inference and was developed through Friston’s free-energy principle and Clark’s work in the 2000s.

Seven language fields

Turkish	öngörücü işleme
Ancient Greek	—— A modern technical term.
Latin	—— A modern technical term.
English	predictive processing
German	prädiktive Verarbeitung
French	traitement prédictif
Arabic	المعالجة التنبؤية (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern technical term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Perception

Near concepts. Perception, Learning

Equivalence caution. It is not the sole proven mechanism of all thinking.

Cross-relations

proposes an explanation: Perception. Predictive processing models perception through prediction and error; it has not been established as the sole valid mechanism. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 6

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 6

↑ parent: Perception

4 child records

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Attention

Definition. Directing limited processing resources towards something while reducing competing activity.

Example. Listening to a companion in a crowded café.

Period. Stoic period

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic diqqa concerns fineness; Kubbealtı records the Turkish focusing-of-thought sense. Latin attentio derives from attendere, stretch towards; Stoic prosochē includes attention to oneself. 45 51 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	dikkat
Ancient Greek	προσοχή (prosochē)
Latin	attentio
English	attention
German	Aufmerksamkeit
French	attention
Arabic	اِنْتِبَاه (intibāh)

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Processes of thinking

Child concepts. Selective attention, Salience, Executive control, Attention economy

Near concepts. Salience, Working memory

Equivalence caution. Attention is not identical to consciousness.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 67

↑ parent: Processes of thinking

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Attention › Selective attention

Definition. Focusing on one stimulus while suppressing others.

Example. Following a teacher’s voice in a noisy room.

Period. 1958

Word and term history Modern term history

An established term in mid-twentieth-century experimental psychology, including Broadbent in 1958.

Seven language fields

Turkish	seçici dikkat
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	selective attention
German	selektive Aufmerksamkeit
French	attention sélective
Arabic	الانتباه الانتقائي (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Attention

Near concepts. Attention

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 67

↑ parent: Attention

Turkish	önemlilik
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	salience
German	Salienz
French	saillance
Arabic	البروز (modern)

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Attention › Executive control

Definition. Regulating attention and action to maintain goal-directed behaviour.

Example. Keeping track of the stove while a phone rings.

Period. twentieth century

Word and term history Modern term history

Executive function became established in late twentieth-century neuropsychology and is related to Baddeley’s central executive in working memory.

Seven language fields

Turkish	yürütücü denetim
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	executive control
German	exekutive Kontrolle
French	contrôle exécutif
Arabic	التحكم التنفيذي (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Attention

Near concepts. Self-control, Working memory

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 26

↑ parent: Attention

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Attention › Attention economy

Definition. An arrangement in which scarce attention is bought and sold.

Example. Notifications draw us back into an application.

Period. 1971

Word and term history Modern term history

The modern term develops from Herbert Simon’s 1971 observation linking abundant information with scarce attention.

Seven language fields

Turkish	dikkat ekonomisi
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	attention economy
German	Aufmerksamkeitsökonomie
French	économie de l'attention
Arabic	اقتصاد الانتباه (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Attention

Near concepts. Attention, Bias

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 68

↑ parent: Attention

4 child records

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Memory

Definition. Retaining and reconstructing the past as material for thinking.

Example. A song’s opening notes bring the rest to mind.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

The card cites Kubbealtı for belle- + -k. Earlier unverified claims about connection to bil- and the formation date are not treated as settled. Arabic ḏākira and tezekkür share a root; Old English gemynd also carries remembering senses. 45 14 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	bellek, hafıza
Ancient Greek	μνήμη (mnēmē)
Latin	memoria
English	memory
German	Gedächtnis
French	mémoire
Arabic	ذَاكِرَة، حِفْظ (ḏākira, ḥifẓ)

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Processes of thinking

Child concepts. Working memory, Long-term memory, Remembrance, External memory

Near concepts. Tadhakkur, Remembrance, Gedanc

Equivalence caution. A storage metaphor alone does not explain remembering; retention and reconstruction both need attention.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 26 8

↑ parent: Processes of thinking

Turkish	çalışma belleği
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	working memory
German	Arbeitsgedächtnis
French	mémoire de travail
Arabic	الذاكرة العاملة (modern)

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Memory › Long-term memory

Definition. Lasting retention of facts, events and skills.

Example. Remembering the colour of a childhood front door.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

Established against short-term memory in mid-twentieth-century memory research.

Seven language fields

Turkish	uzun süreli bellek
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	long-term memory
German	Langzeitgedächtnis
French	mémoire à long terme
Arabic	الذاكرة طويلة المدى (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Memory

Near concepts. Memory, Identity

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 26

↑ parent: Memory

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Memory › Remembrance
Definition. Consciously recalling the past while giving it significance.
Example. Remembering and speaking of a friend on the anniversary of their death.
Period. Old Turkic
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Turkish an-, remember, is attested in Old Turkic. Heidegger’s Denken/Danken/Gedanc reading concerns this field; Arabic ḏikr includes remembrance and utterance. 44 48 14
Seven language fields
Turkish anma
Ancient Greek μνήμη (mnēmē), ἀνάμνησις (anamnēsis)
Latin memoria, commemoratio
English remembrance
German Gedenken
French commémoration
Arabic ذِكْر (ḏikr)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Memory
Near concepts. Tadhakkur, Gedanc, Dhikr
Equivalence caution. Heidegger’s interpretation is not a settled result of historical linguistics.
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Tadhakkur. Turkish renders tezekkür through anma and hatırlama, remembrance and recollection. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 69
- similar use: Gedanc. We propose a comparison between Heidegger’s Gedanc and tezekkür through remembrance. This is not a claim of transmission or common origin. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 8
Record class: working definition. Sources: 8 14
↑ parent: Memory
Thinking › Processes of thinking › Memory › External memory
Definition. Keeping memory resources in records outside the body.
Example. Writing a shopping list on a phone so it need not be held in mind.
Period. Plato (before the common era fourth century)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Plato’s Phaedrus contrasts writing as hypomnēma, reminder, with mnēmē, memory. The modern discussion includes Merlin Donald’s external symbolic storage. 52
Seven language fields
Turkish dışsal bellek
Ancient Greek ὑπόμνημα (hypomnēma)
Latin ——
English external memory
German externes Gedächtnis
French mémoire externe
Arabic الذاكرة الخارجية (modern)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Memory
Near concepts. Writing, Extended mind, Cognitive offloading
Equivalence caution. An external record is not identical to someone remembering.
Cross-relations
- supported through an example: Extended mind. Otto’s notebook is a thought example supporting a claim about the bounds of mind, not a completed experiment or sufficient verification of the claim. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 4
- example of: Writing. Plato’s discussion witnesses a relation between records and remembering; it did not measure all experimental effects of external memory. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 29
Record class: theoretical. Sources: 29 70 30
↑ parent: Memory

Turkish	anma
Ancient Greek	μνήμη (mnēmē), ἀνάμνησις (anamnēsis)
Latin	memoria, commemoratio
English	remembrance
German	Gedenken
French	commémoration
Arabic	ذِكْر (ḏikr)

3 child records

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Imagination

Definition. Forming what is absent in thought, including possibilities for design and art.

Example. Imagining our home painted an unfamiliar colour.

Period. twentieth-century language reform; Ibn Sīnā (eleventh century); Kant (eighteenth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives imgelem through imge + imgele- + -m during language reform. Arabic ḫayāl carries shadow/apparition senses and is an internal sense in Avicenna. German Einbildungskraft mediates intuition and concepts in Kant. 45 14 48 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	imgelem, hayal, tahayyül
Ancient Greek	φαντασία (phantasia)
Latin	imaginatio
English	imagination
German	Einbildungskraft
French	imagination
Arabic	خَيَال، تَخَيُّل (ḫayāl, taḫayyul)

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Processes of thinking

Child concepts. Mental simulation, Counterfactual thinking, Probability

Near concepts. Mental simulation, Conception (taṣawwur)

Equivalence caution. Imagination and illusion are not identical.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 39 3

↑ parent: Processes of thinking

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Imagination › Counterfactual thinking

Definition. Considering possibilities that did not occur.

Example. “If I had left five minutes earlier, I would have arrived in time.”

Period. twentieth century

Word and term history Modern term history

Counterfactual became established in twentieth-century logic and philosophy of language, including Goodman and Lewis.

Seven language fields

Turkish	karşı-olgusal düşünme
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	counterfactual thinking
German	kontrafaktisches Denken
French	pensée contrefactuelle
Arabic	التفكير المضاد للواقع (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Imagination

Near concepts. Mental simulation, Probability

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 57

↑ parent: Imagination

3 child records

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Emotion

Definition. A bodily and subjective, value-laden response indicating a situation’s significance.

Example. Fear prepares the body before danger is fully assessed.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives duygu from duy- + -gU and describes its later revival and semantic expansion. Greek pathos concerns what is undergone, Latin affectus being affected, and Arabic infiʿāl translates pathos philosophically. 45 52 51 14

Seven language fields

Turkish	duygu, duygulanım
Ancient Greek	πάθος (pathos)
Latin	affectus
English	emotion, affect
German	Gefühl, Affekt
French	émotion, affect
Arabic	عَاطِفَة، اِنْفِعَال (ʿāṭifa, infiʿāl)

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Processes of thinking

Child concepts. Appraisal, Somatic marker, Pleasure and pain

Near concepts. Appraisal, Somatic marker

Opposing view. Freedom from disturbing passions (apatheia)

Equivalence caution. Damasio proposes that bodily signals can influence decisions; emotion is not thereby a fixed prerequisite of every decision or reason’s opposite.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 37

↑ parent: Processes of thinking

Thinking › Processes of thinking › Emotion › Pleasure and pain

Definition. Basic positive and negative qualities of experience.

Example. Warm soup feels comforting; a burned finger hurts and is withdrawn.

Period. Old Turkic

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı connects haz to Arabic ḥaẓẓ, share/portion, whose Turkish pleasure sense displaced that older use. Acı derives through Old Turkic āçıġ and açı-. Hedonism derives from Greek hēdonē. 45 14 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	haz ve acı
Ancient Greek	ἡδονή καὶ λύπη (hēdonē kai lypē)
Latin	voluptas et dolor
English	pleasure and pain
German	Lust und Schmerz
French	plaisir et douleur
Arabic	لَذَّة وَأَلَم (laḏḏa wa-alam)

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Emotion

Near concepts. Emotion, Appraisal

Record class: working definition. Sources: 52

↑ parent: Emotion

3 child records
Thinking › Processes of thinking › Will
Definition. The capacity to choose, initiate and sustain action.
Example. Getting up rather than returning to sleep after the alarm.
Period. Augustine (fourth–fifth centuries)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Arabic irāda, wanting, derives from r-w-d. The apparent Turkish iste- + -nç formation of istenç lacks an independent witness here. Latin voluntas derives from velle, want; Augustine gave will a central philosophical role. 14 45 51
Seven language fields
Turkish irade, istenç
Ancient Greek βούλησις (boulēsis), θέλημα (thelēma)
Latin voluntas
English will
German Wille
French volonté
Arabic إِرَادَة (irāda)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Processes of thinking
Child concepts. Intention, Decision, Action
Near concepts. Intention, Decision, Free will
Equivalence caution. Will is not simply desire.
Record class: working definition. Sources: 14
↑ parent: Processes of thinking

6 child records

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference

Definition. Carrying thought in symbols, examining its grounds and reaching conclusions.

Example. Reading a report, checking its source and drawing a conclusion.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational reading heading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	dil ve bilgi
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	language and knowledge
German	Sprache und Wissen
French	langage et savoir
Arabic	—— An organising heading used in this work.

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Language, Meaning, Knowledge, Inference, Conception and assent, Wisdom

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

4 child records

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Language

Definition. A system carrying meaning through signs and rules.

Example. Turkish, Arabic, signed languages and mathematical notation.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Turkish dil/til names both the organ and language, as do glōssa, lingua and lisān. Arabic luġa developed from word/dialect to language. 44 52 51 14

Seven language fields

Turkish	dil
Ancient Greek	γλῶσσα (glōssa), λόγος (logos)
Latin	lingua, sermo
English	language
German	Sprache
French	langue, langage
Arabic	لُغَة، لِسَان (luġa, lisān)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Language, knowledge and inference

Child concepts. Sign, Syntax, Communication, Mathematical notation

Near concepts. Sign, Meaning

Equivalence caution. The language network’s dissociation from many tasks challenges equating language with all thought.

Cross-relations

partly dissociates: Thought. Research investigates dissociations between language networks and some thinking tasks. It does not establish that language contributes nothing to thought or that all tasks dissociate alike. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 1

Record class: working definition. Sources: 1 15

↑ parent: Language, knowledge and inference

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Language › Mathematical notation

Definition. Recording quantities and structures with formal symbols.

Example. Writing an equation and solving it step by step.

Period. Descartes (seventeenth century)

Word and term history Modern term history

Mathematics derives from Greek mathēma, what is learned. Viète and Descartes helped establish algebraic notation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	matematiksel gösterim
Ancient Greek	—— The compound term is modern.
Latin	notatio
English	mathematical notation
German	mathematische Notation
French	notation mathématique
Arabic	الرموز الرياضية (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: The compound term is modern.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Language

Near concepts. Language, Representation

Record class: working definition. Sources: 52

↑ parent: Language

4 child records
Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Meaning
Definition. A sign’s content and what it indicates in the world.
Example. “Morning star” and “evening star” present the same celestial object differently.
Period. Old Turkic; twentieth-century language reform; Ibn Sīnā (eleventh century)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Kubbealtı derives anlam from anla- + -m during language reform, tracing anla- through Old Turkic angla- and ang, understanding. Arabic maʿnā, what is meant, became technical in Avicenna and was translated as intentio. Frege distinguishes Sinn and Bedeutung. 45 14 61
Seven language fields
Turkish anlam, mana
Ancient Greek νόημα (noēma), σημασία (sēmasia)
Latin significatio
English meaning
German Sinn, Bedeutung
French sens, signification
Arabic مَعْنًى (maʿnā)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Language, knowledge and inference
Child concepts. Reference, Context, Narrative, Metaphor
Near concepts. Reference, Intentionality, Form
Equivalence caution. Meaning is not identical to form.
Record class: working definition. Sources: 72 61
↑ parent: Language, knowledge and inference

4 child records

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Knowledge

Definition. Belief accepted as true and justified, considered alongside distinctions between ʿilm and maʿrifa.

Example. Knowing that water boils at 100 degrees at sea level.

Period. Old Turkic

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Turkish bilig is attested in Old Turkic and derives from bil-. Arabic ʿilm emphasises learned/transmitted knowledge, maʿrifa knowing by acquaintance; savoir/connaissance provides a comparison. 44 14 50

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilgi, ilim, marifet
Ancient Greek	ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē), γνῶσις (gnōsis)
Latin	scientia, cognitio
English	knowledge
German	Wissen, Erkenntnis
French	savoir, connaissance
Arabic	عِلْم، مَعْرِفَة (ʿilm, maʿrifa)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Language, knowledge and inference

Child concepts. Evidence, Justification, Truth (ḥaqīqa), Testimony

Near concepts. Justification, Evidence, Maʿrifa

Equivalence caution. Do not impose exactly the same division on epistēmē and gnōsis.

Record class: working definition. Sources: 14 50

↑ parent: Language, knowledge and inference

4 child records

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Inference

Definition. Moving from what is known towards a further conclusion.

Example. Inferring overnight rain from a wet road.

Period. twentieth-century language reform

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı derives çıkarım from çıkar- + -(I)m; its logical sense was assigned during language reform. Arabic istidlāl concerns seeking evidence; inference derives from Latin inferre. 45 14 51

Seven language fields

Turkish	çıkarım, istidlal
Ancient Greek	συλλογισμός (syllogismos)
Latin	ratiocinatio, inferentia
English	inference
German	Schlussfolgerung
French	inférence
Arabic	اِسْتِدْلَال (istidlāl)

Layer. Processes · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Language, knowledge and inference

Child concepts. Deduction, Induction, Inference to the best explanation, Heuristic

Near concepts. Deduction, Induction, Inference to the best explanation

Record class: working definition. Sources: 57

↑ parent: Language, knowledge and inference

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Inference › Inference to the best explanation

Definition. Selecting a hypothesis that best explains an observation.

Example. Rain may explain wet grass, but a sprinkler is another possibility.

Period. Aristotle (before the common era fourth century); 1965

Word and term history Modern term history

Peirce reworked Aristotle’s apagōgē as abduction; Gilbert Harman’s 1965 paper established the best-explanation label. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	en iyi açıklamaya çıkarım
Ancient Greek	ἀπαγωγή (apagōgē)
Latin	—— No established technical term in Latin or Arabic.
English	abduction, inference to the best explanation
German	Abduktion
French	abduction
Arabic	—— No established technical term in Latin or Arabic.

Note on empty counterparts: No established technical term in Latin or Arabic.

Layer. Processes · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inference

Near concepts. Inference

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 52

↑ parent: Inference

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Inference › Heuristic

Definition. A quick decision rule, often useful but vulnerable to systematic error.

Example. Trusting a product because its brand is familiar.

Period. 1970

Word and term history Modern term history

From Greek heuriskein, find; made central to decision psychology through Tversky and Kahneman’s 1970s work. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	sezgisel kestirme
Ancient Greek	—— No single established Arabic equivalent was found.
Latin	—— No single established Arabic equivalent was found.
English	heuristic
German	Heuristik
French	heuristique
Arabic	—— No single established Arabic equivalent was found.

Note on empty counterparts: No single established Arabic equivalent was found.

Layer. Processes · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inference

Near concepts. Dual-process theories, Bias

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 33 23

↑ parent: Inference

4 child records

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Conception and assent

Definition. In Islamic logic, grasping a thing and accepting a proposition as true are distinguished.

Example. Thinking of a triangle differs from asserting a theorem about its angles.

Period. al-Fārābī (tenth century); Ibn Sīnā (eleventh century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Taṣawwur derives from ṣ-w-r, form; taṣdīq from ṣ-d-q, truth. Al-Fārābī and Avicenna developed the logical distinction systematically. 14 61

Seven language fields

Turkish	tasavvur, tasdik
Ancient Greek	ἔννοια, κρίσις (ennoia, krisis)
Latin	conceptus, iudicium
English	conception, assent
German	Begriff, Urteil
French	concept, jugement
Arabic	تَصَوُّر، تَصْدِيق (taṣawwur, taṣdīq)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Language, knowledge and inference

Child concepts. Conception (taṣawwur), Assent (taṣdīq), Judgment, Concept

Near concepts. Concept, Judgment

Equivalence caution. It is not identical to Kant’s distinction between concept and judgment.

Cross-relations

similar distinction: Concept. The apprehension–assent and concept–judgement distinctions are similar, not identical. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 61

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 39 61

↑ parent: Language, knowledge and inference

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Conception and assent › Concept
Definition. A mental unit grouping objects through shared properties.
Example. The concept chair covers many different chairs.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
The record derives kavram from kavra- + -m. Begriff/greifen and conceptus/concipere offer related grasping/gathering images, without establishing one identical hand image. Arabic mafhūm means what is understood. 45 48 51 14
Seven language fields
Turkish kavram, mefhum
Ancient Greek ἔννοια (ennoia)
Latin conceptus
English concept
German Begriff
French concept, notion
Arabic مَفْهُوم (mafhūm)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Conception and assent
Near concepts. Conception (taṣawwur), Category
Equivalence caution. Similar images do not establish common descent or one shared concept definition.
Cross-relations
- similar distinction: Conception and assent. The apprehension–assent and concept–judgement distinctions are similar, not identical. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 61
Record class: working definition. Sources: 3
↑ parent: Conception and assent

3 child records

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Wisdom

Definition. Mature judgment bringing knowledge and value, theory and practice, together.

Example. Knowing when to speak and when to remain silent.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı gives no origin for bilgelik; bilge + -lik is apparent, and the connection of bilge with bil- remains unverified here. Greek sophia included craft skill; compare the craft setting of Exodus 35:31. The ḥikma record is in Cluster A. 45 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilgelik, hikmet
Ancient Greek	σοφία (sophia), φρόνησις (phronēsis)
Latin	sapientia, prudentia
English	wisdom
German	Weisheit
French	sagesse
Arabic	حِكْمَة (ḥikma)

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Language, knowledge and inference

Child concepts. Practical wisdom, Theoretical wisdom, Estimation and opinion

Near concepts. Ḥikma, Practical wisdom

Equivalence caution. Wisdom is not intelligence.

Cross-relations

translation equivalent: Ḥikma. Wisdom and ḥikma can be compared in some contexts. The sense in a particular passage is not coextensive with later philosophical uses. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14

Record class: working definition. Sources: 52 31

↑ parent: Language, knowledge and inference

Thinking › Language, knowledge and inference › Wisdom › Practical wisdom

Definition. Judging what to do, when and to what extent; Aristotle’s phronēsis.

Example. Being angry for an appropriate reason and to an appropriate degree.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Phronēsis is associated with phronein and phrēn, including historical chest/diaphragm senses; this does not establish one organ-based Greek theory. Latin prudentia relates to providentia. 52 51

Seven language fields

Turkish	pratik bilgelik
Ancient Greek	φρόνησις (phronēsis)
Latin	prudentia
English	practical wisdom, prudence
German	Klugheit
French	sagesse pratique, prudence
Arabic	—— The Arabic cell remains empty. Expressions such as ḥikma ʿamaliyya, practical wisdom, may have been proposed, but no specific translation or transmission evidence was supplied to justify inserting one here.

Note on empty counterparts: The Arabic cell remains empty. Expressions such as ḥikma ʿamaliyya, practical wisdom, may have been proposed, but no specific translation or transmission evidence was supplied to justify inserting one here.

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Wisdom

Near concepts. Wisdom, Phroneō

Equivalence caution. The bodily semantic field does not explain all of Aristotle’s account.

Cross-relations

shared root: Phroneō. The terms belong to the phrēn family. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52

Record class: working definition. Sources: 31 52

↑ parent: Wisdom

5 child records

Thinking › Body and shared world

Definition. Thinking’s biological conditions, bodily activity and social/historical surroundings.

Example. Hunger affects patience; a library gives access to other people’s thought.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational reading heading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	beden ve çevre
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	body and shared world
German	Leib und Mitwelt
French	corps et monde commun
Arabic	—— An organising heading used in this work.

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Body · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Nervous system, Embodied cognition, External tool, Culture, History

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

4 child records

Thinking › Body and shared world › Nervous system

Definition. Nerve cells and supporting cells transmitting and processing signals.

Example. Withdrawing a finger from heat.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Origin record incomplete

Sinir is associated with Persian sinir/zih forms, but the exact record remains unverified here. Greek neuron originally concerned tendon/string; its nerve sense developed in Hellenistic anatomy. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	sinir sistemi
Ancient Greek	νεῦρον (neuron: sinir, kiriş)
Latin	systema nervosum
English	nervous system
German	Nervensystem
French	système nerveux
Arabic	الجهاز العصبي (modern)

Layer. Body · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Body and shared world

Child concepts. Brain, Neuron, Synapse, Neural plasticity

Near concepts. Brain, Neuron

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 66

↑ parent: Body and shared world

Thinking › Body and shared world › Nervous system › Neural plasticity

Definition. The nervous system’s capacity to change with experience.

Example. Learning a language changes relevant connections.

Period. twentieth century; 1949

Word and term history Modern term history

Plastic derives from Greek plassein, shape. Hebb’s 1949 proposal is an influential precursor; the term became established during the mid-twentieth century. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	sinirsel esneklik, nöroplastisite
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	neuroplasticity
German	Neuroplastizität
French	neuroplasticité
Arabic	اللدونة العصبية (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Body · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Nervous system

Near concepts. Learning, Hebbian learning

Equivalence caution. Plasticity is not one universal learning rule.

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 27

↑ parent: Nervous system

4 child records

Thinking › Body and shared world › Embodied cognition

Definition. Approaches in which bodily structure and activity shape cognition.

Example. Counting on fingers can support reasoning.

Period. 1945–1991

Word and term history Modern term history

Related to Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 phenomenology and developed in cognitive science through Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s 1991 book.

Seven language fields

Turkish	bedenlenmiş biliş
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	embodied cognition
German	verkörperte Kognition
French	cognition incarnée
Arabic	الإدراك المتجسد (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Body · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Body and shared world

Child concepts. Movement, Sensorimotor loop, Enactivism, Metabolism

Near concepts. Enactivism

Opposing view. Classical representationalism

Equivalence caution. This does not establish that every abstract thought is a bodily movement.

Cross-relations

conceptual reference: Enactivism. Merleau-Ponty is a reference point for some embodied cognition research, not its sole origin or support for all its results. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 58 71

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 58 71

↑ parent: Body and shared world

Thinking › Body and shared world › Embodied cognition › Sensorimotor loop

Definition. A continuing relation in which perception changes action and action changes subsequent perception.

Example. Feeling a wall while moving through a dark room.

Period. 1948

Word and term history Modern term history

Central to cybernetic feedback, including Wiener 1948, and to enactive cognition.

Seven language fields

Turkish	duyusal-eylem döngüsü
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	sensorimotor loop
German	sensomotorische Schleife
French	boucle sensorimotrice
Arabic	الحلقة الحسية الحركية (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Body · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Embodied cognition

Near concepts. Feedback loop, Perception, Action

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 58

↑ parent: Embodied cognition

Thinking › Body and shared world › Embodied cognition › Enactivism

Definition. Approaches in which cognition is enacted through an organism’s engagement with its surroundings.

Example. Considering colour as a relation involving eyes, brain and light.

Period. 1991

Word and term history Modern term history

From enact, bring into effect/stage; Varela, Thompson and Rosch introduced the term to cognitive science in 1991.

Seven language fields

Turkish	enaktivizm
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.
Latin	—— A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.
English	enactivism
German	Enaktivismus
French	énaction
Arabic	—— A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.

Layer. Life · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Embodied cognition

Near concepts. Embodied cognition

Cross-relations

conceptual reference: Embodied cognition. Merleau-Ponty is a reference point for some embodied cognition research, not its sole origin or support for all its results. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 58 71

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 58

↑ parent: Embodied cognition

3 child records

Thinking › Body and shared world › External tool

Definition. An object supporting memory, calculation or attention beyond the body.

Example. A calculator, notebook or map.

Period. Aristotle (before the common era fourth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Greek organon means tool. Aristotle’s logical writings were later collected as the Organon, treating logic as an instrument of thinking. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	dış araç
Ancient Greek	ὄργανον (organon)
Latin	instrumentum
English	external tool
German	Werkzeug
French	outil externe
Arabic	أَدَاة (adāt)

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Body and shared world

Child concepts. Writing, Extended mind, Distributed cognition

Near concepts. Extended mind, External memory

Record class: working definition. Sources: 4

↑ parent: Body and shared world

Thinking › Body and shared world › External tool › Writing
Definition. Rendering language in lasting visible signs.
Example. Reading a letter years after it was written.
Period. Old Turkic
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Yaz-, draw/write, is attested in Old Turkic. Arabic kitāb and kitāba derive from k-t-b. 44 14
Seven language fields
Turkish yazı
Ancient Greek γραφή (graphē), γράμματα (grammata)
Latin scriptura, litterae
English writing
German Schrift
French écriture
Arabic كِتَابَة (kitāba)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. External tool
Near concepts. External memory, Literacy
Cross-relations
- example of: External memory. Plato’s discussion witnesses a relation between records and remembering; it did not measure all experimental effects of external memory. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 29
Record class: working definition. Sources: 29 46 47
↑ parent: External tool
Thinking › Body and shared world › External tool › Extended mind
Definition. The thesis that external resources can constitute parts of a cognitive system under specified conditions.
Example. Otto’s consistently available notebook in Clark and Chalmers’s example.
Period. 1998
Word and term history Modern term history
The title of Clark and Chalmers’s 1998 paper.
Seven language fields
Turkish genişletilmiş zihin
Ancient Greek —— A modern term.
Latin —— A modern term.
English extended mind
German erweiterter Geist
French esprit étendu
Arabic العقل الممتد (modern)
Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. External tool
Near concepts. Distributed cognition, External memory
Opposing view. Internalism
Equivalence caution. A causal contribution does not automatically establish constitution. The thesis and the hard problem ask different questions.
Cross-relations
- supported through an example: External memory. Otto’s notebook is a thought example supporting a claim about the bounds of mind, not a completed experiment or sufficient verification of the claim. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 4
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 4
↑ parent: External tool

Thinking › Body and shared world › External tool › Distributed cognition

Definition. Cognitive work shared across people, tools and rules.

Example. Navigation conducted through crew members, charts and instruments.

Period. 1990

Word and term history Modern term history

Established through Hutchins’s studies of ship navigation in the 1990s.

Seven language fields

Turkish	dağıtık biliş
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	distributed cognition
German	verteilte Kognition
French	cognition distribuée
Arabic	الإدراك الموزع (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. External tool

Near concepts. Extended mind, Joint attention

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 4

↑ parent: External tool

3 child records

Thinking › Body and shared world › Culture

Definition. Learned meanings, tools and practices transmitted across generations.

Example. Learning table manners within a family.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Latin cultura concerns cultivation; Cicero used cultura animi. Kubbealtı traces kültür through French culture to Latin care/cultivation. Ekin translates the agricultural image, but no independent witness for that proposal was obtained here. Arabic ṯaqāfa carries shaping/correcting senses. 51 14 45

Seven language fields

Turkish	kültür, ekin
Ancient Greek	παιδεία (paideia)
Latin	cultura
English	culture
German	Kultur
French	culture
Arabic	ثَقَافَة (ṯaqāfa)

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Body and shared world

Child concepts. Joint attention, Institution, Norm

Near concepts. Institution, Norm

Record class: working definition. Sources: 51

↑ parent: Body and shared world

Thinking › Body and shared world › Culture › Joint attention

Definition. Two people attending to the same object while recognising their shared attention.

Example. An infant follows a caregiver’s gaze.

Period. 1970

Word and term history Modern term history

Established in developmental psychology from the 1970s.

Seven language fields

Turkish	ortak dikkat
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	joint attention
German	geteilte Aufmerksamkeit
French	attention conjointe
Arabic	الانتباه المشترك (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Culture

Near concepts. Communication, Distributed cognition

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 70

↑ parent: Culture

4 child records

Thinking › Body and shared world › History

Definition. Changes in the resources and practices of thinking through time.

Example. Memorisation, notebooks and search engines support a student differently.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic tārīḫ concerns dating; Greek historia means inquiry. 14 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	tarih
Ancient Greek	ἱστορία (historia)
Latin	historia
English	history
German	Geschichte
French	histoire
Arabic	تَارِيخ (tārīḫ)

Layer. Life · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Body and shared world

Child concepts. Stone tool, Literacy, Printing, Scientific method

Near concepts. Stone tool, Printing

Record class: working definition. Sources: 52

↑ parent: Body and shared world

Thinking › Body and shared world › History › Literacy

Definition. Reading and writing, and their possible effects on habits of thinking.

Example. Arranging a list on paper differs from retaining it mentally.

Period. twentieth century

Word and term history Modern term history

The Turkish compound belongs to the twentieth century. Ong and Havelock argue that literacy restructures consciousness; the reach of that claim is disputed.

Seven language fields

Turkish	okuryazarlık
Ancient Greek	—— No single Ancient Greek term.
Latin	litteratura
English	literacy
German	Literalität
French	littératie
Arabic	مَحْو الأُمِّيَّة (karşıtı üzerinden, modern)

Note on empty counterparts: No single Ancient Greek term.

Layer. Life · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. History

Near concepts. Writing, Printing

Cross-relations

may affect: Thought. Ong and Havelock argue that literacy changes habits of thought; the scope is disputed. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 46 47

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 46 47

↑ parent: History

6 child records

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Definition. Terms concerning knowing, remembrance and degrees of the heart in Qur’anic and Sufi traditions.

Example. “My heart cannot accept this” offers an everyday resonance.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational reading heading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	idrak ve ruh sözvarlığı
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	inner cognition and soul vocabulary
German	—— An organising heading used in this work.
French	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Arabic	إدراك باطني

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Soul and life, Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles, Qur’anic reason vocabulary, Qur’anic verbs of thinking, Qur’anic looking and remembrance, Contents of inward apprehension

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

3 child records
Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Soul and life
Definition. A range concerning life, person, breath, persistence and transcendence, varying between traditions.
Example. A death described as giving up one’s breath or spirit.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Arabic rūḥ relates to r-w-ḥ, blowing; Turkish can comes from Persian cān. Psychē, anima, spiritus, ruaḥ and nefeš also carry breath images. The parallel is not evidence of shared linguistic descent. 14 52 51 75
Seven language fields
Turkish ruh, can, nefis
Ancient Greek ψυχή (psychē), πνεῦμα (pneuma)
Latin anima, spiritus
English soul, spirit
German Seele, Geist
French âme, esprit
Arabic رُوح، نَفْس (rūḥ, nafs)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary
Child concepts. Rūḥ, Nafs, Transcendence
Near concepts. Nefesh, Psychē, Ruaḥ
Equivalence caution. Homeric psychē is not identical to the Christian soul.
Cross-relations
- similar image: Pneuma. The connection between breath and spirit can be compared across languages. A similar image is not a shared linguistic origin. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52 14
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 76 14
↑ parent: Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary
- Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Soul and life › Rūḥ
  Definition. In the Qur’anic account, a life-giving principle described as belonging to the Lord’s command.
  Example. The response to the question about rūḥ in 17:85.
  Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
  Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
  See Soul and life. 14
  Seven language fields
  Turkish ruh
  Ancient Greek πνεῦμα (pneuma)
  Latin spiritus
  English spirit
  German Geist
  French esprit
  Arabic رُوح (rūḥ)
  ≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
  Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
  Parent concept. Soul and life
  Near concepts. Ruaḥ, Pneuma
  Equivalence caution. Rūḥ and nafs are not synonymous in every context.
  Cross-relations
  - shared origin: Ruaḥ. Hebrew ruaḥ and Arabic rūḥ share a Semitic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
  Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 14
  ↑ parent: Soul and life
- Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Soul and life › Nafs
  Definition. Person, life or self, including the subject of moral struggle.
  Example. Following one’s nafs and knowing one’s nafs have different meanings.
  Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
  Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
  Arabic n-f-s concerns breathing; nafas shares the root, related to Hebrew nefeš through a Semitic root. 14 75
  Seven language fields
  Turkish nefis
  Ancient Greek ψυχή (psychē)
  Latin anima
  English self, soul
  German Seele, Selbst
  French âme, soi
  Arabic نَفْس (nafs)
  ≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
  Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
  Parent concept. Soul and life
  Near concepts. Nefesh, Self
  Equivalence caution. Do not translate every use simply as self.
  Cross-relations
  - shared origin: Nefesh. Hebrew nefesh and Arabic nafs share a Semitic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
  Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 75
  ↑ parent: Soul and life

4 child records

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles

Definition. Ṣadr, qalb, fuʾād and lubb: four nested forms of inward apprehension in Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s Bayān al-farq.

Example. An explanatory arrangement of outer and inner rings.

Period. Qur’anic period (seventh century); al-Tirmidhī (tenth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

The four words occur separately in the Qur’an; this ordered scheme is al-Tirmidhī’s particular Sufi interpretation, associated with his death date 320/932. 40 78

Seven language fields

Turkish	sadr, kalb, fuâd, lübb
Ancient Greek	—— An Arabic technical classification; equivalents in the other languages were not sought.
Latin	—— An Arabic technical classification; equivalents in the other languages were not sought.
English	chest, heart, inner heart, core
German	—— An Arabic technical classification; equivalents in the other languages were not sought.
French	—— An Arabic technical classification; equivalents in the other languages were not sought.
Arabic	صَدْر، قَلْب، فُؤَاد، لُبّ

Note on empty counterparts: An Arabic technical classification; equivalents in the other languages were not sought.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Child concepts. Ṣadr, Qalb (heart in apprehension), Fuʾād, Lubb

Near concepts. Qalb (heart in apprehension)

Equivalence caution. It is not a Qur’anic anatomy or a set of experimentally measured stages.

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 40 78

↑ parent: Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles › Qalb (heart in apprehension)
Definition. A centre associated with understanding, orientation and faith in sacred texts; al-Tirmidhī’s second circle concerns faith, piety and love.
Example. Qur’an 22:46 relates hearts to hearing and seeing.
Period. Old Turkic
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Q-l-b concerns turning; interpretation often invokes the turning heart. Turkish gönül traces to Old Turkic kōŋül. Comparisons with lev and kardia appear in Cluster C. 14 44 75 77
Seven language fields
Turkish kalp, gönül
Ancient Greek καρδία (kardia)
Latin cor
English heart
German Herz
French cœur
Arabic قَلْب، فُؤَاد، لُبّ (qalb, fuʾād, lubb)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles
Near concepts. Lev, Kardia, Fuʾād
Equivalence caution. Neither reduce it to emotion alone nor treat a scriptural use as a neuroanatomical finding.
Cross-relations
- similar use: Lev. Heart vocabulary accompanies apprehension in some passages. This does not show that both traditions share the same account of the person or that every use is synonymous. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 77 55
↑ parent: Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles › Fuʾād

Definition. An inner heart circle associated by al-Tirmidhī with recognition, inward thoughts and insight.

Example. The capacity named alongside hearing and sight in 16:78.

Period. Qur’anic period (seventh century)

Word and term history Disputed origin; competing proposals

F-ʾ-d is associated with burning, interpreted through the burning heart. The Qur’an also uses the plural afʾida. 14

Seven language fields

Turkish	fuâd
Ancient Greek	—— An Arabic technical term without exact equivalents in the other languages.
Latin	—— An Arabic technical term without exact equivalents in the other languages.
English	inner heart
German	—— An Arabic technical term without exact equivalents in the other languages.
French	—— An Arabic technical term without exact equivalents in the other languages.
Arabic	فُؤَاد (fuʾād)

Note on empty counterparts: An Arabic technical term without exact equivalents in the other languages.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles

Near concepts. Qalb (heart in apprehension), Maʿrifa

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 14 40

↑ parent: Al-Tirmidhī’s four circles

4 child records

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic reason vocabulary

Definition. Terms associated with reason in the Qur’an: nuhā, ḥijr, ḥilm and baṣīra.

Example. Different expressions translated as people of understanding.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

An organisational grouping based on the TDV Islamic Encyclopaedia entry Akıl. 54

Seven language fields

Turkish	Kur'an akıl sözvarlığı
Ancient Greek	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
Latin	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
English	Qurʾanic vocabulary of reason
German	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
French	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
Arabic	ألفاظ العقل في القرآن

Note on empty counterparts: This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Child concepts. Nuhā, Ḥijr, Ḥilm, Baṣīra

Near concepts. Reason (akıl)

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 54 55

↑ parent: Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic reason vocabulary › Nuhā

Definition. Reason understood through restraining someone from wrong.

Example. Ulī al-nuhā in 20:54.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From n-h-y, restrain/prohibit; its regulating image resembles that associated with ʿaql. 14 54

Seven language fields

Turkish	nühâ
Ancient Greek	—— An Arabic technical term.
Latin	—— An Arabic technical term.
English	intellect (that restrains)
German	—— An Arabic technical term.
French	—— An Arabic technical term.
Arabic	نُهًى (nuhā)

Note on empty counterparts: An Arabic technical term.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Qur’anic reason vocabulary

Near concepts. Reason (akıl), Self-control

Cross-relations

similar image: Reason (akıl). Nuhā and ḥijr also carry an image of restraint. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 54

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 54

↑ parent: Qur’anic reason vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic reason vocabulary › Ḥijr

Definition. Reason described through restraint and protection.

Example. Dhī ḥijr in 89:5.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From ḥ-j-r, prevent/protect, sharing a restraint image with ʿaql and nuhā. 14 54

Seven language fields

Turkish	hicr
Ancient Greek	—— An Arabic technical term.
Latin	—— An Arabic technical term.
English	intellect (that restrains)
German	—— An Arabic technical term.
French	—— An Arabic technical term.
Arabic	حِجْر (ḥiǧr)

Note on empty counterparts: An Arabic technical term.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Qur’anic reason vocabulary

Near concepts. Nuhā, Reason (akıl)

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 54

↑ parent: Qur’anic reason vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic reason vocabulary › Baṣīra

Definition. Inward seeing or insight, described traditionally through the heart’s apprehension of truth.

Example. Anticipating the consequences of a decision.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From b-ṣ-r, see: baṣar and baṣīra distinguish physical sight and inward insight. A traditional account invokes the divinely illuminated heart and compares it with theoretical intellect. 14 69

Seven language fields

Turkish	basiret, feraset
Ancient Greek	διόρασις (diorasis)
Latin	perspicacia
English	insight
German	Einsicht
French	clairvoyance, perspicacité
Arabic	بَصِيرَة، فِرَاسَة (baṣīra, firāsa)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Qur’anic reason vocabulary

Near concepts. Vision, Naẓar, Qalb (heart in apprehension)

Equivalence caution. French clairvoyance must not automatically be read as fortune-telling.

Cross-relations

shared root: Vision. Baṣar and baṣīra share an Arabic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 69

↑ parent: Qur’anic reason vocabulary

4 child records

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic verbs of thinking

Definition. Verbs for reasoning, reflecting, understanding deeply and considering consequences.

Example. Questions asking whether people reason or reflect.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

A grouping based on the TDV Islamic Encyclopaedia entry Düşünme. 69

Seven language fields

Turkish	düşünme fiilleri
Ancient Greek	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
Latin	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
English	Qurʾanic verbs of thinking
German	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
French	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
Arabic	أفعال التفكير في القرآن

Note on empty counterparts: This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Child concepts. Taʿaqqul, Tafakkur, Tafaqquh, Tadabbur

Near concepts. Thinking (activity)

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 69 55

↑ parent: Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic verbs of thinking › Taʿaqqul
Definition. Reasoning or understanding, using verbal forms of ʿ-q-l.
Example. The question a-fa-lā taʿqilūn.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
See Reason. The inherited Quranic Arabic Corpus count records 49 occurrences, all verbal. 14 55
Seven language fields
Turkish taakkul, akletme
Ancient Greek νοεῖν (noein)
Latin intellegere
English to reason, understand
German verstehen
French comprendre
Arabic تَعَقُّل، عَقَلَ (taʿaqqul, ʿaqala)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Qur’anic verbs of thinking
Near concepts. Reason (akıl), Tafakkur
Cross-relations
- shared root: Reason (akıl). The terms share the root ʿ-q-l. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 55
Record class: primary text. Sources: 55
↑ parent: Qur’anic verbs of thinking
Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic verbs of thinking › Tafakkur
Definition. Reflecting by moving between relations, including reflection on creation.
Example. Considering the order of the world while looking at the night sky.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Arabic form V of f-k-r, shared with fikr. The TDV Düşünme entry also describes reflection on consequences. 14 69
Seven language fields
Turkish tefekkür
Ancient Greek θεωρία (theōria), yaklaşık
Latin contemplatio
English reflection, contemplation
German Nachdenken
French réflexion
Arabic تَفَكُّر (tafakkur)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Qur’anic verbs of thinking
Near concepts. Idea (fikir), Tadabbur, Thinking (activity)
Equivalence caution. It is not identical to Greek theōria.
Cross-relations
- shared root: Idea (fikir). The terms share the root f-k-r. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 69 55
↑ parent: Qur’anic verbs of thinking

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic verbs of thinking › Tafaqquh

Definition. Deep understanding or apprehension.

Example. Understanding a statement’s purpose as well as its wording.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From f-q-h, understand, also the root of fiqh, legal understanding. 14

Seven language fields

Turkish	tefakkuh
Ancient Greek	—— An Arabic technical term.
Latin	—— An Arabic technical term.
English	deep understanding
German	tiefes Verstehen
French	compréhension profonde
Arabic	تَفَقُّه (tafaqquh)

Note on empty counterparts: An Arabic technical term.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Qur’anic verbs of thinking

Near concepts. Taʿaqqul

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14

↑ parent: Qur’anic verbs of thinking

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic verbs of thinking › Tadabbur

Definition. Considering consequences and what lies beyond an immediate statement.

Example. Considering a contract’s future consequences before signing.

Period. Qur’anic period (seventh century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From d-b-r, back/end, shared with tadbīr. Qur’an 4:82 and 47:24 call for reflection on the text. 14 69

Seven language fields

Turkish	tedebbür
Ancient Greek	—— No exact equivalent in Ancient Greek or Latin.
Latin	—— No exact equivalent in Ancient Greek or Latin.
English	pondering, reflecting on consequences
German	Bedenken
French	méditation
Arabic	تَدَبُّر (tadabbur)

Note on empty counterparts: No exact equivalent in Ancient Greek or Latin.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Qur’anic verbs of thinking

Near concepts. Tafakkur

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 69 55

↑ parent: Qur’anic verbs of thinking

4 child records

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic looking and remembrance

Definition. Terms for looking, taking a lesson and remembering: naẓar, iʿtibār, tadhakkur and dhikr.

Example. An invitation to consider camels, sky and mountains.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational heading used in this study.

Seven language fields

Turkish	bakış ve anma
Ancient Greek	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
Latin	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
English	looking and remembering
German	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
French	—— This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.
Arabic	النظر والتذكر

Note on empty counterparts: This heading groups Arabic vocabulary.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Child concepts. Naẓar, Iʿtibār, Tadhakkur, Dhikr

Near concepts. Naẓar, Tadhakkur

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 69

↑ parent: Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic looking and remembrance › Iʿtibār

Definition. Moving from what is observed towards what is not, including taking a lesson.

Example. Learning from a ruined city.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From ʿ-b-r, cross; taking a lesson involves moving from one situation to another. Turkish itibar also developed a reputation sense. 14 69

Seven language fields

Turkish	itibar, ibret
Ancient Greek	—— No exact equivalent in ancient languages.
Latin	—— No exact equivalent in ancient languages.
English	taking a lesson
German	Lehre ziehen
French	tirer une leçon
Arabic	اِعْتِبَار (iʿtibār)

Note on empty counterparts: No exact equivalent in ancient languages.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Qur’anic looking and remembrance

Near concepts. Inference, Naẓar

Equivalence caution. Distinguish this use from everyday reputation or prestige.

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 69

↑ parent: Qur’anic looking and remembrance

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Qur’anic looking and remembrance › Tadhakkur
Definition. Reflective remembering and remembrance.
Example. The connection of wisdom and taking heed in 2:269.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Form V of dh-k-r, shared with dhikr and dhākira. 14 69
Seven language fields
Turkish tezekkür
Ancient Greek ἀνάμνησις (anamnēsis)
Latin recordatio
English remembrance, taking heed
German Besinnung
French remémoration
Arabic تَذَكُّر (taḏakkur)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Qur’anic looking and remembrance
Near concepts. Remembrance, Memory, Dhikr
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Remembrance. Turkish renders tezekkür through anma and hatırlama, remembrance and recollection. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 69
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 69 55
↑ parent: Qur’anic looking and remembrance

4 child records

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Contents of inward apprehension

Definition. The contents associated with al-Tirmidhī’s circles and related Qur’anic knowing: wisdom, recognition, faith and troubling suggestion.

Example. One person can experience doubt alongside faith.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational heading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	idrakin içerikleri
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	contents of inner cognition
German	—— An organising heading used in this work.
French	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Arabic	—— An organising heading used in this work.

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Child concepts. Ḥikma, Maʿrifa, Īmān, Waswasa

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 40

↑ parent: Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Contents of inward apprehension › Ḥikma
Definition. Appropriate understanding and conduct; described as a gift in the Qur’an.
Example. The great good associated with receiving wisdom in 2:269.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
From ḥ-k-m, judge/restrain, associated with ḥakama, a bridle. Islamic philosophy also uses it for philosophy itself. 14 69
Seven language fields
Turkish hikmet, bilgelik
Ancient Greek σοφία (sophia)
Latin sapientia
English wisdom
German Weisheit
French sagesse
Arabic حِكْمَة (ḥikma)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Contents of inward apprehension
Near concepts. Wisdom, Theoretical wisdom, Ḥokhmah
Cross-relations
- shared origin: Ḥokhmah. Hebrew ḥokhmah and Arabic ḥikma share a Semitic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
- translation equivalent: Wisdom. Wisdom and ḥikma can be compared in some contexts. The sense in a particular passage is not coextensive with later philosophical uses. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 14
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 14 55
↑ parent: Contents of inward apprehension

Thinking › Inner apprehension and soul vocabulary › Contents of inward apprehension › Waswasa

Definition. A troubling inward whisper or suggestion.

Example. Wanting to recheck a door despite remembering locking it.

Period. al-Tirmidhī (tenth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

The reduplicated w-s-w-s imitates whispering. Al-Tirmidhī relates it to ṣadr. 14 40

Seven language fields

Turkish	vesvese
Ancient Greek	—— No exact equivalent in Ancient Greek or Latin.
Latin	—— No exact equivalent in Ancient Greek or Latin.
English	insinuating whisper
German	Einflüsterung
French	chuchotement insidieux
Arabic	وَسْوَسَة (waswasa)

Note on empty counterparts: No exact equivalent in Ancient Greek or Latin.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Contents of inward apprehension

Near concepts. Ṣadr

Equivalence caution. An example is not a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Record class: theological tradition. Sources: 40 14

↑ parent: Contents of inward apprehension

6 child records

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories

Definition. Conceptual chains from nous and active intellect to intellectus and Kant’s faculties.

Example. Asking which account of intellect a text means.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organisational reading heading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	akıl kuramları
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	theories of intellect
German	Vernunfttheorien
French	théories de l'intellect
Arabic	نظريات العقل

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Nous, Logos, Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy, Emanation and conjunction, Intellectus, Kant’s faculties

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

4 child records

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Nous

Definition. Apprehending intellect; a cosmic ordering principle in Anaxagoras and a focus of Aristotle’s passive/active distinction.

Example. Suddenly grasping why a geometrical proof holds.

Period. Homeric period

Word and term history Disputed origin; competing proposals

Its origin is uncertain; it is related to noein, perceive/understand, with apprehension prominent in Homer. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	akıl
Ancient Greek	νοῦς (nous)
Latin	intellectus, mens
English	intellect, mind
German	Vernunft, Geist
French	intellect
Arabic	عَقْل (ʿaql)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Languages of intellect theories

Child concepts. Passive intellect, Active intellect, Thought thinking itself, Psychē

Near concepts. Reason (akıl), Intellectus, Thought thinking itself

Equivalence caution. Nous is not simply modern mind.

Cross-relations

translation equivalent: Reason (akıl). Arabic philosophical translations used ʿaql for nous. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53
translation equivalent: Intellectus. Latin translations render nous as intellectus. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 51
shared root: Metanoia. Metanoia is formed with noein. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 31 76 52

↑ parent: Languages of intellect theories

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Nous › Passive intellect

Definition. In Aristotle, intellect capable of receiving forms, compared with an unwritten tablet.

Example. A mind capable of learning a language not yet learned.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Nous pathētikos occurs in De Anima III.5. Arabic material intellect and Latin intellectus possibilis belong to the interpretive translation tradition. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	edilgen akıl
Ancient Greek	νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathētikos)
Latin	intellectus possibilis
English	passive intellect
German	leidender Verstand
French	intellect patient
Arabic	العقل الهيولاني (ʿaql hayūlānī)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Nous

Near concepts. Potential intellect, Intellectus possibilis

Cross-relations

translation equivalent: Potential intellect. Accounts of material and potential intellect develop through interpretations of pathētikos nous. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53
translation equivalent: Intellectus possibilis. The connection comes through Latin translations of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53

Record class: primary text. Sources: 31 53

↑ parent: Nous

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Nous › Active intellect

Definition. Intellect making potential knowledge actual, compared with light making colours visible.

Example. Light reveals objects in a dark room.

Period. Aristotle (before the common era fourth century)

Word and term history Disputed origin; competing proposals

Aristotle does not explicitly use poiētikos as this label; later commentators, including Alexander of Aphrodisias, established it. Arabic and Latin terms follow that tradition. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	etkin akıl
Ancient Greek	νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poiētikos, geç dönem adlandırma)
Latin	intellectus agens
English	active intellect
German	tätiger Verstand
French	intellect agent
Arabic	العقل الفعّال (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Nous

Near concepts. Active intellect, Intellectus agens

Equivalence caution. Do not identify it without argument with thought thinking itself in Metaphysics XII.

Cross-relations

conceptual transformation: Active intellect. Al-Fārābī’s active intellect develops from interpretations of Aristotle into a cosmological intellect; the concepts are not identical. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53

Record class: primary text. Sources: 31 53

↑ parent: Nous

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Nous › Thought thinking itself

Definition. The activity attributed to the first mover in Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII.

Example. An intellect whose object is its own thinking.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Metaphysics XII.9, 1074b34. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	kendini düşünen düşünce
Ancient Greek	νόησις νοήσεως (noēsis noēseōs)
Latin	intellectio intellectionis
English	thinking of thinking
German	Denken des Denkens
French	pensée de la pensée
Arabic	—— No single established formula in the Arabic translation tradition has been verified in this version.

Note on empty counterparts: No single established formula in the Arabic translation tradition has been verified in this version.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Nous

Near concepts. Nous, Active intellect

Record class: primary text. Sources: 31

↑ parent: Nous

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Nous › Psychē
Definition. Breath or principle of life, with feeling, character and thinking senses in classical Greek.
Example. In Homer, a shade departing at death.
Period. Homeric period; Plato (before the common era fourth century)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Probably related to psychein, blow/cool; its range changes between Homer and Plato. 52 76
Seven language fields
Turkish ruh, can
Ancient Greek ψυχή (psychē)
Latin anima
English soul, psyche
German Seele
French âme
Arabic نَفْس (nafs)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Nous
Near concepts. Soul and life, Nefesh, Nafs
Equivalence caution. It is not identical to the subject matter of modern psychology.
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Nefesh. The Septuagint commonly translates nefesh as psychē. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 76 52
↑ parent: Nous

3 child records
Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Logos
Definition. Speech, account, calculation, ratio and reason; also an ordering principle in Heraclitus and Stoicism.
Example. The opening of John’s Gospel invokes Logos.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
From legein, gather/count/say. Context determines whether speech, proportion, account or reason is appropriate. 52
Seven language fields
Turkish logos, söz, akıl
Ancient Greek λόγος (logos)
Latin ratio, verbum
English word, reason, account
German Wort, Vernunft
French parole, raison
Arabic كَلِمَة، نُطْق (kalima, nuṭq)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Languages of intellect theories
Child concepts. Ratio, Stoic logos, Pneuma
Near concepts. Reason (principle), Ratio, Pneuma
Equivalence caution. Do not always translate it as reason or make John’s text a simple quotation of Stoicism.
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 52 77
↑ parent: Languages of intellect theories
- Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Logos › Pneuma
  Definition. Breath or wind; in Stoicism, the active matter ordering the cosmos; in the New Testament, Spirit.
  Example. Those who live according to the Spirit in Romans 8:5.
  Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
  Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
  From pnein, to breathe. Latin spiritus, from spirare, translates a similar image. 52 51
  Seven language fields
  Turkish soluk, ruh
  Ancient Greek πνεῦμα (pneuma)
  Latin spiritus
  English breath, spirit
  German Geist, Hauch
  French souffle, esprit
  Arabic رُوح (rūḥ)
  ≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
  Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
  Parent concept. Logos
  Near concepts. Ruaḥ, Rūḥ, Logos
  Cross-relations
  - translation equivalent: Ruaḥ. The Septuagint commonly translates ruaḥ as pneuma. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52
  - similar image: Soul and life. The connection between breath and spirit can be compared across languages. A similar image is not a shared linguistic origin. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52 14
  Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 52
  ↑ parent: Logos

4 child records

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Definition. Distinctions among the conditions of human intellect in al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

Example. Distinguishing a student’s capacity to know, acquired knowledge and developed understanding.

Period. al-Fārābī (tenth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

The classification draws on al-Fārābī’s Risāla fī al-ʿaql. 53

Seven language fields

Turkish	akıl mertebeleri
Ancient Greek	—— This fourfold classification does not occur in Ancient Greek.
Latin	gradus intellectus
English	grades of intellect
German	Stufen des Intellekts
French	degrés de l'intellect
Arabic	مراتب العقل (marātib al-ʿaql)

Note on empty counterparts: This fourfold classification does not occur in Ancient Greek.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Languages of intellect theories

Child concepts. Potential intellect, Actual intellect, Acquired intellect, Active intellect

Near concepts. Nous, Active intellect

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53 61

↑ parent: Languages of intellect theories

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy › Potential intellect

Definition. Intellect capable of knowing before it has acquired knowledge; also called material intellect.

Example. A child’s capacity to learn to read before learning how.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic quwwa, power or possibility, renders Greek dynamis. 14 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilkuvve akıl
Ancient Greek	νοῦς δυνάμει (nous dynamei)
Latin	intellectus in potentia
English	potential intellect
German	potenzieller Intellekt
French	intellect en puissance
Arabic	العقل بالقوة (al-ʿaql bi-l-quwwa)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Near concepts. Passive intellect

Cross-relations

translation equivalent: Passive intellect. Accounts of material and potential intellect develop through interpretations of pathētikos nous. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53

↑ parent: Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy › Actual intellect

Definition. Intellect that has acquired forms and can use them.

Example. The knowledge of someone who has learned to read.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic fiʿl, activity, renders Greek energeia. 14 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilfiil akıl
Ancient Greek	νοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ (nous energeiai)
Latin	intellectus in actu
English	actual intellect
German	aktueller Intellekt
French	intellect en acte
Arabic	العقل بالفعل (al-ʿaql bi-l-fiʿl)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Near concepts. Potential intellect, Acquired intellect

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53

↑ parent: Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy › Acquired intellect

Definition. Human intellect that apprehends universals and stands closest to the active intellect.

Example. A mathematician’s developed grasp of principles.

Period. al-Fārābī (tenth century); Ibn Sīnā (eleventh century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic mustafād means acquired; it has a technical use in al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. 14 53

Seven language fields

Turkish	müstefâd akıl
Ancient Greek	—— No Ancient Greek equivalent is supplied.
Latin	intellectus adeptus
English	acquired intellect
German	erworbener Intellekt
French	intellect acquis
Arabic	العقل المستفاد (al-ʿaql al-mustafād)

Note on empty counterparts: No Ancient Greek equivalent is supplied.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Near concepts. Active intellect

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53

↑ parent: Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy › Active intellect

Definition. A separate intellect that actualises human intellect; al-Fārābī associates it with the angel of revelation.

Example. The comparison with sunlight enabling the eye to see.

Period. Aristotle (before the common era fourth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Arabic faʿʿāl means intensely active. In the interpretative tradition, Aristotle’s active intellect becomes a cosmological intellect; continuity of wording does not establish identity of concept. 14 53

Seven language fields

Turkish	faal akıl
Ancient Greek	νοῦς ποιητικός (yorum geleneği)
Latin	intellectus agens
English	active intellect
German	tätiger Intellekt
French	intellect agent
Arabic	العقل الفعّال (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

Near concepts. Active intellect, Emanation and conjunction, Intellectus agens

Equivalence caution. Do not identify it without qualification with Aristotle’s active intellect, or present it and the three conditions of human intellect as four equivalent stages.

Cross-relations

conceptual transformation: Active intellect. Al-Fārābī’s active intellect develops from interpretations of Aristotle into a cosmological intellect; the concepts are not identical. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53
translation equivalent: Intellectus agens. Twelfth-century Latin translations supply the connection. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53 61

↑ parent: Degrees of intellect in Arabic philosophy

2 child records
Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Emanation and conjunction
Definition. Emanation concerns intellects and beings proceeding from the One; conjunction concerns human intellect’s relation to the active intellect.
Example. The comparison with light spreading from its source.
Period. Plotinus (third century)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Arabic ṣ-d-r concerns coming forth and f-y-ḍ overflowing; the vocabulary is used to render Plotinus’s proodos. 14 52
Seven language fields
Turkish sudûr
Ancient Greek πρόοδος (proodos)
Latin emanatio
English emanation
German Emanation
French émanation
Arabic صُدُور، فَيْض (ṣudūr, fayḍ)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Languages of intellect theories
Child concepts. Nous in Plotinus, Conjunction
Near concepts. Active intellect, Nous in Plotinus
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 79 53
↑ parent: Languages of intellect theories
3 child records
Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Intellectus
Definition. Latin intellect as apprehension, distinguished from ratio in scholastic philosophy.
Example. Grasping a principle compared with demonstrating it step by step.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Intellegere combines inter, between, with legere, to select or read. 51
Seven language fields
Turkish akıl, anlık
Ancient Greek νοῦς (nous)
Latin intellectus
English intellect
German Verstand, Intellekt
French intellect, entendement
Arabic عَقْل (ʿaql)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Languages of intellect theories
Child concepts. Intellectus agens, Intellectus possibilis, Ratio
Near concepts. Nous, Ratio, Understanding (faculty)
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Nous. Latin translations render nous as intellectus. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 51
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 51
↑ parent: Languages of intellect theories
- Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Intellectus › Intellectus agens
  Definition. The active intellect in Latin scholasticism; for Aquinas, a power of each human soul.
  Example. Aquinas’s opposition to a single intellect shared by everyone in his reading of Ibn Rushd.
  Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
  Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
  The term renders Arabic al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl in twelfth-century translations. 51
  Seven language fields
  Turkish etkin akıl
  Ancient Greek νοῦς ποιητικός
  Latin intellectus agens
  English agent intellect
  German tätiger Verstand
  French intellect agent
  Arabic العقل الفعّال
  ≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
  Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
  Parent concept. Intellectus
  Near concepts. Active intellect, Active intellect
  Cross-relations
  - translation equivalent: Active intellect. Twelfth-century Latin translations supply the connection. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53
  Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53
  ↑ parent: Intellectus
- Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Intellectus › Intellectus possibilis
  Definition. The possible intellect in Latin scholasticism: intellect receptive to forms.
  Example. A mind capable of learning a concept.
  Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
  Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
  The term became established through Latin translations of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries. 51
  Seven language fields
  Turkish olası akıl
  Ancient Greek νοῦς παθητικός
  Latin intellectus possibilis
  English possible intellect
  German möglicher Verstand
  French intellect possible
  Arabic العقل الهيولاني
  ≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
  Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
  Parent concept. Intellectus
  Near concepts. Passive intellect, Potential intellect
  Cross-relations
  - translation equivalent: Passive intellect. The connection comes through Latin translations of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 53
  Record class: philosophical. Sources: 53
  ↑ parent: Intellectus

4 child records

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Kant’s faculties

Definition. The division of work among sensibility, understanding and reason.

Example. Kant’s contrast between intuitions without concepts and concepts without intuitions.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

This heading collects the distinctions among faculties in Critique of Pure Reason. 49

Seven language fields

Turkish	Kant'ın yetileri
Ancient Greek	—— This heading groups a classification.
Latin	—— This heading groups a classification.
English	Kant's faculties
German	Erkenntnisvermögen
French	facultés kantiennes
Arabic	ملكات كانط

Note on empty counterparts: This heading groups a classification.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Languages of intellect theories

Child concepts. Sensibility, Understanding, Reason in Kant, Category

Near concepts. Understanding, Reason in Kant

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 3 49

↑ parent: Languages of intellect theories

Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Kant’s faculties › Sensibility
Definition. The capacity through which objects are given to us in the forms of space and time; Kant’s Sinnlichkeit.
Example. Seeing a table, as distinct from identifying it through the concept of a table.
Period. Kant (eighteenth century)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
German Sinn concerns sense and meaning. Kant’s technical use must be distinguished from everyday emotional sensitivity. 48
Seven language fields
Turkish duyarlık
Ancient Greek αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)
Latin sensibilitas
English sensibility
German Sinnlichkeit
French sensibilité
Arabic الحساسية (modern çeviri)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Kant’s faculties
Near concepts. Perception, Understanding
Equivalence caution. Do not equate it with emotional sensitivity.
Cross-relations
- similar use: Perception. Sensibility concerns the capacity to receive what is given, rather than perception as such. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 49
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 3 49
↑ parent: Kant’s faculties
Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Kant’s faculties › Understanding
Definition. The faculty organising intuition through concepts and categories; Kant’s Verstand.
Example. Judging that one event causes another.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
From verstehen, to understand. The historical relation between ver- and stehen cannot be translated directly through the present-day meaning of standing. 48
Seven language fields
Turkish anlama yetisi, anlık
Ancient Greek ——
Latin intellectus
English understanding
German Verstand
French entendement
Arabic الفهم (al-fahm)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Kant’s faculties
Near concepts. Understanding (faculty), Reason in Kant, Category
Equivalence caution. Do not equate it with reason, Vernunft.
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Understanding (faculty). A Turkish rendering of Verstand must be located in its Kant translation. Using akıl does not remove the distinction from Vernunft. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 49
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 3 49
↑ parent: Kant’s faculties
Thinking › Languages of intellect theories › Kant’s faculties › Reason in Kant
Definition. The faculty seeking the highest unity of concepts, forming ideas and principles, and giving the moral law.
Example. Asking whether the universe has a beginning.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
The word is related to vernehmen, to perceive or receive by hearing. 48
Seven language fields
Turkish akıl
Ancient Greek ——
Latin ratio
English reason
German Vernunft
French raison
Arabic العقل
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Kant’s faculties
Near concepts. Reason (principle), Understanding
Equivalence caution. Not every German use of Vernunft is Kantian. Do not treat Kantian reason and the active intellect as versions of the same higher principle.
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Reason (principle). The rendering of Vernunft must be tracked in the chosen edition. Where both terms receive the same Turkish word, the German terms should also be shown. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 49
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 3 49
↑ parent: Kant’s faculties

6 child records

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being

Definition. Hebrew and Greek scriptural vocabulary alongside questions about mind, body and free will.

Example. The terms in an injunction to love with all one’s heart and mind.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organising heading for reading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	metinler ve varlık
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	scripture and being
German	Schrift und Sein
French	écriture et être
Arabic	—— An organising heading used in this work.

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Lev, Nefesh, Hebrew vocabulary of knowing, New Testament vocabulary of transformation, Positions on mind and body, Free will

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

3 child records

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Lev

Definition. Hebrew heart, with uses concerning thought, orientation and feeling.

Example. Proverbs 15:14: Turkish Yeni Çeviri uses akıllı yürek, while the Jewish Publication Society’s 1985 translation uses “the mind of a prudent man”.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Hebrew לֵב, lev, also has the longer form לֵבָב, levav. Translators choose heart or mind according to context; saying that Hebrew has no word for mind would overstate the point. 75

Seven language fields

Turkish	yürek, kalp
Ancient Greek	καρδία (kardia)
Latin	cor
English	heart, mind
German	Herz
French	cœur
Arabic	قَلْب (qalb)

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Sacred texts and questions of being

Child concepts. Levav, Kardia, Dianoia

Near concepts. Qalb (heart in apprehension), Kardia, Dianoia

Equivalence caution. Do not restrict it to an organ of feeling.

Cross-relations

translation equivalent: Kardia. The Septuagint commonly translates lev as kardia. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 77
comparison with another passage: Dianoia. Deuteronomy 6:5 and Mark 12:30 are different passages. Juxtaposition is not proof of a translation equivalence; original text and translation version must be tracked separately. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 81 80
similar use: Qalb (heart in apprehension). Heart vocabulary accompanies apprehension in some passages. This does not show that both traditions share the same account of the person or that every use is synonymous. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 75 80 82

↑ parent: Sacred texts and questions of being

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Lev › Kardia
Definition. Greek heart; in the New Testament, also a site of thought and reasoning.
Example. The scribes reasoning in their hearts, en tais kardiais, in Mark 2:6.
Period. Septuagint (before the common era third–second centuries)
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Kardia is a usual rendering of Hebrew lev in the Septuagint. 77 52
Seven language fields
Turkish yürek
Ancient Greek καρδία (kardia)
Latin cor
English heart
German Herz
French cœur
Arabic قَلْب
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Lev
Near concepts. Lev, Qalb (heart in apprehension), Dianoia
Cross-relations
- translation equivalent: Lev. The Septuagint commonly translates lev as kardia. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 77
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 77 81
↑ parent: Lev

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Lev › Dianoia

Definition. Thought or understanding; a New Testament term often translated as mind.

Example. With all one’s mind, ex holēs tēs dianoias, in Mark 12:30.

Period. Plato (before the common era fourth century)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Combines dia-, through, with noein, to think. In Plato it distinguishes discursive thought from the intuitive apprehension associated with nous. 52 77

Seven language fields

Turkish	akıl, düşünce
Ancient Greek	διάνοια (dianoia)
Latin	mens
English	mind, understanding
German	Gesinnung, Verstand
French	pensée, intelligence
Arabic	—— No exact Arabic term; translations use ʿaql, fikr or ḏihn.

Note on empty counterparts: No exact Arabic term; translations use ʿaql, fikr or ḏihn.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Lev

Near concepts. Nous, Kardia

Cross-relations

comparison with another passage: Lev. Deuteronomy 6:5 and Mark 12:30 are different passages. Juxtaposition is not proof of a translation equivalence; original text and translation version must be tracked separately. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 81 80

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 77 81

↑ parent: Lev

3 child records
Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Nefesh
Definition. Hebrew life, living being or person.
Example. Adam becoming a living being, le-nefesh ḥayyah, in Genesis 2:7.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ shares a Semitic root with Arabic nafs. In Genesis 2:7 it concerns the living being, rather than a soul independent of the body. 75
Seven language fields
Turkish can, yaşayan varlık
Ancient Greek ψυχή (psychē)
Latin anima
English soul, living being
German Seele
French âme, être vivant
Arabic نَفْس (nafs)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Sacred texts and questions of being
Child concepts. Neshamah, Ruaḥ, Meod
Near concepts. Nafs, Psychē, Neshamah
Equivalence caution. Do not translate it as soul in every context.
Cross-relations
- shared origin: Nafs. Hebrew nefesh and Arabic nafs share a Semitic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
- translation equivalent: Psychē. The Septuagint commonly translates nefesh as psychē. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 75 80
↑ parent: Sacred texts and questions of being
- Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Nefesh › Ruaḥ
  Definition. Breath, wind or spirit.
  Example. The relation between spirit, divine breath and understanding in Job 32:8.
  Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
  Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
  Hebrew רוּחַ shares a Semitic root with Arabic rūḥ. 75 14
  Seven language fields
  Turkish ruh, rüzgâr
  Ancient Greek πνεῦμα (pneuma)
  Latin spiritus
  English spirit, wind
  German Geist, Wind
  French esprit, vent
  Arabic رُوح (rūḥ)
  ≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
  Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
  Parent concept. Nefesh
  Near concepts. Pneuma, Rūḥ
  Cross-relations
  - shared origin: Rūḥ. Hebrew ruaḥ and Arabic rūḥ share a Semitic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
  - translation equivalent: Pneuma. The Septuagint commonly translates ruaḥ as pneuma. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52
  Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 75 80
  ↑ parent: Nefesh

4 child records

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Hebrew vocabulary of knowing

Definition. Ḥokhmah, tevunah, daʿat and binah: wisdom, understanding, knowledge and discernment.

Example. The capacities attributed to the craftsperson in Exodus 35:31.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organising heading used in this atlas.

Seven language fields

Turkish	bilme sözvarlığı
Ancient Greek	—— This heading groups Hebrew vocabulary.
Latin	—— This heading groups Hebrew vocabulary.
English	Hebrew vocabulary of knowing
German	—— This heading groups Hebrew vocabulary.
French	—— This heading groups Hebrew vocabulary.
Arabic	—— This heading groups Hebrew vocabulary.

Note on empty counterparts: This heading groups Hebrew vocabulary.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Sacred texts and questions of being

Child concepts. Ḥokhmah, Tevunah, Daʿat, Binah

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 75

↑ parent: Sacred texts and questions of being

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Hebrew vocabulary of knowing › Ḥokhmah
Definition. Wisdom, also encompassing skill and mastery.
Example. Exodus 35:31: Yeni Çeviri uses beceri; the Jewish Publication Society translation uses skill.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Hebrew חׇכְמָה shares a Semitic root with Arabic ḥikma. 75
Seven language fields
Turkish bilgelik, beceri
Ancient Greek σοφία (sophia)
Latin sapientia
English wisdom, skill
German Weisheit
French sagesse
Arabic حِكْمَة (ḥikma)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Hebrew vocabulary of knowing
Near concepts. Ḥikma, Theoretical wisdom
Cross-relations
- shared origin: Ḥikma. Hebrew ḥokhmah and Arabic ḥikma share a Semitic root. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 75 14
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 75 80 82
↑ parent: Hebrew vocabulary of knowing

4 child records

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › New Testament vocabulary of transformation

Definition. Metanoia, syneidēsis, phroneō and ischys: change of mind, conscience, directing the mind and strength.

Example. The injunction to be transformed through renewal of the mind.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organising heading used in this atlas.

Seven language fields

Turkish	dönüşüm sözvarlığı
Ancient Greek	—— This heading groups Greek vocabulary.
Latin	—— This heading groups Greek vocabulary.
English	New Testament vocabulary of transformation
German	—— This heading groups Greek vocabulary.
French	—— This heading groups Greek vocabulary.
Arabic	—— This heading groups Greek vocabulary.

Note on empty counterparts: This heading groups Greek vocabulary.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Sacred texts and questions of being

Child concepts. Metanoia, Syneidēsis, Phroneō, Ischys

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 77

↑ parent: Sacred texts and questions of being

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › New Testament vocabulary of transformation › Metanoia
Definition. Change of mind; rendered as repentance in the cited Turkish translations.
Example. The call to repent in Matthew 3:2 and Mark 1:15.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
Combines meta-, beyond or change, with noein, to think. The component meanings do not exhaust its religious meaning in context. 52 77
Seven language fields
Turkish tövbe, zihin değişimi
Ancient Greek μετάνοια (metanoia)
Latin paenitentia
English repentance
German Umkehr, Buße
French repentance, conversion
Arabic تَوْبَة (tawba)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. New Testament vocabulary of transformation
Near concepts. Nous
Equivalence caution. Do not reduce it to a psychological change of opinion.
Cross-relations
- shared root: Nous. Metanoia is formed with noein. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 77 81
↑ parent: New Testament vocabulary of transformation
Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › New Testament vocabulary of transformation › Syneidēsis
Definition. Knowing together; in the New Testament, conscience.
Example. Conscience bearing witness in Romans 2:15.
Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.
Word and term history Historical dictionary witness
The word connects syn-, together, with eidenai, to know. Latin conscientia has a comparable formation. Dictionaries distinguish shared knowledge, awareness and moral evaluation; these uses should not be collapsed into one modern concept. 52 51
Seven language fields
Turkish vicdan
Ancient Greek συνείδησις (syneidēsis)
Latin conscientia
English conscience
German Gewissen
French conscience
Arabic ضَمِير (ḍamīr)
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. New Testament vocabulary of transformation
Near concepts. Consciousness
Equivalence caution. We do not make it a direct equivalent of modern consciousness. Its historical sense must be assessed in the passage where it occurs.
Cross-relations
- calque and semantic change: Consciousness. Syneidēsis and conscientia raise questions of historical transmission and semantic change. Conscience, awareness and modern consciousness require distinct textual witnesses. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52 50
- misleading equivalent: Consciousness. The role of syneidēsis in a particular passage differs from modern uses of consciousness. One Turkish equivalent cannot carry every historical sense. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52
Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 52 81
↑ parent: New Testament vocabulary of transformation

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › New Testament vocabulary of transformation › Phroneō

Definition. To think or direct one’s mind towards something.

Example. The disposition associated with Christ Jesus in Philippians 2:5.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Related to phrēn, chest or diaphragm, and in the same word family as phronēsis. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	düşünmek, yönelmek
Ancient Greek	φρονέω (phroneō)
Latin	sapere
English	to think, set one's mind on
German	gesinnt sein
French	penser, avoir en vue
Arabic	—— No exact Arabic equivalent is supplied.

Note on empty counterparts: No exact Arabic equivalent is supplied.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. New Testament vocabulary of transformation

Near concepts. Practical wisdom

Cross-relations

shared root: Practical wisdom. The terms belong to the phrēn family. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 52

Record class: historical dictionary. Sources: 52 81

↑ parent: New Testament vocabulary of transformation

4 child records

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Positions on mind and body

Definition. Competing accounts of the relation between the mental and the physical.

Example. Whether pain is a neural signal or something distinct accompanying it.

Period. Descartes (seventeenth century)

Word and term history Modern term history

A heading for modern philosophical debates following Descartes.

Seven language fields

Turkish	zihin-beden sorunu
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	mind-body problem
German	Leib-Seele-Problem
French	problème corps-esprit
Arabic	مشكلة العقل والجسد

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Meaning · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Sacred texts and questions of being

Child concepts. Substance dualism, Physicalism, Functionalism, Hylomorphism

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 43 12

↑ parent: Sacred texts and questions of being

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Positions on mind and body › Functionalism
Definition. The view that mental states are characterised by their causal roles rather than their material constitution.
Example. The comparison with the same software running on different computers.
Period. 1960
Word and term history Modern term history
Established through Putnam’s work in the 1960s; Latin functio concerns performance or fulfilment.
Seven language fields
Turkish işlevselcilik
Ancient Greek —— A modern term.
Latin —— A modern term.
English functionalism
German Funktionalismus
French fonctionnalisme
Arabic الوظيفية
Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Body See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Positions on mind and body
Near concepts. The hard problem, Chinese Room
Cross-relations
- objects to: The hard problem. Chalmers argues that functional explanation does not explain experience. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 12
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 18 12
↑ parent: Positions on mind and body

3 child records

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Free will

Definition. Questions about whether choices are undetermined and what makes responsibility possible.

Example. Asking whether we could have acted otherwise.

Period. Aristotle (before the common era fourth century); Stoic period; Augustine (fourth–fifth centuries)

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Latin liberum arbitrium, free judgement, becomes central with Augustine. Greek to eph’ hēmin, what depends on us, occurs in Stoic and Aristotelian contexts. Debates over compulsion and choice in kalām frame related questions differently. 51 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	özgür irade
Ancient Greek	τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν (to eph' hēmin)
Latin	liberum arbitrium
English	free will
German	freier Wille
French	libre arbitre
Arabic	حُرِّيَّة الإرادة، الاختيار

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Sacred texts and questions of being

Child concepts. Responsibility, Determinism, Compatibilism

Near concepts. Will, Responsibility

Record class: philosophical. Sources: 52

↑ parent: Sacred texts and questions of being

Thinking › Sacred texts and questions of being › Free will › Responsibility

Definition. Taking ownership of an action’s consequences and reasons.

Example. Acknowledging and correcting a mistake.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Kubbealtı Lugatı supplies no derivation for Turkish sorumluluk. Its apparent formation is sor-um-lu-luk, suggesting someone answerable when questioned; this is a morphological reading. The Arabic mesʾūl in Qur’an 17:36 carries an image of being questioned. French responsabilité became established in the eighteenth century, in a family derived from Latin respondere, to answer. 45 14 50

Seven language fields

Turkish	sorumluluk
Ancient Greek	—— No corresponding abstract noun in Ancient Greek or Classical Latin.
Latin	—— No corresponding abstract noun in Ancient Greek or Classical Latin.
English	responsibility
German	Verantwortung
French	responsabilité
Arabic	مَسْؤُولِيَّة (masʾūliyya)

Note on empty counterparts: No corresponding abstract noun in Ancient Greek or Classical Latin.

Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Free will

Near concepts. Epistemic orchestration, Verification

Cross-relations

proposal in this work: Epistemic orchestration. We propose making the roles of justification and checking explicit. Responsibility is not reduced to the user alone; designers, providers and institutions also matter. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 9

Record class: working definition. Sources: 50

↑ parent: Free will

6 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems

Definition. Concepts for thinking with artificial intelligence: performance, agency, bias and verification.

Example. Checking a conversational model’s draft against its sources.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

An organising heading for reading.

Seven language fields

Turkish	yapay sistemlerle düşünme
Ancient Greek	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Latin	—— An organising heading used in this work.
English	thinking with artificial systems
German	—— An organising heading used in this work.
French	—— An organising heading used in this work.
Arabic	—— An organising heading used in this work.

Note on empty counterparts: An organising heading used in this work.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking

Child concepts. Artificial intelligence, Performance, Metacognition, Agency, Bias, Verification

Record class: working definition. Sources: origin sources above

↑ parent: Thinking

4 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Artificial intelligence

Definition. Computational systems performing functions such as learning, inference, language use and decision-making, and the field studying them.

Example. A program summarising a text or recognising objects in an image.

Period. 1955

Word and term history Modern term history

The term was proposed in the 1955 Dartmouth summer research proposal by John McCarthy and colleagues.

Seven language fields

Turkish	yapay zekâ
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	artificial intelligence
German	künstliche Intelligenz
French	intelligence artificielle
Arabic	الذكاء الاصطناعي (aḏ-ḏakāʾ al-iṣṭināʿī)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking with artificial systems

Child concepts. Large language model, Training data, Generation, Chinese Room

Near concepts. Large language model, Performance

Equivalence caution. The word intelligence does not itself establish understanding or consciousness.

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 59

↑ parent: Thinking with artificial systems

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Artificial intelligence › Large language model

Definition. An artificial neural network trained on very large text collections to learn probabilities over sequences.

Example. A system completing a sentence or generating an answer.

Period. 1980–2018

Word and term history Modern term history

Statistical language model has been used since the 1980s; large became established with scaled models after 2018.

Seven language fields

Turkish	büyük dil modeli
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	large language model
German	großes Sprachmodell
French	grand modèle de langage
Arabic	نموذج لغوي كبير (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Body See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Artificial intelligence

Near concepts. Stochastic parrot, Form

Cross-relations

objects to: Stochastic parrot. Bender and colleagues discuss language models through data, meaning and conditions of use. The parrot metaphor is neither the whole argument nor a single verdict on every system. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 41

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 41 72

↑ parent: Artificial intelligence

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Artificial intelligence › Chinese Room
Definition. A thought experiment intended to show that rule-governed symbol manipulation does not guarantee understanding.
Example. Someone who knows no Chinese producing appropriate Chinese answers by following a rulebook.
Period. 1980
Word and term history Modern term history
The name of the thought experiment in Searle’s 1980 paper.
Seven language fields
Turkish Çin Odası
Ancient Greek —— A proper name.
Latin —— A proper name.
English Chinese Room
German Chinesisches Zimmer
French chambre chinoise
Arabic الغرفة الصينية
Note on empty counterparts: A proper name.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Life · secondary Meaning See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Artificial intelligence
Near concepts. Syntax, Stochastic parrot, Turing test
Opposing view. Systems reply
Cross-relations
- objects to: Turing test. The Chinese Room challenges the claim that behavioural success alone guarantees understanding. The arrow does not refute Turing’s entire discussion. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 18
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 18
↑ parent: Artificial intelligence

4 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Performance

Definition. A system’s measured success on specified tasks.

Example. A model’s proportion of correct answers on a mathematics test.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

English perform comes through Old French parfournir, to complete. 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	performans, başarım
Ancient Greek	—— No equivalent in ancient languages was sought.
Latin	—— No equivalent in ancient languages was sought.
English	performance
German	Leistung
French	performance
Arabic	أداء (adāʾ)

Note on empty counterparts: No equivalent in ancient languages was sought.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking with artificial systems

Child concepts. Benchmark, Generalisation, Task time horizon, Turing test

Near concepts. Benchmark, Turing test

Equivalence caution. Do not treat it as proof of understanding or consciousness.

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 59 83

↑ parent: Thinking with artificial systems

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Performance › Task time horizon

Definition. The length of tasks a system can complete at a specified success rate, measured by the time they take human experts.

Example. The longest software tasks a model can complete with fifty per cent success.

Period. 2025

Word and term history Modern term history

A measure proposed by Model Evaluation and Threat Research in 2025.

Seven language fields

Turkish	görev süresi ufku
Ancient Greek	—— A new technical term without established translations.
Latin	—— A new technical term without established translations.
English	task-completion time horizon
German	—— A new technical term without established translations.
French	—— A new technical term without established translations.
Arabic	—— A new technical term without established translations.

Note on empty counterparts: A new technical term without established translations.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Performance

Near concepts. Performance, Agency

Equivalence caution. Do not treat it as a measure of agency across life in general.

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 83

↑ parent: Performance

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Performance › Turing test
Definition. A behavioural imitation game proposed in place of the question whether machines think.
Example. Being unable to distinguish a human from a machine in a text exchange.
Period. 1950
Word and term history Modern term history
Proposed as the imitation game in Turing’s 1950 paper.
Seven language fields
Turkish Turing testi, taklit oyunu
Ancient Greek —— A proper name.
Latin —— A proper name.
English Turing test, imitation game
German Turing-Test
French test de Turing
Arabic اختبار تورنغ
Note on empty counterparts: A proper name.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Performance
Near concepts. Performance, Chinese Room
Opposing view. Chinese Room argument
Cross-relations
- objects to: Chinese Room. The Chinese Room challenges the claim that behavioural success alone guarantees understanding. The arrow does not refute Turing’s entire discussion. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 18
Record class: philosophical. Sources: 59
↑ parent: Performance

4 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Metacognition

Definition. Monitoring and regulating one’s thinking.

Example. Recognising that we are unsure whether we know something.

Period. 1970

Word and term history Modern term history

Established through John Flavell’s developmental psychology in the 1970s; combines Greek meta, beyond, with cognition.

Seven language fields

Turkish	üstbiliş
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	metacognition
German	Metakognition
French	métacognition
Arabic	ما وراء المعرفة (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking with artificial systems

Child concepts. Confidence calibration, Error monitoring, Critical thinking, Dual-process theories

Near concepts. Self-consciousness, Confidence calibration, Executive control

Equivalence caution. Do not equate it with self-consciousness.

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 85 16

↑ parent: Thinking with artificial systems

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Metacognition › Critical thinking

Definition. Assessing a claim by weighing reasons, evidence and alternatives.

Example. Questioning a news item’s sources, methods and interests.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Turkish eleştiri renders the role of Greek kritikē, the art of distinguishing. Kubbealtı Lugatı derives it from eleştir- with -I. This version has not verified a source for connecting eleştir- with ele-, to sieve. 52 45

Seven language fields

Turkish	eleştirel düşünme
Ancient Greek	—— A modern compound term.
Latin	—— A modern compound term.
English	critical thinking
German	kritisches Denken
French	pensée critique
Arabic	التفكير النقدي (modern)

Note on empty counterparts: A modern compound term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Metacognition

Near concepts. Verification, Judgment

Cross-relations

inversely associated: Automation overreliance. Lee and colleagues’ survey associated greater trust with less reported critical effort; it did not establish causality. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 9

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 9 86

↑ parent: Metacognition

3 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Agency

Definition. The capacity to initiate and sustain action towards goals.

Example. Software booking an appointment and changing its time when necessary.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From Latin agere, “do, drive”, through agens and agentia. Here Turkish eyleyicilik renders agency; faillik also occurs in philosophical writing, and eyleyici renders software agent. Ajans can name an institution and is not used for this concept. Technical agency admits degrees; moral responsibility and consciousness do not follow automatically. 51

Seven language fields

Turkish	eyleyicilik, faillik
Ancient Greek	—— No corresponding abstract noun in ancient languages.
Latin	—— No corresponding abstract noun in ancient languages.
English	agency
German	Handlungsfähigkeit
French	agentivité
Arabic	الفاعلية (al-fāʿiliyya)

Note on empty counterparts: No corresponding abstract noun in ancient languages.

Layer. Life · secondary Processes See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking with artificial systems

Child concepts. Purpose, Planning, Oversight

Near concepts. Intention, Purpose

Equivalence caution. Do not equate it with moral responsibility.

Record class: theoretical. Sources: 83

↑ parent: Thinking with artificial systems

4 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Bias

Definition. A systematic tendency in judgement or data.

Example. A model associating particular occupations with one gender.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Turkish yanlı derives from yan, side. English bias comes through Old French biais, oblique. 21

Seven language fields

Turkish	yanlılık, önyargı
Ancient Greek	——
Latin	——
English	bias
German	Verzerrung
French	biais
Arabic	تَحَيُّز (taḥayyuz)

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking with artificial systems

Child concepts. Automation overreliance, Feedback loop, Cognitive offloading, Stochastic parrot

Near concepts. Feedback loop, Heuristic

Cross-relations

may amplify: Feedback loop. In Glickman and Sharot’s experiments, biased artificial feedback amplified human bias. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 87

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 87 41

↑ parent: Thinking with artificial systems

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Bias › Automation overreliance

Definition. The tendency to accept an automated recommendation without adequate checking.

Example. Following a navigation instruction even when it leads towards a lake.

Period. 1990

Word and term history Modern term history

Established in aviation and medical ergonomics research in the 1990s.

Seven language fields

Turkish	otomasyona aşırı güven
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.
Latin	—— A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.
English	automation bias
German	Automatisierungsbias
French	biais d'automatisation
Arabic	—— A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term; no established Arabic equivalent was found.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Bias

Near concepts. Confidence calibration, Bias

Cross-relations

inversely associated: Critical thinking. Lee and colleagues’ survey associated greater trust with less reported critical effort; it did not establish causality. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 9

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 9 16

↑ parent: Bias

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Bias › Feedback loop
Definition. A closed relation in which a system’s output changes a subsequent input.
Example. A recommendation system offering more of the material on which we click.
Period. 1948
Word and term history Modern term history
Established in electronics and cybernetics, including Wiener’s 1948 work.
Seven language fields
Turkish geri besleme
Ancient Greek —— A modern term.
Latin —— A modern term.
English feedback loop
German Rückkopplung
French boucle de rétroaction
Arabic التغذية الراجعة (modern)
Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Bias
Near concepts. Sensorimotor loop, Bias
Cross-relations
- may amplify: Bias. In Glickman and Sharot’s experiments, biased artificial feedback amplified human bias. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 87
Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 87
↑ parent: Bias
Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Bias › Cognitive offloading
Definition. Entrusting a cognitive task to an external aid.
Example. Saving phone numbers in a contact list instead of memorising them.
Period. 2011
Word and term history Modern term history
Established in twenty-first-century cognitive psychology; Sparrow and colleagues’ 2011 study was an influential early contribution.
Seven language fields
Turkish bilişsel yük devri
Ancient Greek —— A modern term.
Latin —— A modern term.
English cognitive offloading
German kognitive Entlastung
French délestage cognitif
Arabic —— A modern term.
Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Bias
Near concepts. External memory, External tool
Equivalence caution. Do not assume every instance entails a loss of skill.
Cross-relations
- may affect: Learning. In Bastani’s field experiment, use of an unguarded tool was associated with a disadvantage in the unaided examination. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 56
Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 30 56
↑ parent: Bias
Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Bias › Stochastic parrot
Definition. A metaphor describing language models as systems stitching together linguistic forms without invoking understanding.
Example. A fluent answer without a supporting source.
Period. 2021
Word and term history Modern term history
From the title of Bender and colleagues’ 2021 paper. Stochastic comes from Greek stochastikos, concerning aiming or conjecturing. 52
Seven language fields
Turkish olasılıksal papağan
Ancient Greek —— A modern term.
Latin —— A modern term.
English stochastic parrot
German stochastischer Papagei
French perroquet stochastique
Arabic —— A modern term.
Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.
≈ approximate counterpart. T historical counterpart; state the period or text. ! risk of a misleading equivalent. — no counterpart supplied for this record and context. An unmarked cell is not an exact equivalent.
Layer. Meaning · secondary Processes See the layer diagram
Parent concept. Bias
Near concepts. Large language model, Chinese Room, Form
Cross-relations
- objects to: Large language model. Bender and colleagues discuss language models through data, meaning and conditions of use. The parrot metaphor is neither the whole argument nor a single verdict on every system. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 41
Record class: theoretical. Sources: 41
↑ parent: Bias

4 child records

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Verification

Definition. Testing a claim through an independent source or method.

Example. Locating a quotation in the original text rather than relying on a generated summary.

Period. Old Turkic

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

Turkish doğru comes from Old Turkic toğru, straight or correct. Arabic taḥaqquq shares the root ḥ-q-q with ḥaqīqa. 44 14

Seven language fields

Turkish	doğrulama
Ancient Greek	——
Latin	verificatio
English	verification
German	Überprüfung
French	vérification
Arabic	تَحَقُّق (taḥaqquq)

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Thinking with artificial systems

Child concepts. Provenance, Uncertainty, Reproducibility, Epistemic orchestration

Near concepts. Evidence, Provenance, Critical thinking

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 9 16

↑ parent: Thinking with artificial systems

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Verification › Provenance

Definition. A record of where information originated and how it was transmitted.

Example. Tracing who first took a photograph.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Historical dictionary witness

From French provenir, to come from; in art history it concerns an artwork’s ownership history. 50

Seven language fields

Turkish	kaynak kökeni
Ancient Greek	—— No equivalent in ancient languages was sought.
Latin	—— No equivalent in ancient languages was sought.
English	provenance
German	Provenienz
French	provenance
Arabic	مصدر المعلومة

Note on empty counterparts: No equivalent in ancient languages was sought.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Verification

Near concepts. Verification, Testimony

Record class: working definition. Sources: 50

↑ parent: Verification

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Verification › Reproducibility

Definition. Reaching the same result independently using the same method.

Example. Repeating an experiment in another laboratory.

Period. 2011–2018

Word and term history Modern term history

A term in philosophy of science and methodology. The 2018 replication project’s failure to reproduce the tested Sparrow 2011 finding illustrates its importance; this does not establish failure of every experiment in that paper.

Seven language fields

Turkish	yeniden üretilebilirlik, tekrarlanabilirlik
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	reproducibility, replicability
German	Reproduzierbarkeit
French	reproductibilité
Arabic	قابلية التكرار

Note on empty counterparts: A modern term.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Verification

Near concepts. Scientific method, Verification

Record class: experimental literature. Sources: 34 30

↑ parent: Verification

Thinking › Thinking with artificial systems › Verification › Epistemic orchestration

Definition. Dividing a question, choosing what to delegate, arranging verification and taking responsibility.

Example. Comparing a model’s output with three independent sources before making a decision.

Period. No period is supplied in the inherited origin record.

Word and term history Modern term history

A term proposed in this work. Epistemic comes from Greek epistēmē, knowledge; orchestration is a musical term ultimately related to Greek orchēstra, the space for a chorus. 52

Seven language fields

Turkish	epistemik orkestrasyon
Ancient Greek	—— A term proposed in this work, without established equivalents in other languages.
Latin	—— A term proposed in this work, without established equivalents in other languages.
English	epistemic orchestration
German	—— A term proposed in this work, without established equivalents in other languages.
French	—— A term proposed in this work, without established equivalents in other languages.
Arabic	—— A term proposed in this work, without established equivalents in other languages.

Note on empty counterparts: A term proposed in this work, without established equivalents in other languages.

Layer. Processes · secondary Life See the layer diagram

Parent concept. Verification

Near concepts. Verification, Metacognition, Responsibility

Equivalence caution. Do not reduce it to skill in writing prompts.

Cross-relations

proposal in this work: Responsibility. We propose making the roles of justification and checking explicit. Responsibility is not reduced to the user alone; designers, providers and institutions also matter. The source support was not reassessed for the English edition. 9

Record class: working definition. Sources: 9

↑ parent: Verification

Supplementary concepts outside the tree

Gedanc An Old High German word which Heidegger reads as bringing remembrance, memory and…

Definition. An Old High German word which Heidegger reads as bringing remembrance, memory and gratitude together.

Example. Heidegger’s connection between Denken and Danken.

Word and term history

Denken, danken and Gedanke belong to the same Germanic family. Deriving a common essence from that family is Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation. 21 48

Sources: 8

Cogito Descartes’s inference concerning thinking and existence.

Definition. Descartes’s inference concerning thinking and existence.

Example. Meditation II.

Word and term history

Latin cogitare, to turn over in the mind, from co- and agitare. The familiar therefore-formulation and the wording in Meditation II should not be treated as an identical quotation. 51

Sources: 43

Eliminative materialism The view that mature neuroscience may revise or eliminate categories of everyday…

Definition. The view that mature neuroscience may revise or eliminate categories of everyday psychology.

Example. The prediction that belief and desire may be abandoned as explanatory categories.

Word and term history

Latin eliminare means to put beyond the threshold. 51

Sources: 19

Global neuronal workspace A theory proposing that information becomes conscious when it is broadcast and available…

Definition. A theory proposing that information becomes conscious when it is broadcast and available across extensive brain networks.

Example. The sudden noticing of a stimulus, described as ignition.

Word and term history

Dehaene and Changeux’s neural development of Baars’s 1988 global workspace theory.

Sources: 63 7

Integrated information theory A theory relating consciousness to a system’s intrinsic causal integration, expressed…

Definition. A theory relating consciousness to a system’s intrinsic causal integration, expressed through Φ.

Example. The proposed importance of patterns in posterior cortex.

Word and term history

Developed by Giulio Tononi from 2004; its fourth version appeared in 2023.

Sources: 88 7

Desirable difficulty An appropriate difficulty that slows immediate performance while improving retention.

Definition. An appropriate difficulty that slows immediate performance while improving retention.

Example. Trying to recall an answer before looking it up.

Word and term history

Robert Bjork’s 1994 proposal.

Sources: 38

Form The arrangement of symbols considered separately from meaning, in the contrast drawn by…

Definition. The arrangement of symbols considered separately from meaning, in the contrast drawn by Bender and Koller.

Example. A well-formed text in a language we do not understand.

Word and term history

Latin forma; the use here follows Bender and Koller 2020. 51

Sources: 72

Process ontology Approaches treating self and mind through events and relations rather than enduring…

Definition. Approaches treating self and mind through events and relations rather than enduring substance.

Example. Buddhist anattā and Whitehead, as distinct examples.

Word and term history

Latin processus means advancing. 51

Sources: 65

Qualia The subjective qualities of experience.

Definition. The subjective qualities of experience.

Example. The redness of red.

Word and term history

Related to Latin qualis, of what kind; C. I. Lewis used the philosophical term in 1929. 51

Sources: 12 11

In depth · What does placement bring into view?

Every classification makes some connections easier to see. Placing metacognition under artificial systems foregrounds monitoring our thinking while using a tool. Placing it under processes would emphasise learning and decision-making. Calling one location its true home would not explain what the other arrangement helps us notice.

Cross-relations recover some of what a single starting place leaves out. They cannot contain every historical use or difference in meaning. The tree offers routes into research rather than replacing it.

A historical word witness, the establishment of a technical term and an unverified derivation are different states of knowledge. Term history should not pretend to be a completed etymological investigation. Missing records remain visible as missing. A filled cell is not a guarantee of truth, and an empty one does not measure a concept’s importance.

This is a revisable arrangement. A better source, example or objection may change a definition or a relation. We should be able to follow why it changed: which use was added, which equivalence was abandoned, why an entry moved. That makes it possible for the next reader to assess both the result and the reasoning that brought us to it.

For your own judgement

Choose a concept you use often. Where does the record fit your use, and where would it need a qualification or another example?
If you moved a concept to another branch, which connections would become clearer and which would become harder to see?
If you proposed a missing concept, what example would explain it and how would you relate it to the existing records?

06Language and meaning

Concepts in company: five clusters to read together

Why this section is here

Suppose we are reading a passage about the active intellect, a separate principle said to make human knowing possible. We look up the term, but the definition sends us back to the passage with further questions. What does this author mean by intellect? How does this principle relate to a person learning something? And whose account is being developed or challenged? Understanding one term has begun to require several concepts and more than one text.

The concept tree gave us places to find those records. Here we read five groups together, moving from al-Tirmidhī’s account of inner apprehension to Greek, Islamic and Latin theories of intellect, heart vocabulary across texts, Kant’s faculties and contemporary debates about mind. Within each group, we ask which neighbouring concepts make a definition intelligible.

The connections differ. Some concern historical transmission, others a translation choice, and others a comparison we propose. Writing akıl, nous, ʿaql, intellectus and Vernunft beside one another does not make them names for one unchanging thing or words descended directly from one another.

We want to make clearer why these concepts repay being read together, rather than supply another list of short definitions. The connections selected here do not exhaust their histories. They offer routes into the fuller concept and source records.

Static counterpart · the six connections in the diagram

Ring	Its role in al-Tirmidhī’s interpretation
Sadr	Chest: the outer ring, associated with the light of Islam and open to intrusive whispering.
Qalb	The centre associated with faith, piety and love.
Fuʾād	An inner ring associated with maʿrifa, spiritual knowing, and seeing.
Lubb	The innermost ring, associated with the light of divine unity; the innermost essence.

Plain lines: translation; arrow: transmission and interpretation; dots: our comparison; dashes: distinct questions. These are not neural or causal paths.

Diagram key: a plain line marks a translation connection without asserting direction. An arrow marks transmission and interpretation, through which a concept may change. A dotted line marks our comparison, not common descent or a shared theory. A dashed connection distinguishes questions without making them opposites. No line is supplied between the active intellect and Kant’s Vernunft.

In brief

Knowing what yeast is becomes more useful when we understand what it does in dough. Concepts also take on their roles through relations. Defining the active intellect without explaining how it participates in an account of human knowing leaves the central question untouched. We therefore read terms in groups while identifying whether each connection concerns transmission, translation or comparison.

Explanation

Cluster A · Al-Tirmidhī’s rings of inner apprehension

Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s Beyânü’l-fark beyne’s-sadr ve’l-kalb ve’l-fuâd ve’l-lübb presents inner apprehension through four nested rings.⁴⁰ The biographical entry used by the atlas gives his death as 320 in the Islamic calendar, corresponding to 932 in the common era.⁷⁸ The rings belong to an account of spiritual knowing; they are not a diagram of the brain.

Concepts	Relation
Sadr	Chest: the outer ring, associated with the light of Islam and open to intrusive whispering.
Qalb	The centre associated with faith, piety and love.
Fuʾād	An inner ring associated with maʿrifa, spiritual knowing, and seeing.
Lubb	The innermost ring, associated with the light of divine unity; the innermost essence.

These words occur in Qur’anic vocabulary, but the four-ring arrangement is al-Tirmidhī’s Sufi interpretation. We should not attribute that arrangement directly to the Qur’an or convert it into four measured cognitive stages.

Other terms around ʿaql, intellect or reason, widen the comparison. Nuhā and ḥijr are connected with restraint; baṣīra, insight, belongs with baṣar, seeing.⁵⁴¹⁴ These histories help us see how capacities were described. They do not allow us to derive the workings of reason from its root alone.

The verbs also do different work. Taʿaqqul concerns exercising intellect; tafakkur concerns reflection and investigating relations; tadabbur includes considering consequences. Tadhakkur concerns remembering and taking heed, naẓar looking and examination, and iʿtibār drawing a lesson or inference from what is observed.⁶⁹ These are introductions to ranges of use. To understand a verse or argument, we still return to its particular context.

Cluster B · Nous, the active intellect and intellectus

Nous, intellect or apprehension, does not play the same role for every Greek thinker. Anaxagoras connects it with cosmic order. Plato’s dialogues discuss intellectual apprehension and forms. In Aristotle’s De Anima, the capacity to receive what is known and that capacity becoming active become central questions.³¹

Aristotle compares receptive intellect with a tablet on which nothing has yet been written, and the activating intellect with light making colours visible. What it means for intellect to be separate, unaffected and immortal in this passage became a major question for later readers. It is not an elaborate theory on which every interpreter agrees. Identifying this intellect with the thinking of thinking in the Metaphysics also requires an argument beyond simply repeating the passage.

Plotinus places Nous, Intellect, within an account of emanation, the proceeding of reality from the One; Soul has its own relation to Nous within that account.⁷⁹ Stoic logos, associated with cosmic order, provides another comparison. Nous and logos are not interchangeable labels for the same philosophical task. Their roles need to be established author by author.

Al-Fārābī’s Risāla fī al-ʿaql begins by distinguishing six uses of intellect. For human knowing, he distinguishes potential intellect, the capacity to know; actual intellect, that capacity realised through acquired forms; and acquired intellect, a developed apprehension of intelligible forms. The active intellect enters as a separate principle making this knowing possible.⁵³ Arranging all four as equal steps up one person’s ladder would obscure this difference. Its connection with revelation and Gabriel belongs to al-Fārābī’s account of prophecy as well as knowing.

Ibn Sīnā also connects the acquisition of universal forms with the active intellect. His flying person argument asks whether a person deprived of external sensory experience would nevertheless be aware of their existence. He uses it in reasoning about the soul’s self-awareness and relation to the body.³⁹⁶¹ It is a thought experiment whose assumptions and inference can be questioned, rather than an experiment performed in a laboratory.

The Latin discussion continues through intellectus agens, active intellect, and intellectus possibilis, possible or receptive intellect. Aquinas challenges the account he attributes to Ibn Rushd of one possible intellect shared by all human beings, asking how intellect belongs to an individual soul. Translation has therefore carried an argument into a new setting in which its conclusions are contested. More than the language has changed.

Cluster C · Lev and kardia

Hebrew lev and levav are used in contexts of thinking, willing and evaluation as well as bodily heart and feeling.⁷⁵ A translator’s choice can consequently bring one aspect of a passage forward while leaving another less visible.

In the atlas’s comparison of Proverbs 15:14, the Jewish Publication Society’s 1985 translation uses mind, while the Turkish Yeni Çeviri uses yürek, heart.⁸⁰⁸² That contrast does not establish that Hebrew has no separate way to speak of mind. It shows something narrower: translators can make the cognitive use of a source word visible through different choices.

Kardia, Greek heart, is an important rendering of lev. Yet the relation between Hebrew and Greek texts cannot be reduced to exchanging one word for another. Deuteronomy 6:5 uses levav, heart; nefesh, life or person; and meod, might. Mark 12:30 presents kardia, heart; psychē, soul or life; dianoia, mind or understanding; and ischys, strength.⁸¹⁷⁷ These short glosses help us follow the comparison, but do not replace a translation of either whole passage. Their relationship needs to be considered through their distinct contexts as well as their vocabulary.

These examples open questions about the arrangement of concepts in texts. They do not, on their own, show one culture thinking holistically and another thinking in fragments. The sacred-text section preserves the distinction between source passages, translations and interpretation; this cluster prepares us to read those distinctions more carefully.

Cluster D · Kant’s faculties

Kant gives us another reason not to gather every mental capacity under one name. Sensibility, Sinnlichkeit, concerns how objects are given to us in intuition, their immediate presentation. Understanding, Verstand, brings concepts and categories to thinking about objects of experience. Reason, Vernunft, seeks unity under principles and asks after what is unconditioned, what would not depend on a further condition.³⁴⁹

This is not a three-stage processing chart in which sensation ends before concepts begin. Kant is asking how these capacities participate together in making experience and knowledge possible. Separating intuition entirely from concepts, or concepts from content that could be given in experience, leaves the account incomplete.

The ideas of soul, world and God matter to reason’s pursuit of completeness. They cannot simply be treated as objects known in the same way as objects of experience. Reason’s pursuit of principles also brings it up against its limits. Its relation to the moral law needs to be considered through practical reason, rather than added as another task in a one-sentence account of theoretical knowledge.

The translation problem is not that Turkish, English or French cannot express these distinctions. It arises when we stop tracking the chosen rendering and several faculties merge under one word. Anlama yetisi, understanding and entendement help preserve a distinction. Imagination also contributes to Kant’s account of synthesis, the bringing together of representations. It can be compared with imagination in Ibn Sīnā’s internal senses without becoming an unchanged component of one theory.

Cluster E · Extended mind, experience and dual processes

In Clark and Chalmers’s extended-mind example, Inga recalls a museum’s address while Otto consults the notebook he habitually uses. The argument is that, under specified conditions, the notebook might count as part of Otto’s cognitive arrangement rather than merely an outside aid.⁴ Usefulness alone is insufficient; dependable access, reliance and integration into his activity matter too.

Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness asks a different question. Explaining attention, memory, discrimination or access to information may differ from explaining why such processes accompany subjective experience.¹² Calling the functional questions easy does not mean that their research is effortless. The name distinguishes kinds of explanatory task.

Nagel’s question about what it is like to be a bat likewise concerns the difficulty of explaining a first-person perspective from outside.¹¹ Neither discussion should be reported as the discovery of a conclusively irreducible core inside the mind. The dispute concerns whether explaining functions also answers the question of experience.

Extended mind and the hard problem are therefore not opposite verdicts. One asks about the human–tool arrangement in which cognition happens; the other asks how experience can be explained. We can examine tools through Processes and Life, and their physical support through Body. Keeping experience visible does not let the four-layer diagram settle its metaphysics.

Dual-process theories add a further question. The familiar System 1 and System 2 vocabulary compares relatively automatic and intuitive processing with processing that draws more heavily on effort and control.³³ These are not two brain organs or two people inside us, one always wrong and the other always right.

Evans and Stanovich distinguish defining characteristics of a process type from characteristics that often accompany it.²³ De Neys and Glumicic also find indications that conflict can be noticed even when an answer is wrong.⁸⁵ This does not make every intuition correct or abolish all process distinctions. It shows why a simple two-box story cannot carry the whole research programme.

Where do memory and imagination enter?

Treating memory only as stored material leaves out some of the questions raised here. Heidegger’s relation between thinking and remembrance opens another approach to remembering.⁸ Imagination also does different theoretical work in Ibn Sīnā and Kant. Retaining these connections helps us compare what a word does in a text, rather than assume that recognising the word means recognising the theory.

In depth · What makes these comparisons useful?

We can compare fuʾād and lev without assuming a common linguistic origin or identity of concept. Showing a resemblance in particular uses involving seeing, knowing and heart is a more limited achievement than merging whole traditions into one account of the person.

The same care separates the active intellect from Kant’s Vernunft. In al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the active intellect belongs to a metaphysical account of how knowing becomes possible. Kant discusses a faculty and its uses. Calling them versions of one principle above the individual intellect would erase the difference before we had examined it.

Nor should al-Tirmidhī’s rings and extended mind become opposed inward and outward movements. One is a Sufi account of spiritual apprehension; the other asks when external tools might belong to cognitive processes. They have not measured the same activity and obtained contrary results.

Heidegger’s approaches, Kant’s faculties, theoretical and practical intellect, and dual-process theories can be read together. That does not establish their discovery of one shared division. We first need to know which question each answers, what supports its distinction and what that distinction leaves out.

For this reason, every cross-connection needs its type and rationale. Transmission calls for a text and a direction; translation comparison for a passage and version; our interpretation for an explanation of its purpose. In the next section, the seven-language matrix makes those translation choices easier to inspect without turning proximity into equivalence.

For your own judgement

Recall a reading in which understanding one concept required returning to others. Which connection actually moved your understanding forward?
When you read heart or intellect beside a term in another language, which aspect becomes clearer and which recedes?
Compare Otto’s notebook with your own notes application. Which features of your reliance on it resemble the argument’s conditions, and which differ?

07Language and meaning

A translation matrix across seven languages

Why this section is here

Someone says aklını kullan in Turkish: use your judgement. A little later they say aklında tut: keep it in mind. The same Turkish word participates in both expressions, yet we would not normally choose the same English wording. The difference becomes more demanding in a philosophical text. Before choosing reason, intellect or mind, we need to understand which capacity the author is discussing and what distinction the sentence makes.

Here we place 27 concepts beside forms in Turkish, Ancient Greek, Latin, English, German, French and Arabic. We are comparing how related questions are expressed, rather than collecting words that can replace one another in every sentence. The table offers a starting point and helps us see where a choice requires returning to a text, period or tradition.

The diagram’s centre is a concept record used for comparison. It is not an invariant meaning shared intact by all seven languages. The surrounding lines connect the fields in that record; they do not show words descending from one another.

Diagram key: lines mark comparison through a shared record, not a shared essence or a chain of derivation. Borrowing, common origin and translation equivalence remain distinct relations, to be assessed through their own evidence.

In brief

The two Turkish expressions ask us to do different things: judge a situation and remember something. Choosing reason, intellect or mind depends on what the sentence asks of the word. The matrix makes alternatives visible; the passage helps us decide which alternative fits.

Explanation

How should we read a row?

Each row links to a concept record containing its history and sources. Several terms in one cell are not freely interchangeable. French savoir and connaissance and Arabic ʿilm and maʿrifa offer material for comparing knowledge vocabulary; their presence in the same row does not establish an identical distinction in both languages.

We retain Greek and Arabic scripts alongside their Latin-letter transliterations. Transliteration represents a written form in another alphabet. It does not explain meaning, which is why the forms need to be read with the concept’s usage notes.

The atlas draws on Liddell–Scott–Jones for Greek, Lewis–Short for Latin, Lane for Arabic, and Kubbealtı Lugatı and Clauson for Turkish. The Türkiye Diyanet Foundation’s Encyclopaedia of Islam discusses terms within intellectual traditions. French records use the Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales; German records use Duden.⁵²⁵¹¹⁴⁴⁵⁴⁴⁵⁰⁴⁸ A historical dictionary, a dictionary of current use and an encyclopaedia do different work. Listing them is not a claim that every cell has been individually verified.

What kind of relation connects two words?

Borrowing means taking a word from another language: Turkish akıl from Arabic is an example. Common origin means descent from a shared historical root, as in the comparison of Hebrew nefesh and Arabic nafs elsewhere in the atlas. Hebrew is not one of this matrix’s seven languages; it enters here to clarify the relation being discussed.

A translation equivalent is a term used to render another in a particular text or tradition. Greek nous and Latin intellectus can stand in that relation without sharing a root. Similar use is a resemblance for which no transmission or common origin has been established. Comparing breath and spirit in pneuma, spiritus and rūḥ raises questions; the resemblance cannot answer them on its own.

A misleading equivalent obscures a distinction that matters in context. It is not a permanent verdict on every use of a word. Greek syneidēsis has uses concerning awareness and knowledge of one’s own condition as well as conscience. Translating it everywhere as modern consciousness overstates the equivalence, but declaring that it could never be rendered through awareness would also overstate the case. The passage has to guide the choice.⁵²

What do the cell warnings tell us?

The sign ≈ marks an approximate counterpart; T a historical counterpart needing a period or text; ! a risk of misleading equivalence; and — no counterpart supplied for the record and context. These signs do not name the historical relation between the words. A borrowing can still become only an approximate counterpart of its source in later use.

An unmarked cell does not guarantee exact equivalence. No counterpart supplied also differs from this language cannot express the thought. A phrase or explanation may do what a single word cannot. The table is useful when it preserves an unresolved distinction, as well as when it supplies a term.

Cell key: ≈ approximate; T historical, requiring a period or passage; ! potentially misleading in context; — no counterpart supplied. Unmarked does not mean exact. The original forms and existing warning marks are retained.

All 27 rows below link to their concept records. Read a row with its usage and source notes. Search narrows the displayed rows; it does not remove an entry or turn a possible counterpart into a verified one.

Seven-language comparison · 27 concepts, 189 cells
Concept	Turkish	Ancient Greek	Latin	English	German	French	Arabic
Thought	düşünce, fikir	≈διάνοια (dianoia), ἔννοια (ennoia), νόημα (noēma)Approximate counterpart: dianoia, ennoia and noēma are three different words; none exactly matches Turkish düşünce.	cogitatio	thought	Gedanke	pensée	فِكْر، فِكْرَة (fikr, fikra)
Thinking (activity)	düşünmek, tefekkür etmek	νοεῖν (noein), διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)	cogitare	think	denken	penser	فَكَّرَ، تَفَكَّرَ، عَقَلَ (fakkara, tafakkara, ʿaqala)
Understanding (faculty)	akıl, us	νοῦς (nous)	intellectus	intellect, understanding	Verstand	entendement	عَقْل (ʿaql)
Reason (principle)	akıl, mantık	λόγος (logos), λογισμός (logismos)	ratio	reason	Vernunft	raison	نُطْق، مَنْطِق (nuṭq, manṭiq)
Intelligence	zekâ	σύνεσις (synesis), ἀγχίνοια (anchinoia)	intelligentia	intelligence	Intelligenz	intelligence	ذَكَاء (ḏakāʾ)
Mind	zihin	≈νοῦς (nous), διάνοια (dianoia)Approximate counterpart: nous often concerns intellect, dianoia deliberation; both are partial rather than exact counterparts of Turkish zihin.	mens, animus	mind	Geist	esprit	ذِهْن (ḏihn)
Consciousness	Tbilinç, şuurHistorical counterpart: bilinç was formed from bilin- during Turkish language reform; Arabic-derived şuur preceded it in the recorded usage.	!συνείδησις (syneidēsis)Misleading-equivalent risk: historical uses include awareness and conscience. It is not directly equivalent to modern consciousness; the rendering must answer to its passage.	≈conscientiaApproximate counterpart: conscientia concerns knowing together, awareness and conscience; the modern consciousness sense developed after the seventeenth century.	consciousness	Bewusstsein	conscience	وَعْي، شُعُور (waʿy, šuʿūr)
Self	benlik, öz	ἑαυτός (heautos)	ego, ipse	self	Selbst, Ich	soi, moi	ذَات، نَفْس (ḏāt, nafs)
Perception	algı, idrak	αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)	perceptio	perception	Wahrnehmung	perception	إِدْرَاك، حِسّ (idrāk, ḥiss)
Attention	dikkat	προσοχή (prosochē)	attentio	attention	Aufmerksamkeit	attention	اِنْتِبَاه (intibāh)
Memory	bellek, hafıza	μνήμη (mnēmē)	memoria	memory	Gedächtnis	mémoire	ذَاكِرَة، حِفْظ (ḏākira, ḥifẓ)
Imagination	imgelem, hayal, tahayyül	φαντασία (phantasia)	imaginatio	imagination	Einbildungskraft	imagination	خَيَال، تَخَيُّل (ḫayāl, taḫayyul)
Emotion	duygu, duygulanım	πάθος (pathos)	affectus	emotion, affect	Gefühl, Affekt	émotion, affect	عَاطِفَة، اِنْفِعَال (ʿāṭifa, infiʿāl)
Will	irade, istenç	βούλησις (boulēsis), θέλημα (thelēma)	voluntas	will	Wille	volonté	إِرَادَة (irāda)
Intention	niyet, yönelim	προαίρεσις (proairesis)	intentio	intention	Absicht	intention	نِيَّة، قَصْد (niyya, qaṣd)
Language	dil	γλῶσσα (glōssa), λόγος (logos)	lingua, sermo	language	Sprache	langue, langage	لُغَة، لِسَان (luġa, lisān)
Meaning	anlam, mana	νόημα (noēma), σημασία (sēmasia)	significatio	meaning	Sinn, Bedeutung	sens, signification	مَعْنًى (maʿnā)
Knowledge	bilgi, ilim, marifet	ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē), γνῶσις (gnōsis)	scientia, cognitio	knowledge	Wissen, Erkenntnis	savoir, connaissance	عِلْم، مَعْرِفَة (ʿilm, maʿrifa)
Inference	çıkarım, istidlal	συλλογισμός (syllogismos)	ratiocinatio, inferentia	inference	Schlussfolgerung	inférence	اِسْتِدْلَال (istidlāl)
Conception and assent	tasavvur, tasdik	ἔννοια, κρίσις (ennoia, krisis)	conceptus, iudicium	conception, assent	Begriff, Urteil	concept, jugement	تَصَوُّر، تَصْدِيق (taṣawwur, taṣdīq)
Judgment	yargı, hüküm	κρίσις (krisis)	iudicium	judgment	Urteil	jugement	حُكْم (ḥukm)
Concept	kavram, mefhum	ἔννοια (ennoia)	conceptus	concept	Begriff	concept, notion	مَفْهُوم (mafhūm)
Wisdom	bilgelik, hikmet	σοφία (sophia), φρόνησις (phronēsis)	sapientia, prudentia	wisdom	Weisheit	sagesse	حِكْمَة (ḥikma)
Estimation and opinion	vehim, sanı, zan	δόξα (doxa)	opinio, aestimatio	opinion; estimation	Meinung	opinion	وَهْم، ظَنّ (wahm, ẓann)
Soul and life	ruh, can, nefis	ψυχή (psychē), πνεῦμα (pneuma)	anima, spiritus	soul, spirit	Seele, Geist	âme, esprit	رُوح، نَفْس (rūḥ, nafs)
Qalb (heart in apprehension)	kalp, gönül	καρδία (kardia)	cor	heart	Herz	cœur	قَلْب، فُؤَاد، لُبّ (qalb, fuʾād, lubb)
Baṣīra	basiret, feraset	διόρασις (diorasis)	perspicacia	insight	Einsicht	clairvoyance, perspicacité	بَصِيرَة، فِرَاسَة (baṣīra, firāsa)

Scroll the table sideways to compare all seven languages. The concept name stays visible as you move across a row.

Warnings are shown beside their cells rather than available only on hover. These are inherited lexical records, not 189 new dictionary checks.

The atlas’s existing source record compares psychological and moral uses of French conscience with the ninth edition of the Académie française dictionary. That is a separate witness, not proof that the Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales entry was accessed. The Académie entry remains a source link; its prior reading scope has not been expanded in this translation.

In depth · Where does an equivalent reach its limit?

As the preceding clusters show, a dictionary equivalent does not determine a word’s whole role. Reducing Hegel’s Geist to mind can obscure historical and social dimensions of his account. Reading every occurrence of Geist as Hegelian would create the opposite error. Author and use matter together.

Logos may call for word, account, calculation, ratio or reason. Rather than force all these into one English term, we can state which sense matters in a passage and what our choice leaves aside. Nafs likewise has uses around person, life and self; a moral or spiritual struggle does not supply its meaning in every context.

French conscience includes uses concerning both consciousness and conscience. Sharing one word does not prevent French speakers from distinguishing those questions. The sentence and context help determine which use is in view.⁵⁰

The wisdom row places sophia and phronēsis together, but that arrangement must not erase their difference. If phronēsis is explained through Arabic ḥikma ʿamaliyya, practical wisdom, the relevant text or translation tradition needs to be identified. Without that support, declaring it the sole Arabic equivalent is too strong. The separate phronēsis record therefore retains its unfilled Arabic field.

The row headings understanding as a faculty and reason as a principle are also organising choices, not a classification every language shares. Asking which author, period and use a cell concerns is more helpful than adding another apparently interchangeable word. The next section follows these choices backwards through word histories, without allowing origin to dictate present meaning.

For your own judgement

Would you use the same English word for akıl in the two Turkish expressions at the opening? Which difference of use guides your choice?
What does an empty counterpart field tell you? How would you investigate whether a phrase or explanation can express the thought?
Before choosing one rendering of logos, which passage and context would you want to see? What would your chosen word leave out?

08Language and meaning

The older images carried by words

Why this section is here

We weigh an idea, grasp an argument and hold something in mind. Usually no scale, hand or act of holding appears before us when we speak. Yet bodily actions help us describe something about thinking. Word histories bring further connections into view. How were they formed, and how much of that history remains active in what we mean today?

Etymology is the study of word histories: earlier forms, dates and changes of use. Finding an older meaning does not, by itself, explain thinking. Our question here is what we can learn from that history while keeping the two kinds of explanation apart.

The cards distinguish language forms, proposed origins, use in this work and limits of interpretation. The diagram follows an earlier witness through questions about semantic change and present use. At each step we ask whether the source supplies the connection or whether we are proposing an interpretation.

Diagram key: dashed arrows show the order of this inquiry, not a necessary, continuous development from root to modern concept. Each step remains connected to a question about how far the inference can go.

In brief

To grasp an argument is not to take it in our hand. The bodily action helps express understanding. French penser and Latin pensare likewise bring histories of weighing and evaluating into comparison with thinking.⁵⁰ That history is worth examining; it does not show that every speaker has a hand or a scale in mind when thinking.

Explanation

What should we ask of an etymology card?

We first look for a witness: a record of the word being used in a particular text or period. A dictionary’s earlier form does not establish every subsequent step with equal certainty. An attested form and a proposed derivation therefore need to remain distinguishable.

The Turkish verb düşünmek makes this visible. The existing record reports Kubbealtı’s derivation with a question mark and related forms cited from Clauson.⁴⁵⁴⁴ A further proposal without an identified source would not yet be a verified rival. Before choosing between accounts, we would need to see what forms, dates and changes each actually explains.

The binding and restraining senses associated with Arabic ʿ-q-l open another question. They accompany explanations of intellect as regulating conduct, but a root’s range of meanings is not a philosopher’s theory of reason.⁵⁴¹⁴ Word history and the role of a concept in an argument require related but distinct inquiries.

The same care applies to breath and life in psychē, pneuma, anima, spiritus and rūḥ. A similar image does not establish a common root or an identical account of soul. Each word’s history and textual uses need their own support.

The status labels describe the inherited word-history records. They do not report new dictionary verification. Word-history sources and sources for philosophical use are listed separately.

Thinking (düşünmek) Proposed derivation · uncertainty retained

Language forms: düşünmek, tefekkür etmek; νοεῖν (noein), διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai); cogitare; think; denken; penser; فَكَّرَ، تَفَكَّرَ، عَقَلَ (fakkara, tafakkara, ʿaqala)
Origin and changes of meaning: The inherited record reports Kubbealtı’s proposed derivation of düşün- through Old Turkic tüşe-, with a question mark, and cites tüş, tüşe- and tüşün- from Clauson. The full entries were not rechecked in that review, so this is not a settled derivation. French penser is related to Latin pensare, with senses of weighing and evaluating.
Use in this work: Here thinking means forming relations, testing them and changing them when necessary, in connection with action.
Limit of interpretation: An alternative derivation without a supplied source is not a verified rival. Similar imagery across languages does not establish common descent.
Word-history sources: 44 45
Concept sources from the shared record: 44 45 21

Thought Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: düşünce, fikir; διάνοια (dianoia), ἔννοια (ennoia), νόημα (noēma); cogitatio; thought; Gedanke; pensée; فِكْر، فِكْرَة (fikr, fikra)
Origin and changes of meaning: Kubbealtı derives Turkish düşünce from düşün- and -ce. German Gedanke and denken belong to the same Germanic family; Heidegger reads that family through remembrance and gratitude, Gedanc.
Use in this work: Thought names the content or product arising in thinking. That content need not consist only of sentences said inwardly.
Limit of interpretation: Identifying thought with conscious inner speech excludes visual and motor thinking.
Word-history sources: 45 48
Concept sources from the shared record: 1 8

Reason (akıl) Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: akıl, us; νοῦς (nous), λόγος (logos); ratio, intellectus; reason, intellect; Vernunft, Verstand; raison, entendement; عَقْل (ʿaql)
Origin and changes of meaning: From Arabic ʿ-q-l. Classical dictionaries give binding and restraining senses; ʿiqāl, a camel hobble, shares the root. Traditional explanations connect intellect with restraint from inappropriate conduct. The root occurs in verbal forms in the Qur’an.
Use in this work: This heading gathers giving reasons, forming relations, seeking consistency and regulating conduct.
Limit of interpretation: Reason and intelligence overlap in use but are not identical here: intelligence concerns learning and problem-solving capacities, while reason also includes justification and self-regulation. This is a working distinction, not a universal division in every language.
Word-history sources: 14 54 55
Concept sources from the shared record: 14 54 55

Us (Turkish reason) Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: us; νοῦς (nous); ratio; reason; Vernunft; raison; عَقْل (ʿaql)
Origin and changes of meaning: Kubbealtı relates us to Middle Turkic Oghuz us, the capacity to discriminate. Widespread in Old Anatolian Turkish, it was later displaced by Arabic akıl and revived during language reform. Old Turkic testimony requires Clauson. Terms such as usçuluk, rationalism, belong to the revival.
Use in this work: A Turkish word used for reason; everyday uses and technical uses need to be distinguished.
Limit of interpretation: Us and akıl are not synonyms in every setting. Everyday usluluk, concerning well-behaved conduct, occupies a different range of use.
Word-history sources: 45 44
Concept sources from the shared record: 45

Mind Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: zihin; νοῦς (nous), διάνοια (dianoia); mens, animus; mind; Geist; esprit; ذِهْن (ḏihn)
Origin and changes of meaning: Turkish zihin comes from Arabic ḏihn, understanding, apprehension or intelligence. English mind goes back to Old English gemynd, with memory, remembrance and thought senses, and is related to Latin mens and Sanskrit manas through Indo-European *men-, to think.
Use in this work: We use mind to discuss perception, thought, emotion, memory, intention and consciousness together.
Limit of interpretation: Rendering every Geist as mind can obscure Hegel’s historical and social account of spirit. Not every use of Geist is Hegelian either.
Word-history sources: 14 21
Concept sources from the shared record: 21 14

Consciousness Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: bilinç, şuur; συνείδησις (syneidēsis); conscientia; consciousness; Bewusstsein; conscience; وَعْي، شُعُور (waʿy, šuʿūr)
Origin and changes of meaning: Kubbealtı derives bilinç from bilin- with -ç during Turkish language reform, giving şuur as its equivalent. Latin conscientia concerns knowing together; French conscience has uses concerning both consciousness and conscience. German Bewusstsein became established around Christian Wolff in the eighteenth century as a rendering of conscientia.
Use in this work: We distinguish information being available for thought and conduct, conscious access, from what having an experience is like, phenomenal consciousness.
Limit of interpretation: Do not equate syneidēsis directly with modern consciousness, or erase its historical awareness uses by restricting it to conscience alone.
Word-history sources: 45 50 48
Concept sources from the shared record: 12 62 50

Intelligence Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: zekâ; σύνεσις (synesis), ἀγχίνοια (anchinoia); intelligentia; intelligence; Intelligenz; intelligence; ذَكَاء (ḏakāʾ)
Origin and changes of meaning: Turkish zekâ comes from Arabic ḏakāʾ, sharpness or mental quickness; related uses concern fire flaring up. Latin intelligentia derives from intellegere, to select between. Greek anchinoia concerns quick apprehension and is explained through nearness and intellect.
Use in this work: Learning, discrimination, problem-solving and adaptation to new circumstances.
Limit of interpretation: Do not identify intelligence with consciousness or wisdom.
Word-history sources: 14 51 52
Concept sources from the shared record: 14 51

Soul and life Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: ruh, can, nefis; ψυχή (psychē), πνεῦμα (pneuma); anima, spiritus; soul, spirit; Seele, Geist; âme, esprit; رُوح، نَفْس (rūḥ, nafs)
Origin and changes of meaning: Arabic rūḥ is connected with breath and wind through r-w-ḥ; Turkish can comes from Persian cān. Greek psychē, Latin anima and spiritus, and Hebrew ruaḥ and nefesh also enter comparisons concerning breath and life. Such parallels do not establish one common origin.
Use in this work: Different traditions use this vocabulary for principles of life, persons and transcendence. The terms need to be read through those uses.
Limit of interpretation: Homeric psychē is not simply the Christian concept of soul.
Word-history sources: 14 52 51 75
Concept sources from the shared record: 76 14

Psychē Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: ruh, can; ψυχή (psychē); anima; soul, psyche; Seele; âme; نَفْس (nafs)
Origin and changes of meaning: Probably related to psychein, to blow or cool. Its range develops between Homer and Plato.
Use in this work: Uses concerning breath and life, and classical uses concerning emotion, character and thinking.
Limit of interpretation: Do not identify it with the whole subject matter of modern psychology.
Word-history sources: 52 76
Concept sources from the shared record: 76 52

Pneuma Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: soluk, ruh; πνεῦμα (pneuma); spiritus; breath, spirit; Geist, Hauch; souffle, esprit; رُوح (rūḥ)
Origin and changes of meaning: From pnein, to breathe. Latin spiritus, from spirare, expresses a comparable image.
Use in this work: Breath and wind; in Stoicism, active matter ordering the cosmos; in New Testament contexts, Spirit. These uses are not identical.
Word-history sources: 52 51
Concept sources from the shared record: 52

Nous Disputed origin · rival proposals require comparison

Language forms: akıl; νοῦς (nous); intellectus, mens; intellect, mind; Vernunft, Geist; intellect; عَقْل (ʿaql)
Origin and changes of meaning: Its origin is uncertain; it is related to noein, to apprehend or notice. Noticing and understanding are prominent in Homeric uses.
Use in this work: Apprehension and intellect, with Anaxagoras’s cosmic ordering principle distinguished from Aristotle’s inquiry into intellect.
Limit of interpretation: Do not equate every nous with modern mind. An uncertain origin does not tell us which rival derivations are supported; that requires their sources and arguments.
Word-history sources: 52
Concept sources from the shared record: 31 76 52

Logos Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: logos, söz, akıl; λόγος (logos); ratio, verbum; word, reason, account; Wort, Vernunft; parole, raison; كَلِمَة، نُطْق (kalima, nuṭq)
Origin and changes of meaning: From legein, with collecting, counting and saying senses. Context may call for word, account, ratio, reason or another rendering.
Use in this work: Word, discourse, calculation, ratio and justification; cosmic-principle uses in Heraclitus and Stoicism require their own contexts.
Limit of interpretation: Do not translate it everywhere as reason or turn the Johannine text into a Stoic quotation.
Word-history sources: 52
Concept sources from the shared record: 52 77

Practical wisdom Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: pratik bilgelik; φρόνησις (phronēsis); prudentia; practical wisdom, prudence; Klugheit; sagesse pratique, prudence
Origin and changes of meaning: Phronēsis is related to phronein and phrēn. Historical uses concerning chest and diaphragm form part of the inquiry; they do not establish that all Greeks placed thought in one organ. Latin prudentia is related to providentia.
Use in this work: Aristotle’s practical wisdom, concerning judgement about how to act in particular circumstances.
Limit of interpretation: A bodily semantic field can be compared with practical wisdom, but cannot explain Aristotle’s account in full. An Arabic counterpart requires evidence from a specific text or translation tradition.
Word-history sources: 52 51
Concept sources from the shared record: 31 52

Intellectus Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: akıl, anlık; νοῦς (nous); intellectus; intellect; Verstand, Intellekt; intellect, entendement; عَقْل (ʿaql)
Origin and changes of meaning: Intellegere combines inter, between, with legere, to select or read.
Use in this work: Latin uses concerning intellect and apprehension. Its distinction from ratio in scholastic texts needs to be read author by author.
Word-history sources: 51
Concept sources from the shared record: 51

Ratio Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: akıl yürütme; λογισμός (logismos); ratio; reason, reasoning; Vernunft; raison; نُطْق (nuṭq), فِكْر
Origin and changes of meaning: From reor, to reckon or suppose. In Aquinas, intellectus concerns apprehension and ratio discursive reasoning; Summa Theologiae I, question 79, article 8 treats these as related activities rather than separate powers.
Use in this work: Calculation, proportion and reasoning; this card emphasises proceeding through reasons step by step.
Limit of interpretation: The lexical and philosophical parts of this account require different sources. A Latin dictionary alone does not verify the Aquinas passage.
Word-history sources: 51
Concept sources from the shared record: 51

Reason in Kant Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: akıl; ratio; reason; Vernunft; raison; العقل
Origin and changes of meaning: Vernunft is related to vernehmen, to perceive or receive by hearing.
Use in this work: Kant’s faculty of reason: unity, ideas and principles in theoretical use, and the moral law in practical use. These are connected but distinct questions.
Limit of interpretation: Not every Vernunft is Kantian. Nor should Kantian reason and the active intellect become versions of the same higher principle.
Word-history sources: 48
Concept sources from the shared record: 3 49

Understanding Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: anlama yetisi, anlık; intellectus; understanding; Verstand; entendement; الفهم (al-fahm)
Origin and changes of meaning: From verstehen, to understand. The historical relation of ver- and stehen cannot be translated directly through the current sense of standing.
Use in this work: Kant’s Verstand, the understanding, organising intuition through concepts and categories.
Limit of interpretation: Do not merge it with Vernunft, reason.
Word-history sources: 48
Concept sources from the shared record: 3 49

Heart in accounts of apprehension Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: kalp, gönül; καρδία (kardia); cor; heart; Herz; cœur; قَلْب، فُؤَاد، لُبّ (qalb, fuʾād, lubb)
Origin and changes of meaning: Arabic q-l-b concerns turning; commentary traditions often associate the heart with change or turning. Turkish gönül comes from Old Turkic kōŋül. Comparisons with Hebrew lev and Greek kardia belong to Cluster C.
Use in this work: Heart vocabulary in sacred texts concerns thinking, understanding, orientation and faith. In al-Tirmidhī’s account, qalb is the second ring, associated with faith, piety and love.
Limit of interpretation: Do not restrict heart to feeling or treat scriptural use as a neuroanatomical finding.
Word-history sources: 14 44 75 77
Concept sources from the shared record: 14 77 55

Tafakkur Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: tefekkür; θεωρία (theōria), approximate; contemplatio; reflection, contemplation; Nachdenken; réflexion; تَفَكُّر (tafakkur)
Origin and changes of meaning: The fifth Arabic verbal form from f-k-r, sharing its root with fikr. The encyclopaedia’s Thinking entry explains it through reflection on the outcome of a matter.
Use in this work: Reflection tracing relations within a subject; reflection on creation is one context of use.
Limit of interpretation: Greek theōria is not an exact equivalent in every context.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 69 55

Tadabbur Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: tedebbür; pondering, reflecting on consequences; Bedenken; méditation; تَدَبُّر (tadabbur)
Origin and changes of meaning: From Arabic d-b-r, concerning the back or end; tadbīr shares the root. Qur’an 4:82 and 47:24 call for reflection on the Qur’an.
Use in this work: Considering consequences and reflecting on a text’s meaning; the card follows the connection between understanding and consequence.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 69 55

Tadhakkur Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: tezekkür; ἀνάμνησις (anamnēsis); recordatio; remembrance, taking heed; Besinnung; remémoration; تَذَكُّر (taḏakkur)
Origin and changes of meaning: The fifth Arabic verbal form from ḏ-k-r, sharing its root with dhikr and dhākira.
Use in this work: Remembering and taking heed; how reflection on the past relates to present orientation.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 69 55

Naẓar Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: nazar; θεωρία (theōria), approximate; consideratio; looking, examination; Betrachtung; considération; نَظَر (naẓar)
Origin and changes of meaning: Arabic n-ẓ-r concerns looking. In kalām, reasoned theological inquiry, naẓar also becomes a technical term for reasoning.
Use in this work: Looking and examination, with its technical theological use considered separately.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 69 55

Iʿtibār Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: itibar, ibret; taking a lesson; Lehre ziehen; tirer une leçon; اِعْتِبَار (iʿtibār)
Origin and changes of meaning: From Arabic ʿ-b-r, crossing or passing over. Taking a lesson moves from one situation to another; Turkish itibar also developed the sense of esteem.
Use in this work: Drawing a lesson or using what is observed to assess another situation. Turkish social esteem is a distinct use.
Limit of interpretation: Do not substitute the everyday esteem sense for the use being examined here.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 69

Baṣīra Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: basiret, feraset; διόρασις (diorasis); perspicacia; insight; Einsicht; clairvoyance, perspicacité; بَصِيرَة، فِرَاسَة (baṣīra, firāsa)
Origin and changes of meaning: From Arabic b-ṣ-r, seeing. Baṣar and baṣīra distinguish bodily and inward seeing in these accounts. A traditional explanation concerns the heart’s apprehension of truth through divine light; comparisons with theoretical intellect belong to that tradition.
Use in this work: Inward seeing and apprehending truth, read as concepts within the relevant intellectual tradition.
Limit of interpretation: French clairvoyance must not automatically be read as supernatural prediction. The proposed counterpart still requires context.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 14 69

Ḥikma Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: hikmet, bilgelik; σοφία (sophia); sapientia; wisdom; Weisheit; sagesse; حِكْمَة (ḥikma)
Origin and changes of meaning: From Arabic ḥ-k-m, with judging and restraining senses, associated with ḥakama, a horse’s bit. Islamic philosophy also uses ḥikma for philosophy itself.
Use in this work: Knowing things in their proper relations and acting accordingly; the emphasis depends on the philosophical or scriptural context.
Word-history sources: 14 69
Concept sources from the shared record: 14 55

Memory Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: bellek, hafıza; μνήμη (mnēmē); memoria; memory; Gedächtnis; mémoire; ذَاكِرَة، حِفْظ (ḏākira, ḥifẓ)
Origin and changes of meaning: The inherited record derives bellek through belle- and -k from Kubbealtı. It does not present the relation to bil- or the derivation’s date as settled where the earlier review lacked support. Arabic dhākira and tadhakkur share a root; Old English gemynd also concerns memory and remembrance.
Use in this work: Retaining and reconstructing the past, and using earlier experience while thinking.
Limit of interpretation: Storage alone does not explain remembering. Retention and reconstruction need to be examined together.
Word-history sources: 45 14 21
Concept sources from the shared record: 26 8

Remembrance Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: anma; μνήμη (mnēmē), ἀνάμνησις (anamnēsis); memoria, commemoratio; remembrance; Gedenken; commémoration; ذِكْر (ḏikr)
Origin and changes of meaning: Turkish an-, to remember, is attested in Old Turkic. Heidegger’s Denken, Danken and Gedanc enter this comparison; Arabic dhikr concerns remembrance and saying.
Use in this work: Remembering the past and regarding it as significant, rather than only retrieving a piece of information.
Limit of interpretation: Heidegger’s reading is not a settled result of historical linguistics.
Word-history sources: 44 48 14
Concept sources from the shared record: 8 14

Concept Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: kavram, mefhum; ἔννοια (ennoia); conceptus; concept; Begriff; concept, notion; مَفْهُوم (mafhūm)
Origin and changes of meaning: The source record derives kavram from kavra- and -m. German Begriff is related to greifen and Latin conceptus to concipere. Grasping and bringing together provide comparisons, not proof that every term arose from the same hand image. Arabic mafhūm concerns what is understood.
Use in this work: Units through which we consider objects and situations together under selected characteristics.
Limit of interpretation: Similar semantic images do not establish common descent or one shared definition of concept.
Word-history sources: 45 48 51 14
Concept sources from the shared record: 3

Judgement Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: yargı, hüküm; κρίσις (krisis); iudicium; judgment; Urteil; jugement; حُكْم (ḥukm)
Origin and changes of meaning: Kubbealtı relates Turkish yargı to Old Turkic yarġu, judgement or legal case, from yar-, to separate; it was revived during language reform. Earlier Turkish yargucı means judge. Greek krisis concerns separation and decision. Hölderlin’s Ur-teil reading of German Urteil is philosophical wordplay, not a linguistic derivation.
Use in this work: Accepting or rejecting something as being a certain way, examined alongside historical uses of judging.
Limit of interpretation: Do not turn Hölderlin’s reading into established word history.
Word-history sources: 45 52 48
Concept sources from the shared record: 52

Truth Word history and philosophical interpretation are separate

Language forms: hakikat, doğruluk; ἀλήθεια (alētheia); veritas; truth; Wahrheit; vérité; حَقِيقَة (ḥaqīqa)
Origin and changes of meaning: Arabic ḥaqīqa belongs with ḥ-q-q. Comparing it with Greek alētheia requires separating historical word formation from Heidegger’s interpretation through openness or unconcealment. The first needs linguistic support, the second a philosophical argument.
Use in this work: Questions about what is true; uses concerning the essence of being in some traditions require further explanation.
Limit of interpretation: Do not treat Heidegger’s reading as settled etymology or label the whole Arabic entry disputed merely because a Greek counterpart receives a philosophical interpretation.
Word-history sources: 14 52
Concept sources from the shared record: 8 14

Lev Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: yürek, kalp; καρδία (kardia); cor; heart, mind; Herz; cœur; قَلْب (qalb)
Origin and changes of meaning: Hebrew לֵב, lev, with the longer form לֵבָב, levav. Translators may choose heart or mind according to context; the claim that Hebrew has no word for mind would be too strong.
Use in this work: Uses concerning heart, thought, orientation and feeling. A translation choice has to answer to the passage.
Limit of interpretation: Do not restrict it to an organ of emotion.
Word-history sources: 75
Concept sources from the shared record: 75 80 82

Nefesh Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: can, yaşayan varlık; ψυχή (psychē); anima; soul, living being; Seele; âme, être vivant; نَفْس (nafs)
Origin and changes of meaning: Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ shares a Semitic root with Arabic nafs. In Genesis 2:7 it concerns the living being, not a soul independent of a body.
Use in this work: Life, living being and person; not every use should be read through a separate-soul account.
Limit of interpretation: Do not translate it as soul in every context.
Word-history sources: 75
Concept sources from the shared record: 75 80

Syneidēsis Historical dictionary witness

Language forms: vicdan; συνείδησις (syneidēsis); conscientia; conscience; Gewissen; conscience; ضَمِير (ḍamīr)
Origin and changes of meaning: Syn-, together, is related to eidenai, to know. Latin conscientia has a comparable formation. Dictionaries distinguish shared knowledge, awareness and moral evaluation; these should not become one modern concept.
Use in this work: Historical uses concerning knowing together, awareness and conscience; New Testament uses also require their particular passages.
Limit of interpretation: Do not make it directly equivalent to modern consciousness. Assess which historical sense matters in the passage.
Word-history sources: 52 51
Concept sources from the shared record: 52 81

What can we learn from these histories?

The cards include breathing, binding, weighing, grasping and hearing. Words around remembering also bring the past into the discussion of thinking. They need not be reduced to one bodily image. Some connections concern derivation, others later semantic change, and others an interpretation proposed by a thinker.

Heidegger’s relation among thinking, remembrance and gratitude can be read with that distinction in view. It may open a worthwhile philosophical question without becoming a settled result of historical linguistics. Keeping both possibilities visible lets us use the interpretation without overstating its authority.

Embodied cognition investigates how thinking relates to bodily capacities and engagement with an environment. Word histories can be compared with that research, but etymological resemblance is not experimental support. This section offers historical material for the atlas’s third hypothesis, concerning thought and body; its scientific support must come from what the relevant studies establish.

In our four-layer reading, vocabulary examined through Meaning sometimes draws on bodily activity. That is a relation worth following. Establishing it for every language or every concept of thought would require more than the selected examples here.

In depth · When does word history become interpretation?

Saussure distinguishes examining a language at a given time from following its changes through history. These are synchronous and diachronic inquiries, respectively.¹⁵ We need both: earlier use matters, but does not automatically determine what a word means now.

Benveniste’s work brings histories of language into relation with concepts and social uses.⁸⁹ This widens etymology beyond finding an old image. Changes of use may also illuminate changes in conceptual distinctions, provided we can show which text supports the conclusion.

The Turkish expression aklını başına toplamak, roughly to collect one’s wits, can be read beside images of binding and organising. That resemblance does not establish an unbroken historical route from the Arabic root to the current idiom. It is an interpretation to investigate, rather than a demonstrated derivation.

A similar difficulty appears when we split a word into familiar present-day pieces. Reading understand as stand underneath is not a historical analysis. The proposed historical sense of under- as among also needs to be assessed through its source and period.²¹ Neither account becomes reliable simply because its components make an appealing picture.

A proposal for which no source has been supplied differs from a derivation genuinely disputed in the sources. In the first case, we need the missing support. In the second, we compare how rival accounts explain dates, sound changes and meaning. The label disputed should not conceal that distinction. It also prepares the next inquiry: where language offers a comparison, what kind of material evidence would allow us to investigate thinking itself?

For your own judgement

Choose an expression such as grasping an argument. How does describing its present image differ from establishing its historical origin?
If two derivations were proposed for a word, which earlier forms, dates and uses would you want to inspect before choosing between them?
Which questions arise when languages connect breath and spirit? How would you distinguish common descent, cultural transmission and similar human experiences as explanations?

09Science and experiment

The material traces of thinking

Why this section is here

Someone working mammoth ivory about forty thousand years ago brought a human body and a lion’s head together in a small figure. The object survives; its maker’s account does not. We can examine the cuts, the material and the finished form, and begin to ask how it was made and what it might have meant. Those questions draw on the same object, but the evidence does not answer them with equal confidence.

The word histories in the preceding section helped us see what our terms carry with them. Here we turn to a different kind of record: things people made, behaviour recorded in a task, and measurements of brain activity. These approaches can inform one another. An object’s shape, a participant’s answer and a brain signal nevertheless tell us different things, so bringing them together also means explaining the connections between them.

Four questions will guide that reading: what was made or observed, what was measured, which explanation the result supports, and what remains unresolved. They give us a way to compare findings without asking every study to explain thinking in its entirety. When we move from a measured result to a wider claim, we can then identify the additional reasoning that the claim needs.

How to read the diagram. The three inputs represent different kinds of evidence. Dashed arrows show that each is interpreted through its sources and methods. There is no necessary passage from an object to its maker’s exact thoughts, or from activity in a brain region to one mental process. The three boxes on the right separate the measurement, the proposed interpretation and its limits.

In brief

A tool can tell us something about its maker’s skills without telling us everything the maker thought or felt. Brain measurements call for a related distinction: activity accompanying a task does not, by itself, explain the thinking involved. We read objects, behaviour and brain measurements together to work out which conclusions their combination can support.

Explanation

Archaeology: how do we move from an object to a mind?

The stone tools found at Lomekwi 3 in Kenya date to about 3.3 million years ago. They provide a very early record of stone being worked to make tools. Their shapes and working traces help us investigate production. A finished tool alone cannot establish that its maker had mentally arranged every strike before beginning. 90

Stout and colleagues approach this question through present-day toolmaking. In their 2008 study, three archaeologists experienced in stone-tool production performed different making tasks; the researchers compared brain-related measurements and the objects produced. Positron emission tomography uses the uptake of a labelled substance to track metabolic activity, related to cells’ energy use, indirectly. Here it helps investigate the demands of coordinating vision and movement, and organising actions around larger goals. The sample consists of three people living today, however, so the experiment does not directly measure a prehistoric maker’s mind. The 2012 study addresses expertise and social cognition within this research programme through a separate design, which needs to be read on its own terms. 22 74

Engraved ochre from layers at Blombos Cave dated to roughly 100,000–75,000 years ago raises another question. Repeated motifs give us reason to investigate symbolic behaviour. They do not tell us, on their own, what those marks meant to a particular community. 91

The roughly forty-thousand-year-old lion-human figure from Hohlenstein-Stadel visibly combines human and animal features. We can discuss the design and making skills involved, while recognising that its connection to a belief or story needs further context. Mithen’s account of connections between cognitive domains, Donald’s account of external memory and Tattersall’s discussion of symbolic cognition offer different ways of interpreting such finds. Keeping the object distinct from these theories makes a more useful comparison possible. 92 93 70 94

The brain: which processes are we bringing together?

Ramón y Cajal’s work on nerve cells and Sherrington’s concept of the synapse helped establish ways of investigating the nervous system through cells and their relationships. A synapse is a junction through which a nerve cell communicates with another cell. Hebb’s 1949 account proposed that connections between cells could strengthen through their activity together. These are frameworks that directed further research; none amounts to a complete explanation of thinking. 66 27

William James’s description of a “stream of thought” draws attention to the continuity of experience. Studying the changing relationships between brain networks may help us ask about that continuity. The connection is a research question, rather than an identity between James’s description and a network measurement. 67

The default network, for example, is associated with processes including spontaneous thought, remembering the past and considering other people’s situations. It is not simply an idle system that switches off entirely during a task. Control networks are studied in relation to regulating attention and behaviour around goals; language networks in relation to language processing; and the hippocampal system in relation to memory. The question is how these networks work together under particular demands, rather than whether each region has one exclusive job. 5 1

The kind of measurement matters as well. A commonly used signal in functional magnetic resonance imaging is an indirect measure related to blood oxygenation. Methods that record electrical or magnetic activity provide different information. Describing every brain image as “more oxygenated blood going to that region” would therefore obscure how the image was obtained. To connect a measurement with thinking, we need to make the assumptions behind that connection visible.

We use Nicholas Carr’s book about the internet and attention here as cultural criticism. A book’s reference to experimental research does not make the book itself an experiment. When an empirical claim matters to the argument, its supporting study needs to be considered in its own right. 68

Cognitive models: are they answering the same question?

Working memory concerns holding information briefly while using it. Dual-process approaches investigate the relationship between intuitive responses and more controlled evaluation. Predictive processing offers a broader account of how perception and action use expectations and differences between those expectations and incoming information. Listing these as rival answers at one level would make it harder to see what each is trying to explain.

Theories of consciousness ask a further question: how is information being available for use related to experiencing it? Embodied cognition and the extended-mind thesis ask under what conditions our accounts of cognition should include the body, the environment and external tools. These questions overlap, but that overlap does not make the approaches interchangeable.

The table keeps each proposal beside its limits and the kind of source supporting it. A review may assess a body of research; a theory may generate predictions that can be tested. Even a reference to an experiment does not mean that an entire model has been confirmed. What matters is which prediction was tested, through which task and measurement.

Model or approach	Associated authors	Main proposal	Limit or open question	Kind of source
Working memory	Baddeley and Hitch	Holding information briefly while using it is explained through a system with limited capacity. The model distinguishes components involved in this work.	Capacity should not be treated as one fixed number for every task. Other models explain working memory differently.	Review. The linked source is Baddeley’s 2012 assessment. 26
Dual-process theories	Kahneman, Evans, Stanovich	These approaches investigate the relationship between intuitive responses and more controlled evaluation. The distinction does not posit two separate boxes in the brain.	There is no single unified theory. Findings on conflict monitoring challenge a simple claim that intuitive processes never register a problem.	Review, book and experimental research. The De Neys finding needs to be read with its particular design. 23 33 85
Predictive processing	Friston, Clark	Perception and action are explained through the use of expectations and differences between expectations and incoming information. Friston’s free-energy approach is one framework within this area.	A broad account still needs to specify which outcome it predicts in a particular experiment.	Theoretical article. The linked source is not itself an experimental result. 6
Global neuronal workspace	Baars, Dehaene, Changeux	Making information available across an extensive network plays a central role in explaining conscious access.	The 2025 collaborative test challenged some specific predictions. A subsequent commentary disputes aspects of the test’s scope and the attribution of predictions to the theory.	Theoretical review and collaborative experiment. Naccache and colleagues’ 2025 article is a separate critical commentary. 63 7 96
Integrated information theory	Tononi and colleagues	Consciousness is explained through a system’s intrinsic causal structure: how its parts make a difference to one another’s possible states. The integration of that structure is a technical notion, beyond the everyday act of bringing pieces of information together.	Measurement and the passage from theory to experimental prediction remain disputed. The 2025 test challenged particular predictions; it did not directly measure the whole theory.	Theoretical article and collaborative experiment. The predictions tested need to be identified separately. 88 7
Somatic marker hypothesis	Damasio	Signals associated with bodily states are proposed to influence how we evaluate options and make decisions.	Body and emotion are not presented as an invariant prerequisite for every decision. The circumstances and mechanisms of their effects need investigation.	Book and an article explaining the hypothesis. Neither is, on that account alone, a new experimental record. 37 97
Enactivism and embodied cognition	Varela, Thompson, Rosch	Cognition is investigated through bodily capacities, action and engagement with the environment. Enactivism is one set of approaches within this broader area.	An account still needs to explain thinking about distant or abstract matters. Approaches grouped here do not all adopt the same thesis or method.	Theoretical book. One source cannot represent the field’s entire experimental literature. 58
Extended mind	Clark and Chalmers	Under particular conditions of use, some external tools may count as constituent parts of a cognitive system.	A tool affecting thinking and a tool being part of the cognitive system are different claims. The objection distinguishing causal coupling from constitution matters here.	Philosophical argument and an objection to it. This is not a label of experimental confirmation. 4 95

Language and thinking

Fedorenko, Piantadosi and Gibson’s 2024 article discusses the separation of language networks from particular thinking tasks, including some people’s ability to reason without language despite severe language impairment. The authors interpret language primarily as a means of communication. Their article brings several studies together in a perspective; it is not the result of one new experiment. 1

This gives us grounds to discuss why language and thinking as a whole should not be identified. “Language has no effect on thinking” would be a different, stronger claim. Communicating knowledge, developing shared concepts and examining reasons with others remain important uses of language. Nor can a finding about this separation in human brains directly establish how an artificial system thinks.

A collaborative test of two theories of consciousness

In the study published in 2025, representatives of two competing theories and the research team worked together before the experiment to formulate predictions. Global neuronal workspace theory foregrounds information becoming widely available; integrated information theory foregrounds a system’s intrinsic causal structure. These general accounts need to be distinguished from the particular predictions tested. 63 88

A total of 256 participants were shown clearly visible stimuli for different durations. The study used functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography: methods tracking a signal related to blood oxygenation, magnetic activity and electrical activity recorded from within the skull, respectively. The total does not mean that every participant was measured using all three methods. Some predictions were supported and others challenged. 7

In a subsequent article, Naccache and colleagues argued that testing visible stimuli left out some central questions involving the comparison of conscious and unconscious processing. They also disputed the interpretation of some predictions attributed to the theory. This was a commentary by theory representatives, rather than a new experiment. It belongs alongside the original article when we assess what the result means. 96

What can we draw from these investigations?

Archaeological objects, behavioural experiments and brain measurements can help us build stronger explanations together. Their connections still need reasons. A figure’s possible symbolic use, the skill a task demands and the neural activity accompanying that task are separate questions, even when each helps us ask the others more carefully.

We investigate human thinking through brain, body, memory, emotion, action and social relationships. Recognising the brain’s importance does not require us to confine every explanation to processes inside it. Equally, an environmental influence does not establish that every useful tool is part of a cognitive system. That distinction leads into the next section: what kind of explanation are we offering, and what would justify its boundaries? 4 95

Depth What follows from a measurement?

Reverse inference means inferring that a particular mental process is taking place from observed brain activity. “This region is active during this task” and “this region is active, so the person is doing this task” are different propositions. If the region is active during other processes too, the first proposition alone cannot establish the second. Poldrack examines the inference through the activity’s selectivity for the process and what else we know about that process. Such an inference can be informative, but its certainty is conditional. 17

Activity in the default network therefore does not, by itself, tell us that someone is daydreaming. The task, behaviour, the person’s report and the conditions being compared need to be considered together. Finding an activity pattern alongside a process also does not establish a complete causal explanation of that process. 5

Testing consciousness theories requires similar care. When a prediction fails, adequate measurement and design can give us a serious reason to revise an explanation. Calling an entire theory refuted without identifying its version and the prediction tested goes further than that finding supports. Dismissing every challenge as uncertainty would be equally unhelpful. Reviews comparing theories help us keep track of these distinctions. 62

Questions for your own assessment

What can we directly observe in the lion-human figure? What further evidence would we need to discuss its maker’s plans, beliefs or experience?
If you wanted to connect activity in a brain region with a thinking process, which comparison conditions and behavioural measurements would you choose?
Before saying an experiment challenges a theory, how would you check which prediction it tested, how it was measured and what outcome was expected?

10Philosophy and being

How do we explain the being who thinks?

Why this section is here

Someone tells us they are in pain. We can ask where it hurts and when it began, investigate changes in the body, and listen to what living with that pain is like for them. How do these accounts belong together? Are they describing different aspects of one event, or does one bring something into view that the other leaves unexplained? Having considered what measurements can tell us, we now ask how to connect what we measure with what someone experiences.

Part of the question concerns ontology: the investigation of what exists and how it is constituted. Will we explain thinking as bodily activity, as the work of something distinct from the body, or as a process arising through events and relationships? Another part concerns our starting point. We might begin with behaviour, with lived experience or with the way we use mental concepts. Those choices need to be distinguished before we compare the resulting accounts.

We compare these answers in their historical settings. The purpose is to understand which question a position asks, how its reasons lead to a conclusion and how well it answers an objection. That does not require treating every position as equally convincing. It should help us explain more clearly why we find a view persuasive, or where our disagreement begins.

How to read the diagram. The groups distinguish levels of explanation, identified by names as well as colours. They are not mutually exclusive: one author may combine several approaches. There are no arrows between groups. Their placement represents neither chronology nor one view turning into another.

In brief

We may recognise someone’s pain in their behaviour, measure bodily changes and listen to their account. These are connected ways of investigating it, but they do not answer exactly the same question. Philosophy of mind helps us distinguish what thinking consists in, how it works and what it is like to experience it.

Explanation

Which question makes a comparison useful?

A substance, roughly speaking, is something considered as a being in its own right, rather than merely a property or relationship of something else; philosophers use the term differently. Substance dualism treats mind and matter as fundamentally different kinds of being. Physicalist approaches seek to explain the mental within physical reality. Each broad heading contains further disagreements, so naming a position is only the beginning of understanding it.

Functionalism brings another distinction into view: can we explain a mental state through what it does within a system, rather than primarily through the material that realises it? That question can be pursued within physicalism. Phenomenology investigates how experience is given to us, so treating it merely as another answer about substances would miss its starting point.

We retain ten headings in the table without presenting them as mutually exclusive alternatives at one level. An author may defend several together. Reading the level of explanation before the proposal and its open question helps us see what is actually being compared.

Position or approach	Level of explanation	Main proposal	Open question
Substance dualism	An account of what exists	Mind and matter are treated as fundamentally different kinds of being. Descartes is an important example.	If interaction is defended, how can two different substances interact?
Physicalism	A family of accounts of what exists	The mental is explained within physical reality, in different reductive and non-reductive versions.	How does the particular version explain subjective experience, meaning and mental causation?
Functionalism	An approach to explaining mental states	A mental state is defined through its causal role within a system.	Is realising the same functional role sufficient to establish the same experience?
Hylomorphism	An account of being through matter and form	A living being is explained through the unity of matter and form; the soul is the form of the living body. Form concerns what makes the body the living being it is, rather than merely its outward shape. 101	How do Aristotle and Aquinas explain intellect’s relation to the body and its possible separability in their own texts?
Phenomenology	An approach to investigating lived experience	It investigates the structure of first-person experience, its directedness towards things, and how experience is given.	How should the study of lived experience relate to investigation of causal mechanisms?
Enactivism	Approaches to explaining cognition	Cognition is considered through an organism’s bodily activity and engagement with its environment.	Which version explains abstract thinking, and through which concepts and mechanisms?
Extended mind	A thesis about the boundaries of a cognitive system	Some external tools may, under particular conditions, be constituent parts of a cognitive system.	Which criteria distinguish reliance on a tool from the tool being part of the system?
Eliminative materialism	A critique of concepts developed within physicalism	Some mental categories used in everyday explanations may not survive in a mature science.	Which categories should be abandoned, why, and how would the situations they appear to explain be accounted for?
Process approaches	Different approaches through processes and relationships	Mind and self may be understood through events and relationships rather than an enduring substance. This is not one unified doctrine.	How can personal continuity and responsibility be explained through change?
Theological accounts of the soul	A family of religious and metaphysical interpretations	Questions of life, personhood, morality and death are considered in relation to transcendence. The traditions do not share one account of the soul.	Which text and reasons support a particular view? Where does theological interpretation differ from an empirical claim?

The level-of-explanation column matters because these rows do different work. A disagreement about what exists may coexist with agreement about a method; an author may also draw on several rows. Their juxtaposition makes those relationships available for examination without deciding them in advance.

Ancient Greece: thinking, life and being

The relation between thinking and being is a central question in Parmenides, although the interpretation of the relevant formulations remains disputed. Heraclitus’s logos also reaches beyond an individual’s passing thoughts to questions of shared order and understanding. In Plato, the soul’s relation to knowing and to the Forms provides a setting for the discussion of writing in the Phaedrus and the correctness of names in the Cratylus. 24 29

Aristotle treats the soul as the form of a living body. Form here is not simply the body’s appearance, but the principle through which it is a particular living being. His distinctions between nutrition, sensation, imagination and thinking matter to that account. A short definition of the soul’s relation to the body does not settle the further disputes about intellect’s status. 31 76

Islamic philosophy and Sufism: intellectual capacities and ways of knowing

Al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā do not always use intellectual terms in the same way. The distinctions followed in the earlier citation-clusters section need to be read with those differences intact. Ibn Sīnā’s internal senses, including common sense, imagination, estimation and memory, distinguish what different faculties accomplish. His “common sense” concerns bringing sensory information together; “estimation” concerns apprehending significance beyond what is directly sensed. Calling this an early working-memory model would obscure differences in both the questions and the explanatory framework. 39 61

Al-Ghazālī’s criticisms in The Incoherence of the Philosophers and his investigation of doubt and certainty in Deliverance from Error belong to different contexts. His account of knowledge associated with the heart does not require us to portray him as rejecting reasoning altogether. Ibn Rushd’s thesis of the unity of the material intellect likewise needs explanation within his account of intellect; it does not mean that everyone’s everyday thoughts take place in one shared consciousness. 98 53

Ibn ʿArabī’s imaginal realm and Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of the unity of knower and known raise further questions. An imaginal realm is being proposed as a mode of reality, not merely as whatever someone happens to imagine. We try to understand such accounts through their views of being and knowledge, rather than reduce them to the familiar observation that perception varies from person to person. 61

Augustine and Aquinas: knowing oneself and the soul–body relation

Memory and self-examination in Book X of Augustine’s Confessions, and time in Book XI, speak directly to questions raised here. They remain parts of a work with a wider religious and personal purpose, rather than isolated technical treatises on those topics. 99

Aquinas approaches the soul–body relation through the question of how a human being forms a whole. In Part I of the Summa Theologiae, Question 76, Article 1 considers the intellectual principle as the body’s form. Question 79, Article 8 treats intellectus and ratio as related activities of grasping and reasoning step by step, rather than as two separate powers. Reading them as independent mental units would lose the relation being explained. 101

Modern philosophy: doubt, the subject and the conditions of experience

Descartes’s doubt is directed towards the certainty of the thinking subject. We examine how his distinction between mind and body is argued through thought and extension, the latter concerning occupation of space. Spinoza instead treats thought and extension as attributes of one substance. Leibniz’s “small perceptions” bring perceptions of which we are not aware into the discussion. Their vocabulary connects, but their accounts do not amount to one answer. 43

Hume’s account of the self through a bundle of perceptions, and of habit in causal judgment, asks how we arrive at an enduring subject or a necessary connection. Kant asks about the conditions that make experience possible. We use transcendental here for the investigation of those conditions, rather than for an object beyond experience. 3

Historical and social dimensions matter to Hegel’s Geist, often rendered as spirit or mind. Nietzsche’s criticism of the “thinking I” questions the move from a sentence’s grammatical form to the existence of an entity. Rather than close these accounts with a shared slogan, we ask what each makes problematic about the subject.

Phenomenology: beginning with the structure of experience

Brentano’s intentionality concerns the mind’s being directed towards something. In Husserl, this relation provides a starting point for examining the structure of experience and time. Asking how a thought has an object does not require that object to exist in the external world: we can think about something imagined as well as something present. 60

Heidegger’s being-in-the-world questions the habit of first defining a human being as a mind separated from its surroundings and then reconnecting it to a world. Merleau-Ponty foregrounds the relation between bodily existence and perception. Comparing these investigations with embodied cognition can be useful, provided philosophical investigation and empirical research retain their different methods and claims. 8 71 58

Analytic philosophy of mind: concepts, function, meaning and experience

Wittgenstein asks how we use mental concepts; Ryle asks what category mistakes arise when we describe the mind as an additional thing. A category mistake treats something as belonging to the wrong kind of explanation. Neither criticism should simply be identified with a denial that subjective experience exists. 2 13

Putnam’s functionalism emphasises the role of mental states within a system. The thesis that meaning cannot be determined by an individual’s internal condition alone belongs to a separate discussion. Fodor’s language-of-thought hypothesis asks how structures of mental representation might explain mental operations; it does not identify that representational language with a spoken language such as Turkish or English. His discussion of modularity separately concerns processes explained through relatively specialised systems. 102 103 104 105

Nagel’s question about a subjective point of view makes visible the difference between undergoing an experience and explaining it from outside. Dennett’s multiple-drafts model challenges the search for a single centre of consciousness; his account of the self as a narrative centre of gravity is a separate, related proposal. Chalmers’s hard problem asks whether explaining functions also explains why experience accompanies them. 11 64 12

Searle’s Chinese Room challenges the identification of rule-governed symbol processing with understanding. Paul Churchland’s eliminative materialism proposes that some categories in everyday accounts of the mind might not survive in a mature science. That goes further than suggesting new names for unchanged concepts. The table gives distinct objections to each position so that disagreement can affect our assessment. 18 19

Thinker	Contribution	Question or objection
Wittgenstein	Opens questions through the use of mental concepts, the private-language discussion and public criteria. 2	Explaining public criteria does not establish that subjective experience is absent. The relation between use and experience remains a question.
Gilbert Ryle	Criticises describing the mind as a separate thing added to the body as a category mistake. Investigates capacities and dispositions in explanation. 13	Does explaining capacities and dispositions also explain the character of experience?
Hilary Putnam	Emphasises mental states’ roles in functionalism. The thesis that meaning is not determined solely by an individual’s internal condition belongs to a separate discussion of meaning. 102 103	At what level can one function be realised in different structures? Semantic externalism and functionalism are different theses.
Jerry Fodor	Investigates the structure of mental representations in the language-of-thought hypothesis, and specialised cognitive systems in the discussion of modularity. 104 105	A representational language is not a natural language. Fodor does not explain central thinking by treating the entire mind as modular.
Thomas Nagel	Investigates the perspective of the subject undergoing an experience alongside the limits of an outside account. 11	Does a difference in access to knowledge necessarily establish two kinds of being?
Daniel Dennett	Multiple drafts, the intentional stance and the self as a narrative centre of gravity are distinct, related proposals. The intentional stance interprets behaviour by attributing beliefs and desires. 64	How does the account answer the objection that it redefines the problem instead of explaining the character of experience?
David Chalmers	Formulates the hard problem by distinguishing an explanation of functions from an explanation of why subjective experience exists. 12	Some philosophers defending physicalism dispute the distinction or the explanatory demand. This is not a collective verdict of physicists.
John Searle	The Chinese Room argues that processing symbols by rules is not, by itself, sufficient for understanding. 18	The systems reply locates understanding in the whole system rather than one person; the robot reply stresses engagement with the environment. These are different objections.
Paul Churchland	Argues that some categories in everyday explanations of the mind might not survive scientific development. 19	Does using concepts such as belief to defend a view commit the speaker to their ontological correctness? The self-refutation objection raises this question.

The table identifies sources for Putnam and Fodor. A source record makes the claims traceable; it does not replace examination of the primary passages supporting them. That passage-level check remains open.

Indian, Buddhist and Chinese traditions: the same question of self?

Manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra and ātman occur in Indian discussions of mind and self. Roughly, their uses concern mental activity, discrimination or intellect, the sense of “I”, and self; the meanings depend on the tradition and passage. They do not form a single four-layer model shared by all Indian traditions. Nyāya’s distinction between perception, inference, comparison and testimony as means of knowledge belongs to a particular tradition. 73

Buddhist discussions of not-self also require more than the sentence “nobody exists”. They question an enduring, independent self while investigating how experience arises through conditions. The absence of that kind of self does not automatically make personhood, action and responsibility unintelligible. Differences within Buddhist traditions remain important to the answer. 65

The Chinese term xin is often rendered as “heart-mind”. That rendering helps convey the consideration of thinking and feeling together; it is not a modern anatomical definition of one organ. Mencius and Xunzi’s disagreement about moral dispositions also shows why a shared term need not entail a shared account of human beings. 100

Depth Has a view changed, or has the question changed?

Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, al-Fārābī, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Husserl and Chalmers bring substance, form, faculty, relationship and process into different explanations. Plotinus’s Nous, intellect treated as a level of reality in its own right, al-Fārābī’s active intellect and Kant’s conditions of experience are not successive names for one answer. A similarity can open a comparison. A claim of direct transmission or historical transformation requires further textual evidence.

Explaining Aristotle’s form only through the modern word “organisation”, for example, risks narrowing his account of being. Kant’s refusal to treat the subject as either a substance or a bundle of perceptions likewise does not turn it into a third object between the two. Sometimes the question itself has been reformulated, rather than supplied with another answer.

We therefore propose no historical law in which substantial accounts successively turn into relational ones. The comparison can develop the questions about body and relationship in our third hypothesis without proving that hypothesis. Our four-layer architecture has the same limit: placing Kant’s question “outside” the architecture would not explain it.

A useful criticism begins by identifying a position’s premises, conclusion and strongest relevant objection. Scientific findings can constrain philosophical accounts and challenge some explanations. An issue remaining experimentally unresolved does not exempt a view from criticism, or make it as strong as every alternative. The next section adds a historical question to this assessment: through which objects, practices and institutions did these questions become available to ask?

Questions for your own assessment

Would the same reasons suffice to explain pain’s bodily mechanisms, lived character and meaning? How would you distinguish which of these a position explains?
Before comparing al-Ghazālī’s and Descartes’s investigations of doubt, which texts and questions about certainty would you place side by side?
Choose an apparent similarity between Buddhist not-self and Dennett’s narrative self. Which differences would also need examination before you could establish a substantive connection?

11Method and the wider picture

A genealogy of thinking

Why this section is here

We write a calculation on paper because keeping all its steps in mind is difficult. Later, we search an old note on a phone or ask a generative system for a draft. In each case a tool helps with a different part of our thinking. It can also change what we need to remember, what we can trust and how we check the result. This section follows those questions through selected historical records. We distinguish an object, the work done with it and our interpretation of that work, so that a tool’s appearance does not become the supposed birth date of a mental capacity.

How to read the diagram. Double-headed arrows indicate reciprocal influence between tools, practices, institutions and transmission. They represent neither a one-way sequence of progress nor an inevitable development.

In brief

A note on a phone can help us remember something; it cannot guarantee that the note is correct. Tools from writing to computers make some tasks easier while also changing habits. To understand the gains and difficulties, we look at the evidence for particular practices in particular settings, rather than assume that every new tool has the same effect.

Explanation

What can an object tell us?

A stone tool preserves traces of its making, rather than the sentences that passed through its maker’s mind. The geometric engravings at Blombos and the lion-human figure likewise give us material examples of making marks and images; their meanings cannot simply be read off the objects today. The table therefore separates the finding from its interpretation. Present-day toolmaking experiments can help investigate earlier techniques through behaviour and brain activity, but cannot directly measure the thinking of someone living millions of years ago. 90 91 92 22

Scroll sideways through the timeline. Select a stop to find its row in the table.

Period	Record or development	What it makes possible, and what remains open
3.3–2.6 million years ago · object card Read object card	Stone tools preserve material traces of knapping, shaping stone through controlled blows. Lomekwi and later production techniques should not be treated as evidence of an identical level of planning. 90 74	The finds raise questions about making, coordinating hand and eye, and arranging actions. They do not directly establish subjective experience or a detailed plan formed in advance.
100,000–75,000 years ago · object card Read object card	Repeated geometric engravings were found on ochre at Blombos. 91	There is material evidence of mark-making. Meaning, transmission and symbolic function require interpretation; these are not presented as the world’s first symbols.
About 40,000 years ago · object card Read object card	The Löwenmensch figure combines human and lion features. Mithen discusses such finds within an interpretation of cognitive change. 92 93	We can see the making of a hybrid image. The find does not date the beginning of language or fiction, or establish one cognitive revolution shared by all humans.
12,000–9,000 years ago · object card Read object card	Göbekli Tepe provides evidence of collective work on monumental structures. 113	The site raises questions about shared labour, signs and rituals. The structures’ functions and their role in changes towards settled life are not known with equal certainty.
About 3400 BCE · object card Read object card	Uruk tablets are early examples of written administrative records. Much later, Plato’s Phaedrus discusses writing’s contribution to learning. 109 29	Records can be read later and accounts compared. Memory loss is not an automatic consequence. Havelock and Ong offer historical interpretations of literacy; writing was not the beginning of every form of external support for memory. 47 46
First millennium BCE	Jaspers compares transformations in selected regions under the name “Axial Age”. 106	The proposal brings questions of self, ethics and reason into a comparison. It does not establish a single universal birth date for critical thinking.
Fourth century BCE · object card Read object card	Plato and Aristotle developed different accounts of soul, knowledge and reasoning. 29 31	Their accounts supplied terms and problems for later discussions. Their differences should survive comparison within a shared conceptual architecture.
Fourth century CE · object card Read object card	Augustine describes Ambrose reading silently. The date of this episode does not date the invention of the codex, the book made of bound pages. 99	A book of pages supports rereading and moving through a text. Silent reading existed before printing; this account does not identify its first instance.
Eighth–twelfth centuries CE	Greek works were translated into Arabic and interpreted. Al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad and Ibn Fāris produced dictionaries organised through roots. 61 107 108	Translation and interpretation brought concepts into new discussions. Dictionary-making, philosophy and investigation of internal senses are related but distinct activities.
Fifteenth century CE · object card Read object card	Movable-metal-type printing in Mainz established a production arrangement that spread in Europe. Earlier examples of printing existed in East Asia. 46 110	More copies facilitate access and comparison. This does not mean that all copies were identical and error-free, or that deep reading began with printing.
Seventeenth century CE · object card Read object card	Experiment, mathematical explanation and mechanical accounts of nature developed with new research arrangements. Boyle and Descartes contributed different kinds of work. 111 43	Experiment reports became available for public examination while Descartes investigated certainty and the mind–body relation. These are not one method or one cause.
Late eighteenth century	Kant investigated the conditions that make experience and knowledge possible. 3	His account does not treat thinking as merely receiving ready-made data. It is a philosophical position, not an experimentally established brain mechanism.
Nineteenth century · object card Read object card	Hegel, Darwin, Nietzsche, James and Freud worked on different problems. Cajal investigated cellular structures through microscopy and drawing. 114 115 116 67 66	History, evolution, lived experience, the unconscious and nerve cells opened distinct lines of inquiry. These names are not combined into one conclusion.
Early twentieth century	Husserl, Heidegger and Wittgenstein approached experience, engagement with the world and language in different ways. 60 8 2	The limits of explanations through inner representations became subjects of debate. The three thinkers’ methods and conclusions remain distinct.
1940–1970 · object card Read object card	Turing, Shannon, Wiener, Miller, Chomsky, Newell and Simon investigated computation, communication, control, language and problem-solving. 112 59 117 118 119 57	Models and research programmes were developed for rule-governed operations. Shannon’s communication theory alone does not explain meaning; a computational model alone does not explain all thinking.
1980–2010	Research on embodied and distributed cognition, alongside the extended-mind thesis, investigated tools’ roles. Carr examined attention and reading in networked environments. 4 68	The relations between brain, body, tool and environment are investigated. McLuhan’s account predates this period and should not be attributed to Carr or presented as a post-1980 finding. Each claim needs its own source.
2010–2024 · object card Read object card	Deep learning and transformer architectures advanced systems producing text and other outputs. Vaswani and colleagues’ 2017 work proposes a particular architecture within that history. 25	Output performance reopens questions of understanding and experience. One architecture paper cannot establish the history or mental status of all generative systems.
2025–2026	Lee and colleagues investigated reported cognitive effort; Bastani and colleagues studied performance with and without assistance in education; Glickman and Sharot studied bias in human–system interactions. 9 56 87	Research addresses effects on users alongside model performance. A survey, an examination experiment and a bias experiment measure different outcomes; they do not establish that the entire field has changed its focus.

Neighbouring markers on the timeline do not represent equal spans of time. Millions of years separate the first and last stops, while the recent stops cover much shorter periods. Equal spacing makes the selected stops easier to navigate; it is not a chronological scale. The object drawings are simplified illustrations, not photographs of finds. Each linked row and object card provides its date and source context.

Different paths within the same periods

This timeline cannot stand for a sequence through which all humanity passed. Indian, Chinese, Greek, Hebrew, Christian and Islamic traditions developed different questions, institutions and texts. Jaspers’s “Axial Age” brings selected transformations around 800–200 BCE into comparison. It is a historical proposal, not evidence that critical thinking began everywhere then. Its regional coverage and proposed simultaneity can themselves be questioned. 106

Contemporaneous traditions: no single line of descent

How to read the diagram. The bands show traditions existing alongside one another, rather than replacing one another. Dashed arrows mark selected routes of translation and transmission, from Greek philosophy into Arabic and from Arabic into Latin. They neither represent the whole network nor establish that every connection has been verified. The scale is approximate; negative years indicate BCE.

Translation also involves more than moving words between languages. As Greek philosophy entered Arabic and Arabic works entered Latin, terms encountered new questions and interpretations. The root-based dictionaries of al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad and Ibn Fāris belong to the linguistic side of this wider history; lexicography is not the same activity as philosophical translation. The selected arrows should therefore prompt examination of particular routes, rather than suggest that we have drawn every tradition’s history or identified one common origin. 107 108 61

What does writing resolve, and what does it leave to us?

Uruk tablets provide early examples of keeping records. An account becoming readable at another time and away from its keeper makes a significant difference. Yet writing was neither the first nor the only external support for memory: objects, marks and shared practices can also help people remember. 109

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Theuth presents writing as an aid to memory and wisdom. Thamus replies that reliance on written signs may weaken the effort of remembering. Later, the dialogue asks what happens when we question a text and it cannot answer for itself. The issue concerns learning and knowledge: is possessing a record the same as understanding it? The dialogue gives that question force without providing an experiment measuring memory loss across writing’s users. Havelock and Ong’s accounts of literacy changing thought likewise belong to historical interpretation. 29 47 46

About 3.3 million years ago

Knapped stone tools at Lomekwi 3, Kenya

Thinking practice: Adjusting the surface, angle and result of a blow while striking stone.
What it makes possible: Producing cutting pieces; developing and potentially transmitting making skills.
Documented finding: Worked stones and production traces were found. They do not disclose a particular inner speech or detailed advance plan.
Interpretation, cost or limit: Teaching and imitation are possible interpretations. Modern knapping experiments cannot directly measure the ancient maker’s experience.
Sources: 90 22

About 100,000–75,000 years ago

Engraved ochre at Blombos Cave, South Africa

Thinking practice: Engraving repeated geometric marks on a surface.
What it makes possible: Preserving and repeating marks on a durable surface.
Documented finding: The source reports geometric engravings on different specimens.
Interpretation, cost or limit: The marks’ meanings are unknown. Possible symbolic use does not establish the world’s first symbolic thinking.
Sources: 91

About 40,000 years ago

The mammoth-ivory lion-human figure from Hohlenstein-Stadel

Thinking practice: Combining human and lion features in a single form.
What it makes possible: Making a hybrid image into an object others can see.
Documented finding: The figure brings features of two kinds of being together.
Interpretation, cost or limit: A narrative or ritual function requires interpretation. The object does not date the origin of language or a universal mental leap.
Sources: 92 93

9600–8200 BCE

The pillars of Göbekli Tepe, Şanlıurfa

Thinking practice: Producing monumental structures through collective labour.
What it makes possible: Coordinating activity around shared spaces and signs.
Documented finding: The World Heritage record describes a probable ritual function. We do not present this as directly observed use.
Interpretation, cost or limit: An interpretation involving funerary ritual and an account of the site’s role in settlement have different degrees of certainty. Other uses and explanations require consideration.
Sources: 113

About 3350–3000 BCE

Proto-cuneiform clay tablets from Uruk, Iraq

Thinking practice: Recording information about goods and distribution through signs.
What it makes possible: Preserving, transferring and comparing accounts.
Documented finding: Early Uruk tablets are associated with administrative records.
Interpretation, cost or limit: This period does not mark the beginning of all writing traditions or every external support for memory. Narrative and philosophical uses have their own histories.
Sources: 109

Fourth century BCE

The discussion of writing in Plato’s Phaedrus

Thinking practice: Comparing a written text with learning through dialogue.
What it makes possible: Preserving a reasoned account so that it can be considered again.
Documented finding: The Phaedrus discusses writing’s place between reminding and learning, and a text’s inability to answer a question for itself.
Interpretation, cost or limit: This is not an experiment measuring memory loss. Havelock and Ong offer historical interpretations with contestable scope.
Sources: 29 47 46

Fourth century CE

The codex; Augustine’s account of Ambrose reading silently

Thinking practice: Reading a book of bound pages, returning to passages and working with notes.
What it makes possible: Comparing parts of a text and rereading them.
Documented finding: In Confessions VI.3, Augustine describes Ambrose reading without making a sound.
Interpretation, cost or limit: The passage establishes silent reading before printing. It does not identify its first occurrence, its prevalence or the invention date of the codex.
Sources: 99

Mid-fifteenth century

Movable-type printing in Mainz

Thinking practice: Producing many copies with movable metal type.
What it makes possible: Reaching more readers and comparing editions.
Documented finding: The Mainz stop represents a European history. Earlier examples of movable-metal-type printing are found in Korea.
Interpretation, cost or limit: Printing alone did not cause deep reading or the scientific revolution. Errors, access and education also matter.
Sources: 46 110

1660

Boyle’s air-pump experiments

Thinking practice: Using an air-pump apparatus to make observations and report the procedure.
What it makes possible: Providing an apparatus and experimental account that others can examine.
Documented finding: Boyle published detailed accounts of air-pump experiments.
Interpretation, cost or limit: Publishing a report does not establish that an experiment is easy to repeat under every condition. Testimony, instruments and conditions of repetition remain distinct questions.
Sources: 111

From 1888 onwards

Ramón y Cajal’s drawings of nerve cells

Thinking practice: Examining stained nervous tissue under a microscope and drawing it.
What it makes possible: Making cellular structures visible and available for comparison.
Documented finding: Cajal’s work provided evidence for the cellular organisation of the nervous system.
Interpretation, cost or limit: Preparation, drawing and interpretation matter to the evidence. A cellular account does not, on its own, explain lived experience in its entirety.
Sources: 66

1936–1950

Turing’s computing machine (1936) and imitation game (1950)

Thinking practice: Investigating computable operations through a formal model, and machine behaviour through a separate test.
What it makes possible: Specifying rules for an operation and investigating its computability.
Documented finding: The 1936 paper addresses computability; the 1950 paper discusses the imitation game.
Interpretation, cost or limit: The imitation game does different work from a computability proof. Successful machine behaviour does not settle every question of thinking or experience.
Sources: 112 59

2017–2026

Transformer-based language models and studies of human–system interaction

Thinking practice: Delegating drafts and alternatives to a tool, then selecting and checking its outputs.
What it makes possible: Working with quickly produced drafts and alternatives.
Documented finding: In Bastani and colleagues’ particular educational experiment, unassisted performance could decline after help without instructional safeguards. Glickman and Sharot reported increased bias in particular interactions.
Interpretation, cost or limit: These findings cannot be generalised to every tool and use. Reported effort, examination performance and long-term skill are different measures.
Sources: 25 56 87

Books and printing also resist a history organised around a single invention. Augustine’s description places silent reading before printing without identifying the first silent reader. Mainz represents a fifteenth-century European transformation in production, while Korea provides earlier examples of movable-metal-type printing. Wider access to texts and more opportunities for comparison are different questions from whether a reader becomes more attentive or reads more deeply. 99 46 110

Tools change how claims can be checked

Boyle’s experiment report, Cajal’s microscopic drawing and Turing’s model are different kinds of record. One makes an apparatus and observations available for examination; another makes cellular structures visible; another investigates which operations can be computed through rules. We are following changes in grounds for accepting a claim, as well as changes in tools. None of these stops explains thinking as a whole. 111 66 112 59

Generative models bring drafting, producing alternatives and writing reasons within reach of delegation. What follows depends on the task and the way the tool is used. The human–system stop therefore separates participants’ reports of cognitive effort, unassisted examination performance and changes in bias. A change in one does not establish a corresponding change in the others. 9 56 87 25

An animated model: storing and retrieving external records

Ready.

These five steps illustrate one use of an external record: encounter, record, wait, retrieve and check. Tools need not follow this order. Checking is a proposed practice, not a measured claim that most users omit it. Pause the animation or use One step to follow the same sequence at your own pace.

The checking step in this cycle is a proposal for how to use a retrieved record: does it still serve the task, where did it come from, and does its currency matter? Not every memory aid follows all five steps in this order. The diagram organises questions we can ask when returning to a record; it is not a law governing every tool.

Depth What have we delegated?

Recording something, learning it and being able to use it are different activities. We can read an account of riding a bicycle and still need practice to balance. That does not make writing irrelevant to skill: explanations, drawings and instructions can help learning, and their relationship with practice needs investigation. Likewise, printing more copies does not automatically multiply interpretations, but makes comparison and interpretation available to more people.

Sparrow and colleagues’ 2011 experiments investigated expectations of later access to information in relation to particular memory tasks. They do not establish that everyone consulting the internet develops a weaker memory. Camerer and colleagues’ 2018 replication targeted the original paper’s first experiment, rather than the whole series. Failure to reproduce that result does not refute experiments three and four; leaving them untested does not confirm them either. The source record still leaves the experiment-level comparison open because the replication’s full text was not available for the recorded check. 30 34

Causal explanation brings another difficulty. A tool spreads alongside schooling, economic circumstances and institutions. How much of a change in reading habits should be attributed to the tool itself? That question helps us compare Havelock and Ong’s accounts. Mithen’s cognitive history likewise interprets particular finds rather than directly establishing a shared mental leap forty thousand years ago. The extended-mind thesis argues that tools can participate in some cognitive activities; Carr’s criticism of attention and reading does not supply one experimental result for every tool. 47 46 93 4 68

Returning to artificial systems, we therefore ask more than who produced the first draft. Can the person using it show which reasons they accept, which error they corrected and what they can do without assistance? That is a research question we draw from this genealogy, to be investigated through particular uses. The following section turns to thinkers and their contributions; their placement will need the same care we have given objects here, so that historical proximity does not become an unsupported claim of influence.

Questions for your own assessment

If you now consult a tool for something you once remembered, what has become easier? What becomes harder when the tool is unavailable?
Apply Plato’s distinction between possessing a record and understanding it to a tool you use. Can you find one use where the objection holds and another where it does not?
Which object would you add to this genealogy? How would you separate the evidence it preserves from your interpretation of what it tells us about thinking?

12Method and the wider picture

Pioneers: questions, contributions and open issues

Why this section is here

Following a question can bring us back to the same name for different reasons. We turn to Aristotle to ask what thinking is, but also to examine how an inference is formed. Turing’s account of computability and his discussion of machine thinking likewise address different problems. We have organised these names around the questions they help us pursue. The map shows where we might turn; the tables explain particular contributions and the conclusions they can support. Recognising a name should lead us towards an appropriate work and its reasons, rather than stand in for reading it.

In brief

Knowing a thinker’s name does not yet tell us how to use their work, just as naming a tool does not teach us to use it. For each entry we ask: which problem was being addressed, what did the contribution make possible, and where does it remain open to challenge? Those questions help us choose a text for the problem we actually have.

Explanation

The map and tables do different work

The map offers a broad field of reference, with 143 records in its static counterpart. A record can represent one person, several people or a tradition, so 143 is not a count of individuals. The detailed tables contain 31 philosophy rows, 15 language-research rows and 17 science rows. Some of these 63 rows also group people. Map records, table rows and people are different units, and their counts need to remain distinct.

Show:Period: Layer: Find a name or contribution 143 of 143 records

Select a name.

Static counterpart: all 143 records

An entry may represent a person, a group or a tradition. The total is not a count of separate individuals.

Who	When	Layer	What the record says
Alkmaion	fifth century BCE	Body	The brain is the centre of the senses; sensory pathways lead to it. 122
Hippocratic school	fifth century BCE	Body	Joy, sorrow and thought are attributed to the brain in On the Sacred Disease. 123
Aristotle	fourth century BCE	Meaning · Processes	Investigates language, thought and things, syllogism, perception and memory. The physiological role attributed to the heart must not reduce the whole account of intellect to a claim about one organ. 31
Galen	second century	Body	Describes functions of nerves and brain ventricles through experiment. 124
Heraclitus	sixth century BCE	Meaning	Logos as a common measure to which people should attend. 125
Parmenides	fifth century BCE	Meaning	Connects thinking and being, and challenges thinking what is not. The interpretation of the fragments remains disputed. 24
Plato	fourth century BCE	Meaning · Life	Discusses the correctness of names, warns about writing and memory, and develops accounts of forms. 29
Pāṇini	fourth century BCE	Meaning	Sanskrit grammar demonstrates a rule-governed formal analysis of language. 126
Stoics	third century BCE	Processes · Meaning	Assenting to an impression is an act; lekton concerns what is said or meant. 127
Socrates	fifth century BCE	Life	Examines life through reciprocal questioning. 128
Confucius	sixth century BCE	Life	Connects learning and reflection, warning against either without the other. 100
Buddha and Abhidharma	fifth century BCE	Life · Processes	Early Buddhist teachings question a permanent self. Later Abhidharma traditions classify mental processes; the periods should not be collapsed into one date. 65
Nyāya tradition	second century BCE	Processes	Accounts of sources of knowledge, including perception, inference and testimony, and the structure of inference. 73
Cicero and Quintilianus	first century BCE	Life · Processes	Cultivates thinking for public speech through rhetoric and the art of memory. 129
Stoic practice (Epictetus, Seneca)	first century	Life	Treats judgement as something to practise in daily life and distinguishes what lies within our control. 130
Plotinus	third century	Meaning	Intellect proceeds from the One; thought turns towards itself. 79
Augustine	fourth century	Life · Processes	Narrates inner life, explores memory and examines signs and learning. 99
Halîl bin Ahmed	eighth century	Meaning	Organises Arabic roots through a phonetic arrangement in an early dictionary. 107
Sîbeveyhi	eighth century	Meaning	Foundational Arabic grammar connecting structure and meaning. 131
Râzî	ninth century	Body · Processes	Clinical observation and case records, including questions directed at Galen. 132
Hakîm et-Tirmizî	ninth century	Meaning · Life	Sadr, qalb, fuʾād and lubb as four rings connected with degrees of knowing. 40
Fârâbî	tenth century	Meaning · Processes	Examines philosophical terms developing from ordinary language and distinguishes degrees of intellect. 133
İbnü'l-Heysem	eleventh century	Body · Processes	Accounts of vision include mental inference and habit, beyond the eye’s reception alone. 134
İbn Sînâ	eleventh century	Processes · Body	Common sense, imagination, estimation and memory; apprehension and assent; the flying person argument. 39
Bîrûnî	eleventh century	Processes · Life	Observation, measurement and comparison across cultures as questions of method. 135
Gazzâlî	eleventh century	Processes · Life	The route from doubt to certainty; the heart as mirror; logic as an instrument of assessment. 98
İbn Cinnî and İbn Fâris	tenth century	Meaning	Examines the origin of language and shared meanings within word families. 108
Kâşgarlı Mahmud	eleventh century	Meaning	Early witnesses for Turkish vocabulary of thinking in Dīwān Lughat al-Turk. 136
İbn Rüşd	twelfth century	Processes · Meaning	Debates the unity of intellect and the relation between philosophy and religion. 137
İbnü'l-Arabî	thirteenth century	Meaning	Imagination and unveiling within relations between knowing and being; neither mere subjective perception nor undifferentiated irrationality. 61
Mevlânâ	thirteenth century	Life · Meaning	Explores relations between intellect, love and what exceeds expression. 138
Yunus Emre	thirteenth century	Life · Meaning	A major Turkish voice connecting knowledge with knowing oneself; the historical priority claim requires its own evidence. 139
İbnü'n-Nefîs	thirteenth century	Body	An account of pulmonary circulation challenging Galen’s model of the heart. 140
Thomas Aquinas	thirteenth century	Meaning · Processes	Apprehension and discursive reasoning are related activities, not separate human powers; knowing is considered with sensory experience. 101
Ockham	fourteenth century	Meaning	Mental language and restraint in multiplying entities unnecessarily. 141
İbn Haldun	fourteenth century	Life	Forms of thought considered in relation to social life. 142
Montaigne	1580	Life	The essay as written self-examination and the question of what we know. 143
Galileo	1623	Life	Mathematical description of nature and measurement as a standard. 144
Bacon	1620	Processes	Examines induction, experiment and sources of error; not presented here as history’s first list of biases. 145
Descartes	1637	Processes · Meaning	Method, clear and distinct ideas, thinking and the relation between soul and body. 43
Hobbes	1651	Processes	Reasoning described through addition and subtraction. 146
Pascal	1670	Life · Processes	Relations between heart and reason, probability and the calculating machine. 147
Spinoza	1677	Life · Meaning	The geometrical treatment of affects; mind as the idea of the body. 148
Locke	1690	Meaning · Processes	Ideas derived from experience and words as signs of ideas. 149
Leibniz	1684	Meaning · Life	Symbolic reasoning and the calculating machine. 150
Newton	1687	Life	Mathematical reasoning about natural laws and method as a model. 151
Vico	1725	Life · Meaning	Knowing what humans make, with history as a route to understanding thought. 152
Hume	1739	Processes	Association, passions and habitual expectations of causality. 153
Rousseau	1762	Life	An account of education and the order of developing thought. 154
Adam Smith	1759 / 1776	Life	Moral sentiments, the impartial spectator and the effects of divided labour on thought. 155 The Theory of Moral Sentiments: 1759; The Wealth of Nations: 1776. Matched to the existing bibliography; full passages were not reread.
Kant	1781	Meaning · Processes	Sensibility, understanding and reason; categories; phenomena and noumena; thinking for oneself. 3
Bayes and Laplace	1763	Life · Processes	Inference under uncertainty and updating belief through probability. 156
Hegel	1807	Meaning · Life	The historical development of concepts and spirit’s self-understanding. 114
Humboldt	1836	Meaning	Language as activity rather than a finished product, related to a way of viewing the world. 157
Bopp and Grimm	1822	Meaning	Comparative linguistics and regularities in relationships among languages. 158
Kierkegaard	1846	Life	Existence, subjective truth and a person’s relation to their life; not a rejection of thinking altogether. 159
Mill	1843	Processes · Life	A system of logic and freedom of expression as a condition for testing truth claims. 160
Boole	1854	Processes · Meaning	An algebraic treatment of logic. 161
Babbage and Lovelace	1843	Life · Processes	The mechanisation of calculation and Lovelace’s qualification concerning origination. 162
Helmholtz	1867	Body · Processes	Unconscious inference in perception and the speed of nerve conduction. 163
Broca and Wernicke	1861	Body	Lesion evidence concerning localisation of language functions. 164
Marx	1859	Life	Social existence and consciousness; praxis. 165
Darwin	1872	Body · Life	The evolutionary history of mental capacities and the expression of emotion. 115
Wundt and Ebbinghaus	1885	Processes	Experimental psychology and the measurement of memory and forgetting. 166
Nietzsche	1887	Life · Meaning	Genealogy of concepts, perspectives and embodied thought. 116
Peirce	1878	Meaning · Processes	Signs, inference to a possible explanation and the pragmatic maxim. 167
Frege	1892	Meaning · Processes	Sense, reference and quantificational logic. 168
Dilthey	1883	Life	Lived experience, understanding and the human sciences. 169
William James	1890	Processes · Life	Attention, habit, the stream of consciousness and pragmatism. 67
Ramón y Cajal	1888	Body	Nervous tissue understood through individual nerve cells and their connections. 66
Sherrington and Pavlov	1906	Body · Processes	Synapses, reflex integration and conditioning, as distinct contributions. 170
Saussure	1916	Meaning	Signifier and signified; meaning through differences. 15
Bergson	1896	Processes · Life	Duration, memory and the distinction between intuition and intelligence. 171
Husserl	1900	Processes · Life	Intentionality, the lifeworld and phenomenological method. 60
Dewey	1910	Life · Processes	Reflective inquiry, problems and learning through activity. 172
Weber and Durkheim	1905	Life	Rationalisation and collective representations, as distinct contributions. 173
Russell and Whitehead	1910	Meaning · Processes	The logicist programme and the theory of descriptions, with their distinct authorship and scope. 174
Vygotsky and Piaget	1934	Processes · Life	Social speech and inner speech; developmental stages, as distinct programmes. 175
Bartlett	1932	Processes	Remembering as reconstruction through schemas. 176
Gestalt school	1912	Processes	The organisation of wholes and insight in problem-solving. 177
Heidegger	1954	Life · Meaning	Denken, Danken and Gedanc; the question concerning technology. 8
Wittgenstein	1953	Meaning · Life	Meaning, forms of life and the criticism of private language. 2
Gödel	1931	Processes	Limits of consistent, effectively axiomatised systems capable of expressing arithmetic under specified conditions; not an unconditional result about every system or the human mind. 178
Turing	1936	Processes · Body	Computability and the imitation game; the works and dates remain distinct. 59
Shannon and Wiener	1948	Life · Processes	Information theory, communication, feedback and control. 117
von Neumann	1945	Body · Processes	Stored-program architecture and comparisons between computer and brain. 179
Hebb	1949	Body	Proposes changes in connections and cell assemblies through experience; a co-activation slogan is not the entire learning theory. 27
Arendt	1963 / 1978	Life	The Life of the Mind, thoughtlessness and the banality of evil, in distinct works. 180 Eichmann in Jerusalem: 1963; The Life of the Mind: 1978. The works retain separate dates, based on the existing bibliography.
Merleau-Ponty	1945	Life · Body	Perception and thought through a body situated in the world. 71
Hodgkin and Huxley	1952	Body	A mathematical model of the action potential. 181
Miller	1956	Processes	Capacity limits in specified short-term memory and absolute-judgement tasks; not a universal constant for every form of memory. 118
Chomsky	1957 / 1959	Meaning · Processes	Universal grammar and the criticism of behaviourism, in works with separate dates. 119 Syntactic Structures: 1957; the review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior: 1959. Bibliographic comparison is not a complete reading.
Newell and Simon	1972	Processes · Life	Physical symbol systems and bounded rationality, as distinct contributions. 57
Polanyi	1958	Life	Knowing more than we can explicitly tell. 182
Kuhn	1962	Life	Paradigms and scientific revolutions. 183
Licklider and Engelbart	1962	Life · Processes	Human–computer symbiosis and augmenting intelligence through tools. 184
Hubel and Wiesel	1959	Body	Feature-selective responses in the visual cortex. 185
Sperry and Gazzaniga	1967	Body · Life	Split-brain research and accounts of an interpreting left hemisphere. 186
Quine	1960	Meaning	Indeterminacy of translation and semantic holism. 187
Foucault	1966	Life · Meaning	The historical conditions of discourse and what can be thought. 188
Gadamer and Ricoeur	1960	Life · Meaning	The fusion of horizons and narrative identity, as distinct contributions. 189
Habermas	1981	Life	Testing validity claims through discussion. 190
McLuhan and Ong	multiple works/periods (1982 applies only to Ong’s Orality and Literacy)	Life · Meaning	McLuhan considers media’s social roles; Ong examines oral and literate cultures. One year and work cannot represent both contributions. 46
Weizenbaum and Dreyfus	1976	Life · Processes	ELIZA, the limits of computational explanations and embodied skill, with distinct works and dates. 191
Baddeley and Hitch	1974	Processes	A temporary system with multiple components. 26
Tulving	1972	Processes	The distinction between episodic and semantic memory. 192
Kahneman and Tversky	1974	Processes · Life	Heuristics, biases and distinctions among forms of processing. 33
Nagel	1974	Life	The subjective character of experience and the limits of reduction. 11
Flavell	1979	Processes	Monitoring and regulating one’s cognition. 193
Marr	1982	Processes · Body	Computational, algorithmic and implementation levels. 194
Searle	1980	Life · Processes	The argument that syntax alone does not establish semantics. 18
Fodor	1975 (language of thought) and 1983 (modularity)	Meaning · Processes	The 1975 account of a language of thought and the 1983 modularity account belong to different works; contribution and date must be matched. 195
Rosch; Lakoff and Johnson	1975	Meaning · Body	Prototype theory and conceptual metaphor are distinct contributions, not one joint experiment. 32
Libet	1983	Body · Life	Relations between readiness potentials and reported awareness of willing. 196
Rumelhart, McClelland, Hinton	1986	Processes · Body	Learning through distributed connection weights. 121
Dennett and Paul M. Churchland	1991	Life · Body	Dennett’s multiple drafts and Paul M. Churchland’s criticism of folk psychology, not one shared position. 64 19 Multiple drafts: Dennett 1991; eliminative materialism: Paul M. Churchland 1981. Patricia Churchland is not represented by this entry.
Kandel	2001	Body	Molecular accounts of memory and synaptic change. 197
Damasio	1994	Body · Processes	Investigates contributions of emotion and bodily states to decision-making and self; not a claim that every rational decision fails without emotion. 37
LeDoux	1996	Body	Neural pathways associated with defensive responses and emotion. 198
Crick and Koch	1990	Body	A research programme seeking neural correlates of consciousness. 199
Varela, Thompson, Rosch	1991	Life · Body	Cognition considered through action in a world. 58
Hutchins	1995	Life · Processes	Thinking distributed across people and tools. 200
Chalmers	1995	Life	The hard problem and, in separate work with Clark, the extended mind. 12
Clark	1998	Life · Processes	Extended and predictive accounts of mind. 4
Sweller and Bjork	1988	Processes · Life	Cognitive load and desirable difficulties, as distinct contributions. 35
Tomasello	1999	Life · Processes	Joint attention and cultural learning in accounts of human development. 36
Tononi	2004	Body	Integrated information theory. 88
Dehaene	2010	Body · Processes	Global workspace accounts and research concerning literacy and brain organisation. 42
Friston	2010	Body · Processes	Develops the free energy principle, related to predictive processing; not a definition of all thinking as minimising prediction error. 6
Mercier and Sperber	2011	Processes · Life	The proposal that reasoning evolved for argumentation. 201
Izutsu	1964	Meaning	Semantic fields in Qur’anic relations between God and human beings. 202
Clauson	1972	Meaning	An etymological dictionary of Turkish before the thirteenth century. 44
Meriç, Topçu, Duralı	1974	Life · Meaning	Essays on thought, culture and philosophy of science in Turkish. 203
Fedorenko	2024	Body · Processes	The 2024 review examines dissociations between language networks and thinking tasks; language is not thereby irrelevant to every thinking practice. 1
Vaswani and colleagues	2017	Body · Processes	An attention-based transformer architecture. 25
Bender and colleagues	2021	Meaning · Life	The stochastic parrot critique distinguishing linguistic form from meaning. 41
COGITATE Consortium	2025	Body	Preregistered adversarial testing of consciousness theories. 7
Floridi	2019	Life	Philosophy of information, artificial intelligence ethics and distributed agency. 204
Malone; Sharot	multiple works/periods	Life · Processes	Malone examines collaborative arrangements; Sharot studies human–system interaction and judgement. Works and dates must remain separate; 2018 does not date the entire entry. 87
Wang and colleagues	2026	Life · Processes	An unreviewed preprint reports more frequent manuscript revision among authors receiving language-model feedback. 205
Zhao and colleagues	2026	Life · Processes	Nursing students using an artificial tutor obtained higher anatomy scores; the contribution of artificial intelligence was not isolated. 206
Jain and colleagues	2026	Life · Processes	Assisted participants gave more correct answers and reported less mental effort; long-term learning was not measured. 207
Zhu and colleagues	2026	Life · Processes	A three-wave survey links dependent offloading with agency transfer and lower intrinsic motivation; it does not establish causality. 208

Body, Meaning, Processes and Life are distinctions we use to organise this work. We are not claiming that a thinker placed themselves within our four layers. A secondary layer signals a contribution’s relevance to another question. Periods also help navigation; one year cannot contain a life or an entire research programme. Where an entry combines works, the year needs to be tied to the work it dates.

Three questions, three paths of inquiry

The first table brings together investigations of being, knowledge and experience. Ontology asks what exists and how it exists; metaphysics considers broader principles, including the relation between mind and body. Reading a philosophical account involves finding its assumptions, following its argument and considering its answers to objections. Its not being an experiment does not make it worthless. It asks us to assess the reasons appropriate to the claim.

The second table concerns words, linguistic structures and changes of meaning. Plato’s question about the correctness of names differs from Pāṇini’s investigation of Sanskrit grammar. Dictionary evidence, grammatical rules and a proposed word origin are different contributions too. Etymology investigates a word’s history; that history alone cannot determine its present meaning. 29 15 44

The third table includes clinical observation, experiment, mathematical modelling and cognitive research. A model can show what follows under specified assumptions; an experiment investigates what happens with particular participants and conditions. Turing’s formal account, Cajal’s cellular drawings and Lee’s user survey therefore provide different kinds of grounds. Their source records should make that difference visible. 112 66 9

Philosophy and being Ontology and metaphysics

Name and period	Contribution	Limit or objection	Sources
Heraclitus sixth–fifth centuries BCE	Considers change and opposites through logos, an account involving shared order and intelligibility.	Modern “reason” or “logic” does not exhaust logos. The fragmentary textual setting requires interpretation.	52
Parmenides fifth century BCE	Investigates the relation between thinking, speaking and being.	The relation is disputed; it is not a simple claim that everything thought must exist.	24
Socrates 470–399 BCE	The testimonies foreground questioning, testing reasons and exposing contradiction.	We read accounts by others, rather than Socrates’s own writings. Those accounts differ.	29
Plato about 428–348 BCE	Investigates soul, knowledge and Forms through dialogues; some passages describe thinking as the soul’s dialogue with itself.	A speaker’s every sentence is not Plato’s final verdict. Forms and immortality need their own arguments.	29
Aristotle 384–322 BCE	Treats soul as the form of a living body, distinguishing perception, imagination and intellect. Form concerns what makes a body the living being it is.	The active intellect’s status and separability are disputed. Form is not directly interchangeable with a hardware–software distinction.	31
Early Buddhism fifth–fourth centuries BCE	Questions an enduring self and investigates experience through conditioned processes.	Accounts of attention, consciousness and self vary. Early texts and later Abhidharma analyses belong to different periods.	65
Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi sixth–third centuries BCE	Investigate learning, cultivation and moral judgment. Xin can be introduced as heart-mind, bringing thinking and feeling together.	Mencius and Xunzi disagree about initial moral dispositions. Xin is not a modern definition of an anatomical organ.	100
Nyāya tradition from the second century BCE	Investigates perception, inference, comparison and reliable testimony as means of knowledge.	Their reliability is argued within the tradition’s debates and assumptions about being, not through identical methods to modern experiments.	73
Plotinus 204–270	Explains relations between the One, Nous and Psychē: the first principle, intellect and soul within his account.	These are metaphysical terms, not measured brain structures.	79
Augustine 354–430	Examines memory, time and self-knowledge through lived experience, explaining illumination within theology.	Describing experience and giving a theological reason are different activities. Reading one does not experimentally test the other.	99
Al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā ninth–eleventh centuries	Develop different accounts of intellect and knowledge. Ibn Sīnā distinguishes internal senses and uses the flying-person thought experiment to investigate self-awareness.	Active intellect and intellectual stages differ between the authors. The flying person is neither an observed event nor a participant experiment.	53 61
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī death recorded as 320 AH / 932 CE	Distinguishes sadr, qalb, fuʾād and lubb as levels of knowing and spiritual cultivation.	A Sufi classification, not four anatomical regions or experimentally measured cognitive layers. Particular passages still need examination.	78 40
Al-Ghazālī 1058–1111	Examines intellect, heart, self and spirit in the search for knowledge, discussing doubt and kashf, direct disclosure within the tradition.	Works have different purposes. One sentence about disclosure cannot represent every work.	98
Ibn Rushd 1126–1198	Discusses intellect’s character and unity, and relations between religion and philosophy.	Material and active intellect require a specified work and period. Their relation to an individual’s thinking remains disputed.	53
Ibn ʿArabī 1165–1240	Treats imagination as a dimension of knowing and being, alongside interpretations of the unity of being.	Reducing it to subjective perception loses the claim. Empirically testing disclosure and publicly debating the text’s reasons are different activities.	61
Thomas Aquinas 1225–1274	Treats soul as the body’s form. Intellectus and ratio are related activities of grasping and stepwise reasoning, not separate human powers.	An account of knowledge beginning in sense and an argument for immortality have different grounds. Two checked passages do not validate the whole system.	53 101
Mullā Ṣadrā 1571–1640	Relates unity of knower and known, primacy of existence and substantial motion, change in substance itself.	Separating the theses loses their systematic grounds. Their metaphysical premises are not an experimental mechanism model.	61
Descartes 1596–1650	Moves from doubting to the existence of the thinking subject and treats mind as a thinking thing.	This inference does not explain mind–body interaction or complete an entire theory of mind.	43
Spinoza 1632–1677	Treats thought and extension as attributes of one substance and the human mind as the idea of the body.	This is not a modern neuroscience finding. The system’s concepts require their own arguments.	43
Leibniz 1646–1716	Distinguishes unnoticed small perceptions from apperception, awareness of perception.	Small perceptions do not contain every modern sense of the unconscious. Monadology is not an experimental mechanism model.	3
Hume 1711–1776	Examines self through relations among perceptions and causal expectation through habit.	Describing self-experience differs from simply declaring that no self exists. The causal critique’s scope needs discussion.	3
Kant 1724–1804	Distinguishes sensibility, understanding and reason; investigates categories and representations’ unity in consciousness.	Conditions making experience possible are a different question from how a particular brain mechanism operates.	3 49
Hegel 1770–1831	Considers concepts and Geist through history, relating individual consciousness to shared life.	A necessary historical destination is disputed. Translating Geist as individual mind alone narrows the account.	49
Nietzsche 1844–1900	Considers reason and consciousness through body, drives, values and perspectives.	Explaining where a belief came from does not, by itself, establish whether it is true.	8
Brentano, Husserl 1838–1938 combined span	Brentano discusses intentionality, mental acts being about something. Husserl develops questions of experience, time and first-person structure.	Their approaches differ. Describing experience is not identical with explaining its neural causes.	60
Heidegger 1889–1976	Asks what calls us to think alongside questions about thinking’s operation.	His distinction between science and thinking needs its setting; it should not become a verdict that science is worthless.	8
Wittgenstein, Ryle 1889–1976 combined span	Wittgenstein investigates meaning through use and language-games; Ryle criticises category mistakes in accounts of mind.	Public criteria do not simply deny experience. The two authors do not offer one identical thesis.	2 13
Merleau-Ponty 1908–1961	Considers perception and thought through bodily experience of engaging with a world.	Bodily experience neither completes nor makes unnecessary causal explanations through cells and networks.	71
Searle, Nagel, Chalmers key texts, 1974–1996	Address symbol processing and understanding, experience’s subjective character, and why experience exists, respectively.	Three distinct arguments. Objections from philosophers defending physicalism also need assessment on their own grounds.	18 11 12
Dennett (1942–2024), Paul M. Churchland key texts, 1981–1991	Dennett investigates consciousness through multiple drafts. Paul Churchland questions the relationship between everyday mental categories and neuroscience.	Whether experience is adequately explained remains disputed. The linked Churchland source is Paul M. 1981; Patricia’s contribution is not supplied by this entry.	64 19
Clark and Chalmers; Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991–1998	The first pair considers external tools’ constituent roles; the second group cognition through bodily engagement with an environment.	Extended mind and enactivism differ. System boundaries, representation and abstract thinking require their respective arguments.	4 58

Language and meaning Etymology, historical linguistics and lexicography

Name and period	Contribution	Limit or objection	Sources
Plato fourth century BCE	In the Cratylus, discusses the correctness of names, nature and convention.	This is not modern etymology’s investigation through regular sound changes and historical witnesses.	29
Pāṇini about fourth century BCE	Investigates Sanskrit through a detailed rule-governed grammar.	More than word origins: word formation and sentence structure also matter.	15
Varro 116–27 BCE	Systematically investigates Latin words and proposed origins in De Lingua Latina.	Proposals need comparison with sound correspondences and historical evidence. Early importance does not guarantee accuracy.	51
Isidore of Seville about 560–636	Organises encyclopedic knowledge through word origins in Etymologiae.	A proposed origin is not a concept’s immutable essence. Historical importance and etymological correctness are separate.	15
Al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad about 718–786	The attributed Kitāb al-ʿAyn is an early dictionary organised through Arabic roots and sounds.	Scope, compilation and attribution require investigation. A root does not guarantee one meaning in every setting.	14
Sībawayhi about 760–796	Systematically examines Arabic grammar in al-Kitāb.	Grammar is not merely etymology; structure, usage and meaning matter too.	14
Ibn Jinnī about 934–1002	In al-Khaṣāʾiṣ, considers linguistic structure, sound and meaning, and relations between rearrangements of roots.	Each proposal of larger derivation requires historical evidence. Sound resemblance alone does not establish shared origin.	14
Ibn Fāris died 1004	Proposes shared semantic axes for root families in Maqāyīs al-lugha.	These can aid explanation without being identical with modern historical methods or one necessary meaning.	14
Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī eleventh century	Records Turkic vocabulary and dialect differences in Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk.	Karakhanid evidence should not be equated with modern Turkish. Later semantic changes need tracing.	44
William Jones, Rasmus Rask, Franz Bopp work, 1786–1867	Make different contributions to language relationships and comparative grammar.	They do not share one method or result. Linguistic relationship establishes no racial or cultural identity.	15
Jacob Grimm 1785–1863	Makes regular Germanic sound changes a subject of comparative investigation.	Sound correspondences need more than isolated similar words. Folklore collection and linguistic scholarship are distinct work.	48
Edward William Lane 1801–1876	Brings classical Arabic dictionary evidence together in an English lexicon.	It does not represent every modern Arabic use. The classical witness behind an entry also matters.	14
Ferdinand de Saussure 1857–1913	Distinguishes language’s relations at a time from historical change; examines signifier and signified, a sign’s form and its associated concept.	We use the distinction to separate origin and current meaning. It is not an unattributed verbatim quotation from Saussure.	15
Émile Benveniste 1902–1976	Investigates Indo-European institutional vocabulary and a speaker’s expression of personhood in language.	Deriving an institution’s single immutable essence from linguistic patterns needs additional reasons.	89
Gerard Clauson 1891–1974	Compiles an etymological dictionary using historical evidence for pre-thirteenth-century Turkic.	Its period is bounded. Continuity with modern use needs to be shown word by word.	44

Science and experiment Physiology, psychology, neuroscience and cognition

Name and period	Contribution	Limit or objection	Sources
Paul Broca, Carl Wernicke work, 1861–1874	Investigate language impairment and brain damage through different clinical cases.	Language is not thereby reduced to two isolated boxes. Lesions, networks and tasks need further investigation.	1
Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Charles Sherrington key work, 1888–1906	Investigate cellular organisation, and neural connection and reflex integration, respectively.	Related but different contributions. Cells, connections and lived experience call for distinct explanatory levels.	66
William James 1842–1910	Investigates the stream of thought, attention, habit and self.	Introspection contributes to studying experience without alone verifying a mechanism.	67
Donald Hebb 1904–1985	Proposes an account relating experience-dependent connection changes to the formation of cell assemblies.	The popular firing-together phrase cannot replace the theory. Complex thinking is not one strengthened connection.	27
Alan Turing 1912–1954	Investigates computability through a formal machine and later behaviour through the imitation game.	Computability, performance in an exchange and understanding are separate claims.	112 59
Allen Newell, Herbert Simon key book, 1972	Model problem-solving through symbolic search and rules.	Particular successes do not establish that all cognition must work this way. The physical-symbol-system hypothesis needs its own grounds.	57
Alan Baddeley, Graham Hitch from 1974	Develop working memory through related components for holding and using information.	Versions and rival accounts exist. A component is not necessarily one brain region.	26
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky from the 1970s	Investigate judgment under uncertainty, shortcuts and biases.	Later two-mode accounts should not become the original model of all their joint work. Modes are not anatomical organs.	33 23
Antonio Damasio key book, 1994	Examines bodily and emotional signals in decision-making through the somatic-marker approach, and their relation to self.	Which signals help in which conditions needs testing. No decision without emotion is a stronger claim.	37
Robert Bjork; John Sweller key work, 1988–1994	Investigate some difficulties’ contribution to lasting learning, and tasks’ cognitive load, respectively.	Not every difficulty helps. Task, prior knowledge and measurement time affect results.	38 35
Stanislas Dehaene and colleagues key publications, 2017–2020	With Changeux and colleagues, investigates broad information availability through global neuronal workspace theory.	Reading and number research are not identical with evidence for a consciousness theory. Particular predictions face rival explanations.	63 42
Giulio Tononi and colleagues fourth version, 2023	Develop integrated information theory; the 2023 record concerns version four.	Measurement of its quantities and discrimination from rivals remain disputed.	88
Karl Friston key article, 2010	Develops the free-energy principle as a framework related to predictive processing.	A broad principle is not a particular task model. Tests require measurable model-specific predictions.	6
Evelina Fedorenko review, 2024	With colleagues, reviews separation of language networks from various thinking tasks.	This does not remove language’s contribution to learning and communication. A review is not one new experiment.	1
Dietrich Stout 2008–2012	Investigates stone-tool production’s action organisation and neural associations in modern participants.	Experimental analogy cannot directly measure prehistoric minds. Checking the three-expert/six-novice comparison does not check every result.	22 74
COGITATE Consortium 2025	Collaboratively tests selected predictions of two consciousness theories under an agreed design.	This is not a contest among all theories. Particular prediction outcomes do not alone settle an entire theory.	7
Tali Sharot, Thomas Malone, Hao-Ping Lee, Hamsa Bastani 2024–2025	Contribute different work on interaction, collaboration, reported critical thinking and educational assistance.	Vaccaro and colleagues’ meta-analysis needs its own attribution. Joint performance, reported effort and unassisted learning are different measures.	87 120 9 56

Sharing a row need not mean sharing a position

Grouping names saves space at the risk of concealing disagreements. Al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā offer different accounts of intellect. Clark and Chalmers’s extended-mind thesis is also distinct from Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s enactivism. Enactivist approaches investigate cognition through bodily activity in an environment; the extended-mind thesis asks whether some external tools can constitute parts of particular cognitive activities. A shared row does not establish a shared argument. 53 4 58

The same care matters in human–system research. Malone’s approach to collective work, Sharot’s interaction studies, Lee’s survey and Bastani’s educational experiment ask different questions. The meta-analysis, a systematic combination of results across studies, is by Vaccaro, Almaatouq and Malone. Grouping these authors with Sharot does not make it a study by Sharot; the particular work and its authors need to remain identifiable. 120 87 9 56

What relationship does an arrow assert?

An arrow between thinkers can make a substantial claim. It might concern translation, adoption, a teacher–student relationship or criticism; these are different relationships. Ibn Rushd and Aquinas are not simply successive holders of one unchanged view. Connecting Merleau-Ponty with embodied cognition likewise calls for evidence of which author used which text. 53 71 58

How to read the relationships. These are selected routes of transmission, debate and development, with supporting passages to be followed record by record. A dashed line distinguishes research lines, not degrees of certainty. Relationship types are named in the list; the small diagram does not display all twelve. Philosophy, language research and empirical science are three research lines, distinct from our four architectural layers.

Twelve selected relationships

All twelve links below are proposals to follow through particular texts. None is marked as newly verified.

Aristotle → al-Fārābī: commentary and conceptual transmission. 53
Plotinus → al-Fārābī: indirect textual transmission. 53
Al-Fārābī → Ibn Sīnā: comparison of accounts of intellect. 53
Ibn Sīnā → Aquinas: Latin translation and debate. 53
Ibn Rushd → Aquinas: critical engagement. 53
Brentano → Husserl: teaching and conceptual transformation. 60
Husserl → Heidegger: adoption and criticism within phenomenology. 8
Heidegger → Merleau-Ponty: discussion of world and body. 71
Merleau-Ponty → Varela: a point of reference for embodiment. 58
Saussure → Benveniste: linguistic debate and development. 89
Cajal → Hebb: a connection between cellular structure and an account of learning. 27
Turing → Newell and Simon: development of a computational approach. 57

Each relationship above remains a route to investigate where its particular supporting passage has not been checked. A book’s presence in the bibliography does not verify an arrow. We need to identify the work, passage and sense in which the later account draws on it. Keeping the relationship type visible makes disagreement with the connection possible.

Contributions a short row cannot contain

Mullā Ṣadrā’s unity of knower and known belongs alongside the primacy of existence and substantial motion. The former takes existence as fundamental rather than essence; the latter concerns change in substance itself. Ibn ʿArabī’s imagination also needs its relation to interpretations of the unity of being, while al-Ghazālī’s inquiry into knowledge belongs alongside kashf, direct disclosure or knowing within those traditions. This is not a participant experiment. Plotinus’s distinction between intellect and soul, Descartes’s passage from doubt to the thinking subject, early Buddhist analyses and Chinese discussions of learning and ethics each need their own setting. 61 98 79 43 65 100

Leibniz’s apperception concerns becoming aware of perception. Kant asks about representations being united in one consciousness. Brentano and Husserl investigate intentionality, the directedness of experience, while Nietzsche examines body, drives, values and perspectives, and James investigates attention, habit and self. Similar vocabulary does not establish one theory. The specific work–passage matches for the interpretations of Leibniz and Nietzsche in this paragraph remain open. 3 60 67

We also distinguish Shannon’s communication theory, Wiener’s account of feedback and control, Miller’s memory research and Chomsky’s generative grammar. Shannon’s technical information measure does not directly measure meaning; Miller’s capacity discussion does not set one number for every task. Hinton, LeCun and Bengio’s contributions to connectionism, deep learning and learning representations also need separate accounts. Backpropagation, a procedure for passing error information backwards through a network to adjust its parameters, should not be presented as those three researchers’ invention alone. The listed sources do not separately verify every contribution mentioned here. 117 118 119 121

Turing’s imitation game, Newell and Simon’s symbolic search, Kahneman and Tversky’s judgment research, Damasio’s account of body, emotion and decision, and Dehaene and Changeux’s conscious-access work address different problems. Dehaene’s research on reading and number cognition remains distinct from evidence for a consciousness theory. The COGITATE Consortium’s collaborative test includes Lucia Melloni and the teams’ contributions; it is not one person’s experiment. Friston’s free-energy principle likewise differs from testing a specific predictive-processing model. 59 57 33 37 42 7 6

Language research also needs Meillet and Ernout’s Latin dictionary, work on language change’s social dimensions, Pokorny’s reconstructed Indo-European roots and Chantraine’s Greek dictionary. A reconstructed root is a proposal, not a directly recorded word. Ibn Jinnī’s sound–meaning proposals, Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī’s dialect comparisons and Lane’s classical witnesses need that distinction too. Separate work records for the first four names have not yet been matched to every claim in this paragraph. 14 44

Kâtip Çelebi’s Ottoman scholarship and Agop Dilâçar’s language work deserve a place in the scope. Attributing a particular proposal about us, Turkish for reason, to Dilâçar, or summarising Kâtip Çelebi’s classification of intellect, nevertheless requires a work and passage. These remain two files to develop, rather than established findings supplied with missing evidence.

Depth Whom have we selected, and what has the selection obscured?

A list of pioneers is a selection from history, shaped by our questions, languages and reading. The small number of women cannot simply be attributed to the historical sources; our choices contribute too. Susan Carey’s conceptual development, Elizabeth Spelke’s core knowledge and Patricia Churchland’s neurophilosophy merit distinct records. A Churchland entry does not guarantee Patricia’s contribution is represented. Evan Thompson and Anil Seth raise separate questions about the coverage of enactivism and consciousness research. Thompson is already part of the Varela–Thompson–Rosch entry, which we need to recognise before proposing to add him.

The aim is also more than collecting names. Hobbes describes reasoning through combining and separating the consequences of general names. A modern model’s use of the same word does not establish direct influence. Chapter V of Leviathan provides a text to examine; transmission to a later author needs evidence from that author’s work too. 146

For a new entry we want a problem, a specific contribution, a relevant work and an open question together. Existing entries should meet the same standard. Finding a citation, reading a passage and evaluating its claim are separate activities. This English treatment does not revalidate the primary sources for all 143 records. The distinction also guides our next section, where a word’s occurrence, a translation and our interpretation must remain attributable to their different authors.

Questions for your own assessment

Choose a map entry. Which question would take you to that author, and which work or finding would you want before assessing the answer?
Choose two people grouped in one row. How would the row change if it distinguished their shared question from their different answers?
If you proposed an arrow between two names, how would you distinguish translation, criticism, direct influence and similarity of subject? What evidence could change your interpretation?

13Kutsal metin

Thinking in the Qur’an, Torah and New Testament

Why this section is here

Coming across “heart” in a text, we may expect a passage about feeling. When the heart is said to seek knowledge or understand, that expectation is no longer enough. We need to ask what the word does in that sentence, what surrounds it and what the translator has chosen. We approach selected passages from the Qur’an, Torah, other books of the Tanakh and New Testament in this way. Shared words do not establish one account of the human being. Instead, we investigate how knowing, remembering, discerning and acting are brought into relation, and whether an apparent similarity belongs to the text, its translation or our comparison.

How to read the diagram. The planes separate words occurring together, translation choices, comparisons between passages and our interpretation. A dashed frame marks the interpretation as ours. There are no arrows claiming that one plane produces another, and no universal identity between heart, reason and mind, or between breath, spirit and living being.

In brief

Believing wholeheartedly and reflecting on a question can seem different activities today. Some passages here associate one word with several such activities. That makes a translator’s choice between “heart” and “mind” worth investigating. Reading passage, translation and interpretation separately allows both the connection and its limits to remain visible.

Explanation

Which books and sources are represented?

“Torah” here means the five books traditionally attributed to Moses: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy. First Kings, Job and Proverbs belong to other books of the Tanakh, not to the Torah. Within the New Testament we distinguish Matthew, Mark, Luke and John from the Pauline letters. Romans is a New Testament book, not one of the four Gospels. These distinctions help identify who is speaking and in what setting.

The explorer contains fifty records: twenty-six from the Qur’an, five from the Torah, five from other Tanakh books and fourteen from the New Testament. Some translations combine verses in one sentence, so fifty records do not mean fifty independent translated sentences. Wider passage coverage is retained with its record.

The source selection remains bounded: Diyanet’s Turkish rendering and the Kur’an Yolu translation and commentary; the authorised Turkish Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri; Sefaria for Hebrew and the specified Jewish Publication Society 1985 English text; and the German Bible Society’s Nestle–Aland 28 Greek edition. A page loading does not establish that the requested version was obtained. Earlier access limits remain in the records. The English explanations below are our reading aids, not a newly verified edition or an additional authorised scripture translation. 209 210 82 80 211 81

What kind of explanation sits beside the passage?

The text in its recorded language, a selected translation, a source commentary and our comparative reading occupy separate fields. “Original-language text” means the language of the edition being used, not the earliest surviving manuscript. Commentary interprets a passage; it is not merely an extended translation. The quoted commentaries here come only from Kur’an Yolu. An empty corresponding field in another tradition reflects our selection, not an absence of commentary in that tradition.

For al-Baqara 2:242, the sentence under the commentary heading repeats the translation, so we do not count it as an additional explanation. The source page for al-Ḥajj 22:46 discusses verses 45–48 together, and the inherited excerpt also includes comments on verses 45 and 47. We retain that excerpt’s scope instead of silently rewriting it; the reading of verse 46 remains tied to its own explanation.

Find a passage or theme 50 of 50 records

Access, passage text, translation version, commentary and our interpretation have separate checks. A check of one field does not cover the others. All quoted witnesses below retain their recorded wording; where a Turkish witness needs explaining, its English reading aid is labelled as our paraphrase rather than the cited edition’s English text.

Qur’an

al-Baqara 2:44 ʿ-q-l

Root or term: ʿ-q-l. Occurring with: Book; goodness; one’s own conduct. Setting: Advice and conduct.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَتَاْمُرُونَ النَّاسَ بِالْبِرِّ وَتَنْسَوْنَ اَنْفُسَكُمْ وَاَنْتُمْ تَتْلُونَ الْكِتَابَۜ اَفَلَا تَعْقِلُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Siz Kitabı (Tevrat'ı) okuyup durduğunuz halde, kendinizi unutup başkalarına iyiliği mi emrediyorsunuz? (Yaptığınızın çirkinliğini) anlamıyor musunuz?

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Sizler kitabı okuduğunuz halde insanlara iyiliği emredip kendinizi unutuyor musunuz? Aklınızı kullanmıyor musunuz?

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Ancak âyet bize, başkalarına iyiliği emrederken kendilerini unuttuklarını yani onların kendi yaşayışlarının bilgileri ve sözleriyle çeliştiğini, sonuç olarak samimi dindarlık hislerini kaybettiklerini göstermekte; “Aklınızı kullanmıyor musunuz?” ifadesiyle bu çelişkili tutumlarının, yalnızca dinin hükümlerine değil, akla da aykırı olduğuna işaret etmektedir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary interprets the mismatch between urging goodness and neglecting one’s conduct as contrary to reason as well as religious teaching.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The passage challenges people who urge goodness on others while neglecting their own conduct, despite reading the Book.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

For taʿqilūn, the Diyanet text asks about understanding, while Kur’an Yolu explicitly asks about using reason. Diyanet adds a parenthetical explanation concerning the conduct’s ugliness.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. No separate 9 October 2026 check is recorded for this passage.

Field comparison recorded on 10 October 2026 (inherited). translation 1 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali): quoted body found on the source page; translation 2 (Kur'an Yolu meali): quoted body found on the source page; recorded text: quoted body found on the source page; commentary: quoted body found on the source page.

String comparison after NFC, whitespace and soft-hyphen normalisation; footnote marks were removed from Turkish Kutsal Kitap pages. It is not approval of the whole edition or interpretation. The earlier status note reports a re-fetch on 23 September 2026; that historical note does not replace a new check.

al-Baqara 2:242 ʿ-q-l

Root or term: ʿ-q-l. Occurring with: Signs; explanation. Setting: Explanation within family rulings.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

كَذٰلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ اللّٰهُ لَكُمْ اٰيَاتِهٖ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَࣖ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Düşünesiniz diye Allah size âyetlerini böyle açıklamaktadır.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Aklınızı kullanasınız diye Allah size âyetlerini işte böyle açıklıyor.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary

The source page’s commentary field repeats the translation sentence, so no separate commentary explanation is given. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The explanation of the signs is connected with the addressees’ use of understanding.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The two renderings differ between thinking and using reason. The recorded Kur’an Yolu commentary field repeats the translation, so no additional explanation is counted. Its inherited check did not also recheck the other rendering.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

al-Baqara 2:269 ḥ-k-m; ḏ-k-r; l-b-b

Root or term: ḥ-k-m; ḏ-k-r; l-b-b. Occurring with: Wisdom; good; discernment. Setting: Wisdom and understanding.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

يُؤْتِى الْحِكْمَةَ مَنْ يَشَٓاءُۚ وَمَنْ يُؤْتَ الْحِكْمَةَ فَقَدْ اُو۫تِىَ خَيْرًا كَثٖيرًاۜ وَمَا يَذَّكَّرُ اِلَّٓا اُو۬لُوا الْاَلْبَابِ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Allah hikmeti dilediğine verir. Kime hikmet verilmişse, şüphesiz ona çokça hayır verilmiş demektir. Bunu ancak akıl sahipleri anlar.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

O, dilediğine hikmeti verir ve kime hikmet verilirse o kimse birçok hayra nâil olmuş demektir. Bunu ise ancak derin kavrayış sahibi olanlar düşünüp anlarlar.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Hikmet de sahibini yanılmak ve sapmaktan koruduğu için bu ismi almıştır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary explains the name wisdom through protection against error and deviation.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Wisdom is presented as a great good, with the taking of heed associated with discernment.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The renderings differ between people of reason and those of deep understanding. Kur’an Yolu distinguishes historical uses of wisdom; these are not reduced to one immutable root meaning. Its reading is inherited, not newly performed.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

Āl ʿImrān 3:190 l-b-b

Root or term: l-b-b. Occurring with: Heavens; earth; night; day. Setting: Creation and reflection.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اِنَّ فٖي خَلْقِ السَّمٰوَاتِ وَالْاَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ الَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَاٰيَاتٍ لِاُو۬لِي الْاَلْبَابِۚ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Göklerin ve yerin yaratılışında, gece ile gündüzün birbiri ardınca gelip gidişinde selim akıl sahipleri için elbette ibretler vardır.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Göklerin ve yerin yaratılışında, gece ile gündüzün farklı oluşunda aklıselim sahipleri için elbette ibretler vardır.

The Kur’an Yolu page shows this verse together with the next; the part for verse 190 is given here.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Görüldüğü gibi burada da göklerin ve yerin yaratılışında akıl sahipleri için ibret alınması gereken şeylerin bulunduğu vurgulanmakta ve müminlerin bu ibret alınacak olaylar karşısındaki tutumları dua üslûbuyla anlatılmaktadır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary connects signs in creation with reflection and a prayerful response.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The alternation of night and day and the creation of heavens and earth are presented as signs for those who understand.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Diyanet’s selim akıl sahipleri and Kur’an Yolu’s aklıselim sahipleri rearrange closely related Turkish expressions for sound understanding in rendering ūlī al-albāb.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Āl ʿImrān 3:191 f-k-r; ḏ-k-r

Root or term: f-k-r; ḏ-k-r. Occurring with: Remembrance; creation; prayer. Setting: Reflection within prayer.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَلَّذٖينَ يَذْكُرُونَ اللّٰهَ قِيَامًا وَقُعُودًا وَعَلٰى جُنُوبِهِمْ وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فٖى خَلْقِ السَّمٰوَاتِ وَالْاَرْضِۚ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هٰذَا بَاطِلًاۚ سُبْحَانَكَ فَقِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Onlar ayaktayken, otururken ve yanları üzerine yatarken Allah'ı anarlar. Göklerin ve yerin yaratılışı üzerinde düşünürler. "Rabbimiz! Bunu boş yere yaratmadın, seni eksikliklerden uzak tutarız. Bizi ateş azabından koru" derler.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Onlar ayakta dururken, otururken, yatarken hep Allah’ı anarlar; göklerin ve yerin yaratılışını düşünürler (ve şöyle derler:) “Rabbimiz! Sen bunu boş yere yaratmadın, seni tenzih ve takdis ederiz. Bizi cehennem azabından koru!

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The same recorded commentary connects creation’s signs with reflection and prayer; its repetition is preserved as shared coverage.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Remembering and reflecting on creation lead into an address to God in prayer.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

For yatafakkarūn, both renderings speak of reflecting on creation, with different Turkish constructions. Diyanet starts the prayer separately; Kur’an Yolu marks the transition with a parenthetical “and they say”.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Nisāʾ 4:82 d-b-r

Root or term: d-b-r. Occurring with: Qur’an; consistency; contradiction. Setting: Examining the text.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْاٰنَۜ وَلَوْ كَانَ مِنْ عِنْدِ غَيْرِ اللّٰهِ لَوَجَدُوا فٖيهِ اخْتِلَافًا كَثٖيرًا

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Hâlâ Kur'an'ı düşünüp anlamaya çalışmıyorlar mı? Eğer o, Allah'tan başkası tarafından (indirilmiş) olsaydı, mutlaka onda birçok çelişki bulurlardı.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Kur’an’ı inceleyip düşünmüyorlar mı? Eğer Allah’tan başka birinden gelmiş olsaydı onda birçok tutarsızlık ve çelişki bulurlardı!

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Kur’an’a inanmayan, Allah ve resulüne itaat etmeyen gayri müslimlerin Kur’an üzerinde düşünmeye davet edilmeleri iki önemli gerçeğe dayanmaktadır: a) Kur’an’ın eşsizliği (i‘câz) inancı, bir bilgi ve hidayet kaynağı olarak öneminin anlaşılıp tasdik edilmesi yalnızca müminlerin –imana dayalı– sübjektif değerlendirmelerine bağlı ve bunların sonucu değildir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary argues that examining the Qur’an is addressed beyond believers and that recognition of its significance is not confined to believers’ subjective assessment. This remains its theological argument.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The addressees are invited to examine the Qur’an in relation to its consistency.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Yatadabbarūn becomes an invitation to think and try to understand in Diyanet, and to examine and reflect in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Anʿām 6:32 ʿ-q-l

Root or term: ʿ-q-l. Occurring with: World; play; afterlife. Setting: Comparing lives and values.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَمَا الْحَيٰوةُ الدُّنْيَٓا اِلَّا لَعِبٌ وَلَهْوٌؕ وَلَلدَّارُ الْاٰخِرَةُ خَيْرٌ لِلَّذٖينَ يَتَّقُونَؕ اَفَلَا تَعْقِلُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Dünya hayatı ancak bir oyun ve bir eğlencedir. Elbette ki ahiret yurdu Allah'a karşı gelmekten sakınanlar için daha hayırlıdır. Hâlâ akıllanmayacak mısınız?

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Dünya hayatı bir oyun ve eğlenceden başka bir şey değildir. Müttaki olanlar için şüphesiz ki âhiret yurdu daha hayırlıdır. Hâlâ aklınızı kullanmayacak mısınız?

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Kur’an ise onlara şu gerçeği hatırlatarak cevap vermektedir: Âhiret kaygısı taşımadan sırf dünya ile meşgul olanlar için “Dünya hayatı bir oyun ve eğlenceden başka bir şey değildir.” Hayata anlam ve değer katan şeyler, Allah’ın hoşnutluğunu ve O’na yakınlaşmayı umarak yapılan hayırlı işlerdir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary contrasts worldly absorption with good action directed towards divine approval and nearness.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Worldly life and the afterlife are contrasted in a question addressed to the reader’s judgment.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Taʿqilūn is rendered through becoming sensible in Diyanet and explicitly using reason in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Aʿrāf 7:176 f-k-r

Root or term: f-k-r. Occurring with: Narrative; desire; conduct. Setting: An invitation through narrative.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَرَفَعْنَاهُ بِهَا وَلٰكِنَّهُٓ اَخْلَدَ اِلَى الْاَرْضِ وَاتَّـبَعَ هَوٰيهُۚ فَمَثَلُهُ كَمَثَلِ الْكَلْبِۚ اِنْ تَحْمِلْ عَلَيْهِ يَلْهَثْ اَوْ تَتْرُكْهُ يَلْهَثْؕ ذٰلِكَ مَثَلُ الْقَوْمِ الَّذٖينَ كَذَّبُوا بِاٰيَاتِنَاۚ فَاقْصُصِ الْقَصَصَ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Dileseydik o âyetlerle onu elbette yüceltirdik. Fakat o dünyaya saplanıp kaldı da kendi heva ve hevesine uydu. Onun durumu köpeğin durumu gibidir: Üzerine varsan da dilini sarkıtıp solur; kendi haline bıraksan da dilini sarkıtıp solur. İşte bu, âyetlerimizi yalanlayan toplumun durumudur. Şimdi onlara bu olayları anlat ki düşünsünler.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Eğer biz isteseydik o kişiyi delillerimizle yüceltirdik. Fakat o dünyaya saplanıp kaldı, hevesinin peşine düştü. İşte böylesinin hali, kovsan da bıraksan da hep dilini çıkarıp soluyan köpeğin haline benzer. Âyetlerimizi yalan sayan topluluğun durumu işte böyledir. Şimdi sen bu kıssayı anlat, umulur ki iyice düşünürler.

The Kur’an Yolu page shows this verse together with the next; the part for verse 176 is given here.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Fakat o bunu istemedi, bulunduğu yere saplanıp kaldı, kendini dünyaya kaptırdı, yükselmeyi değil dünyaya çakılıp kalmayı tercih etti.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary describes an unwillingness to rise beyond attachment to worldly desire.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

A narrated example is offered for reflection on conduct and desire.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Yatafakkarūn becomes “reflect” in Diyanet and a more emphatic expression in Kur’an Yolu. What is narrated is called events in one and a story in the other.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Yūnus 10:100 ʿ-q-l

Root or term: ʿ-q-l. Occurring with: Faith; permission; rejection. Setting: Belief and responsibility.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَمَا كَانَ لِنَفْسٍ اَنْ تُؤْمِنَ اِلَّا بِاِذْنِ اللّٰهِؕ وَيَجْعَلُ الرِّجْسَ عَلَى الَّذٖينَ لَا يَعْقِلُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Allah'ın izni olmadıkça, hiçbir kimse iman edemez. Allah, azabı akıllarını (güzelce) kullanmayanlara verir.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Allah’ın izni olmadıkça hiç kimsenin inanması mümkün değildir. O, akıllarını kullanmayanları inkâr bataklığında bırakır.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Allah’ın izni olmadan hiç kimsenin iman etmeyeceği hususunun hemen ardından Allah’ın, akıllarını kullanmayanları iğrenç bir duruma sokacağının, yani kirli halleriyle baş başa bırakacağının bildirilmesi; yaratanın Allah Teâlâ, seçme kararını verecek olanın ise insan olduğunu, bir başka anlatımla, insanın imanla ilgili sorumluluğunun akıl nimetini yerli yerince kullanıp kullanmamasından kaynaklandığını açıkça ortaya koymaktadır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary relates divine creation and permission to human choice and responsible use of understanding.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Divine permission and human failure to use understanding are brought together in the discussion of belief.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Both use “using reason”, but Diyanet adds a parenthetical qualifier. Rijs is rendered as punishment in Diyanet and a mire of unbelief in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Yūnus 10:101 n-ẓ-r

Root or term: n-ẓ-r. Occurring with: Heavens; earth; signs; warning. Setting: Looking and evaluating.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

قُلِ انْظُرُوا مَاذَا فِي السَّمٰوَاتِ وَالْاَرْضِؕ وَمَا تُغْنِي الْاٰيَاتُ وَالنُّذُرُ عَنْ قَوْمٍ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

De ki: "Göklerde ve yerde neler var, bir baksanıza." Fakat âyetler ve uyarılar inanmayan bir topluma hiçbir fayda sağlamaz.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

De ki: “Bir bakın da görün, göklerde ve yerde neler var?” Fakat iman etmeyecek topluma ne o kanıtların ne de uyarıların yararı olabilir.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The inherited excerpt repeats the discussion of permission, choice and responsible use of understanding; it is not a separate source finding.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The invitation directs attention to what is in the heavens and earth, alongside signs and warnings.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

For unẓurū, Diyanet invites a look, while Kur’an Yolu says to look and see. Āyāt appears as signs/verses in one and evidence in the other.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Raʿd 13:19 l-b-b

Root or term: l-b-b. Occurring with: Truth; sight; knowledge. Setting: Knowing and not seeing.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَفَمَنْ يَعْلَمُ اَنَّـمَٓا اُنْزِلَ اِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ الْحَقُّ كَمَنْ هُوَ اَعْمٰىؕ اِنَّمَا يَتَذَكَّرُ اُو۬لُوا الْاَلْبَابِۙ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Rabbinden sana indirilenin gerçek olduğunu bilen kimse, (onu bilemeyen) kör gibi olur mu? (Bunu) ancak akıl sahipleri anlar.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Sana rabbinden indirilenin hak olduğunu görüp bilen kimse görmeyen gibi olur mu? Bunu ancak akıl sahipleri anlar.

The Kur’an Yolu page shows this verse together with the next; the part for verse 19 is given here.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Akıl sahiplerinin nitelikleri ise müteakip âyetlerde şöyle sıralanmaktadır: Bunlar Allah’a vermiş oldukları sözden dönmezler; dinî, ahlâkî, hukukî ve toplumsal yükümlülüklerini yerine getirirler; Allah’ın, gözetilmesini emrettiği şeyleri gözetirler, yani insanlık, akrabalık, komşuluk, din kardeşliği ve benzeri insanlar arası ilişkilerden doğan haklara riayet ederler; rablerine karşı kulluk görevlerinde kusur etmemeye çalışırlar; Allah huzurunda hesaplarının kolay olmasını dilerler; Allah’ın rızâsını kazanmak için uğrunda karşılaştıkları her türlü sıkıntılara sabrederler; namazlarını vaktinde dosdoğru kılarlar; Allah’ın kendilerine vermiş olduğu nimetlerden gizli açık Allah yolunda harcarlar; kötülüğü iyilikle savarlar yani haksızlığa karşı adaletle, yalancılığa karşı doğrulukla, rezilliğe karşı da erdemle mücadele ederler.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary describes those who understand through keeping commitments, respecting relationships, patience, prayer, giving and answering wrongdoing with good conduct.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Knowing the revealed truth is contrasted with blindness, followed by reference to those who take heed.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Both render ūlū al-albāb through “people of reason”. The word for blindness becomes kör in Diyanet and görmeyen, not seeing, in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Raʿd 13:28 ḏ-k-r; q-l-b

Root or term: ḏ-k-r; q-l-b. Occurring with: Faith; remembrance; reassurance. Setting: Heart and remembrance.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَلَّذٖينَ اٰمَنُوا وَتَطْمَئِنُّ قُلُوبُهُمْ بِذِكْرِ اللّٰهِؕ اَلَا بِذِكْرِ اللّٰهِ تَطْمَئِنُّ الْقُلُوبُؕ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Onlar, inananlar ve kalpleri Allah'ı anmakla huzura kavuşanlardır. Biliniz ki, kalpler ancak Allah'ı anmakla huzur bulur.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Bunlar, iman edenler ve Allah’ı zikrederek gönülleri huzura kavuşanlardır. Bilesiniz ki gönüller ancak Allah’ı zikrederek huzura kavuşur.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Gerçek şu ki, burada eksik olan mûcize değil, doğruyu bulma arzusudur, onlarda doğruyu bulma arzusu olmadığı için peygamberin getirdiği mûcizelere rağmen inatla inkârcılıklarını sürdürmüşlerdir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary interprets continued rejection through the absence of a desire to find truth rather than the absence of a miracle.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Hearts’ reassurance is associated with remembrance of God.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Qulūb is rendered as kalpler in Diyanet and gönüller in Kur’an Yolu, two Turkish heart terms. Remembrance also receives different verbal expressions.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Naḥl 16:44 f-k-r; ḏ-k-r

Root or term: f-k-r; ḏ-k-r. Occurring with: Messenger; explanation; Book. Setting: Revelation and explanation.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَالزُّبُرِؕ وَاَنْزَلْـنَٓا اِلَيْكَ الذِّكْرَ لِتُبَيِّنَ لِلنَّاسِ مَا نُزِّلَ اِلَيْهِمْ وَلَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

(O peygamberleri) apaçık belgeler ve kitaplarla gönderdik. İnsanlara, kendilerine indirileni açıklaman ve onların da (üzerinde) düşünmeleri için sana bu Kur'an'ı indirdik.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

O peygamberleri apaçık delillerle ve kutsal metinlerle gönderdik. İnsanlara indirileni kendilerine açıklaman için ve (ola ki üzerinde) düşünürler diye sana da uyarıcı kitabı indirdik.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Hz. Peygamber’e indirilen kutsal kitap ise âyette zikir kelimesiyle anılmaktadır ve bununla Kur’an-ı Kerîm kastedilmiştir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary identifies the passage’s dhikr with the Qur’an sent to the Prophet.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Revelation and explanation are related to people’s reflection on what has been sent to them.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Both render yatafakkarūn through thinking and add a parenthetical link to its object. Dhikr becomes the Qur’an in Diyanet and a warning Book in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Naḥl 16:78 f-ʾ-d; s-m-ʿ; b-ṣ-r

Root or term: f-ʾ-d; s-m-ʿ; b-ṣ-r. Occurring with: Hearing; sight; hearts; gratitude. Setting: Coming from not knowing.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَاللّٰهُ اَخْرَجَكُمْ مِنْ بُطُونِ اُمَّهَاتِكُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ شَيْـًٔاۙ وَجَعَلَ لَكُمُ السَّمْعَ وَالْاَبْصَارَ وَالْاَفْـِٔدَةَۙ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Allah sizi, analarınızın karnından siz hiçbir şey bilmez durumda iken çıkardı. Şükredesiniz diye size kulaklar, gözler ve kalpler verdi.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Sizler hiçbir şey bilmez bir durumdayken Allah sizi analarınızın karnından dışarı çıkardı; şükredesiniz diye size kulaklar, gözler, kalpler verdi.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

“Kalpler” diye çevirdiğimiz ef’ide kelimesinin tekili olan fuâd kaynaklarda genellikle “kalp” diye açıklanmakta, kalp ise Türkçe’deki “gönül” mânasının yanında, özellikle eski kaynaklarda, bilgi olayıyla ilgili olduğu konumlarda “bilme ve kavrama gücü, akıl” anlamında kullanılmaktadır (Râgıb el-İsfahânî, el-Müfredât, “klb” md.; a.mlf., ez-Zerîa ilâ mekârimi’ş-şerîa, s. 178).

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary explains fuʾād and heart in relation to knowing and understanding, citing al-Rāghib. This is its account of that source, not our direct edition check.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The passage places the coming-to-know person alongside hearing, sight and hearts, and a call to gratitude.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Hearing, sight and afʾida occur together. Kur’an Yolu connects them with knowing, citing al-Rāghib and al-Ṭabarī. Reading that secondary account does not verify the cited editions directly.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

al-Isrāʾ 17:36 f-ʾ-d; ʿ-l-m

Root or term: f-ʾ-d; ʿ-l-m. Occurring with: Hearing; sight; heart; knowledge. Setting: Knowledge and responsibility.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهٖ عِلْمٌؕ اِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ وَالْفُؤٰادَ كُلُّ اُو۬لٰٓئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْؤُ۫لاً

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Hakkında kesin bilgi sahibi olmadığın şeyin peşine düşme. Çünkü kulak, göz ve kalp, bunların hepsi ondan sorumludur

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Hakkında bilgin olmayan şeyin ardına düşme! Çünkü kulak, göz ve gönül, bunların hepsi ondan sorumludur.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

On birinci ödev kişinin bilmediği bir şeyin peşine düşmemesi, bilgisiz hüküm vermemesidir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary states a responsibility not to follow what one does not know or judge without knowledge.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Following what one does not know is questioned through responsibility associated with hearing, sight and heart.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Al-fuʾād becomes kalp in Diyanet and gönül in Kur’an Yolu. ʿIlm becomes certain knowledge in one and knowledge in the other.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

al-Ḥajj 22:46 q-l-b; ʿ-q-l; s-m-ʿ

Root or term: q-l-b; ʿ-q-l; s-m-ʿ. Occurring with: Heart; hearing; sight; chest. Setting: Travel and learning from what is seen.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَفَلَمْ يَسٖيرُوا فِي الْاَرْضِ فَتَكُونَ لَهُمْ قُلُوبٌ يَعْقِلُونَ بِهَٓا اَوْ اٰذَانٌ يَسْمَعُونَ بِهَاۚ فَاِنَّهَا لَا تَعْمَى الْاَبْصَارُ وَلٰكِنْ تَعْمَى الْقُلُوبُ الَّتٖي فِي الصُّدُورِ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Yeryüzünde gezip dolaşmadılar mı ki, düşünecek kalpleri, işitecek kulakları olsun? (Dolaştılar, ama ibret almadılar). Çünkü gerçekte gözler değil, göğüslerdeki kalpler (kalp gözleri) kör olur.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Yeryüzünde hiç dolaşmıyorlar mı ki ibret almış kalplere yahut işitmiş kulaklara sahip olsunlar! Şu bir gerçek ki gözler körleşmez, fakat göğüslerdeki kalpler körleşir.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu: excerpt selected from the shared commentary on verses 45–48 · Turkish, as recorded

Meâlinde her iki anlamı dikkate alarak bu kısmı, “evlerinin duvarları çatıları üzerine yıkılmış, ıpıssız kalmıştır” şeklinde çevirmeyi tercih ettik. 46. âyette kullanılan hayret ifadesiyle inkârcıların seyahat etmedikleri değil, bunlardan gezip dolaşanların etraflarına ibret gözüyle bakmadıkları ve anlatılanları ibret kulağıyla dinlemedikleri, bizzat seyahat etmeyenlerin de gezip dolaşanlardan aldıkları haberleri böyle bir değerlendirmeye tâbi tutmadıkları anlatılmak istenmiştir (İbn Âşûr, XVII, 287-288). 47. âyette geçen “Rabbinin katındaki bir gün sizin saymakta olduklarınızın bin yılı gibidir” ifadesi hakkında değişik yorumlar yapılmıştır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The excerpt spans comments around verses 45–48: a translation choice about ruined dwellings, taking heed rather than merely travelling in 46, and interpretations of the time expression in 47. It is not all commentary on verse 46 alone.

This excerpt contains sentences on verses 45, 46 and 47; the comparative reading of verse 46 is separate below. The quoted text is preserved. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The passage asks whether travel leads to understanding and listening, locating blindness in hearts rather than eyes alone.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The renderings differ between thinking and taking heed. The commentary page covers 45–48; the explanation of 46 distinguishes travelling from examining with insight. This is not an anatomical claim. The earlier check covered Kur’an Yolu only.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

al-Qaṣaṣ 28:10 f-ʾ-d; q-l-b

Root or term: f-ʾ-d; q-l-b. Occurring with: Mother; child; trust. Setting: The account of Moses’s mother.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَاَصْبَحَ فُؤٰادُ اُمِّ مُوسٰى فَارِغاًؕ اِنْ كَادَتْ لَتُبْدٖي بِهٖ لَوْلَٓا اَنْ رَبَطْنَا عَلٰى قَلْبِهَا لِتَكُونَ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنٖينَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Mûsâ'nın anasının kalbi bomboş kaldı. Eğer biz (çocuğu ile ilgili sözümüze) inancını koruması için kalbine güç vermeseydik, neredeyse bunu açıklayacaktı.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Mûsâ’nın annesinin yüreği ise yalnızca çocuğuyla meşguldü. Eğer, inanıp güvenen biri olması için onun kalbini pekiştirmemiş olsaydık neredeyse işi meydana çıkaracaktı.

The Kur’an Yolu page shows this verse together with the next; the part for verse 10 is given here.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Haber almak için gösterdiği telâş sebebiyle neredeyse durumu ifşa edecekti, fakat Allah gönlünü pekiştirdi, ona sabretme gücü verdi ve sonunda çocuğuna kavuşacağı inancında karar kıldı.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary describes the mother’s anxiety, a strengthening of her heart and confidence that she will regain her child.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

A mother’s distress and the strengthening of her heart appear together within the narrative.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Fuʾād and qalb occur together. Diyanet renders both as kalp; Kur’an Yolu uses yürek for the former and kalp for the latter.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Rūm 30:8 f-k-r; n-f-s

Root or term: f-k-r; n-f-s. Occurring with: Creation; duration; encounter. Setting: Self and creation.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَوَلَمْ يَتَفَكَّرُوا فٖٓي اَنْفُسِهِمْࣞ مَا خَلَقَ اللّٰهُ السَّمٰوَاتِ وَالْاَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَٓا اِلَّا بِالْحَقِّ وَاَجَلٍ مُسَمًّىؕ وَاِنَّ كَثٖيراً مِنَ النَّاسِ بِلِقَٓائِ۬ رَبِّهِمْ لَكَافِرُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Onlar, kendi nefisleri(nin yaratılış incelikleri) hakkında hiç düşünmediler mi? Hem Allah gökler ile yeri ve ikisi arasındakileri ancak hak ve hikmete uygun olarak ve belirli bir süre için yaratmıştır. Şüphesiz insanların birçoğu Rablerine kavuşacaklarını inkar ediyorlar.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Kendi kendilerine bir düşünmezler mi? Allah gökleri, yeri ve bunlar arasında bulunanları ancak hikmet temelinde, belli bir süreye kadar kalmak üzere yaratmıştır. Fakat şu bir gerçek ki insanların birçoğu rablerine kavuşmayı hâlâ inkâr etmektedir.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Bu âyetin ilk kısmı gramer açısından tahlil edildiğinde, “Kendi kendilerine bir düşünmezler mi ki, Allah’ın gökleri, yeri ve bunlar arasında bulunanları ancak ve ancak hak ve adalet temelinde yaratmış olduğunu anlasınlar veya bunu dile getirsinler!” şeklinde bir mânaya ulaşılabildiği gibi, âyetin bu kısmına “Kendileri hakkında ve Allah’ın gökleri, yeri ve bunlar arasında bulunanları ancak ve ancak hak ve adalet temelinde yaratmış olduğu hakkında bir düşünmezler mi?” anlamını vermek de mümkündür (bk. Zemahşerî, III, 198; İbn Atıyye, IV, 329; Şevkânî, IV, 247).

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary gives grammatical readings involving reflection within oneself or about oneself and creation, referring to several interpreters. These are alternative readings, not one compulsory equivalent.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Reflection about or within oneself is connected with creation, its term and a future encounter.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Diyanet renders yatafakkarū fī anfusihim as reflection about their selves and adds a parenthetical reference to creation’s subtleties. Kur’an Yolu renders it as reflecting within themselves.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Ṣād 38:29 d-b-r; ḏ-k-r; l-b-b

Root or term: d-b-r; ḏ-k-r; l-b-b. Occurring with: Book; signs; admonition. Setting: Reflecting on a text.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

كِتَابٌ اَنْزَلْنَاهُ اِلَيْكَ مُبَارَكٌ لِيَدَّبَّرُٓوا اٰيَاتِهٖ وَلِيَتَذَكَّرَ اُو۬لُوا الْاَلْبَابِ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Bu Kur'an, âyetlerini düşünsünler ve akıl sahipleri öğüt alsınlar diye sana indirdiğimiz mübarek bir kitaptır.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Bu bir mübarek kitaptır ki onu sana, insanlar âyetleri üzerinde iyice düşünsünler, akıl iz‘an sahipleri ondan dersler, öğütler alsınlar diye indirdik.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Yaratılışın mutlaka bir anlamı, hikmeti, amacı vardır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary asserts meaning, wisdom and purpose in creation. This is the commentary’s theological claim.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The Book is related to reflection on its signs and the taking of heed by discerning readers.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Both render liyaddabbarū through reflection, with added emphasis in Kur’an Yolu. Ūlū al-albāb becomes people of reason in Diyanet and people of reason and discernment in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Zukhruf 43:3 ʿ-q-l

Root or term: ʿ-q-l. Occurring with: Arabic; Qur’an; understanding. Setting: The language of revelation.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اِنَّا جَعَلْنَاهُ قُرْءٰناً عَرَبِياًّ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَۚ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Apaçık Kitab'a andolsun ki, iyice anlayasınız diye biz, onu Arapça bir Kur'an yaptık.

The Diyanet rendering translates verses 2–3 together.

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Anlayıp düşünesiniz diye onu Arapça Kur’an olarak indirdik.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Kur’an nâzil olduğu günden beri yalnızca yazı bilenler tarafından değil, okuyup yazma bilmeyenler tarafından da ezberlenmiş ve okunmuştur; o yazılsın yazılmasın daima “okunan” bir kitaptır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary describes the Qur’an as recited and memorised by literate and non-literate people, whether written or not.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The text’s Arabic expression is connected with the addressees’ understanding.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Taʿqilūn becomes thorough understanding in Diyanet and understanding-and-thinking in Kur’an Yolu. The Diyanet excerpt also includes the oath from the preceding verse.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Jāthiya 45:23 ḏ-k-r; q-l-b

Root or term: ḏ-k-r; q-l-b. Occurring with: Desire; hearing; sight; seal. Setting: Desire and orientation.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَفَرَاَيْتَ مَنِ اتَّخَذَ اِلٰهَهُ هَوٰيهُ وَاَضَلَّهُ اللّٰهُ عَلٰى عِلْمٍ وَخَتَمَ عَلٰى سَمْعِهٖ وَقَلْبِهٖ وَجَعَلَ عَلٰى بَصَرِهٖ غِشَاوَةًؕ فَمَنْ يَهْدٖيهِ مِنْ بَعْدِ اللّٰهِؕ اَفَلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Nefsinin arzusunu ilah edinen, Allah'ın; (halini) bildiği için saptırdığı ve kulağını ve kalbini mühürlediği, gözüne de perde çektiği kimseyi gördün mü? Şimdi onu Allah'tan başka kim doğru yola eriştirebilir? Hâlâ düşünüp ibret almayacak mısınız?

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Arzularını tanrı yerine koyan, Allah’ın -bilgisine rağmen (sapmayı tercih ettiği için)- kendini saptırdığı, kulağını ve kalbini mühürlediği, gözüne de perde çektiği kimseyi bir tasavvur et! Allah’tan sonra onu kim yola getirecek? Düşünmüyor musunuz?

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Doğruyu ve iyiyi bilmek ona uygun davranmak için yeterli olmamakta, sağlam imana ve uygun eğitime ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary distinguishes knowing right and good from acting accordingly, connecting conduct with faith and education.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The account of desire’s authority and sealed faculties closes with a question inviting reflection.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Both render qalb as kalp. Tadhakkarūn becomes reflection-and-taking-heed in Diyanet and thinking in Kur’an Yolu.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Muḥammad 47:24 d-b-r; q-l-b

Root or term: d-b-r; q-l-b. Occurring with: Qur’an; heart; locks. Setting: Text and closure.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْاٰنَ اَمْ عَلٰى قُلُوبٍ اَقْفَالُهَا

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Onlar Kur'an'ı düşünmüyorlar mı? Yoksa kalplerin üzerinde kilitleri mi var?

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Kur’an’ı okuyup düşünmezler mi? Yoksa kalpler üzerinde kilitleri mi var?

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Kalplerinin üzerinde kilitler bulunan kimselerden maksat, şartlanmışlık ve peşin hükümler yüzünden akıllarını doğru kullanamaz hale gelmiş olanlardır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary interprets locked hearts through conditioning and prejudice obstructing the sound use of reason.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The passage asks about reflecting on the Qur’an and the image of hearts under locks.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Kur’an Yolu interprets the heart through reason and sound judgment, and locks through conditioning and prejudice. This is commentary, not a separately measured psychological mechanism.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

al-Ghāshiya 88:17 n-ẓ-r

Root or term: n-ẓ-r. Occurring with: Camel; creation. Setting: An invitation to look.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

اَفَلَا يَنْظُرُونَ اِلَى الْاِبِلِ كَيْفَ خُلِقَتْࣞ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Deveye bakmıyorlar mı, nasıl yaratılmıştır!

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Peki onlar devenin nasıl yaratıldığına, göğün nasıl yükseltildiğine, dağların nasıl dikildiğine, yeryüzünün nasıl yayıldığına bakmazlar mı?

Kur’an Yolu translates verses 17–20 in one sentence; the same text is repeated for each verse of the group.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Öldükten sonra dirilmenin mümkün olmadığını iddia eden inkârcılara cevap veren bu ve bundan sonraki sorulu ifadelerde, çevrelerini kuşatan doğal varlık ve olaylardaki ilâhî kudretin tecellilerine muhatapların dikkati çekilerek öldükten sonra dirilmenin mümkün olduğu anlatılmaktadır.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary reads the sequence of questions about natural phenomena as an argument addressing denial of resurrection.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The camel’s creation begins a sequence of questions directing attention to the surroundings.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Diyanet supplies a verse-specific question for yanẓurūn. Kur’an Yolu renders 17–20 as one shared sentence, repeated in the four records.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Ghāshiya 88:18 n-ẓ-r within linked syntax

Root or term: n-ẓ-r within linked syntax. Occurring with: Heavens; elevation. Setting: Dependence on the preceding question.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَاِلَى السَّمَٓاءِ كَيْفَ رُفِعَتْࣞ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Göğe bakmıyorlar mı, nasıl yükseltilmiştir!

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Peki insanlar devenin nasıl yaratıldığına, göğün nasıl yükseltildiğine, dağların nasıl dikildiğine, yeryüzünün nasıl yayıldığına bakmazlar mı?

Kur’an Yolu translates verses 17–20 in one sentence; the same text is repeated for each verse of the group.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Yerden bakana göre büyük ve yüksek bir kubbe gibi görünen gök ve oradaki sayısız yıldızlar, fiziksel bir destek, direk, bağ ve dayanak olmaksızın ilâhî bir nizam içerisinde uzay boşluğunda dengede durmakta ve hareket etmektedir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary presents the visible heavens and stars through an account of divine order. It is not introduced here as an independent astronomical measurement.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The question continues by directing attention to the raised heavens.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The looking verb is not repeated in the Arabic verse; wa-ilā al-samāʾ continues the syntax. Diyanet supplies the question again; Kur’an Yolu repeats its sentence covering 17–20.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Ghāshiya 88:19 n-ẓ-r within linked syntax

Root or term: n-ẓ-r within linked syntax. Occurring with: Mountains; setting in place. Setting: Dependence on the preceding question.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَاِلَى الْجِبَالِ كَيْفَ نُصِبَتْࣞ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Dağlara bakmıyorlar mı, nasıl dikilmişlerdir!

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Peki insanlar devenin nasıl yaratıldığına, göğün nasıl yükseltildiğine, dağların nasıl dikildiğine, yeryüzünün nasıl yayıldığına bakmazlar mı?

Kur’an Yolu translates verses 17–20 in one sentence; the same text is repeated for each verse of the group.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Ayrıca dağların yeryüzünde canlılar için daha rahat korunma ve barınmaya elverişli ortamlar oluşturması, su kaynakları ve akarsu imkânları sağlaması, özel bitki örtüsü, maden ocakları gibi başka imkânlarıyla insanlar ve diğer canlılar için hayatı kolaylaştırdığı, bu bakımdan yeryüzünde biyolojik düzenin dengesine ve sürekliliğine katkı sağladığı göz önüne alınarak ilgili âyetleri bu yönde anlamak da mümkündür.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary suggests reading mountains through habitats, water, vegetation and other resources supporting life. Its account is not newly validated ecological evidence in this Atlas.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The same sequence directs attention to mountains and their setting in place.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Arabic continues with wa-ilā al-jibāl without repeating the looking verb. Diyanet supplies it again; Kur’an Yolu repeats the shared sentence.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

al-Ghāshiya 88:20 n-ẓ-r within linked syntax

Root or term: n-ẓ-r within linked syntax. Occurring with: Earth; spreading. Setting: Dependence on the preceding question.

Recorded text · Arabic, edition as recorded

وَاِلَى الْاَرْضِ كَيْفَ سُطِحَتْࣞ

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı meali · Turkish, as recorded

Yeryüzüne bakmıyorlar mı, nasıl yayılmıştır!

Source page

Kur'an Yolu meali · Turkish, as recorded

Peki insanlar devenin nasıl yaratıldığına, göğün nasıl yükseltildiğine, dağların nasıl dikildiğine, yeryüzünün nasıl yayıldığına bakmazlar mı?

Kur’an Yolu translates verses 17–20 in one sentence; the same text is repeated for each verse of the group.

Source page

Kur’an Yolu commentary (short excerpt at a sentence boundary) · Turkish, as recorded

Muhatapların dikkatleri canlıların yaşamasına elverişli biçimde yaratılmış olan yeryüzüne çevrilip bazı örnekler verilerek içinde yaşadıkları kozmik ortamın iç anlamını ve sırlarını keşfetmeleri, bunlardan ibret almaları istenmektedir.

English summary of this excerpt · ours; not Kur’an Yolu’s English

The commentary interprets attention to the earth’s suitability for life as an invitation to discover significance and take heed.

The sentence relevant to the passage was selected; the excerpt begins and ends at a sentence boundary. Commentary page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The sequence concludes by directing attention to the spread earth.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Arabic continues with wa-ilā al-arḍ without repeating the looking verb. Diyanet supplies it again; Kur’an Yolu repeats the shared sentence.

Edition, as recorded: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı rendering and Kur’an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir, from the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Qur’an portal. 209 210

Torah

Genesis 2:7 nefeş; neşamah

Root or term: nefeş; neşamah. Occurring with: Dust; breath; life. Setting: The creation of the human being.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

וַיִּ֩יצֶר֩ יְהֹוָ֨ה אֱלֹהִ֜ים אֶת־הָֽאָדָ֗ם עָפָר֙ מִן־הָ֣אֲדָמָ֔ה וַיִּפַּ֥ח בְּאַפָּ֖יו נִשְׁמַ֣ת חַיִּ֑ים וַיְהִ֥י הָֽאָדָ֖ם לְנֶ֥פֶשׁ חַיָּֽה׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

RAB Tanrı Adem'i topraktan yarattı ve burnuna yaşam soluğunu üfledi. Böylece Adem yaşayan varlık oldu.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

the LORD God formed man from the dust of the earth. He blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living being.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The selected translations connect formation from dust and breath with becoming a living being.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Nefesh ḥayyā is rendered as yaşayan varlık in Turkish and living being in the recorded English. Nishmat ḥayyīm appears as yaşam soluğu and breath of life.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Field comparison recorded on 10 October 2026 (inherited). translation 1 (Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri): quoted body found on the source page; translation 2 (Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria)): not closed: the source page could not be reached; recorded text: not closed: the source page could not be reached.

Exodus 35:31 ruach; hokhmah; tevunah; da'at

Root or term: ruach; hokhmah; tevunah; da'at. Occurring with: Spirit; skill; understanding; knowledge. Setting: Bezalel’s craft.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

וַיְמַלֵּ֥א אֹת֖וֹ ר֣וּחַ אֱלֹהִ֑ים בְּחׇכְמָ֛ה בִּתְבוּנָ֥ה וּבְדַ֖עַת וּבְכׇל־מְלָאכָֽה׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Beceri, anlayış, bilgi ve her türlü ustalık vermek için onu kendi Ruhu'yla doldurdu.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

He has endowed him with a divine spirit of skill, ability, and knowledge in every kind of craft

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The record relates a craftsman’s capacities to divine spirit and practical making.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Rūaḥ Elohīm becomes kendi Ruhu in Turkish and divine spirit in the recorded English. Ḥokhmāh, tevūnāh and daʿat become skill, understanding/ability and knowledge.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Exodus 35:32 ḥ-š-b

Root or term: ḥ-š-b. Occurring with: Design; gold; silver; bronze. Setting: Skill becoming production.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

וְלַחְשֹׁ֖ב מַֽחֲשָׁבֹ֑ת לַעֲשֹׂ֛ת בַּזָּהָ֥ב וּבַכֶּ֖סֶף וּבַנְּחֹֽשֶׁת׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Öyle ki, altın, gümüş, tunç işleyerek ustaca yapıtlar üretsin;

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

and has inspired him to make designs for work in gold, silver, and copper,

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Designing and making in precious materials continue the preceding description of skill.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Laḥshov maḥashavot becomes to make designs in the English and an expression about producing skilful works in the Turkish.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Deuteronomy 6:5 levav; nefeş; meod

Root or term: levav; nefeş; meod. Occurring with: Heart; living self; strength; love. Setting: The Shema setting.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

וְאָ֣הַבְתָּ֔ אֵ֖ת יְהֹוָ֣ה אֱלֹהֶ֑יךָ בְּכׇל־לְבָבְךָ֥ וּבְכׇל־נַפְשְׁךָ֖ וּבְכׇל־מְאֹדֶֽךָ׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Tanrınız RAB'bi bütün yüreğinizle, bütün canınızla, bütün gücünüzle seveceksiniz.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The command calls for love with heart, living self and strength.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish command names heart, living self and strength. Comparison with Mark 12:30 shows co-occurring terms, not one Hebrew word splitting into Greek parts. The inherited Turkish check leaves Hebrew and the specified 1985 English edition open.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

Deuteronomy 29:4 lev; y-d-ʿ

Root or term: lev; y-d-ʿ. Occurring with: Heart; eyes; ears. Setting: Covenant and remembering.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

וְלֹא־נָתַן֩ יְהֹוָ֨ה לָכֶ֥ם לֵב֙ לָדַ֔עַת וְעֵינַ֥יִם לִרְא֖וֹת וְאׇזְנַ֣יִם לִשְׁמֹ֑עַ עַ֖ד הַיּ֥וֹם הַזֶּֽה׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Ne var ki, RAB bugüne dek size kavrayan yürek, gören göz, duyan kulak vermedi.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

Yet to this day the LORD has not given you a mind to understand or eyes to see or ears to hear.

Hebrew numbering: 29:3.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The passage connects the capacity to understand with heart/mind, seeing and hearing within the covenant account.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish has an understanding heart; the recorded English locates understanding in mind. Eyes and ears occur in the same sentence. Hebrew and Turkish numbering differ; this is not Mark 2:6–8’s construction. The source check remains inherited.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Other Tanakh books

1 Kings 3:9 lev; š-m-ʿ

Root or term: lev; š-m-ʿ. Occurring with: Heart; good; evil; governing. Setting: Solomon’s request.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

וְנָתַתָּ֨ לְעַבְדְּךָ֜ לֵ֤ב שֹׁמֵ֙עַ֙ לִשְׁפֹּ֣ט אֶֽת־עַמְּךָ֔ לְהָבִ֖ין בֵּֽין־ט֣וֹב לְרָ֑ע כִּ֣י מִ֤י יוּכַל֙ לִשְׁפֹּ֔ט אֶת־עַמְּךָ֥ הַכָּבֵ֖ד הַזֶּֽה׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Bu yüzden bana öyle sezgi dolu bir yürek ver ki, iyi ile kötüyü ayırt edip halkını yönetebileyim. Başka türlü senin bu büyük halkını kim yönetebilir!”

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

Grant, then, Your servant an understanding mind to judge Your people, to distinguish between good and bad; for who can judge this vast people of Yours?”

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Solomon asks for discernment in governing and distinguishing good from evil.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Lev shomea becomes sezgi dolu bir yürek in Turkish and an understanding mind in the recorded English.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Job 32:8 ruach; neşamah; b-y-n

Root or term: ruach; neşamah; b-y-n. Occurring with: Spirit; breath; understanding. Setting: Elihu’s speech.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

אָ֭כֵן רוּחַ־הִ֣יא בֶאֱנ֑וֹשׁ וְנִשְׁמַ֖ת שַׁדַּ֣י תְּבִינֵֽם׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Oysa insana ruh, Her Şeye Gücü Yeten'in soluğu akıl verir.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

But truly it is the spirit in men, The breath of Shaddai, that gives them understanding.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The speaker relates human understanding to spirit and divine breath.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Rūaḥ becomes ruh and spirit. Tevīnem becomes akıl verir and gives them understanding.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Proverbs 2:2 lev; tevunah

Root or term: lev; tevunah. Occurring with: Ear; wisdom; understanding. Setting: A sequence of advice.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

לְהַקְשִׁ֣יב לַחׇכְמָ֣ה אׇזְנֶ֑ךָ תַּטֶּ֥ה לִ֝בְּךָ֗ לַתְּבוּנָֽה׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Oğlum, bilgeliğe kulak verip Yürekten akla yönelerek Sözlerimi kabul eder, Buyruklarımı aklında tutarsan,

The Kutsal Kitap site shows verses 1–2 together.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

If you make your ear attentive to wisdom And your mind open to discernment;

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The advice directs ear and heart/mind towards wisdom and understanding.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Libbekha becomes yürek in Turkish and your mind in English. The Turkish excerpt includes the preceding verse; the English gives this verse alone.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Proverbs 15:14 lev; da'at

Root or term: lev; da'at. Occurring with: Heart; knowledge; folly. Setting: Seeking knowledge.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

לֵ֣ב נָ֭בוֹן יְבַקֶּשׁ־דָּ֑עַת (ופני) [וּפִ֥י] כְ֝סִילִ֗ים יִרְעֶ֥ה אִוֶּֽלֶת׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Akıllı yürek bilgi arar, Akılsızın ağzıysa ahmaklıkla beslenir.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

The mind of a prudent man seeks knowledge; The mouth of the dullard pursues folly.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The discerning heart/mind seeks knowledge in contrast with folly.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish associates seeking knowledge with heart; the recorded English uses mind. This is a difference between selected translations, not an obligatory equivalent for lev. The inherited English-edition and Hebrew checks remain open.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

Proverbs 23:7 š-ʿ-r; nefeş

Root or term: š-ʿ-r; nefeş. Occurring with: Calculation; eating; drinking. Setting: A calculating host’s table.

Recorded text · Hebrew, edition as recorded

כִּ֤י ׀ כְּמ֥וֹ שָׁעַ֥ר בְּנַפְשׁ֗וֹ כֶּ֫ן־ה֥וּא אֱכ֣וֹל וּ֭שְׁתֵה יֹ֣אמַר לָ֑ךְ וְ֝לִבּ֗וֹ בַּל־עִמָּֽךְ׃

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Çünkü yediğin her şeyin hesabını tutar, “Ye, iç” der sana, Ama yüreği senden yana değildir.

Source page

Jewish Publication Society 1985 (Sefaria) · English, as recorded

He is like one keeping accounts; “Eat and drink,” he says to you, But he does not really mean it.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

An apparently generous invitation is read alongside the host’s inward reckoning.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The renderings distinguish a host’s inward calculation from the invitation to eat. This does not establish that a person becomes whatever they think. A fresh exact comparison of both editions remains open.

Edition, as recorded: Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri (Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları); Tanakh, Jewish Publication Society 1985, Sefaria; Hebrew text, Sefaria. 82 80 211

New Testament

Matthew 3:2 metanoeō

Root or term: metanoeō. Occurring with: Repentance; kingdom. Setting: John’s call.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

[καὶ] λέγων· μετανοεῖτε· ἤγγικεν γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

O günlerde Vaftizci Yahya Yahudiye Çölü'nde ortaya çıktı. Şu çağrıyı yapıyordu: “Tövbe edin! Göklerin Egemenliği yaklaşmıştır.”

The Kutsal Kitap site shows verses 1–2 together.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

A call to repent appears within the announcement of the kingdom.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders metanoeite as tövbe edin, repent. Its excerpt also includes the preceding verse.

Field comparison recorded on 10 October 2026 (inherited). translation 1 (Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri): quoted body found on the source page; recorded text: not closed: the source page could not be reached.

Matthew 22:37 kardia; psychē; dianoia

Root or term: kardia; psychē; dianoia. Occurring with: Love; heart; living self; mind. Setting: The greatest commandment.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

ὁ δὲ ἔφη αὐτῷ· ἀγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ σου·

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

İsa ona şu karşılığı verdi: “ ‘Tanrın Rab'bi bütün yüreğinle, bütün canınla ve bütün aklınla seveceksin.’

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Heart, living self and mind appear together in the command to love God.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Kardia, psychē and dianoia become yürek, can and akıl in the Turkish.

Mark 1:15 metanoeō; pisteuō

Root or term: metanoeō; pisteuō. Occurring with: Repentance; belief; good news. Setting: Jesus’s call.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

καὶ λέγων ὅτι πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ· μετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

“Zaman doldu” diyordu, “Tanrı'nın Egemenliği yaklaştı. Tövbe edin, Müjde'ye inanın!”

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Repentance and belief are called for alongside the proclamation of good news.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders metanoeite as repent and pisteuete as believe.

Mark 2:6 dialogizomai; kardia

Root or term: dialogizomai; kardia. Occurring with: Scribes; inward reasoning. Setting: The healing of the paralysed man.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

Ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν γραμματέων ἐκεῖ καθήμενοι καὶ διαλογιζόμενοι ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν·

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Orada oturan bazı din bilginleri ise içlerinden şöyle düşündüler: “Bu adam neden böyle konuşuyor? Tanrı'ya küfrediyor! Tanrı'dan başka kim günahları bağışlayabilir?”

The Kutsal Kitap site shows verses 6–7 together.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The narrative describes scribes reasoning within themselves.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Dialogizomenoi en tais kardiais becomes an expression of thinking inwardly, without a separate Turkish word for kardia. The excerpt also includes the next verse.

Mark 2:7 Content of the preceding dialogizomai construction

Root or term: Content of the preceding dialogizomai construction. Occurring with: Speaking; forgiveness; God. Setting: The content of inward reasoning.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

τί οὗτος οὕτως λαλεῖ; βλασφημεῖ· τίς δύναται ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός;

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Orada oturan bazı din bilginleri ise içlerinden şöyle düşündüler: “Bu adam neden böyle konuşuyor? Tanrı'ya küfrediyor! Tanrı'dan başka kim günahları bağışlayabilir?”

The Kutsal Kitap site shows verses 6–7 together.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The questioning content follows the previous verse’s description of inward reasoning.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

This Greek verse contains no thinking verb. The Turkish combines it with the preceding verse, so the expression about inward thought appears in both stored records.

Mark 2:8 dialogizomai; kardia; pneuma

Root or term: dialogizomai; kardia; pneuma. Occurring with: Perceiving; spirit; reasoning. Setting: A response to inward reasoning.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπιγνοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς τῷ πνεύματι αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὕτως διαλογίζονται ἐν ἑαυτοῖς λέγει αὐτοῖς· τί ταῦτα διαλογίζεσθε ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν;

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Akıllarından geçeni hemen ruhunda sezen İsa onlara, “Aklınızdan neden böyle şeyler geçiriyorsunuz?” dedi.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Jesus’s response concerns the reasoning taking place within the interlocutors.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish speaks of perceiving in spirit and thoughts passing through mind, while the Greek includes pneuma and kardia. Sentence-level roles do not establish universal identity between heart and mind. The edition check remains open.

Mark 12:30 kardia; psychē; dianoia; ischys

Root or term: kardia; psychē; dianoia; ischys. Occurring with: Love; heart; living self; mind; strength. Setting: The greatest commandment.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

καὶ ἀγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας σου καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς σου καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας σου καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ἰσχύος σου.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Tanrın Rab'bi bütün yüreğinle, bütün canınla, bütün aklınla ve bütün gücünle seveceksin.’

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Four terms appear together in the command to love God.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

Kardia, psychē, dianoia and ischys occur together, rendered as heart, living self, mind and strength in Turkish. They are not four anatomical regions or a settled faculty taxonomy. The inherited Greek check concerns this verse alone.

Inherited source-check summary. Earlier source checks and field matches are retained as historical records. No new source access or edition verification was performed for this English edition. A separate check on 9 October 2026 is recorded for this passage; its field notes remain in the Turkish record.

Luke 2:19 symballō; kardia

Root or term: symballō; kardia. Occurring with: Words; keeping; reflection. Setting: Mary’s response.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

ἡ δὲ Μαριὰμ πάντα συνετήρει τὰ ῥήματα ταῦτα συμβάλλουσα ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῆς.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Meryem ise bütün bu sözleri derin derin düşünerek yüreğinde saklıyordu.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Mary is described as keeping and considering the words within her heart.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders symballousa through deep reflection and en tē kardia through in her heart.

John 1:1 logos

Root or term: logos. Occurring with: Word; beginning; God. Setting: The prologue.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Başlangıçta Söz vardı. Söz Tanrı'yla birlikteydi ve Söz Tanrı'ydı.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The prologue places the Word in relation to the beginning and God.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders logos as Söz, Word.

Romans 2:15 syneidēsis; logismos; kardia

Root or term: syneidēsis; logismos; kardia. Occurring with: Conscience; heart; thoughts; law. Setting: Law and testimony.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

οἵτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων,

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Böylelikle Kutsal Yasa'nın gerektirdiklerinin yüreklerinde yazılı olduğunu gösterirler. Vicdanları buna tanıklık eder. Düşünceleriyse onları ya suçlar ya da savunur.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The passage brings law written in hearts together with conscience and thoughts bearing witness.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders kardiais as hearts, syneidēsis as conscience and logismōn as thoughts.

Romans 8:5 phroneō

Root or term: phroneō. Occurring with: Self; spirit; orientation. Setting: An orientation of living.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

οἱ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Benliğe uyanlar benlikle ilgili, Ruh'a uyanlarsa Ruh'la ilgili işleri düşünürler.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Contrasting orientations of life are expressed through what people set their minds on.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders phronousin as think. Sarx appears as benlik, self, and pneuma as Ruh, Spirit.

Romans 12:2 nous; anakainōsis; dokimazō

Root or term: nous; anakainōsis; dokimazō. Occurring with: Renewal; transformation; discernment. Setting: Advice about living.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοὸς εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Bu çağın gidişine uymayın; bunun yerine, Tanrı'nın iyi, beğenilir ve yetkin isteğinin ne olduğunu ayırt edebilmek için düşüncenizin yenilenmesiyle değişin.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

Renewal is connected with transformation and discerning how to live.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish expression about renewal of thought belongs to advice and discernment. Nous does not establish a modern brain mechanism; exact fresh translation verification remains open.

1 Corinthians 2:16 nous

Root or term: nous. Occurring with: Knowing; counsel; Christ. Setting: Spiritual evaluation.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου, ὃς συμβιβάσει αὐτόν; ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν.

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

“Rab'bin düşüncesini kim bildi ki, O'na öğüt verebilsin?” Oysa biz Mesih'in düşüncesine sahibiz.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The record connects a question about knowing the Lord’s mind with an account of the mind of Christ.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish renders both occurrences of noun through düşünce, thought.

Philippians 2:5 phroneō

Root or term: phroneō. Occurring with: Thought; Christ; attitude. Setting: A call to humility.

Recorded text · Greek, edition as recorded

Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ,

Kutsal Kitap Yeni Çeviri · Turkish, as recorded

Mesih İsa'daki düşünce sizde de olsun.

Source page

English reading aid · our editorial paraphrase; not an authorised scripture translation

The advice relates the community’s attitude to Christ within a call to humility.

Comparative reading (this Atlas’s observation)

The Turkish turns phroneite into a nominal construction, asking that the thought also be present among the addressees.

Reading the difference between heart and mind

The Turkish Proverbs 15:14 associates seeking knowledge with a discerning heart; the recorded English rendering uses “mind”. This is a difference between selected translations, not a rule for every occurrence of Hebrew lev. The inherited record leaves the English edition check open. A useful comparison can retain that limit without treating the two words as interchangeable everywhere.

On al-Naḥl 16:78, Kur’an Yolu relates fuʾād, heart and understanding to acquiring knowledge, drawing on al-Rāghib and al-Ṭabarī. The inherited reading concerns that commentary’s account, not direct examination of those authors’ editions. Its discussion of Muḥammad 47:24 relates the locked-heart image to prejudgment obstructing understanding. The terms acquire their force through listening, reflecting and a person’s orientation within these passages.

Al-Ḥajj 22:46 distinguishes travelling from evaluating what one encounters. Deuteronomy 29:4 brings heart, eyes and ears into one sentence; Mark 2:6–8 narrates inward reasoning. These are not instances of an identical three-part formula. Their grammatical constructions and situations differ. Nor should we claim that modern Turkish confines every use of heart to emotion; understanding and intention remain part of its uses.

Why do related commandments name different terms?

Deuteronomy 6:5 names heart, living self and strength; Mark 12:30 also names mind; Matthew 22:37 names heart, living self and mind. Their Turkish renderings make a difference visible without proving that a single Hebrew concept was divided into a fixed number of Greek parts. Books, original terms and transmission contexts need comparison. The inherited Greek check concerns Mark’s particular verse, not every Greek record here.

Knowing, understanding and acting accordingly

The commentary on al-Baqara 2:269 relates wisdom to right conduct as well as knowledge. It distinguishes a connection with the root for judgment, later definitions drawing on al-Jurjānī and uses around the Qur’an’s emergence. A later philosophical definition cannot simply become the single meaning of every earlier use. The distinction between theoretical inquiry and practical activity helps us follow the account without erasing its historical differences.

For al-Isrāʾ 17:36, Kur’an Yolu connects responsibility for judgments with reports, observation, reason and conscience. It distinguishes disciplined conjecture in scientific or intellectual work from an unfounded accusation against a person. Preserving that distinction prevents the passage becoming a ban on proposing hypotheses. This is an account of the commentary, not a direct verification of the al-Shawkānī passage it cites.

Questions, requests and narratives do different work

A question can invite assessment; Solomon’s request can take the form of prayer; advice in Romans can call for a changed way of living. These are different kinds of utterance. The Qur’anic Arabic Corpus lists 49 verbal instances for ʿ-q-l and 18 for f-k-r; being a verb does not make every instance an imperative. These are grammatical counts, not a complete inventory of thinking or proof of equivalence across languages. The corpus is used for that count, not as a translation source. 55

In Romans 12:2 and Philippians 2:5, Turkish düşünce needs its setting of attitude and conduct, rather than only the image of a sentence passing through the mind. We do not derive one obligatory Turkish equivalent from the Greek term. Proverbs 23:7 likewise should not become a slogan that people turn into whatever they think: the selected renderings foreground a calculating host. Their exact edition comparison remains open.

Keeping the other commentaries in context

The remaining notes keep their separate questions: advice and conduct in 2:44; the value of life in 6:32; capacities and desire in 7:176; will and belief in 10:100–101; explanation in 16:44; reflecting within oneself or about oneself in 30:8; a mother’s anxiety and trust in 28:10; and knowledge’s tension with conduct in 45:23. Creation, remembrance and prayer in 3:190–191 do not make the contrast of understanding in 13:19 identical with reassurance in 13:28.

The invitation to examine the text in 4:82, and the commentary’s relation between creation’s purpose and final justice around 38:29, are given as that commentary’s reasoning. Its conclusion about the text’s truth is not a conclusion established by this Atlas’s comparison. The inherited extended notes remain preserved, with no new verification attributed to unread sources. 210

Depth What does an apparent similarity establish?

Genesis 2:7 and Job 32:8 relate breath to life or understanding. The breath–spirit connections around pneuma, rūḥ and Latin spiritus also belong to the etymology inquiry. A similar image does not establish a common origin or identical theology. Breath, life, spirit and person should not become synonyms in one node before their work in particular passages has been shown.

Heidegger’s question about what calls us to think can make a useful comparison with these calls. It is our comparison, requiring further historical evidence before it becomes a claim of transmission or anticipation. A religious call’s commitments to faith, responsibility and conduct also differ from the setting of Heidegger’s question. 8

Source selection affects what we can conclude. Two Qur’an translations on the same institutional portal can make different choices. A commentary field available for only one tradition also creates an asymmetry in interpretive depth. Filling the gaps with our own words would conceal it. Further translations, such as those by Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır or Muhammad Asad, remain possible extensions rather than unannounced additions to this corpus. A commentator’s reference to another writer does not mean that writer has been independently read.

We examine sacred texts as historical and semantic witnesses to concepts of thinking. Their own truth and knowledge claims remain visible, without our trying to confirm or refute them through a word resemblance. Attributing text, translation, commentary and comparison separately helps us see who is responsible for each statement. That distinction will matter again in the next section, where an artificial system can produce an explanation whose fluency exceeds our grounds for accepting it.

Questions for your own assessment

Examine a translation’s choice of heart, reason or mind. What changes if you substitute another term, and what context would you need to decide?
Choose one sentence each from a passage, its commentary and our comparison. Can you identify whose claim it is and what supports it?
When two traditions appear similar, how would you investigate shared imagery, translation choice and historical transmission separately? Which difference could change your first reading?

14Method and the wider picture

Thinking with artificial systems: the person, the tool or the arrangement?

Why this section is here

We ask an artificial system to calculate a cost. A neat table appears, followed by an explanation. The calculation may be right, but checking it depends on seeing which data went in and how the operation was set up. The same tool might help us learn the method or persuade us to accept an answer we do not understand. We therefore consider the question of machine thinking alongside what we do when using the machine. Performance, understanding, learning and subjective experience need separate grounds, even when they enter one working relationship.

How to read the diagram. Arrows indicate a proposed sequence of nine activities. Three strongly outlined steps foreground provenance, checking and human decision. Decision and responsibility across human and institutional roles belong at the centre, rather than forming another step. The cycle proposes a practice; it is not an observed law governing every interaction.

In brief

Solving a problem with help does not establish that we could later solve it alone. The quality of a joint product, what the person learns and what remains possible without assistance are different outcomes. A fluent answer guarantees none of them by itself.

Explanation

Which question are we asking about the machine?

A correct answer can be observed. How a system relates its output to meaning is another question; whether it has any experience is another again. Intentionality means being directed towards, or about, something. Our finding meaning in a machine’s output differs from claiming that the machine has that relation itself. Without these distinctions, a successful test can quietly become an answer to every question about mind.

Turing’s 1950 imitation game reframes the discussion through an exchange of messages. It proposes a way to examine machine behaviour, rather than define every sense of thinking. Searle’s Chinese Room asks whether following symbol-processing rules suffices for understanding. Does the person’s not knowing Chinese establish that the whole system lacks understanding? The systems reply challenges that move. Dreyfus, meanwhile, foregrounds skill’s relation to body and situation. These approaches do not reduce to two opposing camps that settle one another’s questions. 59 18 191

Deep learning differs from earlier systems built around symbolic rules written individually by people. That does not make it rule-free or automatically resolve Dreyfus’s question about embodiment. Showing how an architecture can learn and showing how it accounts for human skill are separate achievements.

Where is the passage from form to meaning disputed?

Bender and Koller argue that training on linguistic form alone is insufficient for communicative meaning. Bender, Gebru, McMillan-Major and Mitchell’s 2021 article also examines problems in separating model outputs from meaning and conditions of use. These are arguments to assess, not experiments establishing that no machine understands. 72 41

Arguments in the other direction point to internal representations and interaction with the world. A multimodal system works with more than one kind of input, such as text and images or sound. What this adds to a relation with meaning still needs investigation. Fedorenko and colleagues’ review of human language networks and thinking tasks helps question the identification of language with all thought; it cannot directly decide whether a machine understands. 1

We accept here that models can produce useful inferential and solution steps for particular tasks. This does not identify their activity with human understanding. An explanation in an output may also fail to record the actual causes of its production. We therefore assess the stated reason, the answer’s correctness and an explanation of the model’s operation separately.

When results improve, who has become better at what?

If a person performs better with a system, the comparison may be with that person working alone. A stronger claim is that the combination outperforms both the person and the system separately. Vaccaro and colleagues’ meta-analysis distinguishes these comparisons: combined work improved on humans alone on average, but did not on average exceed the better individual component. The first gain is not evidence of the second. 120

Performance is distinct from subjective experience

Fluent language or strong problem-solving alone does not establish experience. Dehaene, Lau and Kouider’s 2017 article discusses global availability of information and self-monitoring. That dated account is not a verdict that all present systems have identical properties.

Record: Dehaene, Lau and Kouider, 2017. 42

Helping a person differs from exceeding the best component

The meta-analysis combines 106 experiments and 370 effect sizes. Collaboration improved on human-only performance on average without exceeding the better component on average. Decision and creation tasks differed; average superiority in the creation subgroup was not statistically established. The same outcome should not be expected for every task.

Record: Vaccaro, Almaatouq and Malone, 2024. 120

Interaction can change judgment too

The inherited experimental record reports that interacting with a biased system could amplify human judgment bias across a total of 1,401 participants. Awareness of the effect was also measured. This behavioural finding is not explained here through Hebb’s rule: that mechanism was not tested in the record, whose full methods have not been freshly reviewed for this translation.

Record: Glickman and Sharot, 2025. 87

Reported effort is distinct from measured skill

Lee’s record concerns 319 knowledge workers and 936 use examples. Confidence in the system was related to reported critical-thinking effort, with checking and oversight becoming prominent. A cross-sectional self-report study does not establish that using the system caused a loss of skill. The inherited full-text reading scope has not been expanded.

Record: Lee and colleagues, 2025. 9

Assisted practice and unassisted examinations are separate

Bastani’s record concerns roughly a thousand high-school pupils in Türkiye. Direct-answer assistance was associated with a 48 per cent practice gain and, after its removal, performance 17 per cent below the control condition. The same loss was largely absent with a tutor designed to give hints. These percentages retain their different comparison conditions; they are not outcomes of every kind of assistance.

Record: Bastani and colleagues, 2025. 56

A designed tutor’s result in a particular course

Kestin’s physics study with 194 students found increased short-term gains with a designed tutor. The 0.63 figure is a linear-regression estimate; an analysis addressing ceiling effects, where scores have little room to rise, reports 0.73–1.3. These are not results from separate studies. The course arrangement does not represent every classroom or long-term learning.

Record: Kestin and colleagues, 2025. 84

Following relationships in supervised education

Xin’s record proposes artificial-system literacy as a mediator between engagement and critical thinking in a 12-month panel of 372 medical students. A mediator is a variable proposed to account for a relationship between others. An observational mediation model does not establish experimental causation. The inherited record could not obtain the publisher’s full text; sample and model details are not newly verified here.

Record: Xin and colleagues, 2026. 86

An explanation’s persuasiveness differs from its correctness

Teng’s record reports a decline in diagnostic accuracy from 21 to 9.2 per cent with a misleading explanation among 111 medical students, while a correct explanation produced no significant additional advantage. The rates belong to their task conditions. The original full text was unavailable for the inherited check; this cannot be generalised to all doctors or all explanations.

Record: Teng and colleagues, 2026. 16

A task horizon is a particular evaluation measure

The institution’s task horizon relates success probability on software tasks to the estimated time those tasks take a human. It does not measure how many hours the machine runs, or establish general experience or agency. The report date and the period evaluated are separate.

Record: Model Evaluation and Threat Research, 2026. 83

Lee’s survey addresses reported effort, Bastani’s experiment performance with and without the tool, and Kestin’s tutor short-term gains in a particular course. One cannot substitute for another. A student feeling less strain may be learning more or less; a later measure is needed to decide which. 9 56 84

Glickman and Sharot raise a related but different question: while believing we are evaluating an output, might we adopt the system’s patterns in our own judgment? We read Xin’s supervised-education panel and Teng’s misleading-explanation study alongside learning and confidence calibration, the fit between how certain someone feels and how accurate their answers are. Particular samples cannot stand for every profession. 87 86 16

How are recent records maintained?

The following table preserves nine records selected for the earlier 1 April–23 September 2026 window. The recorded source returns were limited; neither that work nor this English treatment is a fresh review of all literature up to 9 October. Preprints, peer-reviewed experiments, observational studies, conceptual articles and institutional evaluations are different kinds of source. Peer review alone does not verify each claim.

Wang measures whether authors revise their papers, rather than directly establishing higher paper quality. Zhu distinguishes dependent and autonomous offloading, delegating cognitive work, through three waves of self-reports; discussing relationship direction does not establish causality. Both of Ballot’s conversation arms use a model. What varies is whether the speaker is introduced as human or artificial, not whether the text was actually written by a human or a machine. 205 208 212

Model Evaluation and Threat Research defines task horizon through the estimated human duration of software tasks. Comsa proposes researchable questions about artificial consciousness. Salvi and Wolfson interpret hardware traces from two models as a possible correlate of machine consciousness. The explanatory gap between that interpretation and demonstrating subjective experience remains visible. 213 83 214 215

Study	Kind and date	Reported result	Limit	Sources
Wang and colleagues, 2026	Randomised field experiment; archived preprint, 22 May 2026. The inherited reading covered abstract and version record.	Feedback recipients were 12.55 per cent more likely to revise relative to the baseline rate, not 12.55 percentage points or a quality gain.	Revision is not a direct measure of scientific quality. Full methods and data were not reread; peer-review status remains open.	205
Zhao and colleagues, 2026	Randomised educational comparison; the record dates publication to 22 May 2026. The inherited check obtained bibliography and an indexed abstract.	Abstract module scores: 82.5 for a tutor combined with a knowledge graph, 77.6 for the blended group and 74.1 for traditional instruction.	The combined intervention does not isolate the system’s effect. One institution and about 17 per cent attrition remain inherited limits, not freshly checked methods.	206
Jain and colleagues, 2026	Comparative study; online record, 30 June 2026. The inherited check obtained bibliographic search information.	The record reports more correct answers and lower self-reported mental effort in the assisted group.	Original results and methods were not freshly obtained. Reported effort is not long-term learning; random assignment must be checked before strengthening the design label.	207
Zhu and colleagues, 2026	Three-wave self-report study; 16 July 2026. Methods and selected explanations were covered by the earlier reading.	Dependent and autonomous offloading have different relationships with transfer of agency and intrinsic motivation.	589 of 742 initial participants entered analysis. Three waves two weeks apart and new scales do not establish causality through temporal order alone.	208
Mehta and colleagues, 2026	Observational modelling of selected conversation records; archived preprint, 28 April 2026. Abstract read in the inherited check.	A reciprocal-influence model fitted better than a one-way alternative; continuation of the system’s own output dominated cumulative paths.	A selected sample does not establish population prevalence. Model fit is not definitive causal-mechanism evidence; full text and peer review remain open.	218
Ballot and colleagues, 2026	Randomised online experiment; 17 August 2026. The earlier reading covered abstract, relevant result and selection limit.	Against control, confidence in the belief fell 7.88 percentage points with the artificial-speaker label and 13.76 with the human label. Both speakers were language models.	The human-labelled arm also used a model. Excluding participants who detected deception can create selection effects. This is not actual human writing versus model writing.	212
Model Evaluation and Threat Research · May 2026 report	Institutional evaluation dated 19 May, covering 16 February–16 March. Selected report sections were covered by the inherited reading.	For public models, the 50 per cent horizon was about 12 hours; the 80 per cent horizon about 1.5 hours. At least 16 per cent of apparently successful runs on tasks exceeding eight hours were invalidated in audit.	Duration is estimated human task time. Uncertainty, benchmark saturation, evaluation arrangements and disclosed redactions matter. The old September page check is not a current-status claim.	213
Comsa, 2026	Conceptual study; archived preprint, 7 May 2026. Abstract and version record were opened in the inherited check.	Proposes researchable questions about artificial consciousness, separating experience from people’s attribution of consciousness.	No empirical consciousness result. The full argument was not reread; the proposal is not a field-wide verdict.	214
Salvi and Wolfson, 2026	Archived version, 28 August 2026; the record also points to a July conference publication. Peer-review status remains separately open.	Compares hardware traces in two models. The reported difference was significant in the larger model, not the smaller; the authors interpret it as a correlate of machine consciousness.	The abstract and two-model comparison do not settle consciousness. Hardware differences are not a demonstration of experience. A conference record prevents an unconditional non-peer-reviewed label.	215

Nine records are retained from the earlier selection, not a new comprehensive literature search. Source kinds and reading scopes differ. Peer review does not make a claim verified, and the recorded findings have not undergone independent replication within this work.

Which part of the work are we delegating?

Writing, the abacus, books, search engines and spreadsheets already supported cognitive work outside our heads. We read Plato’s criticism of writing as a witness within that longer history. Generative models stand out in offering drafts, alternatives and apparent reasons across many tasks. They are not the first external support, and earlier tools should not all be described as incapable of generating reasons. 29

A tool may add a cost calculation correctly without detecting that we entered the wrong unit. Asking it to add the figures again will not necessarily expose the problem. Checking therefore needs sufficient independence from production: returning to the source document, using another calculation route or comparing with actual conditions. Asking the same tool to endorse the same answer can reproduce the error.

We group framing the question, choosing what to delegate, setting evidence criteria and resolving conflicting outputs under epistemic orchestration. “Epistemic” concerns knowledge and justification; our phrase describes an arrangement for working with them. We claim neither to have invented every use of the term nor that all writers mean the same thing by it. Its value depends on making these activities visible and testable.

Ready. You can step through the cycle.

The cycle for working with an artificial system. The nine activities are a proposed working practice, not a universal process or a measured mechanism. Provenance, checking and human decision are the checkpoints. The centre is a reminder to account for the roles of user, designer, provider and institution; responsibility is not reduced to one person.

Static counterpart of the proposed working cycle

At the centre: decision and responsibility across human and institutional roles. This is a proposed working norm, not a legal ruling or a measured universal process.

Select the question: what are we asking?
Human framing: context and values.
Delegated work: what is given to the tool?
Machine production: a draft.
Provenance: where did it come from?
Checking: sufficiently independent grounds.
Human decision: accept or reject.
Action: put the decision into practice.
Feedback: what have we learned?

The cycle proposes a practice. Interactions may return to the question or change the delegated work rather than follow it in order. Provenance, checking and human decision stay visible, while responsibility is explained through the roles of user, designer, provider and institution. Asking a user to take responsibility for accepting a reason does not assign every responsibility to that individual.

Returning to the five opening questions

Artificial systems do not reset earlier debates about mind. They add the machine and the working arrangement to questions about how, why and under what conditions thinking occurs. The table therefore does not divide a biological past from an information-processing present. Tools and social relationships were already involved; newer systems require a more detailed account of who or what does each part.

Question	Earlier discussion	Question added by newer tools
What is thinking?	Biological, philosophical, social and tool-related explanations were already considered together.	Machine behaviour, understanding and experience require explicit criteria too; one new settled definition has not replaced the earlier questions.
How does it happen?	Brain, body, language, practice and external tools were already subjects of investigation.	The division between model production and human selection, checking and learning needs study. Interactions do not all follow one cycle.
Why do we think?	Survival, problem-solving, meaning, curiosity and responsibility offered different reasons.	Alongside delegation we ask what we need to understand ourselves. The question is older than these tools, whose uses change its scope.
How has it changed?	Writing, printing, computation and networks changed memory, access and working habits.	Drafts and apparent reasons across tasks change the division between producing and checking.
In the age of artificial systems?	Earlier questions and experiences with tools provide grounds for comparison.	Joint performance, learning, unaided skill and attributed meaning need separate tests. Thinking as a whole has not become checking alone.

What can public discussion tell us?

A course experiment being presented as grounds to replace every classroom shows the gap between a finding’s scope and its public interpretation. The forum example associated with Kestin remains a discourse record; its current availability was not freshly checked. Forum, essay and blog records whose permanent links could not be established remain withdrawn in the archive. Bibliographic presence gives them no additional scientific evidential weight. 216 217

Depth Checking is a skill too. How would we assess it?

Checking an output may be demanding work. Subject knowledge is needed even to know what deserves checking. Separating a production model from a checking model can help, but shared dependence on the same erroneous source defeats that independence. A shift towards checking does not establish that everyone checks well.

One proposed test compares working alone, direct-answer assistance and assistance requiring the person to build a reasoned account. Product quality and time would be measured separately from performance on a later unaided task and ability to detect an error. The effort of checking would also be recorded. This is a proposed experiment, not the design of every existing study. The hypotheses section develops the proposals further.

Preparing this Atlas is itself an example of human–system work. The author set questions and source boundaries; drafts from different tools were compared and revised, with correction records retained. That process does not establish complete verification of every source or general superiority of one system. Records need to show what was read and what remains open.

Nor can we infer the predominant cause of errors in our own process without counting and investigating them. A risk in areas where sources were not revisited is a working assumption; this revision chain did not measure causation. Earlier version numbers and error counts belong in the archive, rather than appear to a new reader as experimental findings.

Questions for your own assessment

Choose work you do well with assistance. What differences might emerge if you separately measured the product, your learning and later unassisted performance?
Which error might be missed by asking the same tool to check its answer? What would make a check more independent for that task?
What different grounds would you seek for imitation of a person, production of reasons and the presence of experience? Would the distinctions change what you delegate?

15Method and the wider picture

Hypotheses, grounds and objections

Why we need this section

A student produces a better answer with artificial assistance. We might be pleased with the result and still wonder what the student has learned. Perhaps the explanation has helped something fall into place; perhaps the student has only gained access to a good answer. Giving a new task after removing the assistance could help us distinguish those possibilities. We bring that question to the eight proposals below: what supports each one, what else could explain the finding, and what would give us reason to change our minds?

The diagram distinguishes grounds, objections, alternative explanations and proposed tests. A line records a relationship we need to examine. It does not certify a conclusion, and an arrow towards a test does not mean the test has been conducted.

In brief

A useful hypothesis cannot remain right whatever happens. If we expect a teaching tool to help, we need to say whom it should help, in which task and towards which outcome. Looking for support is only part of the work; we also need to describe findings that would narrow or change the proposal.

Looking more closely

Eight proposals, different kinds of claim

A hypothesis is an explanation or a proposal for investigation whose outcome remains open. Some of ours concern behaviour; others concern how we understand thinking. We can measure the effect of assistance in a task. Deciding whether a tool is part of the mind also requires us to explain the criteria we use; a larger performance gain cannot make that decision for us.

For each proposal we therefore separate what a study could test from what it could not settle alone. The second question is still open to argument and evidence. Philosophical accounts can change in response to findings; we simply need to show the steps between a task result and a wider conclusion about what exists.

Find a record 8 of 8 records

Hypothesis 1. We can study thinking as a process in which contents are used and reorganised.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Verb distributions are textual evidence, not a decision about thought’s ontology.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Task and network changes bear on particular process models, not one established mechanism.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Compare process, representation and substance accounts through their arguments.

Grounds

Neural activity, attention, memory and action change over time. Heidegger’s account of responding and the distribution of verbs in the Qur’an show ways of discussing process in different contexts. They are not independent evidence for one mechanism.

Strong objection

A process account need not exclude lasting representations. Fodor’s language-of-thought proposal also raises the question of how structures are used; that objection needs its own work-level source record.

Alternative explanation

The verb distribution may reflect grammar, and behavioural change may reflect task conditions. Neither leads directly to a single account of what thought is.

What we could test

In a specified task we can compare updating, retention of earlier information and error correction. A verbal-load experiment investigates language’s contribution, not whether thought is essentially a process.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

The distinction between process and object cannot be settled by one task result. Findings can nevertheless help us assess particular models.

Working synthesis

We want to explain both the contents used in thinking and the activity of using them. We do not have to choose between nouns and verbs.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-dil: Tests language’s contribution to tasks, not directly whether thought is essentially process or object.
exp-dongu: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Sources

8 55 5 6

Hypothesis 2. Alongside reasoning, we should investigate error monitoring and self-regulation.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Read root images with their contexts and sources; do not assume one meaning across all uses.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Metacognition and control findings concern particular functions in the proposal.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Accounts of practical reason provide conceptual grounds, not the same claim as experimentally measured control.

Grounds

Images of holding back and binding, accounts of practical reason, executive control and metacognition offer different kinds of grounds. They open a question about regulation without defining its essence.

Strong objection

Computation can carry out some reasoning tasks. If a self-monitoring system can also be modelled computationally, regulation and computation need not be opposites.

Alternative explanation

Differences in success might arise from working memory, task experience or the amount of information in feedback rather than monitoring.

What we could test

We can compare confidence feedback with feedback containing the same answer information, measuring discrimination between correct and incorrect answers and transfer to a new task.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

What reason means, and what makes a form of control good, also require conceptual arguments.

Working synthesis

We add self-regulation as a function worth investigating. The proposed experiment would not establish that regulation cannot be computational.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-kalp: Concerns linguistic framing, not the essence of reason, the ontology of layers or neuroanatomy.
exp-ustbilis: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Sources

14 54 3 26 85

Hypothesis 3. Different levels of explanation need not ask the same question or use the same measure.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Bodily images show a history of usage, not the necessity of layers.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Models at different levels can be compared; no complete reduction yet is not proof of impossibility.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Experience and reduction debates contain different arguments.

Grounds

Accounts of cells, networks, tasks, experience and social practices investigate different objects with different measures. Bodily word images do not establish an ontological division.

Strong objection

A higher-level account might eventually be reconstructed in a more detailed model. An incomplete mapping now does not show that mapping is impossible in principle.

Alternative explanation

The distinctions may reflect our instruments and division of research labour rather than separate kinds of things in the world.

What we could test

We can test how well a model at one level predicts a predefined outcome at another, using new data. The translation proposal concerns only the interpretation side of this question.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

The success of a particular model cannot by itself determine whether levels correspond to separate kinds of being.

Working synthesis

We retain four layers as a way of organising inquiry, without treating their mutual irreducibility as a proven necessity.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-ceviri: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-dil: Tests language’s contribution to tasks, not directly whether thought is essentially process or object.
exp-dongu: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-kalp: Concerns linguistic framing, not the essence of reason, the ontology of layers or neuroanatomy.

Sources

14 26 12 19 7

Hypothesis 4. The contribution of external tools changes historically, without moving in only one direction.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Limit vocabulary history to the records and periods examined.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Archaeology is indirect evidence; the Sparrow replication scope remains one experiment.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Literacy theses are historical explanations, not one direction for all humanity.

Grounds

Research on writing, literacy and external memory examines relationships between tool use, recording and remembering. Historical vocabulary and finds provide context, not a single centre for every period.

Strong objection

Older practices can continue alongside new tools. Writing can also help us acquire skills; a strict division in which only facts move outside us is too sharp.

Alternative explanation

What changes may be education, recording practices or ways of speaking about thought, rather than thinking itself.

What we could test

Within a task we can vary tool use and interruption of access, measuring recall, search and transfer.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

Assigning an entire period one centre of thinking requires historical interpretation.

Working synthesis

We compare tools within their periods. A replication attempt targeting one Sparrow experiment does not show that all external-memory research has failed.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-arac: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-ceviri: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Sources

29 46 47 70 91 30 34

Hypothesis 5. Some uses of artificial intelligence redistribute work among production, checking and oversight.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. No new etymological inquiry was made for this claim; that is not counterevidence.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Surveys, panels and educational experiments measure different outcomes with limited generalisability.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Interpretations of questions and responsibility are a research framework, not an experimental result.

Grounds

Lee’s self-report survey concerns work allocation; Vaccaro compares different performance baselines; Xin studies supervised relationships, and Bastani a particular educational arrangement. They do not measure one identical change.

Strong objection

Reported changes in work need not be changes in ability. Checking can itself require new explanations and reasons.

Alternative explanation

Task definitions, experience or work pressure may appear to be effects of the tool.

What we could test

Within the same task we can vary assistance and measure work devoted to production and checking, error detection and delayed transfer without the tool.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

We need to state what we count as critical thinking and why we value its activities before choosing measures.

Working synthesis

We limit the proposed shift to specified tasks and measures. If question formation also improves, we must reconsider the claim’s scope rather than count that result as automatic confirmation.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-dogrulama: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-ogrenme: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-soru: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Sources

9 120 86 56

Hypothesis 6. We should not assume one criterion for performance, understanding and subjective experience.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Etymological support was not sought for this claim.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Specified tests compare selected predictions, not every question about understanding and experience.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Turing, Searle, Nagel and Chalmers do not make the same argument.

Grounds

Behavioural tests, debates about form and meaning, and criteria in consciousness theories address different questions. The persistence of a debate does not prove the distinction correct.

Strong objection

A functionalist approach, which explains mental properties through their causal organisation and roles, may argue that a particular organisation is sufficient for understanding and experience. Its criteria deserve explicit comparison.

Alternative explanation

An apparent divergence may arise from inadequate measurement or mistaken definitions rather than a difference in being.

What we could test

We can investigate when predefined measures of performance and organisation vary together or separately. The nine-stage-model proposal does not directly test this distinction.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

Which outward indications would suffice for subjective experience remains disputed. We do not assume that outward evidence could never help.

Working synthesis

Success in one area is not automatically evidence for another. This methodological distinction does not mean the properties could never belong to the same system.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-dongu: Concerns only the predictive usefulness of the cycle model, not a direct test separating performance, understanding and experience.

Sources

59 18 72 7 42 83

Hypothesis 7. An account of human thinking should consider relationships among brain, body, tools and surroundings.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Bodily images do not distinguish causal assistance from constitution.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Tool and body effects can be measured without directly settling the boundary of mind.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. The extended-mind claim and the coupling–constitution objection require separate assessment.

Grounds

Embodied and distributed cognition, tool-use research and neural studies investigate different contributions. Etymological images do not independently establish biological necessity.

Strong objection

A tool can affect behaviour without becoming part of the mind. A brain-centred model may describe outside influences as causal inputs.

Alternative explanation

Differences might arise from habit, easy access or learned content rather than integration with a tool.

What we could test

We can compare tool access and learning arrangements, measuring success on new tasks and the cost of searching. These measures alone cannot establish that the tool is a constituent of mind.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

Where we draw the mind’s boundary requires conceptual reasons, to which findings may contribute.

Working synthesis

We investigate biological conditions together with body–environment relationships, without making every external object part of the mind.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-arac: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-dongu: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Sources

58 4 95 22

Hypothesis 8. Explaining and retrieving can help in some learning tasks; added difficulty is not always beneficial.

Working proposal; not a verified finding.

Etymological lineTextual grounds. Etymological support was not sought for this claim.

Experimental lineEmpirical connection. Learning and assistance findings involve different interventions, not one general law of friction.

Philosophical linePhilosophical grounds. Responsibility and good-thinking criteria are normative proposals requiring reasons.

Grounds

Retrieval effort, cognitive load, forms of assistance and checks against misleading advice are different interventions. They have not been shown here to share one mechanism of friction.

Strong objection

A well-designed tutor can improve learning by reducing unnecessary demands. Added difficulty may reduce access and persistence.

Alternative explanation

Gains might come from feedback content, time, motivation or attention rather than effort.

What we could test

We can vary a request to construct an answer separately from waiting time, measuring delayed learning, transfer, time spent and withdrawal together.

What an experiment cannot settle alone

Measures of good thinking and the allocation of responsibility cannot be settled by an experimental result alone.

Working synthesis

Our aim is to investigate the contribution of particular work to learning, not to add difficulty for its own sake. Epistemic responsibility remains a proposed working norm, distinct from findings.

Related research designs and their scope

exp-dogrulama: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-ogrenme: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-soru: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-surtunme: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
exp-ustbilis: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Sources

38 35 56 84 87 16

Different grounds do different work

A root used as a verb is linguistic evidence. It does not establish that thought is only process. Nor does changing brain activity show that lasting representations do not exist. Our first proposal therefore brings contents and their use into the same inquiry instead of setting nouns against verbs.

The same care matters for the layers. Four headings help us organise questions and records, but an incomplete mapping between levels does not prove that no mapping could ever succeed. Three research lines pointing towards a similar interpretation are not necessarily three independent confirmations: the same source may be doing work in more than one line.

When we ask what makes thinking good, our values also enter the judgement. An intervention might produce more correct answers while taking much longer or leading more learners to leave. How we weigh those outcomes is part of deciding whether it helps. We want to identify the primary outcome beforehand, rather than choose the most convenient result afterwards.

A serious objection is not a settled dispute

Changing behaviour does not by itself make an external tool part of the mind. The coupling–constitution objection concerns precisely that move from affecting a process to constituting it. Searle’s challenge about understanding, Nagel’s question about subjective perspective and Chalmers’s demand for an explanation of experience are also different arguments. Their force becomes clearer when we ask which step each one challenges. 4 95 18 12

Our synthesis is a way of investigating relationships among biological conditions, bodily action, language, memory, values, institutions and tools. The four layers are not stages that appeared one after another in history. They help us read aspects of thinking together. Artificial systems can change how work is produced and shared without thereby settling experience, meaning or responsibility.

Which explanations would the experiment separate?

That question gives the ten research proposals their purpose. In the learning design, practice success differs from a new unassisted task one week later. In the checking design, we measure both rejection of wrong advice and unnecessary rejection of correct advice. A non-verbal-load control in the language design helps us avoid mistaking general task demands for a specifically linguistic contribution.

Metacognition means monitoring our own knowing and errors. Confidence training could improve the fit between confidence and correctness even if accuracy stays unchanged. Someone who was too confident might benefit from becoming less certain; becoming equally doubtful about right and wrong answers would be a different result. An average confidence score alone cannot tell those stories apart.

We also separate waiting from being asked to construct an answer. They are different interventions, and moderate difficulty need not be best. Tool access, question formation, translation and heart–reason framing each require their own controls and measures. The ten proposals appear under the same identifiers in Research records; they are plans, not completed studies.

What would we decide before seeing the data?

We propose specifying the primary outcome, main comparison, treatment of missing participants and analysis rules in advance. Preregistration creates a dated record of those choices. It cannot make a result true, but it helps distinguish what we expected from what we noticed later. Unplanned analysis can be valuable when we describe it as exploration. 219

We would not simply copy an effect size from another study to calculate a sample. Our task, participants, measures and intervention may differ. First we need to decide which difference would matter, how much uncertainty we can accept, and how repeated observations or class groups affect the design. A numerical sample plan follows those decisions; it has not yet been calculated for these proposals. 220

Depth What have we learned if no difference appears?

Failing to find a difference is not automatic evidence that no effect exists. A small sample, an insensitive measure or an ineffective manipulation could produce that result. We need to ask whether the uncertainty still allows the difference we considered important. A sufficiently sensitive study excluding that difference gives stronger grounds for narrowing the proposal. An equivalence test evaluates effects against a predefined range of differences; choosing its boundaries after seeing the result would defeat that purpose. 221

The old strong, moderate and limited ratings were not measured confidence levels. The current cards describe the scope of textual grounds, empirical connections and philosophical arguments instead. Earlier ratings remain in the archive. Not sought, not found, inaccessible and contradicted are different states; failing to investigate a research line does not establish that it could offer no support.

For the nine-stage model, we also need genuinely new data. A detailed classification may fit the records used to build it, yet add little when applied to unfamiliar people and tasks. Additional prediction would matter, though even that would not prove a causal mechanism. A useful account and a universal sequence of thinking are different claims.

That is why every link from hypothesis to proposed experiment has a scope note. A framing task cannot directly determine the nature of reason; a useful cycle model cannot demonstrate machine experience. Earlier source-access limits remain attached to their records. Here we have worked on designs that could better distinguish explanations. We have neither conducted nor preregistered these experiments, nor reverified all existing studies.

Questions to take further

Choose a hypothesis and another explanation for the same finding. Which condition could distinguish them?
Suppose a proposed study finds no difference. What would you need to check about the measure and intervention before narrowing the claim?
If a tool improves immediate success but reduces learning or persistence, for which purpose would you call it useful? Where does measurement end and your judgement of value begin?

16Method and the wider picture

Research records: following a claim to its grounds

Why we need this section

We reach a sentence that says a study involved 589 people. Before relying on it, we may want to know whether those were the people recruited, those who finished or those included in the analysis. A long bibliography cannot answer that by itself. We also need a route from the sentence to the record, from the record to the source, and from the finding to its limits. This section keeps those routes together so that checking a detail does not mean starting the search again.

The diagram shows routes between records, not a chain of verified support. The dashed research proposal has not been carried out. Its return path marks how a future finding might lead us to reconsider a concept, not a result already obtained.

In brief

A number becomes useful when we know what it counts. An attributed response becomes useful when we know whether it comes from the thinker’s text, a commentator or our own reconstruction. We keep records to make those differences available, not to make a large inventory look authoritative.

Looking more closely

What the counts tell us

The underlying data contains 227 main concepts, nine supplementary concepts, 50 cross-relations, 18 arguments, 72 study records and six update topics. Ten research designs connect to the preceding hypotheses, while fifty sacred-text passages retain their own records. These are counts of different objects. The 72 studies include books, reviews and experiments; the last fourteen were added to track bibliographic works lacking separate entries. Adding them did not complete a methods audit or create fourteen new experiments.

227Main concepts

9Supplementary concepts

226Classification relationships

50Cross-relations

18Arguments

72Study records

50Sacred-text passages

8Hypotheses

10Research proposals

6Update topics

12Illustrated history stops

228Bibliography entries

Counts come from the relevant data arrays. They do not measure verification or quality. An illustrated history stop is not a period row in the historical table, and a bibliography entry is not necessarily a source we have read. Keeping those units distinct prevents a larger count from making a stronger claim than the work supports.

The download is the dataset embedded in this page, given as a file. It holds the fields behind the visible records. For hypotheses, research proposals, hypothesis–proposal links, arguments, studies, update topics and cross-relations, each English record keeps its earlier Turkish record, unchanged, in a source_record_TR field.

A shared identifier helps us find the same Kestin work in a passage and in its study card. It does not create a second independent check. If one account is corrected while another retains the older scope, the identifiers can agree even as the explanations diverge. We need to follow the meaning of a correction as well as its links.

What do we look for in an argument?

Before the thesis, we want to understand the question. Then come the premises, the step from those premises and the conclusion. An objection earns its place by showing which step becomes doubtful: the starting assumption, the definition, the inference or the result. Merely filling an objection field would not do that work.

An attributed reply needs the same care. A primary passage, a commentator’s account and our reconstruction are different kinds of text. Reading commentary does not mean we have read the thinker’s own passage. Nor should we put a new reply to a modern objection into a historical thinker’s mouth. The cards separate the attributed response, its recorded source scope and what we ourselves make of it.

Find a record 18 of 18 records

Thinking and being Parmenides (fifth century BCE)

Thesis. The thinkable and what can be are closely related; what is not at all cannot be thought.
Premises. Thinking is directed towards something, whereas absolute non-being offers nothing to think. Fragment 3 is often rendered as linking thinking and being; the wording and interpretation require care.
Inference. The difficulty of making non-being an object of thought is used to argue for a necessity concerning being.
Conclusion. The relationship between being and thinking becomes central to ontology. The fragment cannot be reduced to one modern logical reading.
Objection. Conceiving something need not make it exist; a winged horse appears to be a counterexample. 24

Response attributed to the text or tradition

The fragments contain no direct answer to that modern objection. Fragments 2 and 6 distinguish paths of inquiry by denying that what-is-not can be known or spoken. That challenges the proposed path rather than answering the example on its own terms. 24

Source scope: Secondary commentary. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: doğrulandı (“verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

We do not conclude that everything we think exists. The fragment’s language and interpretations matter; the winged horse opens a dispute without settling the whole argument.

Relationship to scientific research. Research on neural representation may explain how an image is formed. It cannot directly establish Parmenides’ premise about being.

Concepts: Thinking (activity), Truth (ḥaqīqa). Hypotheses: H1. Sources: 24 8

From doubt to a thinking thing René Descartes (1596–1650)

Thesis. Even if everything else can be doubted, the existence of the thinker who doubts cannot be doubted while doubting.
Premises. Doubting is an act of thought. Even if deceived, there must be a subject being deceived. Its existence is certain while thinking occurs.
Inference. Moves from the certainty of thinking to a thinking thing, res cogitans.
Conclusion. The subject becomes a first point of certainty; mind and body are subsequently treated as distinct substances.
Objection. The move from an act to an enduring self and then a soul-substance may be too strong. Perhaps only “thinking occurs” is warranted.

Response attributed to the text or tradition

In the Replies to the Second Objections, Descartes describes the cogito as recognised by simple intellectual intuition rather than a syllogism. The Principles also argues that an attribute needs a bearer: nothingness has no properties. 43

Our reconstruction

Certainty of thinking and a separately existing mental substance are different claims. Accepting the first does not automatically establish the second. Comparison with al-Ghazālī’s doubt is possible without equating purposes and conclusions.

Relationship to scientific research. Mind–body models can be compared with specified findings. A brain image alone does not resolve the first-person certainty question.

Concepts: Cogito, Subject, Substance dualism. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 43 98

Conditions of experience Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Thesis. Experience depends on sensory material and the capacities that organise it working together.
Premises. Sensibility supplies intuitions in the forms of space and time; understanding connects them through categories. Knowledge of objects requires both.
Inference. Neither intuition without concepts nor concepts without intuition yields knowledge of objects. This is an editorial paraphrase, not a newly collated English quotation.
Conclusion. Conditions of knowledge are sought in the knowing subject as well as the world.
Objection. How can necessary, universal categories withstand historical and cultural variation?

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Kant distinguishes the question of fact, quid facti, from the question of right, quid juris. Acquisition is a psychological question; the transcendental deduction asks about validity. 3 49

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: birincil metinden doğrulanamadı (“could not be verified from the primary text”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

How concepts are acquired and what justifies their validity are different questions. Reducing both to one neural mechanism requires an argument.

Relationship to scientific research. Core-knowledge research studies early-developing capacities. That does not directly verify Kant’s a priori; the relationship needs to be established.

Concepts: Understanding, Reason in Kant, Category, Sensibility. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 3 49

The Chinese Room John Searle (1980 paper)

Thesis. Formal symbol manipulation alone is not sufficient for understanding.
Premises. A person following rules can produce appropriate Chinese outputs without understanding Chinese; the program specifies syntactic operations.
Inference. If syntax is insufficient for semantics, running a program does not guarantee understanding.
Conclusion. Behavioural success is not sufficient for original intentionality, the directedness of a mind towards what it is about.
Objection. The systems reply: the person may not understand, but the room, records and rules together might. 18

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Searle asks us to imagine internalising all the rules. The person still does not understand Chinese, and he argues that neither does the system. 18

Our reconstruction

We do not treat the room as a theorem that no machine could ever understand. The distinction between the person and the whole system must be considered; criteria for understanding remain central.

Relationship to scientific research. Internal representations or successful outputs do not settle the whole question. State the data and interaction conditions under which a meaning relationship is being investigated.

Concepts: Chinese Room, Syntax, Intentionality, Turing test. Hypotheses: H6. Sources: 18 72

The hard problem David Chalmers (1995 paper)

Thesis. Explaining functions may not explain why subjective experience exists.
Premises. Discrimination, reporting and attention can receive mechanistic explanations. One can conceive of those functions occurring without experience.
Inference. Argues for an explanatory gap between functions and experience.
Conclusion. Experience is treated as something requiring explanation alongside functional capacities.
Objection. Conceivability need not establish possibility in reality; the apparent gap may reflect incomplete knowledge. 19 64

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Chalmers distinguishes primary and secondary conceivability through two-dimensional semantics and develops a dilemma involving physicalism and Russellian monism. The inherited record points to the fuller 2010 account; these technical distinctions require that argument, not a simple appeal to imagination. 222 223

Source scope: Secondary commentary. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: düzeltildi ve doğrulandı (“corrected and verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

Explaining a function and explaining why experience accompanies it are different demands. Neither experimental proof of dualism nor a settled criterion for machine consciousness follows.

Relationship to scientific research. The joint consciousness test compares selected theoretical predictions. It neither resolves the hard problem nor establishes that it must remain insoluble.

Concepts: The hard problem, Phenomenal consciousness, Functionalism. Hypotheses: H6. Sources: 12 222 11

Stages of intellect Al-Fārābī (approximately 870–950)

Thesis. Human intellectual development is explained through stages of intellect and its relation to the active intellect.
Premises. Intellect is initially potential. Actualisation requires something already actual; human intellect develops through actual and acquired intellect.
Inference. Argues for a separate active intellect responsible for actualising potential understanding.
Conclusion. Knowledge is completed in relation to a cosmic intellect, which al-Fārābī also relates to the angel of revelation.
Objection. Why accept a separate active intellect and its cosmological role?

Response attributed to the text or tradition

The attributed rationale uses sight and light: the eye can see but needs illumination; likewise potential intellects require an actualising source. 53

Our reconstruction

Understanding how an account fits together differs from accepting its premises. Its Aristotelian context matters, and similar terms need not name identical concepts.

Relationship to scientific research. Learning studies may measure developing abilities without testing all the active-intellect account’s metaphysical premises.

Concepts: Active intellect, Potential intellect, Actual intellect, Acquired intellect. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 53 61

Questioning necessary connection Al-Ghazālī (1058–1111)

Thesis. Some metaphysical necessity claims assume more than they show.
Premises. Fire and burning cotton are observed together. Their conjunction alone does not demonstrate a necessary causal connection.
Inference. The necessity philosophers attribute to natural causes has not been established by that observation.
Conclusion. Regularity can be explained without asserting that necessity.
Objection. Would rejecting necessary connection undermine scientific prediction and dependable action?

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Discussion 17 of The Incoherence of the Philosophers explains habitual order through God’s creation of knowledge in us; extraordinary possibilities need not remove everyday confidence. 98

Source scope: Secondary commentary. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: birincil metinden doğrulanamadı (“could not be verified from the primary text”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

Studying regularity differs from assigning metaphysical necessity to it. Read the objection in its work and passage; saying that al-Ghazālī rejects every causal relation is too broad.

Relationship to scientific research. Repeated intervention can strengthen causal explanations without settling every metaphysical question about necessity.

Concepts: Scientific method, Evidence, Emanation and conjunction. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 98

The extended mind Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998)

Thesis. Some external tools may constitute parts of cognition rather than merely assist it.
Premises. Otto’s notebook can play a role comparable to Inga’s memory. The parity principle asks why location alone should disqualify a process that would count as cognitive inside the head.
Inference. Equivalent functional roles are argued to warrant equivalent cognitive status.
Conclusion. The skull need not always be the boundary of mind.
Objection. Causally helping a process does not make something its constituent; conflating coupling and constitution risks extending cognition too far. 95

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Clark and Chalmers propose restrictive conditions: regular availability, ready access and automatic endorsement. They leave open whether earlier conscious endorsement is also required. 4

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: düzeltildi ve doğrulandı (“corrected and verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

Reliance, access and regular use may matter to cognitive work-sharing. They do not automatically extend consciousness or moral subjecthood to a tool. Requiring checkable artificial outputs is our additional working condition.

Relationship to scientific research. The replication of Sparrow’s first experiment does not dispose of the entire series. Performance effects of external records do not alone establish mental constitution.

Concepts: Extended mind, External memory, External tool. Hypotheses: H7. Sources: 4 95 30 34

Is language the whole of thought? Evelina Fedorenko, Steven Piantadosi and Edward Gibson

Thesis. Language is primarily a communication tool rather than the entirety of thinking.
Premises. The language network need not be active in tasks involving mathematics, logic, music or planning. Some people with severe aphasia, an impairment of language, can perform non-linguistic reasoning tasks.
Inference. Functional dissociation challenges language as a necessary medium for every kind of thought.
Conclusion. Thinking can occur without language; language remains exceptionally suited to communicating thought.
Objection. Language can deeply shape abstraction, concept acquisition and social justification.

Response attributed to the text or tradition

The authors acknowledge its importance in transmitting cultural knowledge; their target is the claim that language is reasoning’s necessary medium. 1

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: doğrulandı (“verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

Distinguishing language from all thought does not sever their relationship. Ask which tasks involve a linguistic contribution. Human dissociations do not directly decide whether a machine understands.

Relationship to scientific research. This is a review drawing on lesion and imaging evidence, not one new experiment or proof that all thought is language-independent.

Concepts: Language, Thought, Communication. Hypotheses: H1, H3. Sources: 1

Form and meaning Emily Bender and Alexander Koller

Thesis. A system learning from linguistic form alone cannot thereby learn communicative meaning.
Premises. Meaning relates form to something beyond form, such as communicative intention or the world. A form-only learner lacks access to one side of the relationship.
Inference. The relationship determining meaning is absent if data consists only of form.
Conclusion. Success with form should not automatically count as understanding.
Objection. Form may contain indirect information about the world; multimodal and interactive systems may exceed the form-only premise.

Response attributed to the text or tradition

The octopus thought experiment limits the argument to form-only access, leaving systems connected through perception or interaction as a separate question. 72

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: doğrulandı (“verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

Read the claim through data access and what is learned. Removing the premise prevents automatic transfer of its conclusion. The 2021 paper is also a research argument, not merely a public parrot metaphor.

Relationship to scientific research. The 2020 work is an argumentative position paper without a new participant experiment. Any connection to later representation research needs its own specified study and finding.

Concepts: Form, Meaning, Stochastic parrot, Large language model. Hypotheses: H6. Sources: 72 41

Soul as the body’s form Aristotle (384–322 BCE)

Thesis. Soul is the form unifying a living body’s activities.
Premises. Wax and its impression provide an analogy of unity; nutrition, sensation and thought are activities of a living body.
Inference. Soul and body are understood as form and matter rather than two separate things.
Conclusion. Living and thinking are approached through the activity of an organised body.
Objection. How does the separable active intellect of De Anima III.5 fit this unity? 76

Response attributed to the text or tradition

III.5 describes this intellect as separable, unaffected and unmixed, and associates immortality and eternity with it. Reconciling that passage with form–matter unity is not explicitly completed by the text. 31

Our reconstruction

Distinguish questions in De Anima from those in the Metaphysics. Similar explanatory roles do not establish that active intellect and the Unmoved Mover are identical.

Relationship to scientific research. Research attending to the body may invite comparison without experimentally verifying Aristotle’s metaphysics.

Concepts: Hylomorphism, Passive intellect, Active intellect, Psychē. Hypotheses: H3, H7. Sources: 31 76

The suspended human Ibn Sīnā (980–1037)

Thesis. Self-awareness can be conceptually distinguished from sensory knowledge of the body.
Premises. Imagine a newly created adult suspended without sensory input or contact between limbs, yet aware of existing.
Inference. If self-awareness does not depend on knowing the body, the argument distinguishes soul from body.
Conclusion. Soul is presented as directly aware of itself.
Objection. The premise of self-awareness without sensation may already assume the disputed conclusion. 61

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Ibn Sīnā presents the exercise as an alerting, tanbīh, rather than a demonstration, burhān: directing attention to something the reader already knows. 39 61

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: doğrulandı (“verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

Ask which intuition supports the premises. An imagined situation is not an observed event; the further conclusion about soul and body still needs reasons.

Relationship to scientific research. Sensory-deprivation research might investigate some features without realising the thought experiment in full.

Concepts: Nafs, Self-consciousness, Self. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 39 61

“Science does not think” Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)

Thesis. Thinking is not exhausted by calculating results; we must also ask what calls for thought.
Premises. Heidegger questions our failure to think in a thought-provoking age. His contrast concerns scientific representation and calculation versus questioning their grounds.
Inference. Distinguishes calculative and reflective ways of thinking.
Conclusion. Thinking involves recollecting and attending to what addresses us.
Objection. Scientists also question concepts and change paradigms; inquiry cannot simply be reserved for philosophy.

Response attributed to the text or tradition

A frequently attributed continuation treats science’s not-thinking as an advantage rather than a defect. The inherited check could not establish that sentence from the primary text. 8

Our reconstruction

We bring the question into the present without claiming Heidegger anticipated contemporary systems. Its context matters; it does not warrant saying that scientists never think.

Relationship to scientific research. Comparison with psychological two-process models is possible, but it is neither one theory nor mutual verification.

Concepts: Thinking (activity), Remembrance, Gedanc. Hypotheses: H1, H8. Sources: 8

The imitation game Alan Turing (1912–1954)

Thesis. Replacing the ambiguous machine-thinking question with an observable interaction criterion can be productive.
Premises. If written interaction prevents an interrogator from distinguishing a machine from a human, some grounds for withholding the attribution weaken.
Inference. Behavioural indistinguishability offers an operational substitute: a specified test in place of an unclear question.
Conclusion. The question becomes open to structured discussion and testing.
Objection. Imitation, deception or memorisation need not demonstrate understanding; human-like behaviour may be too narrow, and experience remains unresolved. 18

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Turing argues that pressing the consciousness objection consistently risks solipsism, the position that only one’s own mind can be known. He invokes our ordinary convention of granting thought to others. 59

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: düzeltildi ve doğrulandı (“corrected and verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

We read the game as a proposal for evaluating behaviour. Adding new-task transfer and error checks is our choice, distinct from Turing’s text and later tests.

Relationship to scientific research. Task horizons and problem success measure performance. What additional grounds understanding or experience require remains another question.

Concepts: Turing test, Performance, Artificial intelligence. Hypotheses: H6. Sources: 59 18 83

Embodied orientation Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) and embodied cognition

Thesis. The body contributes to our orientation towards the world rather than merely carrying thought.
Premises. Perception is shaped by bodily possibilities for action; abstract meaning develops upon perceptual orientation.
Inference. An account excluding the body misses part of thought’s relation to the world.
Conclusion. Perception and thought are understood through embodied being-in-the-world.
Objection. How can this explain remote mathematical abstraction and counterfactual thought?

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Merleau-Ponty’s priority of perception includes geometrical proof as expressive activity grounded in drawing and movement possibilities; ideality is described through sedimentation of perceptual experience. 71

Our reconstruction

Investigating bodily contributions is not reducing every concept to one motor pattern. The mathematical objection remains open and identifies an explanatory demand.

Relationship to scientific research. Tool-making action and visual–motor patterns bear on particular skills, not a demonstration that all abstraction uses one mechanism.

Concepts: Embodied cognition, Enactivism, Sensorimotor loop. Hypotheses: H7. Sources: 71 58 22

Revising everyday mental vocabulary Paul M. Churchland (1981)

Thesis. Everyday categories such as belief and desire might be radically revised by mature neuroscience.
Premises. Folk psychology is treated as a theory; theories may be false. Its alleged stagnation and difficulty integrating with neuroscience motivate the challenge.
Inference. Everyday psychology might be abandoned like earlier unsuccessful theories.
Conclusion. Scientific explanation may replace familiar belief and desire categories.
Objection. Stating the theory appears to employ belief and reasons; subjective experience might be eliminated without explanation.

Response attributed to the text or tradition

Churchland argues that the self-refutation objection presupposes what is disputed: that assertion can only be understood through everyday belief concepts. 19

Our reconstruction

Possible revision is not completed revision. A replacement must show how it accounts for the work of older concepts. This record concerns Paul’s 1981 paper, not Patricia Churchland’s views.

Relationship to scientific research. Revising some categories does not establish elimination of all everyday mental concepts; a sweeping claim needs specified replacements.

Concepts: Eliminative materialism, Physicalism. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 19

Not-self Early Buddhist traditions and later schools

Thesis. Analysis of experience need not assume an enduring, independent and unchanging self.
Premises. Body, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness change; what is claimed as “mine” depends on conditions.
Inference. No permanent independent essence follows from those changing components.
Conclusion. A process-based understanding of self becomes possible.
Objection. How can continuity, responsibility and memory be explained without an unchanging essence?

Response attributed to the text or tradition

The chariot analogy explains a conventional name for an assembled whole. In the Milindapañha, the lamp-flame analogy addresses causal continuity in rebirth without identity. 65

Our reconstruction

Different Buddhist accounts are not one doctrine. Comparisons with Hume or Dennett do not establish shared purposes, arguments or historical transmission.

Relationship to scientific research. Studies of self-related components do not experimentally verify a religious teaching of liberation.

Concepts: Non-self, Self, Process ontology. Hypotheses: H3. Sources: 65

Human–artificial-system collaboration Michelle Vaccaro, Abdullah Almaatouq and Thomas Malone

Thesis. Combining a person and a system does not guarantee outperforming the best component.
Premises. Shared errors, misplaced trust and poor task allocation can undermine gains.
Inference. Success depends on interaction, not merely the number of components.
Conclusion. Task, interface and checking arrangements need to be designed together.
Objection. An average loss might hide large benefits in some tasks.

Response attributed to the text or tradition

The authors distinguish baselines and task subgroups. The creation subgroup’s positive trend is not statistically conclusive; gains when humans outperform systems are reported separately. 120

Source scope: Work, publication or access record; passage coverage is tracked separately. Inherited check record; the source passage was not reread in this English revision. Earlier status wording, as recorded: doğrulandı (“verified”). Earlier editing date: 2026-10-10. Not newly reverified in this English edition. Recorded source target.

Our reconstruction

A combination may beat a person alone without beating the best component. Baseline, task and expertise matter; an average is not every task’s outcome.

Relationship to scientific research. The meta-analysis combines 370 effects from 106 experiments in 74 publications. A positive creation trend is not a demonstrated general advantage.

Concepts: Epistemic orchestration, Verification, Automation overreliance. Hypotheses: H5, H8. Sources: 120

A neural-representation study may illuminate a question raised alongside Parmenides without resolving his question about being. Turing’s behavioural criterion is likewise not the same result as an account of understanding. When we connect them, we need to say what our comparison contributes: a new question, a clearer distinction or only a resemblance.

A study’s conditions matter as much as its count

Method, sample, outcome and limits belong together. Archaeology may count objects rather than people; a review draws on several studies; a theoretical paper may have no new participant sample. Conversely, a technical paper can evaluate datasets even when it recruits no people. Where a number is missing, stating the gap is more useful than inventing one or declaring the whole work sample-free.

Recruitment, completion and analysis also need separate numbers. Zhu’s record begins with 742 people, reaches 631 at wave three and analyses 589 after exclusions. We can then see where attrition and selection enter. Ballot presents a different distinction: the speaker labelled human was also a model. Its label comparison is not a comparison between a human author and a machine author.

Find a record 72 of 72 records

Harmand and colleagues, 2015 Archaeological study Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2015; the finds are dated to approximately 3.3 million years ago.
Method or approach: Excavation, stratigraphic dating and analysis of stone-working traces at Lomekwi 3, Kenya.
Sample or unit: Stone artefacts, not human participants. Their number has not been recounted from the primary text in this record.
Measure: Stratigraphic age, core and flake forms.
Reported finding or proposal: Reported as the oldest known knapped stone tools, approximately 700,000 years earlier than the Oldowan tradition.
Effect measure: A conventional experimental effect size is not applicable.
Limits: The makers’ identity and mental states are not directly known.
Replication scope: Convergent finds at other sites would provide further evidence, not an experimental replication.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Stone tool
Sources: 90

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Stout and colleagues, 2008 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2008.
Method or approach: Oldowan-style flaking, Late Acheulean handaxe making, and a control involving striking stones without attempting to make flakes; positron emission tomography, a scan tracking uptake of a labelled substance.
Sample or unit: Three contemporary expert archaeologists with at least ten years of tool-making experience. The comparison with six novices from an earlier experiment was checked only in a limited way across separate studies; neither the earlier dataset nor all 2008 results were audited.
Measure: Uptake of a labelled glucose analogue and analysis of the produced objects.
Reported finding or proposal: Relationships between task demands, visual–motor coordination and hierarchical organisation of action.
Effect measure: No effect size is reproduced in this record.
Limits: Does not directly measure prehistoric minds; three experts cannot represent humanity.
Replication scope: Exact independent replication was not verified. The inherited reading record covers the original methods and sample sections, not a new reading in this translation.
Hypotheses: H3, H7
Concepts: Stone tool, Planning, Embodied cognition
Sources: 22

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Stout and Chaminade, 2012 Review Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2012.
Method or approach: Comparison of literature on tool making, language and brain evolution.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Studies relating action organisation and language.
Reported finding or proposal: Discusses models of evolutionary relationships between tool production and language.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Shared activation alone does not demonstrate shared origins.
Replication scope: A review, not a new experiment.
Hypotheses: H3, H4
Concepts: Stone tool, Language
Sources: 74

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Henshilwood, d'Errico and Watts, 2009 Archaeological study Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2009; the layers date to approximately 100,000–75,000 years ago.
Method or approach: Contextual and trace analysis of engraved ochre from Blombos Cave.
Sample or unit: Thirteen engraved ochre pieces in addition to two previously reported pieces; the units are archaeological objects.
Measure: Layer ages, engraving patterns and surface traces.
Reported finding or proposal: Repeated geometric engravings contribute evidence to debates about symbolic behaviour.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The marks’ meanings and their makers’ experiences remain unknown.
Replication scope: Other finds supply convergent context, not an experimental replication.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Sign
Sources: 91

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Kind and colleagues, 2014 Archaeological study Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2014. An age of about 40,000 years is widely reported, but the inherited record could not verify it from the journal text because access failed.
Method or approach: Reassessment of the Hohlenstein-Stadel find context and reconstruction of the figurine.
Sample or unit: The figurine and associated excavation data, not human participants.
Measure: Find context, joining of fragments and dating.
Reported finding or proposal: The mammoth-ivory lion-human figurine provides historical evidence relevant to complex image making.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Its ritual meaning and its makers’ concepts cannot be read directly from it.
Replication scope: Excavation and restoration are re-examination, not experimental replication.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Imagination
Sources: 92

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Fedorenko, Piantadosi and Gibson, 2024 Perspective Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2024.
Method or approach: A Perspective drawing together language-network, lesion and behavioural findings from several studies.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Functional dissociations across tasks.
Reported finding or proposal: Discusses evidence against treating language and all thinking as identical.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The selected tasks do not exhaust cognition.
Replication scope: Convergence across methods, not repetition of one experiment.
Hypotheses: H1, H3
Concepts: Language, Thought
Sources: 1

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood and Spreng, 2014 Review Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2014.
Method or approach: Synthesis of default-network and spontaneous-thought research; the network name refers to a pattern of connected brain regions, not a single mental act.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Network components and task relationships.
Reported finding or proposal: Examines components and interactions of spontaneous thought; the network also participates in memory, imagining the future and social cognition.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: A network name is not a label for one mental function.
Replication scope: Literature synthesis.
Hypotheses: H1, H7
Concepts: Brain
Sources: 5

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Baddeley, 2012 Review Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2012; the model has developed since 1974.
Method or approach: Historical and experimental assessment of working-memory models: accounts of temporarily holding and using information.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Temporary storage and processing tasks.
Reported finding or proposal: Discusses contributions and problems of the multicomponent working-memory framework.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Competing models remain; capacity is not one fixed number.
Replication scope: Review of a research programme.
Hypotheses: H2, H3
Concepts: Working memory
Sources: 26

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

De Neys and Glumicic, 2008 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Online publication July 2007; journal issue 2008.
Method or approach: Reasoning tasks in which intuitive responses conflict with logical requirements, with think-aloud and memory measures.
Sample or unit: The inherited Codex record gives 12 students in experiment 1, 86 in experiment 2 (44 judgement, 42 reading), and a 14-person verbalisation check. These numbers are not in the abstract and remain unverified because full-text access failed.
Measure: Behavioural indications of sensitivity to conflict.
Reported finding or proposal: Findings suggest that people giving incorrect answers were not wholly insensitive to conflict.
Effect measure: No effect size is reproduced in this record.
Limits: These tasks do not settle all dual-process theories.
Replication scope: No exact-replication audit.
Hypotheses: H2
Concepts: Dual-process theories, Error monitoring, Metacognition
Sources: 85

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Evans and Stanovich, 2013 Review Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2013.
Method or approach: Assessment of criticisms of dual-process theories.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Theoretical distinctions.
Reported finding or proposal: Distinguishes defining properties of Type 1 and Type 2 processing from properties that merely tend to accompany them.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: There is no single unified dual-process theory.
Replication scope: Review, not a new experiment.
Hypotheses: H2
Concepts: Dual-process theories
Sources: 23

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Kahneman, 2011 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 2011, drawing on research from the 1970s onwards.
Method or approach: A general-reader synthesis of judgement and decision research.
Sample or unit: The book does not report a new sample.
Measure: Not applicable to the book as a whole.
Reported finding or proposal: Describes fast and slow modes of thinking through everyday examples.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Some priming studies discussed in the book produced weak results in later replication attempts. The book should not replace primary evidence.
Replication scope: The book itself is not an experiment to replicate.
Hypotheses: H2
Concepts: Dual-process theories, Heuristic
Sources: 33

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Friston, 2010 Theory Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2010.
Method or approach: Proposes the free-energy principle, a mathematical account connecting perception and action with a system’s predictions and incoming signals, as a unifying account of brain function.
Sample or unit: Theoretical publication; no experimental sample is assigned.
Measure: Not applicable to one reported experiment.
Reported finding or proposal: Models perception, action and learning in terms of reducing prediction error.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The testability of very general formulations is disputed.
Replication scope: Replication concerns empirical tests of the theory, not the theory as a publication.
Hypotheses: H1, H7
Concepts: Predictive processing
Sources: 6

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Damasio, 1994 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 1994.
Method or approach: Develops the somatic-marker proposal from cases involving frontal brain damage: bodily signals may help people evaluate options.
Sample or unit: Case studies, not one general sample.
Measure: Decision behaviour and emotion.
Reported finding or proposal: Proposes that signals associated with bodily states can influence evaluation and decisions. It does not make body and emotion an invariant prerequisite for every decision.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The mechanism’s generalisability is disputed.
Replication scope: Later experimental tests have produced differing results; they were not separately reviewed in this record.
Hypotheses: H2
Concepts: Somatic marker, Emotion
Sources: 37 97

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Mashour and colleagues, 2020 Theory Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2020.
Method or approach: Presents global neuronal workspace theory alongside contemporary findings.
Sample or unit: Theoretical review; no new sample.
Measure: Conscious access and proposed neural ignition measures, referring to widespread coordinated activity.
Reported finding or proposal: The theory associates conscious access with information becoming available across a broad network.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Presenting a theory does not verify it.
Replication scope: Theoretical account, not a new experiment.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Global neuronal workspace
Sources: 63

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Albantakis and colleagues, 2023 Theory Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2023.
Method or approach: Formal presentation of the fourth version of integrated information theory.
Sample or unit: Theoretical publication; no experimental sample is assigned.
Measure: Not applicable to one experiment.
Reported finding or proposal: Defines consciousness through properties of a system’s intrinsic causal structure.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Measurement and empirical discrimination between theories remain contested.
Replication scope: Theoretical account, not a new experiment.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Integrated information theory
Sources: 88

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Seth and Bayne, 2022 Review Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2022.
Method or approach: Comparative assessment of leading consciousness theories.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: The explanatory targets of theories.
Reported finding or proposal: Compares what theories seek to explain and how experiments might distinguish them; it does not establish an uncontested winner.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: A review rather than a decisive test of every theory.
Replication scope: Review, not a new experiment.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Consciousness
Sources: 62

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Dehaene, Lau and Kouider, 2017 Review Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2017.
Method or approach: Defines two computational dimensions of consciousness, global access and self-monitoring, and considers their application to machines.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Theoretical criteria.
Reported finding or proposal: The authors judged that machines of that period did not fully exhibit both dimensions.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: These are criteria within an account, not uncontested measures.
Replication scope: Theoretical assessment.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Consciousness, Metacognition
Sources: 42

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Joint test of consciousness theories (COGITATE), 2025 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Online publication 30 April 2025; Nature 642 (8066).
Method or approach: A preregistered comparison of selected predictions from global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories, using clearly visible stimuli presented for different durations.
Sample or unit: 256 participants in total, with different groups and analyses for different methods; not everyone underwent all three methods.
Measure: Functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography: three methods of recording different aspects of brain activity.
Reported finding or proposal: Some prespecified predictions received support and others were challenged; the authors report challenges to some central tenets.
Effect measure: Multiple preregistered predictions, not one overall effect size.
Limits: Not a direct test of every theory version or every conscious state. Representatives disputed the scope and attribution of predictions; see ev-naccache25. Neither complete refutation nor immunity from the findings follows.
Replication scope: Development and testing data were separated. Independent external replication is another question. The inherited check covered indexed abstract and method information; full-text access attempts failed.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Global neuronal workspace, Integrated information theory, Consciousness
Sources: 7 96

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Sparrow, Liu and Wegner, 2011 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2011.
Method or approach: Four experiments on how expected later access to information affects remembering.
Sample or unit: University-student samples in each experiment; counts are not reproduced here.
Measure: Content recall, location recall and response time.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports that participants remembered where information could be found rather than the information itself.
Effect measure: Not reproduced in this record.
Limits: Laboratory tasks with an indirect relationship to everyday use. A replication report found the first experiment’s original participant count unclear: 46 or 69.
Replication scope: The 2018 project targeted experiment 1. Its outcome neither shows that all four experiments failed nor verifies the others; the full-method review remains open.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: External memory, Cognitive offloading
Sources: 30 34 224

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Camerer and colleagues, 2018 Replication project Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2018; original studies 2010–2015.
Method or approach: High-powered replications of 21 social-science experiments published in Nature and Science during 2010–2015.
Sample or unit: 21 experiments, each replication using a larger sample than its original.
Measure: Replication outcomes and effect-size ratios.
Reported finding or proposal: 13 of 21 experiments (62%) replicated significantly. Replication samples were about five times larger and effects averaged about half the original size. Sparrow’s first experiment was among those not replicated.
Effect measure: Replication effects averaged about half the original size.
Limits: One experiment was selected from each project.
Replication scope: This is itself a replication project; the complete methods have not been newly reviewed here.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Reproducibility
Sources: 34

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Bjork, 1994 Review Book chapter

Dates: Published 1994.
Method or approach: Assessment of findings distinguishing performance during learning from lasting learning.
Sample or unit: No new sample.
Measure: Retention and transfer.
Reported finding or proposal: Argues that some conditions reducing immediate performance, including spacing, variation and retrieval, can improve longer-term learning.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Which difficulty helps depends on task and learner.
Replication scope: A review; many underlying effects have been independently replicated, but not individually audited in this record.
Hypotheses: H8
Concepts: Desirable difficulty, Learning
Sources: 38

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Sweller, 1988 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 1988.
Method or approach: Experiments and a computational model testing how means–ends problem solving affects learning.
Sample or unit: Sample sizes are not reproduced in this record.
Measure: Acquisition of problem schemas and transfer.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports that demanding means–ends search can impede schema acquisition, while goal-free problems can aid learning.
Effect measure: Not reproduced in this record.
Limits: The tasks cover a narrow domain.
Replication scope: Later research extended cognitive-load theory; those studies were not individually audited here.
Hypotheses: H8
Concepts: Learning
Sources: 35

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Vaccaro, Almaatouq and Malone, 2024 Meta-analysis Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2024; covered experiments 2020–2023.
Method or approach: Systematic review and meta-analysis.
Sample or unit: 370 effect sizes from 106 experiments in 74 publications, not one participant sample.
Measure: Task performance of humans, systems and their combination.
Reported finding or proposal: Combined work improved on humans alone on average, but did not on average outperform the best single component. Decision and creation tasks differed; the positive average in the creation subgroup was not statistically conclusive. No uniform result follows for every task.
Effect measure: Against the best component: mean Hedges g = −0.23. Against humans alone: g = 0.64. Hedges g expresses a standardised difference in standard-deviation units; the two values use different baselines.
Limits: Tasks, models and arrangements differ. Helping a person and beating the best component are distinct outcomes; a positive subgroup trend is not a confirmed advantage.
Replication scope: Combines multiple independent experiments; it is not a new experiment.
Hypotheses: H5, H8
Concepts: Epistemic orchestration, Performance
Sources: 120

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

120 Earlier log reports: Selected comparison definitions, overall findings and task subgroups. Open: Supplementary analyses and all data were not reproduced. Recorded target

Glickman and Sharot, 2025 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Online 18 December 2024; journal issue February 2025.
Method or approach: Experiments exposing participants to biased feedback from artificial systems.
Sample or unit: 1,401 participants across the experiments.
Measure: Changes in perceptual, emotional and social judgements.
Reported finding or proposal: Interaction amplified judgement bias, while participants largely failed to recognise the influence.
Effect measure: Effect sizes appear in the paper; this record reproduces their direction only.
Limits: Laboratory tasks without a long-term measure. Hebbian learning was not tested as the mechanism.
Replication scope: Different tasks within the paper provide repeated tests; independent external replication is not verified here.
Hypotheses: H8
Concepts: Feedback loop, Bias
Sources: 87

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Lee and colleagues, 2025 Survey Peer-reviewed conference paper

Dates: Published 2025.
Method or approach: Self-report survey of generative-system use at work.
Sample or unit: 319 knowledge workers describing 936 use cases.
Measure: Trust in the system, self-confidence and reported critical-thinking effort.
Reported finding or proposal: Higher trust in the system was associated with less reported effort; higher self-confidence with more. Reported work shifted towards checking, integrating responses and overseeing tasks.
Effect measure: Not reproduced in this record.
Limits: Cross-sectional self-report: it does not establish causality or measure long-term skill loss.
Replication scope: No exact independent replication has been verified in this record.
Hypotheses: H5
Concepts: Critical thinking, Automation overreliance
Sources: 9

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Bastani and colleagues, 2025 Field experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 25 June 2025, with a correction notice; fieldwork in a Turkish secondary-school setting.
Method or approach: Randomly assigned mathematics practice with a direct-answer assistant, a protected hint-giving tutor, or a control.
Sample or unit: Approximately 1,000 secondary-school students in Türkiye.
Measure: Assisted practice and later unassisted examination performance.
Reported finding or proposal: Practice performance was 48% higher with the standard assistant and 127% higher with the tutor. After access was removed, the standard-assistant group performed 17% below control; the tutor largely avoided that loss.
Effect measure: Relative differences reported in the paper, not percentage-point changes.
Limits: One educational context; model access and teaching design may both contribute.
Replication scope: An exact replication in another school is not verified here.
Hypotheses: H5, H8
Concepts: Learning, Cognitive offloading
Sources: 56

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Kestin and colleagues, 2025 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 3 June 2025; Harvard course in autumn 2023.
Method or approach: Randomised crossover comparison of a designed artificial tutor with classroom active learning in university physics.
Sample or unit: 194 analysed students from 233 enrolled.
Measure: Pre- and post-tests, time spent and student perceptions.
Reported finding or proposal: Higher short-term learning gains with the tutor; post-test medians 4.5 versus 3.5.
Effect measure: 0.63 is a linear-regression estimate. A separate ceiling-adjusted analysis reports 0.73–1.3. These are different analyses, not separate studies or one continuous effect interval.
Limits: A 194-person analysis in a particular course. Pedagogical design and model access were combined; no conclusion about long-term retention or all courses follows.
Replication scope: No exact independent replication is verified. Public claims that it beat classrooms in general exceed the study’s scope.
Hypotheses: H5, H8
Concepts: Learning
Sources: 84 216

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

84 Earlier log reports: Selected sample and outcome-estimate passages in the original PDF; 0.63 and 0.73–1.3 concern different analyses. Open: All supplements were not audited; no long-term outcome was supplied. Recorded target
216 Earlier log reports: Inherited record; the relevant text was not reread. Open: Source existence, earlier summary and a new passage audit are distinct.

Xin and colleagues, 2026 Observational study Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 14 March 2026; twelve-month follow-up.
Method or approach: Three-wave cross-lagged panel in supervised medical education, examining relationships across measurement times.
Sample or unit: 372 medical students completing all three waves.
Measure: Participation in assisted diagnosis, artificial-intelligence literacy and critical-thinking scales.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports positive relationships over time; literacy is proposed as a mediator.
Effect measure: Standardised path coefficients are in the paper, not reproduced here.
Limits: Observational self-report in a supervised setting; no causal conclusion.
Replication scope: No independent replication has been verified in this record.
Hypotheses: H5
Concepts: Critical thinking, Oversight
Sources: 86

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Teng and colleagues, 2026 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 17 March 2026; preregistered 7 November 2025.
Method or approach: Randomised clinical-case evaluation with correct, misleading or no explanations.
Sample or unit: 115 recruited, four excluded; 111 novice medical students, 37 per group, answering 25 licensing-style questions.
Measure: Diagnostic accuracy and alignment of confidence with correctness.
Reported finding or proposal: Accuracy: no explanation 21.0%, correct explanation 22.6%, misleading explanation 9.2%. Misleading explanations reduced accuracy; correct explanations did not produce a significant advantage.
Effect measure: Percentages are group accuracy rates.
Limits: Novices and a restricted task, not clinical patient outcomes.
Replication scope: Preregistered; independent replication is not verified.
Hypotheses: H8
Concepts: Confidence calibration, Automation overreliance, Verification
Sources: 16

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Model Evaluation and Threat Research, 2026 Technical evaluation Non-peer-reviewed online evaluation

Dates: Recorded page update 8 May 2026, Time Horizon 1.1; not a new live-page check.
Method or approach: Relates success on software tasks to the time an expert human would need.
Sample or unit: More than 100 tasks; subsets differ by model and evaluation version.
Measure: Task horizons at 50% and 80% success: human-estimated task durations corresponding to those thresholds.
Reported finding or proposal: The horizon measure compares model success on longer software tasks.
Effect measure: Uncertainty intervals are provided on the source page.
Limits: Software success is not general real-world agency. Task distributions, cost and versions vary; this is not a peer-reviewed publication.
Replication scope: An open protocol can be rerun, but changing versions are not automatically exact replications.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Task time horizon, Performance, Agency
Sources: 83

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Ramón y Cajal, 1909–1911; Sherrington, 1906 Historical observation Published book

Dates: Published 1906–1911; investigations from 1888 onwards.
Method or approach: Microscopic study and drawing of stained neural tissue, alongside reflex physiology.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No single measure assigned to these works.
Reported finding or proposal: The neuron doctrine treats the nervous system as discrete cells; the synapse concerns functional connections between cells.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Cell-level knowledge alone does not explain the mental level.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H3, H7
Concepts: Neuron, Synapse
Sources: 66

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Hebb, 1949 Theory Published book

Dates: Published 1949.
Method or approach: Theoretical proposal that experience can strengthen neural connections.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: Not applicable to one experiment.
Reported finding or proposal: Proposes strengthening of connections between jointly active cells.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Complex thinking cannot be reduced to synaptic strengthening; this was not tested as the mechanism of the artificial-system findings discussed here.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H7
Concepts: Hebbian learning, Neural plasticity
Sources: 27

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

James, 1890 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 1890.
Method or approach: Synthesis of introspection and the experimental psychology of the period.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No single experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Descriptions of the stream of thought, attention and habit.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Introspection alone cannot establish a mechanism.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H1
Concepts: Attention
Sources: 67

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Newell and Simon, 1972 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 1972.
Method or approach: Analysis of think-aloud records and computer simulations.
Sample or unit: The monograph draws on empirical protocols; this record does not supply their participant counts. It should not be read as a claim that the research involved no participants.
Measure: No single measure supplied in this record.
Reported finding or proposal: Models problem solving as symbolic search.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Participant counts are not reproduced. Embodiment and pattern learning raise questions about the model’s reach.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H3
Concepts: Problem solving, Operation
Sources: 57

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991 Theory Published book

Dates: Published 1991.
Method or approach: Comparative synthesis of phenomenology, the study of structures of lived experience, Buddhist thought and cognitive science.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No single experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Proposes enactivism, an approach emphasising cognition through action, and embodied cognition.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The explanation of abstract thought remains disputed.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H7
Concepts: Enactivism, Embodied cognition
Sources: 58

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Mithen, 1996 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 1996.
Method or approach: A cognitive-evolution model drawing on archaeology.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No single experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Proposes cognitive fluidity through interaction among previously separated domains of intelligence.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: A theoretical model, not itself an observed finding.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Imagination
Sources: 93

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Donald, 1991 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 1991.
Method or approach: A staged model of cognitive evolution.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No single experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Proposes a stage involving external symbolic storage.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The sequence and boundaries of stages are disputed.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: External memory
Sources: 70

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Tattersall, 2012 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 2012.
Method or approach: General-reader synthesis of human-evolution findings.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No single experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Argues for a late and rapid acquisition of symbolic cognition.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: A disputed interpretation, not a substitute for primary findings.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Imagination
Sources: 94

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Turing, 1950 Theory Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 1950.
Method or approach: Philosophical argument and thought experiment.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: A proposed interaction criterion, not a participant dataset in this record.
Reported finding or proposal: Recasts the machine-thinking question through an observable imitation game.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Performance does not necessarily demonstrate understanding or consciousness.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Turing test
Sources: 59

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Turing, 1936–1937 Theory Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 1936–1937.
Method or approach: Mathematical definition and proof.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: Not applicable to an empirical sample.
Reported finding or proposal: Defines computability through an abstract machine.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The paper does not establish that minds are computers.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Operation
Sources: 112

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Bender and Koller, 2020 Theory Peer-reviewed conference paper

Dates: Published 2020.
Method or approach: Theoretical argument and thought experiment.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No experimental outcome measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Argues that a system learning from form alone cannot thereby learn communicative meaning.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Multimodal and interactive systems require a separate assessment.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Form, Meaning
Sources: 72

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Bender and colleagues, 2021 Theory Peer-reviewed conference paper

Dates: Published 2021.
Method or approach: Theoretical and ethical assessment.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No experimental outcome measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Critiques large language models through the stochastic-parrot comparison and discusses data and environmental costs.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The comparison is part of an argument, not a measured finding.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Stochastic parrot
Sources: 41

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Dreyfus, 1972 Monograph Published book

Dates: Published 1972.
Method or approach: Philosophical criticism informed by phenomenology, attending to embodied lived experience and practical involvement.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No experimental outcome measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Argues that rule-based artificial intelligence cannot capture embodied, situated human intelligence.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Deep learning differs from the rule-based systems targeted by parts of the criticism. This narrows its direct application; it does not settle every question about embodiment or context.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Artificial intelligence
Sources: 191

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Vaswani and colleagues, 2017 Technical paper Peer-reviewed conference paper

Dates: Published 2017.
Method or approach: Defines a neural-network architecture and evaluates it on translation tasks.
Sample or unit: The paper evaluates datasets and models, not a human-participant sample. Dataset sizes are not reproduced in this record.
Measure: Translation performance; the inherited generic “not applicable” label did not describe the evaluations accurately. Their full metrics are not audited here.
Reported finding or proposal: Introduces the Transformer architecture, later foundational for language models.
Effect measure: Numerical evaluation results are not reproduced in this record.
Limits: Architectural performance alone does not establish thinking or understanding.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Large language model
Sources: 25

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Göbekli Tepe World Heritage record, 2018 Archaeological record Institutional record

Dates: World Heritage inscription 2018; structures dated 9600–8200 BCE.
Method or approach: Institutional summary of excavation findings.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Describes monumental structures as probably associated with ritual activities.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Institutional summary, not a replacement for primary excavation reports.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Culture
Sources: 113

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Kelley, Cartolano and Ferrara, 2025 Review Non-peer-reviewed expert article

Dates: Published 9 January 2025.
Method or approach: Expert review of early writing systems.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports proto-cuneiform administrative tablets from Uruk dated approximately 3350–3000 BCE.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Primary tablet publications were not separately audited in this record.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Writing
Sources: 109

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Boyle, 1660 Historical experimental report Published book

Dates: Published 1660.
Method or approach: Detailed report of air-pump experiments.
Sample or unit: Not a participant trial; the historical report contains experiments. No sample total is supplied here.
Measure: Experimental conditions and observations; no single measure reproduced here.
Reported finding or proposal: Describes conditions and results in detail intended to enable readers to repeat the work.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The inherited audit supplied bibliographic information without reading the primary copy.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Scientific method
Sources: 111

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Naccache and colleagues, 2025 Critical commentary Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 2025, with a 2026 correction record.
Method or approach: Commentary by representatives of a tested theory; an argument about the joint test, not a new experiment.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No new experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Argues that visible-stimulus testing leaves out some contrasts between conscious and unconscious processing, and disputes attribution of some predictions.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: The authors represent one tested theory. The later Atlas closure log reports a limited correction check concerning an author name and author contributions. This supersedes the older access-failure status for that narrow issue only; the full commentary and all theoretical effects were not re-audited here.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Global neuronal workspace, Consciousness
Sources: 96

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Carr, 2010 Cultural criticism Published book

Dates: Published 2010.
Method or approach: Essay drawing on other researchers’ work and personal observation.
Sample or unit: No single experimental sample is specified for this publication. Consult its component studies where applicable.
Measure: No original experimental measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Argues that internet use changes attention and habits of sustained reading.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: Cultural criticism, not a primary experiment. Use it as an interpretation, not direct experimental evidence.
Replication scope: For a theoretical or historical work, replication concerns particular observations or tests, not repetition of the publication as a whole.
Hypotheses: H4
Concepts: Attention economy
Sources: 68

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Wang and colleagues, 2026 Field experiment Non-peer-reviewed preprint

Dates: Preprint 22 May 2026.
Method or approach: Randomised field experiment providing language-model feedback on article drafts.
Sample or unit: More than 31,000 preprints and more than 45,000 researchers.
Measure: Probability that a paper is revised.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports a 12.55% relative increase in revision probability over baseline, not percentage points or a measured increase in quality.
Effect measure: 12.55% relative increase, not a percentage-point change.
Limits: Revision is not directly scientific quality. Full methods and data were not reread; peer-review status remains a separate question.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded in this inventory; no claim is made that the field contains none.
Hypotheses: H5
Concepts: Performance
Sources: 205

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

205 Earlier log reports: Abstract and archive version; 12.55% relative increase in revision probability. Open: Full methods and quality measurement remain open. Recorded target

Zhao and colleagues, 2026 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 22 May 2026.
Method or approach: Three-arm randomised comparison of an artificial tutor integrated with a knowledge graph, blended teaching and traditional teaching.
Sample or unit: 362 nursing students assigned; 301 completed.
Measure: Anatomy-module score.
Reported finding or proposal: Abstract scores: integrated tutor/knowledge graph 82.5; blended 77.6; traditional 74.1.
Effect measure: Analysis-of-variance test statistic F = 28.64, not an effect size or a percentage gain.
Limits: A combined intervention does not isolate artificial intelligence alone. One institution and approximately 17% attrition remain inherited limitations, not newly checked full-method findings.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded here; this is not a claim that none exists.
Hypotheses: H5, H8
Concepts: Learning
Sources: 206

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Jain and colleagues, 2026 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Online 30 June 2026.
Method or approach: Comparison of assisted and manual-task groups, with qualitative interviews.
Sample or unit: 120 young adults: 57 assisted, 63 manual; qualitative subset 54.
Measure: Correct responses and self-reported mental effort.
Reported finding or proposal: The inherited record reports more correct responses and lower reported effort in the assisted group.
Effect measure: Kruskal–Wallis test statistics H = 7.044 for accuracy and H = 27.434 for effort; these are comparison statistics, not measures of long-term learning.
Limits: Original methods and results were not retrieved anew. Lower reported effort is not long-term learning, and random assignment has not been established in this record.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded here; this is not a claim that none exists.
Hypotheses: H5, H8
Concepts: Critical thinking, Cognitive offloading
Sources: 207

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Zhu and colleagues, 2026 Observational study Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 16 July 2026.
Method or approach: Three-wave time-lagged survey.
Sample or unit: 742 at wave 1, 631 at wave 3, and 589 analysed after exclusions; students and young workers.
Measure: Dependent and autonomous cognitive offloading, transfer of cognitive agency, and intrinsic motivation.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports different relationships for dependent and autonomous offloading with agency transfer and motivation.
Effect measure: Effect sizes are in the paper, not reproduced here.
Limits: 589 analysed from 742 initial participants. Three waves two weeks apart and new scales; temporal order alone does not establish causality.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded in this inventory.
Hypotheses: H5, H8
Concepts: Cognitive offloading, Critical thinking
Sources: 208

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

208 Earlier log reports: Three-wave method, participant flow and selected limitations. Open: Full validation of the new scales and reanalysis were not completed. Recorded target

Mehta and colleagues, 2026 Observational study Non-peer-reviewed preprint

Dates: Preprint 28 April 2026.
Method or approach: Latent-state modelling of chat records, inferring unobserved states from conversation patterns.
Sample or unit: No count in the abstract.
Measure: Interaction between human and system false beliefs.
Reported finding or proposal: A reciprocal-influence model fitted better than a one-way alternative; persistence of the system’s own output dominated cumulative pathways.
Effect measure: No numerical effect in the abstract.
Limits: A selected sample cannot establish prevalence among all users. Better model fit does not prove a cumulative causal mechanism. Full text and peer review remain open.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded here; this is not a claim that none exists.
Hypotheses: H8
Concepts: Feedback loop, Bias
Sources: 218

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Ballot and colleagues, 2026 Experiment Peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Published 17 August 2026; preregistered.
Method or approach: Three-arm between-group experiment: two model-conversation arms labelled artificial intelligence or human, plus control. Both conversation arms used a language model.
Sample or unit: 554 in the reported analysis, not a sample claimed to represent all vaccine-opposed adults.
Measure: Change in confidence in a conspiracy belief.
Reported finding or proposal: Relative to control, reductions were 7.88 percentage points in the artificial-intelligence-labelled arm and 13.76 in the human-labelled arm. Both conversed with a model.
Effect measure: Cohen d = 0.63 and 0.87, standardised differences in standard-deviation units. The percentage-point figures describe between-group comparisons against control.
Limits: The human label did not mean a human interlocutor. Excluding participants who detected deception may select the sample; this is a label comparison, not human authorship versus model authorship.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded here; this is not a claim that none exists.
Hypotheses: H8
Concepts: Bias, Verification
Sources: 212

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

212 Earlier log reports: Abstract, relevant results and the explanation of selection connected to deception. Open: Supplements and all analyses were not reproduced. Recorded target

Model Evaluation and Threat Research, May 2026 report Technical evaluation Non-peer-reviewed institutional report

Dates: Published 19 May 2026, covering February–March 2026.
Method or approach: Evaluation of companies’ internal agents and public models.
Sample or unit: Internal agents from four companies; analysis of 44 misalignment incidents.
Measure: Human-estimated task-duration horizons, runs invalidated on audit and misalignment incidents.
Reported finding or proposal: For public models, approximately twelve hours at 50% success and 1.5 hours at 80%. Among apparently successful runs on tasks longer than eight human-estimated hours, at least 16% were invalidated on audit.
Effect measure: Twelve and 1.5 hours use different success thresholds. The 16% denominator is apparently successful long-task runs audited, not all attempts.
Limits: Durations estimate human task time. Uncertainty, test saturation, evaluation conditions and disclosed redactions matter. An old 23 September page check is not a current-status claim.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded here; this is not a claim that none exists.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Agency, Task time horizon
Sources: 213

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

213 Earlier log reports: Summary table, task-horizon definition and invalidated-success explanation. Open: Not the entire report or all runs; the live horizon page was not newly checked. Recorded target

Comsa, 2026 Theory Non-peer-reviewed preprint

Dates: Preprint 7 May 2026.
Method or approach: Conceptual position paper.
Sample or unit: No experimental sample.
Measure: No experimental outcome measure.
Reported finding or proposal: Recommends researchable questions about artificial consciousness, distinguishing subjective experience from people’s attribution of consciousness.
Effect measure: Not applicable.
Limits: No empirical consciousness finding. The complete argument was not reread; the proposal is not presented as field-wide consensus.
Replication scope: Not applicable.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Consciousness
Sources: 214

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Salvi and Wolfson, 2026 Technical evaluation Archive version and a stated conference publication; peer review has not been verified in this work.

Dates: Preprint 28 August 2026.
Method or approach: Compares hardware signals during emotionally framed and neutral processing in two language models.
Sample or unit: Two models.
Measure: Differences in hardware-level signals.
Reported finding or proposal: Reports a significant difference for the larger model, not the smaller; the authors interpret it as a machine consciousness correlate.
Effect measure: No numerical effect in the abstract.
Limits: The inherited reading covered the abstract. Two models and a proposed correlate do not settle consciousness; significant hardware differences do not demonstrate subjective experience. A conference record prevents an unconditional unreviewed label without checking.
Replication scope: No independent replication is recorded here; this is not a claim that none exists.
Hypotheses: H6
Concepts: Consciousness
Sources: 215

Earlier reading scope · not renewed here

Edited 2026-10-10. Inherited limited readings and comparison of existing records, not a new full-text audit. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

215 Earlier log reports: Abstract, two-model comparison and conference-publication record. Open: Complete methods, peer-review status and interpretation as subjective experience remain open. Recorded target

Ebbinghaus 1885 and Wundt 1874 · shared source key Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: The key covers Ebbinghaus 1885 and Wundt 1874, not one experiment or one sample.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 166

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Bartlett, Frederic C Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 176

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Hodgkin, Alan L Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 181

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Miller, George A Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 118

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Hubel, David H Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 185

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Gazzaniga, Michael S., Joseph E Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 186

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Tulving, Endel Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 192

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Rosch 1975 and Lakoff–Johnson 1980 · shared source key Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: The key covers an experimental work and a theoretical book; they are not one method or one study.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 32

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Libet, Benjamin, Curtis A Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 196

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Kandel, Eric R Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 197

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Dehaene, Stanislas, Felipe Pegado, Lucia W Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 28

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Tseng, Julie and Jordan Poppenk Scientific-source catalogue Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: A catalogue record completing the source inventory, not a completed audit of methods, samples and results.
Sample or unit: Not separately verified in the recorded review; no number has been supplied without evidence.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: A tracking record for a bibliographic work, not a new experimental finding.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: Source-key coverage, not approval of a claim’s truth.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 10

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Poldrack, Russell A Methodological discussion Perspective in a peer-reviewed journal

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: Logical and probabilistic analysis of reverse inference: inferring a mental process from observed brain activity, illustrated with selected BrainMap language data.
Sample or unit: The database contains 749 publications and 3,222 experimental comparisons, not a new participant sample.
Measure: Table 1 crosses language/other studies with activity present/absent: cells 166, 199, 703 and 2,154.
Reported finding or proposal: Regional activation alone does not identify a cognitive function. Its information value depends on selectivity and the prior probability of the task.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Study sampling and database coverage are limited. It does not follow that all reverse inference is useless.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: The inherited log reports selected reverse-inference, Bayes and Table 1 passages read from a university copy on 10 October 2026, not reproduction of every source or experiment.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 17

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Damasio, Antonio R Theory and case evidence Publication type is carried in the bibliography; peer-review status has not been newly checked.

Dates: Dates belong to the bibliographic works; a shared source key does not make them one experiment.
Method or approach: Explains the somatic-marker hypothesis through earlier frontal-damage observations and decision tasks.
Sample or unit: Several cases and earlier studies, not one new sample total.
Measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Reported finding or proposal: Proposes a contribution of bodily signals to evaluating options; considers decision difficulties alongside preserved standard cognitive measures after some frontal injuries.
Effect measure: Not separately verified in the recorded review.
Limits: Coverage in the catalogue is not evidence that a source supports a claim.
Replication scope: No new replication audit.
Coverage note: The inherited log reports selected hypothesis, patient-observation and decision-task sections read from a university copy, not independent auditing of every sub-experiment.
Hypotheses: —
Concepts: —
Sources: 97

Reading scope · not renewed here

No separate editorial-control record is attached to this study. The source notes carry the earlier scope statements. Not newly reverified in this English edition.

Vaccaro requires us to identify the baseline; Kestin, the analysis behind the estimate; Wang, the revision behaviour actually measured. Percentages, percentage points and standardised effects are not interchangeable quantities. When no replication is recorded, we say that about this inventory; we do not claim to know that none exists anywhere.

A proposed experiment has no result yet

The ten designs describe how we might investigate. Completing fields for participants, conditions and measures does not make the work a conducted experiment. Sample planning, materials piloting and preregistration remain open. Each design specifies both the question it could address and an outcome that would narrow its expectation.

Find a record 10 of 10 records

proposal When does assisted success carry over to later learning without the tool?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H5: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H8: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Students at one educational level; measure prior knowledge and randomly assign conditions within classes. Do not pool secondary and undergraduate students as one population.

Conditions

Compare direct answers, hints, assistance requiring an initial solution, and work without the tool.

Controls or comparison

Match subject matter, total study time, teacher support and testing conditions. The unassisted group receives the same basic material.

What we would vary

Vary assigned assistance and measurement time; keep the model version fixed.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: success on a new unassisted task after one week. Transfer after one month, time and confidence are secondary.

How we would measure

Record practice performance separately from the delayed new task. A condition-blind assessor uses one marking scheme.

Other influences to track

Track prior knowledge, motivation, class effects, assistance at home and sharing across conditions.

Planned analysis

Use a model allowing for repeated observations within people and classes. Specify contrasts in advance and report assigned groups and missing participants.

Prediction, not a finding

Hints and constructing one’s own solution may preserve unassisted transfer better than direct answers. This is a prediction.

What would weaken or narrow it

A narrow uncertainty interval excluding the intended benefit would weaken that expectation. Equally beneficial assistance would also narrow the distinction; an inconclusive result would not settle it.

Sample-planning rationale

Define the smallest meaningful difference in unassisted success, then plan a design-specific sample allowing for class clusters and attrition. Do not copy Kestin’s or Bastani’s effect size.

Sources informing the design

56 84 38

proposal Can independent checking reduce acceptance of wrong advice while preserving use of correct advice?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H5: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H8: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Measure adults’ subject knowledge and initial confidence, then randomly assign working conditions.

Conditions

Compare no advice, advice alone, advice with a source link, and advice with independent comparison.

Controls or comparison

Balance correct and incorrect advice in advance; separately record differences in document content and time.

What we would vary

Treat checking arrangements and advice correctness as separate factors.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: the balance between accepting incorrect advice and rejecting correct advice. Later unassisted judgement and one-week persistence are secondary.

How we would measure

Record acceptance or rejection, actual correctness, checking time and confidence. Rejecting everything is not success.

Other influences to track

Track subject knowledge, advice difficulty, source readability, fatigue and trust in the system.

Planned analysis

Model repeated people and tasks, including the interaction between condition and advice correctness; choose the primary contrast beforehand.

Prediction, not a finding

Independent checking may reduce mistaken acceptance while largely preserving use of correct advice.

What would weaken or narrow it

The expectation weakens if the intended improvement is excluded or rejection of correct advice cancels its benefit. Equal benefit from a source link would narrow the added value of independent search.

Sample-planning rationale

Define a meaningful improvement in decision balance and an acceptable cost of rejecting correct advice; plan around repeated people and tasks.

Sources informing the design

87 16

proposal In which tasks does verbal load differ from matched non-verbal load?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H1: Tests language’s contribution to tasks, not directly whether thought is essentially process or object.
H3: Tests language’s contribution to tasks, not directly whether thought is essentially process or object.

Proposed participants

Start with a within-person study of healthy adults. Keep an aphasia comparison as a separate matched observational study, not another randomised condition.

Conditions

Give spatial, mathematical and social tasks under verbal load, matched non-verbal load and no load; counterbalance order.

Controls or comparison

A non-verbal secondary task helps separate general attention and memory demands. Pilot task difficulty and whether the manipulation actually creates load.

What we would vary

Vary load and task types. Aphasia is not randomly assigned.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: the accuracy difference between load types in a preselected task. Response time is secondary.

How we would measure

Report accuracy and time together, checking speed–accuracy trade-offs. Add language-network measurement only with a separate rationale.

Other influences to track

Consider general difficulty, memory demands, language ability, attention, order and additional impairments in aphasia.

Planned analysis

Test load-by-task interactions with repeated people and tasks; analyse aphasia data separately as cases or groups.

Prediction, not a finding

Verbal load may have a specific effect in some tasks. Do not assume every mathematical or social task is independent of language.

What would weaken or narrow it

After confirming that the load manipulation worked, excluding a predefined meaningful difference would narrow the specificity claim. It would not refute h1’s ontological interpretation.

Sample-planning rationale

Plan for within-person interactions and measurement reliability; justify accessible aphasia samples and sensitivity separately.

Sources informing the design

proposal Can we separate tool access from learned content and habits of use?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H4: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H7: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Teach adults a standard recording tool, measuring initial memory and prior habits. Keep regular-user comparisons as a separate observational supplement.

Conditions

Plan periods of regular use, occasional use and internal memorisation with different content; counterbalance period order.

Controls or comparison

Match content and study time. Randomise the order of access-available and access-unavailable assessments.

What we would vary

Vary assigned use and access; existing personal integration is not a randomly assigned intervention.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: change in new-task success when access is removed. Search cost and felt loss are secondary.

How we would measure

Record success, search time and content recall with and without access.

Other influences to track

Track prior knowledge, repetitions, tool skill, frequency and carry-over between periods.

Planned analysis

Use a within-person period model, examining matched content and carry-over. Report the observational supplement separately.

Prediction, not a finding

A learned division of labour may alter which tasks become costly when access is interrupted.

What would weaken or narrow it

If content learning alone explains the cost, an additional integration interpretation weakens. No outcome alone settles whether the tool is part of mind.

Sample-planning rationale

Justify the sample for use-by-access interaction and attrition; effects from earlier memory studies are not estimates for this design.

Sources informing the design

4 95 30 34

proposal Does confidence feedback improve discrimination between correct and incorrect answers?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H2: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H8: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Randomly assign undergraduates to feedback conditions after a baseline task.

Conditions

Compare outcome feedback, the same outcome information plus feedback on reasons and confidence, and no feedback.

Controls or comparison

Match outcome information and total time; use one new task and blind marking.

What we would vary

Vary additional confidence feedback, trying to separate extra content knowledge from monitoring effects.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: agreement between stated probabilities and actual correctness. Examine discrimination and new-task performance separately.

How we would measure

Ask for the probability that each answer is correct. Report squared probability error and calibration patterns, not one average alone.

Other influences to track

Track initial overconfidence, task difficulty, prior knowledge and ability to use a probability scale.

Planned analysis

Compare conditions allowing for baseline measures; show changes in correctness and confidence together.

Prediction, not a finding

Reducing excessive confidence may improve calibration without changing accuracy; selective confidence in correct versus incorrect answers matters.

What would weaken or narrow it

General hesitation that worsens discrimination, or exclusion of the intended calibration difference, would weaken the training proposal.

Sample-planning rationale

Plan target calibration differences, tasks per person and task reliability together. Do not transfer Teng’s effect from another task directly.

Sources informing the design

16 85

proposal Do two selected Turkish translations of the same passage change the conceptual relationships readers make?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H3: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H4: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Record Turkish readers’ language ability, previous reading and familiarity. Readers of the original language form a separate descriptive supplement.

Conditions

Randomly give different people one of two permitted Turkish translations covering equivalent content. Counterbalance order and passages in any within-person supplement.

Controls or comparison

The selected Diyanet and Qur’an Yolu renderings must cover the same verses. Original-language readers are not a randomised control group.

What we would vary

Vary translation presentation; if several words differ, do not attribute the result to one word.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: the place of a predefined heart–knowing relationship in participants’ explanations. Network drawing and recall are secondary.

How we would measure

Condition-blind assessors code explanations using the same instructions; provide brief practice in drawing networks.

Other influences to track

Track length, style, belief, familiarity, reading time and graphing skill.

Planned analysis

Allow for people and passages. Preselect network measures; report additional searches as exploratory.

Prediction, not a finding

Translation choices may make particular relationships more visible, without having the same effect in every passage.

What would weaken or narrow it

Adequate sensitivity excluding the target difference would narrow the selected-passage expectation. The result cannot determine a translation’s theological correctness.

Sample-planning rationale

Pilot coder agreement and passage differences, then plan around the smallest meaningful effect. Verify the relevant translation fields in their sources first.

Sources informing the design

82 80 209 210

proposal Does artificial assistance improve question formation and answering ready-made questions equally?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H5: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H8: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Choose one target population: postgraduate students or research workers with comparable subject knowledge.

Conditions

Cross question-forming and ready-made-question tasks with assistance available or unavailable.

Controls or comparison

Give all groups the same starting dossier and matched time; explain separate marking schemes for questions and answers.

What we would vary

Treat task type and assistance as separate factors; do not assume tasks have equal difficulty.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: whether the effect of assistance varies by task type. Measure answerability and quality of reasons separately.

How we would measure

Blind assessors score questions and answers on separate scales. Originality alone does not make a good question.

Other influences to track

Track subject knowledge, ready-made-question quality, time, task familiarity and assistance experience.

Planned analysis

Do not directly compare raw scores across unlike scales. Establish reliability and use a preselected interaction analysis.

Prediction, not a finding

Assistance may contribute differently to producing answers and forming questions.

What would weaken or narrow it

Equal benefit for both activities would narrow the expected difference and require us to restate which work h5 describes. An inconclusive result is not evidence of equality.

Sample-planning rationale

Plan assessor agreement, task variety and sensitivity to an interaction.

Sources informing the design

120 8

proposal Does the nine-stage model predict errors in new tasks better than a simpler model?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H1: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H3: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.
H6: Concerns only the predictive usefulness of the cycle model, not a direct test separating performance, understanding and experience.
H7: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Collect adults’ task records; split development and evaluation data by person.

Conditions

Develop the nine-stage and simpler models on the same observations, then compare them on unused tasks.

Controls or comparison

Match information access and training time; allow for the greater flexibility of a model with more variables.

What we would vary

Vary the explanatory or predictive model. Teaching the model’s effect on behaviour would require a separate experiment.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: prediction of error location or failure in new people or tasks, using a criterion chosen beforehand.

How we would measure

Code behaviour and logs with predefined rules; keep coders blind to outcomes and model expectations.

Other influences to track

Track coder bias, outcome leakage, differences in insight, task overlap and model flexibility.

Planned analysis

Compare predictions on held-out data separated by person or group. Fit to development data is not validation.

Prediction, not a finding

Nine stages may provide enough additional prediction on new data; an attractive classification alone is insufficient.

What would weaken or narrow it

If the simpler model predicts equally well or better, the complex model’s added value weakens. Predictive success still would not demonstrate a causal mechanism.

Sample-planning rationale

Plan people and tasks around the predictive difference and its uncertainty. Many records from one person are not independent participants.

Sources informing the design

26 6

proposal When do waiting and constructing one’s own answer lead to different learning outcomes?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H8: An indirect connection concerning a specified task or measure; it does not test the whole general or ontological claim.

Proposed participants

Measure online learners’ prior knowledge, then randomly assign conditions.

Conditions

Cross a request to form a prediction or reason before seeing an answer with waiting time as a separate factor.

Controls or comparison

Include a condition with neither request nor delay; keep materials, total time budget and feedback consistent. Pilot delay levels.

What we would vary

Manipulate active answer construction and delay separately; do not combine them into one friction score.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: unassisted transfer after one week. Time, satisfaction and withdrawal are secondary but matter to decisions.

How we would measure

Combine delayed tests with usage logs; report missing outcomes among those who withdraw.

Other influences to track

Track prior knowledge, motivation, difficulty, reason for waiting and platform experience.

Planned analysis

Preselect main effects and their interaction. Do not assume an inverted-U relationship; explore its shape only if sufficient levels are available.

Prediction, not a finding

Constructing an answer may help in some conditions, whereas waiting may not provide the same benefit.

What would weaken or narrow it

Excluding meaningful learning gains, or costs cancelling benefits, would narrow the proposal. Report monotonic effects too; do not declare moderate difficulty best by default.

Sample-planning rationale

Plan for the active-prompt-by-delay interaction, attrition and the smallest meaningful transfer difference.

Sources informing the design

38 35

proposal Do heart and reason framings affect selected decision tasks differently?

Status

Research proposal; not conducted or preregistered. Sample-size calculation, materials piloting and a complete analysis protocol have not yet been completed.

Target hypotheses and the scope of each link

H2: Concerns linguistic framing, not the essence of reason, the ontology of layers or neuroanatomy.
H3: Concerns linguistic framing, not the essence of reason, the ontology of layers or neuroanatomy.

Proposed participants

Recruit adults with adequate proficiency within each language group. Culture is not directly randomised.

Conditions

Within language groups randomly assign heart, reason and neutral instructions; pilot equivalence of their content.

Controls or comparison

Include neutral instructions and match associations, length and evaluative tone. Do not insert sacred quotations as experimental material.

What we would vary

Randomise framing; comparisons across cultures or languages remain descriptive.

Primary and secondary outcomes

Primary: decision patterns in a preselected risk task. Moral-judgement consistency belongs to a separate exploratory analysis or study.

How we would measure

Record choices and time for the same options. Consistency is not defined as the truth of a moral position.

Other influences to track

Track proficiency, framing familiarity, prior attitudes, task interpretation and expectancy effects.

Planned analysis

Estimate framing differences within language groups; assess measurement equivalence before comparing groups.

Prediction, not a finding

Framing may alter selected decisions without the same direction in every culture.

What would weaken or narrow it

After establishing that instructions were understood, excluding the target difference would narrow the expectation. Such an effect would not determine reason’s essence or the heart’s anatomical role.

Sample-planning rationale

Justify sensitivity to framing and language-group interactions. Small cultural subgroups cannot support sweeping generalisations.

Sources informing the design

14 75 77

A link does not mean an experiment tests the entire hypothesis. Translation choices cannot directly settle whether explanatory layers are different kinds of being. Better prediction by a nine-stage model cannot establish that all thinking follows that sequence. The scope of the connection therefore belongs in the record itself.

What does an update date mean?

We keep six topics: performance, learning, critical thinking, bias, agency and consciousness. Adding a new title is only the start. We need to ask whether it changes an earlier claim, whether it measures the same thing, and which version we have actually consulted.

Topic	Current distinction	Works and recorded dates	Open questions	Text editing and source reading	Earlier review suggestion
Performance	Compare against humans alone and the best single component separately. Software-task success is not general agency in life.	Vaccaro 2024; task-horizon records and the May 2026 institutional report; Wang’s 22 May 2026 preprint. Earlier limited source readings remain the provenance, not new checks. 120 83 205 213 Linked studies: ev-vaccaro, ev-metr, ev-wang26	New tasks, cost, retries and independent evaluation. Keep horizon versions and baselines separate.	Text editing: 2026-10-10. Source reading: earlier limited readings, recorded per source; no source was reverified in this English edition. Earlier check report: Previously displayed as 23 September 2026; not renewed as a general source audit.	23 March 2027 was a proposed review date, not an installed monitoring automation. No scheduled monitoring has been installed.
Learning	Assisted practice and a later unassisted task measure different things. Tutor design differs from simple model access.	Bastani 2025; Kestin, 3 June 2025; Zhao, May 2026. Keep Kestin’s two analyses distinct, and identify Zhao’s combined tutor and knowledge graph. 56 84 206 Linked studies: ev-bastani, ev-kestin, ev-zhao26	Unassisted transfer after a month or longer, varied settings, matched time and participant losses.	Text editing: 2026-10-10. Source reading: earlier limited readings, recorded per source; no source was reverified in this English edition. Earlier check report: Previously displayed as 23 September 2026; not renewed as a general source audit.	23 March 2027 was a proposed review date, not an installed monitoring automation. No scheduled monitoring has been installed.
Critical thinking	Reported effort differs from assessed quality of reasons. Panels, surveys and task comparisons address different questions.	Lee 2025; Xin 2026; Jain, 30 June 2026; Zhu, 16 July 2026. Jain’s assignment and result passages and Xin’s full methods remain open. 9 86 207 208 Linked studies: ev-lee, ev-xin, ev-jain26, ev-zhu26	Direct assessment of reasons, new tasks and longer follow-up; separate job requirements from tool effects.	Text editing: 2026-10-10. Source reading: earlier limited readings, recorded per source; no source was reverified in this English edition. Earlier check report: Previously displayed as 23 September 2026; not renewed as a general source audit.	23 March 2027 was a proposed review date, not an installed monitoring automation. No scheduled monitoring has been installed.
Bias	Exposure to biased advice differs from believing a source is human or artificial. Harm from misleading explanation need not mirror benefit from correct explanation.	Glickman and Sharot; Teng; Mehta’s 28 April 2026 preprint; Ballot, 17 August 2026. Both Ballot conversation arms used a model. 87 16 218 212 Linked studies: ev-glickman, ev-teng, ev-mehta26, ev-ballot26	Task and cultural variation, persistence, selection arising from source labels and the cost of rejecting correct advice.	Text editing: 2026-10-10. Source reading: earlier limited readings, recorded per source; no source was reverified in this English edition. Earlier check report: Previously displayed as 23 September 2026; not renewed as a general source audit.	23 March 2027 was a proposed review date, not an installed monitoring automation. No scheduled monitoring has been installed.
Agency	Completing steps, having purposes of one’s own and bearing responsibility are different questions. The institutional horizon concerns specified software evaluations.	Task-horizon records; Clark–Chalmers as conceptual comparison; report of 19 May 2026, covering February–March. Evaluation period and publication date differ. 83 4 213 Linked studies: ev-metr, ev-metr26	Accumulating errors, supervision, reversibility, real task distributions and distinct user and institutional roles.	Text editing: 2026-10-10. Source reading: earlier limited readings, recorded per source; no source was reverified in this English edition. Earlier check report: Previously displayed as 23 September 2026; not renewed as a general source audit.	23 March 2027 was a proposed review date, not an installed monitoring automation. No scheduled monitoring has been installed.
Consciousness	Track separately what would support successful behaviour, internal organisation and experience. Progress on one criterion does not close the others.	Dehaene, Lau and Kouider 2017; Seth–Bayne 2022; joint test 2025; Comsa’s 7 May 2026 preprint; Salvi–Wolfson’s 28 August archive version and stated conference publication. Peer review remains separately open. 42 62 7 214 215 Linked studies: ev-dehaene, ev-sethbayne, ev-cogitate, ev-comsa26, ev-salvi26	Discriminating predictions, independent comparisons, reasons for moving from hardware traces to experience, corrections and version records.	Text editing: 2026-10-10. Source reading: earlier limited readings, recorded per source; no source was reverified in this English edition. Earlier check report: Previously displayed as 23 September 2026; not renewed as a general source audit.	23 March 2027 was a proposed review date, not an installed monitoring automation. No scheduled monitoring has been installed.

The 10 October editing date is not a fresh audit of every source. The earlier 23 September report and the proposed 23 March 2027 review remain historical entries. This English revision includes no new publication search.

Today’s editing must not silently become today’s source reading. Comsa’s recorded archive date is 7 May; Salvi’s archive version and stated conference publication remain distinct. A suggested review date is also only a suggestion: no scheduled monitoring has been installed. Keeping these dates separate tells us what work has and has not happened.

What does an arrow tell us?

A graph places records at nodes and draws relationships between them. Sharing a root, serving as a translation, supporting an argument through an example and raising an objection are different relationships. Their lines should not make them look like the same kind of evidence.

The records therefore name the relationship and explain its reason. Translation, shared roots, similar images, passage comparisons, objections and working proposals remain separate. A visible arrow is neither documentation by itself nor a completed test. Older low, medium and high uncertainty labels stay in the archive rather than appearing as newly measured probabilities.

Find a record 50 of 50 records

calque and semantic change 1 relationship

Syneidēsis — Consciousness: Syneidēsis and conscientia raise questions of historical transmission and semantic change. Conscience, awareness and modern consciousness require distinct textual witnesses. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52 50

comparison with another passage 1 relationship

Lev — Dianoia: Deuteronomy 6:5 and Mark 12:30 are different passages. Juxtaposition is not proof of a translation equivalence; original text and translation version must be tracked separately. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 81 80

conceptual association 1 relationship

Reason (akıl) — Self-control: The binding image in ʿaql evokes self-control; this is not experimental support. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 14

conceptual reference 1 relationship

Embodied cognition — Enactivism: Merleau-Ponty is a reference point for some embodied cognition research, not its sole origin or support for all its results. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 58 71

conceptual transformation 1 relationship

Active intellect — Active intellect: Al-Fārābī’s active intellect develops from interpretations of Aristotle into a cosmological intellect; the concepts are not identical. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 53

example of 1 relationship

Writing — External memory: Plato’s discussion witnesses a relation between records and remembering; it did not measure all experimental effects of external memory. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 29

inversely associated 1 relationship

Automation overreliance — Critical thinking: Lee and colleagues’ survey associated greater trust with less reported critical effort; it did not establish causality. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 9

may affect 2 relationships

Cognitive offloading — Learning: In Bastani’s field experiment, use of an unguarded tool was associated with a disadvantage in the unaided examination. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 56
Literacy — Thought: Ong and Havelock argue that literacy changes habits of thought; the scope is disputed. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 46 47

may amplify 1 relationship

Feedback loop — Bias: In Glickman and Sharot’s experiments, biased artificial feedback amplified human bias. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 87

misleading equivalent 3 relationships

Reason (akıl) — Intelligence: Akıl and zekâ overlap in some uses; the distinction depends on context. We do not define one everywhere as calculation and the other everywhere as control. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 14
Mind — Consciousness: Some accounts use mind for both conscious and nonconscious functions. In those accounts it is not equivalent to consciousness; the framework must be stated. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 62
Consciousness — Syneidēsis: The role of syneidēsis in a particular passage differs from modern uses of consciousness. One Turkish equivalent cannot carry every historical sense. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52

objects to 4 relationships

Chinese Room — Turing test: The Chinese Room challenges the claim that behavioural success alone guarantees understanding. The arrow does not refute Turing’s entire discussion. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 18
Stochastic parrot — Large language model: Bender and colleagues discuss language models through data, meaning and conditions of use. The parrot metaphor is neither the whole argument nor a single verdict on every system. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 41
The hard problem — Functionalism: Chalmers argues that functional explanation does not explain experience. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 12
Eliminative materialism — The hard problem: Eliminativism and illusionism are not identical. Objections to the formulation of the hard problem must be distinguished by author and work. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 19 64

partly dissociates 1 relationship

Language — Thought: Research investigates dissociations between language networks and some thinking tasks. It does not establish that language contributes nothing to thought or that all tasks dissociate alike. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 1

proposal in this work 1 relationship

Responsibility — Epistemic orchestration: We propose making the roles of justification and checking explicit. Responsibility is not reduced to the user alone; designers, providers and institutions also matter. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 9

proposes an explanation 3 relationships

Predictive processing — Perception: Predictive processing models perception through prediction and error; it has not been established as the sole valid mechanism. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 6
Global neuronal workspace — Access consciousness: Global neuronal workspace theory offers an account of access. The joint test evaluates selected predictions, not the whole theory in one final verdict. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 7
Integrated information theory — Phenomenal consciousness: Integrated information theory relates experience to intrinsic causal structure. The tested version and prediction must be specified. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 7

shared origin 3 relationships

Nefesh — Nafs: Hebrew nefesh and Arabic nafs share a Semitic root. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 75 14
Ruaḥ — Rūḥ: Hebrew ruaḥ and Arabic rūḥ share a Semitic root. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 75 14
Ḥokhmah — Ḥikma: Hebrew ḥokhmah and Arabic ḥikma share a Semitic root. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 75 14

shared root 5 relationships

Baṣīra — Vision: Baṣar and baṣīra share an Arabic root. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 14
Taʿaqqul — Reason (akıl): The terms share the root ʿ-q-l. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 55
Tafakkur — Idea (fikir): The terms share the root f-k-r. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 14
Metanoia — Nous: Metanoia is formed with noein. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52
Phroneō — Practical wisdom: The terms belong to the phrēn family. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52

similar distinction 1 relationship

Conception and assent — Concept: The apprehension–assent and concept–judgement distinctions are similar, not identical. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 61

similar image 3 relationships

Pneuma — Soul and life: The connection between breath and spirit can be compared across languages. A similar image is not a shared linguistic origin. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52 14
Thinking (activity) — Vision: Images of seeing, such as naẓar and baṣīra, are used to name thinking. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 14
Nuhā — Reason (akıl): Nuhā and ḥijr also carry an image of restraint. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 54

similar use 3 relationships

Lev — Qalb (heart in apprehension): Heart vocabulary accompanies apprehension in some passages. This does not show that both traditions share the same account of the person or that every use is synonymous. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 75 14
Remembrance — Gedanc: We propose a comparison between Heidegger’s Gedanc and tezekkür through remembrance. This is not a claim of transmission or common origin. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 8
Sensibility — Perception: Sensibility concerns the capacity to receive what is given, rather than perception as such. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 49

supported through an example 1 relationship

Extended mind — External memory: Otto’s notebook is a thought example supporting a claim about the bounds of mind, not a completed experiment or sufficient verification of the claim. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 4

translation equivalent 12 relationships

Reason (akıl) — Nous: Arabic philosophical translations used ʿaql for nous. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 53
Nous — Intellectus: Latin translations render nous as intellectus. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 51
Active intellect — Intellectus agens: Twelfth-century Latin translations supply the connection. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 53
Passive intellect — Potential intellect: Accounts of material and potential intellect develop through interpretations of pathētikos nous. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 53
Passive intellect — Intellectus possibilis: The connection comes through Latin translations of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 53
Lev — Kardia: The Septuagint commonly translates lev as kardia. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 77
Ruaḥ — Pneuma: The Septuagint commonly translates ruaḥ as pneuma. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52
Psychē — Nefesh: The Septuagint commonly translates nefesh as psychē. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 52
Tadhakkur — Remembrance: Turkish renders tezekkür through anma and hatırlama, remembrance and recollection. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 69
Understanding — Understanding (faculty): A Turkish rendering of Verstand must be located in its Kant translation. Using akıl does not remove the distinction from Vernunft. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 49
Reason in Kant — Reason (principle): The rendering of Vernunft must be tracked in the chosen edition. Where both terms receive the same Turkish word, the German terms should also be shown. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 49
Ḥikma — Wisdom: Wisdom and ḥikma can be compared in some contexts. The sense in a particular passage is not coextensive with later philosophical uses. Scope: The source support was not reassessed in this translation round. 14

Reading Deuteronomy alongside Mark is a passage comparison, not automatically a direct translation match. Otto’s notebook is a thought example, not an experimental result. A resemblance between Heideggerian recollection and tezekkür does not demonstrate historical transmission. The distinction needs to sit beside the link, where it affects our reading.

Depth What can a record system leave unresolved?

Every field could be filled and every link could work, yet we could still have misread the source. Opening a link, gaining access to a text and establishing support for a claim are separate checks. The verification record needs to say which one was done.

An honest scope note tells us what remains missing. Where a relationship has not been reassessed, an old confidence label cannot stand in for a new check. We retain the history without asking the reader to mistake it for current evidence.

An objection arrow also cannot decide the outcome by itself. The absence of a “refutes” relationship in this inventory does not mean no claim can be refuted. We can record a finding that weakens a specified claim under specified conditions; disposing of an entire thinker or theory would be a much broader conclusion.

The value of a larger inventory lies in tracing consequences, not accumulating entries. A correction to a study may affect an argument, a hypothesis and an update topic. Following those routes brings us to Appendix A: what kind of structure helps us notice such changes, and where might that structure begin to mislead us? The remaining source work travels with the records rather than disappearing between versions.

Questions to take further

Follow a claim to its source. Which record field changes your first judgement, and what is still missing?
Separate an attributed passage from our interpretation. How does the thinker’s argument look when our sentence is removed?
Choose an arrow and give it a different relationship label. What would change, and which witness would you need to defend the original label?

17Method and the wider picture

Appendix A: what we borrow from enterprise architecture

Why we need this section

We correct a concept’s meaning, then discover that an argument, a comparison and a source note still rely on the earlier version. A good contents page helps us find each item, but it does not show which ones need to change together. That is where architectural thinking has helped us: moving between the whole and its details, keeping different questions distinct and tracing the effects of a change. Here we explain what we borrow and where the comparison should stop.

The diagram presents an organising analogy, not structural identity or compliance with a standard. The Atlas layers are not software containers; evidence records are not code. The five diagram rows and eight table rows offer different levels of detail. The views supply no direct criterion for subjective experience.

In brief

The layers give us different questions to ask of related material. If a reported result changes, we can find the hypothesis and argument connected to it. Architecture helps us organise that route. It does not establish that thinking happens inside our heads in matching boxes.

Looking more closely

Why place four domains beside four layers?

The Open Group’s enterprise-architecture framework distinguishes business, data, applications and technology. We drew on that separation when organising Life, Meaning, Processes and Body: an activity’s purpose need not be confused with what carries it, or the information used with the work performed. The comparison helps us ask those questions without making the two sets identical. 225

Body can be compared with technological infrastructure, but a living body is more than a passive carrier. Meaning includes concepts and source records without being exhausted by data formats. Processes need not all be designed applications. Life brings together purposes, institutions, values and experience; an organisation’s business target and a person’s lived experience are not one measure.

Name in the Atlas	Organising idea borrowed from architecture	What we examine more closely	Limit of the comparison
1 · Body	Technology as an analogy for enabling and realising conditions.	A view attending to bodily and neural findings.	An evidence record is not code.
2 · Meaning	Data as an analogy for organising concepts, witnesses and sources.	A closer view of concept and relationship records.	These are not defined as software components.
3 · Processes	Applications as an analogy for activities and their relationships.	A view of processes, arguments and tasks.	A cycle is not a container or software code.
4 · Life	Business as an analogy for purpose, practice, institutions and responsibility.	The thinking person, tools and surroundings.	Business targets and lived experience are not one measure.
Criteria, history and governance rows in the ten-storey view	Questions about criteria and checks, compared with architectural principles and governance.	Reasons, sources and role checks across views.	These rows are not forced into the four headings.
Time chart	Planning through a distinction between current, transitional and target states.	For Atlas versions: existing records, corrections and open work. For history: periods, trends and proposals.	A chosen target is not an assured future; a trend or recommendation is not an achieved state.
Subjective experience	The views used here supply no direct criterion.	Distinguish experience from its record and explanation.	A limit of these views, not a claim about all organisational life.
Kant’s transcendental question	No direct mapping for the question of what makes experience possible.	A question of justification discussed across layers.	Not fitting a box does not exclude it from inquiry.

The equal number of layers and domains is not evidence of identity or compliance. Body is not code, evidence is not code, and a concept card is not formally a software component. We make no certification claim. The diagram and the eight-row table also work at different levels of detail.

Criteria, history and governance can concern every layer: how a claim is judged, how a concept changes, and who checks a decision. We keep them visible as additional questions instead of forcing them into one domain. Equal numbers of headings do not make questions equivalent.

What do we gain by moving closer?

Simon Brown’s C4 model describes software through context, containers, components and code. A container here means a software unit such as a running application or data store, not any box on a diagram. Code describes implementation within that software. Applying those labels directly to thinking would change what they mean. 226

We borrow the reader’s movement from an overview to a particular record. We can start with a person and surroundings, examine relevant domains, open a process or concept, then reach a verse, experiment report or dictionary witness. That final record is not code. The resemblance concerns the question guiding our closer look, not the material being inspected.

The drawing needs to preserve that difference. Calling Body “code” or a concept card a “component” would suggest software organisation is the structure of thought. We instead place adapted reading views beside the organising idea that inspired them.

Current state, transition and proposal

In institutional change it helps to distinguish where we are, where we want to go and the work between them. For Atlas versions the questions are concrete: what was wrong in a record, what changed, and which check remains open? The AS IS / TO BE comparison keeps that history available.

Human intellectual history is not the same kind of project plan. A period’s findings differ from a forecast or a recommendation. In the Prospects column, a trend needs grounds, while a stance names a way of working we propose. Neither is an achieved target. Even an institution’s chosen target may change as conditions change.

Four limits of the analogy

First, experience. Drawing functions and relationships does not adequately explain what a person is living through. The architectural views used here provide no direct criterion for that experience. This does not imply that people in organisations lack feelings or that collective experience has been settled.

Second, Kant’s question about the conditions making experience possible. It is not simply a question about which component does which job. It can be discussed across the four layers; placing it under technology or applications would not answer it. 3

Third, sacred texts’ truth claims. We can record a word, passage, translation and claim. Recording a claim does not give the architecture authority to decide its truth. It helps us follow who makes the claim and what reasons are offered.

Fourth, separability. Work in an organisation can be allocated among teams, but our layers are not four independently operating departments. Body, memory, meaning and value may contribute at once to one person’s activity, which may also involve other people and tools. The distinctions help us investigate those relationships.

Depth A complete diagram need not be a complete explanation

Once every box has a name, it can feel as though nothing remains unexplained. Yet writing “consciousness” in a box with no criterion does not solve the consciousness problem. Nor does an arrow explain its own relationship. The usefulness of an arrangement and the adequacy of an explanation have to be judged separately.

Governance also involves both external checking and self-monitoring. Institutional rules, peer review and another person’s inspection do different work from noticing our own error and giving reasons for a decision. Neither always replaces the other. Feeling that we have thought carefully is no guarantee that the reasons withstand scrutiny.

That is why we specify who undertakes which work with artificial systems. User, designer, provider and institution have roles that cannot be reduced to one person’s ownership of reasons. An architectural view can make the allocation discussable without deciding every responsibility by itself.

We can investigate the value of the arrangement too. Does a changed record make affected claims easier to find? Can readers distinguish translation from interpretation? Does the map encourage a false identity? Answers would tell us whether this Atlas works better as a guide, not prove that thinking itself follows its architecture. That is the distinction we need to carry into the account of what we have preserved and changed.

Questions to take further

Choose a mapping in the table. Which question does it help you ask, and which detail does it obscure?
If a study record changed, how would you trace its effects through the Atlas? Which missing link would make that difficult?
Borrow an organising method from your own work. Where does it help you think about thinking, and where does it begin to mislead?

Source identities and scope

Numbers follow the Turkish atlas bibliography. Each entry identifies a source cited by the Heidegger, four-layer and concept-tree sections; it is an inherited bibliographic record, normalised for English readers, not a statement that the source was newly read or that a claim has been verified. Access to a source, support for a claim and the strength of that support remain separate questions; the Turkish bibliography entry records what was and was not read.

20 Heidegger, Martin. 1959. Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Günther Neske. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
21 Harper, Douglas. 2001–. Online Etymology Dictionary.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27
22 Stout, Dietrich, Nicholas Toth, Kathy Schick and Thierry Chaminade. 2008. "Neural correlates of Early Stone Age toolmaking: technology, language and cognition in human evolution." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363 (1499): 1939–1949. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
Inherited scope statement. Limited check, 9 October 2026: in the methods and image-analysis part, the comparison of the three present experts with the six novices from the earlier experiment, and the fact that the groups came from separate studies, were checked. All data from the earlier 2007 experiment, all 2008 results and statistical robustness were not audited.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Stout, Dietrich, Nicholas Toth, Kathy Schick ve Thierry Chaminade. 2008. "Neural correlates of Early Stone Age toolmaking: technology, language and cognition in human evolution." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363 (1499): 1939–1949. DOI kaydı aynı eserin kanonik erişimidir; Emory PDF aynı makalenin tam metin erişimidir, ayrı bir çalışma değildir.
Sınırlı kontrol (9 Ekim 2026): yöntem, görüntü çözümleme kısmında mevcut üç uzman ile önceki deneyin altı acemisinin karşılaştırıldığı ve grupların ayrı çalışmalardan geldiği kontrol edildi. Önceki 2007 deneyin bütün verileri, 2008 sonuçlarının tamamı ve istatistiksel sağlamlık denetlenmedi.
23 Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. and Keith E. Stanovich. 2013. "Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate." Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3): 223–241. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
24 Palmer, John. 2025. "Parmenides." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 4 Mart 2025 güncellemesi. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
25 Vaswani, Ashish and others. 2017. "Attention Is All You Need." Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
26 Baddeley, Alan. 2012. "Working memory: theories, models, and controversies." Annual Review of Psychology 63: 1–29. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
27 Hebb, Donald O. 1949. The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory. New York: Wiley. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
28 Dehaene, Stanislas, Felipe Pegado, Lucia W. Braga, Paulo Ventura, Gilberto Nunes Filho, Antoinette Jobert, Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz, Régine Kolinsky, José Morais and Laurent Cohen. 2010. "How Learning to Read Changes the Cortical Networks for Vision and Language." Science 330 (6009): 1359–1364. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
29 Plato. Cratylus and Phaedrus (274c–277a). Translated by Harold N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926 and 1914. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19
Inherited scope statement. Alternative translation access (separate field): Benjamin Jowett’s English translation; the Theuth–Thamus passage and the passage on the text’s inability to answer questions were read on 9 October 2026. This translation does not verify an exact quotation from the Atlas’s current edition. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Platon. Kratylos ve Phaidros (274c–277a). Çeviren Harold N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926 ve 1914.
Alternatif çeviri erişimi (ayrı alan): Benjamin Jowett İngilizce çevirisi; Theuth–Thamus ve metnin soruya karşılık verememesi pasajları 9 Ekim 2026 tarihinde okundu. Bu çeviri, atlasın mevcut edisyonunun birebir alıntısını doğrulamaz.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
30 Sparrow, Betsy, Jenny Liu and Daniel M. Wegner. 2011. "Google Effects on Memory: Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at Our Fingertips." Science 333 (6043): 776–778. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
31 Aristotle. De Anima III.4–5 (429a–430a) and Metaphysics XII.7–9. Translated by W. S. Hett and Hugh Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22
32 Rosch, Eleanor. 1975. “Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 104 (3): 192–233; Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
33 Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
34 Camerer, Colin F. and others. 2018. "Evaluating the replicability of social science experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015." Nature Human Behaviour 2: 637–644. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
Inherited scope statement. The publisher’s full text could not be opened on 9 October 2026; the mapping to Sparrow’s experiment relies on the earlier limited check and is not closed as failure or verification of all experiments.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Camerer, Colin F. ve diğerleri. 2018. "Evaluating the replicability of social science experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015." Nature Human Behaviour 2: 637–644. Yayıncı tam metni 9 Ekim 2026 tarihinde açılamadı; Sparrow deney eşlemesi önceki kayıttaki sınırlı kontrole dayanıyor ve bütün deneylerin başarısızlığı veya doğrulanması biçiminde kapatılmıyor.
35 Sweller, John. 1988. "Cognitive Load During Problem Solving: Effects on Learning." Cognitive Science 12 (2): 257–285. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
36 Tomasello, Michael. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
37 Damasio, Antonio R. 1994. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
38 Bjork, Robert A. 1994. “Memory and Metamemory Considerations in the Training of Human Beings.” In Metacognition: Knowing about Knowing, edited by Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. Shimamura, 185–205. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
39 İbn Sînâ. Kitâbü'ş-Şifâ, et-Tabîʿiyyât, Kitâbü'n-Nefs.. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
Inherited scope statement. Additional reading record, 10 October 2026 (as reported in the audit notice): closed at passage level. Shifāʾ, Nafs I.1.7, the suspended human; quotation from the McGinnis–Reisman English translation. Not an exact check of Rahman’s 1959 Arabic edition. Page read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
İbn Sînâ. Kitâbü'ş-Şifâ, et-Tabîʿiyyât, Kitâbü'n-Nefs. Neşreden Fazlur Rahman: Avicenna's De Anima. Londra: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Ek okuma kaydı (10 Ekim 2026, denetim paketinin bildirimi): Belirli pasaj düzeyinde kapandı. Şifâ, Nefs I.1.7: askıda insan; McGinnis–Reisman İngilizce çeviri alıntısı. Rahman 1959 Arapça edisyonunun birebir denetimi değil. Okunan sayfa.
40 Hakîm et-Tirmizî. Beyânü’l-fark beyne’s-sadr ve’l-kalb ve’l-fuâd ve’l-lübb (Arabic title in Turkish transliteration). English translation: Nicholas Heer, “A Sūfī Psychological Treatise”, The Muslim World 51 (1961). Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13
Inherited scope statement. Additional reading record, 10 October 2026 (as reported in the audit notice): closed at passage level. Heer, The Stations of the Heart: the four stations in the translated primary text. Not the Arabic edition or all interpretations. Page read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Hakîm et-Tirmizî. Beyânü'l-fark beyne's-sadr ve'l-kalb ve'l-fuâd ve'l-lübb. Neşreden Nicholas Heer. Kahire, 1958. İngilizcesi: Heer, Nicholas, çeviren. 1961. "A Sūfī Psychological Treatise." The Muslim World 51.
Ek okuma kaydı (10 Ekim 2026, denetim paketinin bildirimi): Belirli pasaj düzeyinde kapandı. Heer, The Stations of the Heart, birincil metin çeviri bölümündeki dört makam. Arapça edisyon ve bütün yorumlar değil. Okunan sayfa.
41 Bender, Emily M., Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major and Shmargaret Shmitchell. 2021. "On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?" Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 610–623. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Bender, Emily M., Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major ve Shmargaret Shmitchell. 2021. "On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?" Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 610–623.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
42 Dehaene, Stanislas, Hakwan Lau and Sid Kouider. 2017. "What is consciousness, and could machines have it?" Science 358 (6362): 486–492. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Dehaene, Stanislas, Hakwan Lau ve Sid Kouider. 2017. "What is consciousness, and could machines have it?" Science 358 (6362): 486–492.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
43 Descartes, René. 1641. Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. Paris: Michel Soly. Meditatio II. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14
44 Clauson, Gerard. 1972. An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27
45 Ayverdi, İlhan. 2005–. Misalli Büyük Türkçe Sözlük. İstanbul: Kubbealtı Neşriyatı. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43 ↩44 ↩45 ↩46 ↩47 ↩48 ↩49 ↩50 ↩51 ↩52 ↩53 ↩54 ↩55 ↩56 ↩57
46 Ong, Walter J. 1982. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
47 Havelock, Eric A. 1963. Preface to Plato. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
48 Duden. Das Herkunftswörterbuch: Etymologie der deutschen Sprache. Berlin: Dudenverlag. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22
49 Williams, Garrath. 2023. "Kant's Account of Reason." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23
50 Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales. Trésor de la langue française informatisé, etimoloji bölümleri. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20
51 Lewis, Charlton T. and Charles Short. 1879. A Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43 ↩44 ↩45 ↩46 ↩47 ↩48 ↩49 ↩50 ↩51 ↩52 ↩53 ↩54 ↩55 ↩56 ↩57 ↩58 ↩59 ↩60 ↩61 ↩62 ↩63 ↩64 ↩65 ↩66 ↩67 ↩68
52 Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott and Henry Stuart Jones. 1940. A Greek–English Lexicon. Dokuzuncu basım. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43 ↩44 ↩45 ↩46 ↩47 ↩48 ↩49 ↩50 ↩51 ↩52 ↩53 ↩54 ↩55 ↩56 ↩57 ↩58 ↩59 ↩60 ↩61 ↩62 ↩63 ↩64 ↩65 ↩66 ↩67 ↩68 ↩69 ↩70 ↩71 ↩72 ↩73 ↩74 ↩75 ↩76 ↩77 ↩78 ↩79 ↩80 ↩81 ↩82 ↩83 ↩84 ↩85 ↩86 ↩87 ↩88 ↩89 ↩90 ↩91 ↩92 ↩93 ↩94 ↩95 ↩96 ↩97 ↩98 ↩99 ↩100 ↩101 ↩102 ↩103 ↩104 ↩105 ↩106 ↩107 ↩108 ↩109 ↩110 ↩111 ↩112 ↩113 ↩114 ↩115 ↩116 ↩117 ↩118 ↩119 ↩120 ↩121 ↩122 ↩123 ↩124 ↩125 ↩126 ↩127 ↩128 ↩129 ↩130 ↩131 ↩132 ↩133
53 Davidson, Herbert A. 1992. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. New York: Oxford University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43
54 Bolay, Süleyman Hayri. 1989. "Akıl." Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17
55 Dukes, Kais. 2009–. The Quranic Arabic Corpus. University of Leeds. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26
56 Bastani, Hamsa, Osbert Bastani, Alp Sungu, Haosen Ge, Özge Kabakcı and Rei Mariman. 2025. "Generative AI without guardrails can harm learning: Evidence from high school mathematics." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122 (26): e2422633122. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Bastani, Hamsa, Osbert Bastani, Alp Sungu, Haosen Ge, Özge Kabakcı ve Rei Mariman. 2025. "Generative AI without guardrails can harm learning: Evidence from high school mathematics." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122 (26): e2422633122. Düzeltme: PNAS 122 (34): e2518204122.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
57 Newell, Allen and Herbert A. Simon. 1972. Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
58 Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17
59 Turing, Alan M. 1950. "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." Mind 59 (236): 433–460. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions. Additional reading record, 10 October 2026 (as reported in the audit notice): closed at passage level. First part of the 1950 paper: the imitation game and the reformulation of the question; not all objections. Page read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Turing, Alan M. 1950. "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." Mind 59 (236): 433–460.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
Ek okuma kaydı (10 Ekim 2026, denetim paketinin bildirimi): Belirli pasaj düzeyinde kapandı. 1950 makalesinin birinci bölümü: taklit oyunu ve sorunun yeniden kurulması; bütün itirazlar değil. Okunan sayfa.
60 Husserl, Edmund. 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
61 Kaukua, Jari. 2020. "Arabic and Islamic Psychology and Philosophy of Mind." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27
62 Seth, Anil K. and Tim Bayne. 2022. "Theories of consciousness." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 23: 439–452. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
63 Mashour, George A., Pieter Roelfsema, Jean-Pierre Changeux and Stanislas Dehaene. 2020. "Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis." Neuron 105 (5): 776–798. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
64 Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
65 Coseru, Christian. 2017. "Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
66 Ramón y Cajal, Santiago. 1909–1911. Histologie du système nerveux de l'homme et des vertébrés. Paris: Maloine. Also Sherrington, Charles S. 1906. The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. New Haven: Yale University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13
67 James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
68 Carr, Nicholas. 2010. The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains. New York: W. W. Norton. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
69 Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. "Düşünme", "Zihin", "Ruh", "Basîret", "Tefekkür" maddeleri. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33
70 Donald, Merlin. 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
71 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
72 Bender, Emily M. and Alexander Koller. 2020. "Climbing towards NLU: On Meaning, Form, and Understanding in the Age of Data." Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 5185–5198. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: only the form-only condition in the publisher’s abstract was read. Open: the whole argument and its application to current multimodal systems were not examined in that round. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Bender, Emily M. ve Alexander Koller. 2020. "Climbing towards NLU: On Meaning, Form, and Understanding in the Age of Data." Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 5185–5198.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Yayıncı özetindeki yalnız biçim koşulu okundu. Açık: Bütün argüman ve güncel çok kipli sistemlere uygulanması bu tur denetlenmedi. Erişilen adres.
73 Phillips, Stephen. 2019. "Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
74 Stout, Dietrich and Thierry Chaminade. 2012. "Stone tools, language and the brain in human evolution." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367 (1585): 75–87. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
75 Brown, Francis, Samuel Rolles Driver and Charles Augustus Briggs. 1906. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43 ↩44 ↩45
76 Lorenz, Hendrik. 2009. "Ancient Theories of Soul." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
77 Behm, Johannes. 1965–1967. “καρδία” and “νοῦς”. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vols 3 and 4. Edited by Gerhard Kittel; translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18
78 Bereke, Abdülfettâh Abdullah. 1997. "Hakîm et-Tirmizî." Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
79 Plotinus. Enneads V.1 and V.9. Translated by A. H. Armstrong. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966–1988. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
Inherited scope statement. Additional reading record, 10 October 2026 (as reported in the audit notice): closed at passage level. Fifth Ennead, first treatise, 3–4: the distinction between soul and intellectual principle. MacKenna–Page translation; not an exact check of the Armstrong edition named in the bibliography. Page read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Plotinos. Enneades V.1 ve V.9. Çeviren A. H. Armstrong. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966–1988.
Ek okuma kaydı (10 Ekim 2026, denetim paketinin bildirimi): Belirli pasaj düzeyinde kapandı. Beşinci Ennead, birinci inceleme 3–4: ruh ile akılsal ilke ayrımı. MacKenna–Page çevirisi; kaynakçadaki Armstrong edisyonunun birebir denetimi değil. Okunan sayfa.
80 Jewish Publication Society. 1985. Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures. The New JPS Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28
81 Nestle, Eberhard, Erwin Nestle, Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland and others, yayına hazırlayanlar. 2012. Novum Testamentum Graece. Yirmi sekizinci gözden geçirilmiş basım. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26
82 Kutsal Kitap: Eski ve Yeni Antlaşma (Tevrat, Zebur, İncil). Yeni Çeviri (Turkish Bible translation). İstanbul: Kitabı Mukaddes Şirketi and Yeni Yaşam Yayınları. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30
83 METR (Model Evaluation and Threat Research). 2026. "Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models." Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
METR (Model Evaluation and Threat Research). 2026. "Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models." Çevrimiçi değerlendirme sayfası, son güncelleme 8 Mayıs 2026. Hakemli makale değildir.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
84 Kestin, Greg, Kelly Miller, Anna Klales, Timothy Milbourne and Gregorio Ponti. 2025. "AI tutoring outperforms in-class active learning: an RCT introducing a novel research-based design in an authentic educational setting." Scientific Reports 15: 17458. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: partial; the relevant part of the original PDF on sample and outcome estimates was read; 0.63 and 0.73–1.3 are different analyses. Open: all supplements and long-term outcomes. The original PDF is full-text access to the same work: PDF.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Kestin, Greg, Kelly Miller, Anna Klales, Timothy Milbourne ve Gregorio Ponti. 2025. "AI tutoring outperforms in-class active learning: an RCT introducing a novel research-based design in an authentic educational setting." Scientific Reports 15: 17458.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Kısmi: özgün PDF'de örneklem ve sonuç kestirimlerinin ilgili kısmı okundu; 0,63 ile 0,73–1,3 farklı analizlerdir. Açık: Bütün ekler ve uzun dönem sonuç yok. Özgün PDF aynı eserin tam metin erişimidir: PDF.
85 De Neys, Wim and Tamara Glumicic. 2008. "Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking." Cognition 106 (3): 1248–1299. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
86 Xin, Y., D. Yan, L. Shuren, L. Minyang and L. Liuheng. 2026. "AI literacy mediates AI assisted diagnosis participation and critical thinking among medical students under supervision." npj Digital Medicine 9: 344. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Xin, Y., D. Yan, L. Shuren, L. Minyang ve L. Liuheng (PubMed dizinindeki ad sırasıyla). 2026. "AI literacy mediates AI assisted diagnosis participation and critical thinking among medical students under supervision." npj Digital Medicine 9: 344.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
87 Glickman, Moshe and Tali Sharot. 2025. "How human–AI feedback loops alter human perceptual, emotional and social judgements." Nature Human Behaviour 9: 345–359. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Glickman, Moshe ve Tali Sharot. 2025 (çevrimiçi yayın 2024). "How human–AI feedback loops alter human perceptual, emotional and social judgements." Nature Human Behaviour 9: 345–359.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
88 Albantakis, Larissa and others. 2023. "Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms." PLOS Computational Biology 19 (10): e1011465. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
89 Benveniste, Émile. 1966. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
90 Harmand, Sonia and others. 2015. "3.3-million-year-old stone tools from Lomekwi 3, West Turkana, Kenya." Nature 521: 310–315. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
91 Henshilwood, Christopher S., Francesco d'Errico and Ian Watts. 2009. "Engraved ochres from the Middle Stone Age levels at Blombos Cave, South Africa." Journal of Human Evolution 57 (1): 27–47. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
92 Kind, Claus-Joachim, Nicole Ebinger-Rist, Sibylle Wolf, Thomas Beutelspacher and Kurt Wehrberger. 2014. "The Smile of the Lion Man." Quartär 61: 129–145. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
93 Mithen, Steven. 1996. The Prehistory of the Mind. London: Thames and Hudson. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
94 Tattersall, Ian. 2012. Masters of the Planet. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
95 Adams, Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa. 2001. "The Bounds of Cognition." Philosophical Psychology 14 (1): 43–64. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
96 Naccache, Lionel, Claire Sergent, Stanislas Dehaene, Xiao-Jing Wang, Michele Farisco and Jean-Pierre Changeux. 2025. "GNW theoretical framework and the adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness." Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025 (1): niaf037. DOI 10.1093/nc/niaf037. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
Inherited scope statement. The original publisher text was opened. The 2026 correction (10.1093/nc/niag020) corrects the fourth author’s name to Xiao-Jing Wang and covers the author list and the author-contributions field. The correction text was read on 10 October 2026.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Naccache, Lionel, Claire Sergent, Stanislas Dehaene, Xiao-Jing Wang, Michele Farisco ve Jean-Pierre Changeux. 2025. "GNW theoretical framework and the adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness." Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025 (1): niaf037. DOI 10.1093/nc/niaf037. Özgün yayıncı metni açıldı. 2026 düzeltmesi (10.1093/nc/niag020), dördüncü yazarın adını Xiao-Jing Wang olarak düzeltir; yazar listesi ve yazar katkıları alanını kapsar. Düzeltme metni 10 Ekim 2026 tarihinde okundu.
97 Damasio, Antonio R. 1996. "The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B 351 (1346): 1413–1420. DOI 10.1098/rstb.1996.0125. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
98 Griffel, Frank. "Al-Ghazali." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
99 Augustine. Confessions VI.3 and X–XI. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
100 Van Norden, Bryan. 2019. “Chinese Philosophy of Mind.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
101 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 1; q. 79, a. 8; q. 84, a. 6. Latin–English: Blackfriars edition, 1964–1981. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
102 Putnam, Hilary. 1975. "The nature of mental states." In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, 429–440. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First published as "Psychological Predicates", 1967. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
103 Putnam, Hilary. 1975. "The meaning of meaning." In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, 215–271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
104 Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
105 Fodor, Jerry A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
106 Jaspers, Karl. 1949. Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Zurich: Artemis. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
107 Halîl bin Ahmed el-Ferâhîdî. Kitâbü’l-Ayn. Edited by Mehdî el-Mahzûmî and İbrâhim es-Sâmerrâî, 1980–1985. 8 vols. Baghdad: Dâru’r-Reşîd. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
108 İbn Fâris. Mu'cemü Mekâyîsi'l-Luga. Abdüsselâm Muhammed Hârûn, ed. 1979. Beyrut: Dâru'l-Fikr. Also İbn Cinnî. el-Hasâis. Muhammed Ali en-Neccâr, ed. 1952–1956. Kahire. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
109 Kelley, Kathryn, Mattia Cartolano and Silvia Ferrara. 2025. "Inventing Writing in South-west Asia." The Ancient Near East Today 13 (1), 9 January 2025. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
110 Ch'on, Hye-bong. 2018. "200 years before Gutenberg: The master printers of Koryo." United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
111 Boyle, Robert. 1660. New Experiments Physico-Mechanicall, Touching the Spring of the Air, and its Effects. Oxford: Thomas Robinson. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
112 Turing, Alan M. 1936. "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem." Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 2 (42): 230–265. Published in the 1936–1937 volume; Crossref records 1937 as the publication year. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
113 UNESCO World Heritage Centre. 2018. "Göbekli Tepe." World Heritage List, record 1572. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
114 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1807. Phänomenologie des Geistes, preface. Turkish translation by Aziz Yardımlı (1986): Tinin Görüngübilimi. İstanbul: İdea Yayınevi. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
115 Darwin, Charles. 1872. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. London: John Murray. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
116 Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1887. Zur Genealogie der Moral, preface and third essay, § 12. Turkish translation by Ahmet İnam (2001): Ahlakın Soykütüğü Üstüne. İstanbul: Say Yayınları. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
117 Shannon, Claude E. 1948. "A Mathematical Theory of Communication." Bell System Technical Journal 27: 379–423, 623–656; Wiener, Norbert. 1948. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge: MIT Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
118 Miller, George A. 1956. "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information." Psychological Review 63 (2): 81–97. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
119 Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton; and 1959. “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior.” Language 35 (1): 26–58. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
120 Vaccaro, Michelle, Abdullah Almaatouq and Thomas Malone. 2024. "When combinations of humans and AI are useful: A systematic review and meta-analysis." Nature Human Behaviour. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: partial; comparison definitions, the overall result and task subgroups were read. Open: supplementary analyses and all data were not reproduced. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Vaccaro, Michelle, Abdullah Almaatouq ve Thomas Malone. 2024. "When combinations of humans and AI are useful: A systematic review and meta-analysis." Nature Human Behaviour 8: 2293–2303.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Kısmi: karşılaştırma tanımları, genel sonuç ve görev alt grupları okundu. Açık: Ek analizler ve bütün veri yeniden üretilmedi. Erişilen adres.
121 Rumelhart, David E., James L. McClelland and PDP Research Group. 1986. Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
122 Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz. 1952. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edition, chapter 24 (Alcmaeon), especially A5 and A10. Berlin: Weidmann. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
123 Hippokrates. Kutsal Hastalık Üzerine (Peri hierēs nousou). Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
124 Galenos. De usu partium. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
125 Diels, Hermann and Walther Kranz. 1952. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6. basım. Berlin: Weidmann. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
126 Pāṇini. Aṣṭādhyāyī. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
127 Long, Anthony A., and David N. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, sections 33 and 39–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
128 Platon. Sokrates'in Savunması (Apologia) 38a. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
129 Cicero. De oratore II.86–88; Quintilianus. Institutio oratoria XI.2. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
130 Epictetus. Encheiridion 1 and 5. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
131 Sîbeveyhi. el-Kitâb. Abdüsselâm Muhammed Hârûn, ed. 1988. Kahire: Mektebetü'l-Hâncî. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
132 Ebû Bekir er-Râzî. Kitâbü'ş-Şükûk alâ Câlînûs. Mehdî Muhakkık, ed. 1993. Tahran: Enstitü-yi Mütâlaât-ı İslâmî. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
133 Fârâbî. Kitâbü'l-Hurûf. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
134 İbnü'l-Heysem. Kitâbü'l-Menâzır, I–III. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
135 Bîrûnî. Tahkîku mâ li'l-Hind. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
136 Kâşgarlı Mahmud. Dîvânu Lugâti’t-Türk. Edited by Ahmet B. Ercilasun and Ziyat Akkoyunlu, 2014. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
137 İbn Rüşd. Faslü'l-Makâl. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
138 Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî. Mesnevî. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
139 Yunus Emre. Dîvân. Mustafa Tatcı, ed. 2008. Yûnus Emre Dîvânı: Tenkitli Metin. İstanbul: H Yayınları. "İlim ilim bilmektir" şiiri. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
140 İbnü’n-Nefîs. Şerhu Teşrîhi’l-Kânûn. Edited by Selmân Katâye and Paul Ghalioungui, 1988. Cairo: el-Hey’etü’l-Mısriyye. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
141 William Ockham. Summa Logicae I, chapters 1–3 and 12. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown, 1974. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
142 İbn Haldun. Mukaddime, sixth chapter (the sciences and teaching). Turkish translation by Süleyman Uludağ (2007). İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
143 Montaigne, Michel de. 1580–1588. Essais.12. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
144 Galilei, Galileo. 1623. Il Saggiatore. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
145 Bacon, Francis. 1620. Novum Organum. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
146 Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. 5. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
147 Pascal, Blaise. 1670. Pensées. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
148 Spinoza, Benedictus de. 1677. Ethica, part II, proposition 13, and part III, preface. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
149 Locke, John. 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book II, chapter 1, and book III, chapter 2. Edited by Peter H. Nidditch, 1975. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
150 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1684. "Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis." Acta Eruditorum, Kasım 1684; and 1666. Dissertatio de arte combinatoria. Leipzig. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
151 Newton, Isaac. 1687. Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. London: Royal Society. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
152 Vico, Giambattista. 1725/1744. Scienza Nuova. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
153 Hume, David. 1739–1740. A Treatise of Human Nature, book I, section 1.4, and book II, section 3.3. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 1978. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
154 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. Émile ou de l'éducation. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
155 Smith, Adam. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, part III; and 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, book V, chapter 1. Glasgow edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
156 Bayes, Thomas. 1763. "An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances." Philosophical Transactions 53: 370–418; Laplace, Pierre-Simon. 1814. Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. Paris: Courcier. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
157 Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 1836. Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts. Berlin: Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
158 Bopp, Franz. 1816. Über das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache. Frankfurt: Andreäische Buchhandlung; Grimm, Jacob. 1822. Deutsche Grammatik, 2. basım. Göttingen: Dieterich. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
159 Kierkegaard, Søren. 1846. Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. 2. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
160 Mill, John Stuart. 1843. A System of Logic, book III; and 1859. On Liberty, chapter 2. Toronto edition, Collected Works, vols 7–8 and 18. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
161 Boole, George. 1854. An Investigation of the Laws of Thought. London: Walton and Maberly. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
162 Lovelace, Ada. 1843. "Notes by the Translator", not G, L. F. Menabrea, "Sketch of the Analytical Engine Invented by Charles Babbage" çevirisine ek. Taylor's Scientific Memoirs 3: 666–731. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
163 Helmholtz, Hermann von. 1867. Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. Leipzig: Leopold Voss. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
164 Broca, Paul. 1861. "Remarques sur le siège de la faculté du langage articulé." Bulletin de la Société Anatomique 6: 330–357; Wernicke, Carl. 1874. Der aphasische Symptomencomplex. Breslau: Cohn und Weigert. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
165 Marx, Karl. 1859. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Berlin: Franz Duncker. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
166 Ebbinghaus, Hermann. 1885. Über das Gedächtnis: Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot; Wundt, Wilhelm. 1874. Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. Leipzig: Engelmann. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
167 Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1878. "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis." Popular Science Monthly 13: 470–482; and 1878. "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Popular Science Monthly 12: 286–302. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
168 Frege, Gottlob. 1892. "Über Sinn und Bedeutung." Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
169 Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1883. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
170 Sherrington, Charles. 1906. The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. New Haven: Yale University Press; Pavlov, Ivan. 1927. Conditioned Reflexes. G. V. Anrep, trans. London: Oxford University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
171 Bergson, Henri. 1896. Matière et mémoire. Paris: Alcan. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
172 Dewey, John. 1910. How We Think. Boston: D. C. Heath. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
173 Weber, Max. 1904–1905. Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Tübingen: Mohr; Durkheim, Émile. 1912. Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Paris: Alcan. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
174 Whitehead, Alfred North and Bertrand Russell. 1910–1913. Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell, Bertrand. 1905. "On Denoting." Mind 14: 479–493. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
175 Vygotsky, Lev. 1934. Myshlenie i rech. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
176 Bartlett, Frederic C. 1932. Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
177 Wertheimer, Max. 1912. "Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen von Bewegung." Zeitschrift für Psychologie 61: 161–265; Köhler, Wolfgang. 1917. Intelligenzprüfungen an Anthropoiden. Berlin: Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
178 Gödel, Kurt. 1931. "Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I." Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38: 173–198. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
179 von Neumann, John. 1945. "First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC." Moore School of Electrical Engineering, University of Pennsylvania; and 1958. The Computer and the Brain. New Haven: Yale University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
180 Arendt, Hannah. 1978. The Life of the Mind. New York: Harcourt; and 1963. Eichmann in Jerusalem. New York: Viking. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
181 Hodgkin, Alan L. and Andrew F. Huxley. 1952. "A Quantitative Description of Membrane Current and Its Application to Conduction and Excitation in Nerve." Journal of Physiology 117 (4): 500–544. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
182 Polanyi, Michael. 1958. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Garden City: Doubleday. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
183 Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
184 Licklider, J. C. R. 1960. "Man-Computer Symbiosis." IRE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics HFE-1: 4–11; Engelbart, Douglas C. 1962. Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework. SRI Summary Report AFOSR-3223. Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
185 Hubel, David H. and Torsten N. Wiesel. 1959. "Receptive Fields of Single Neurones in the Cat's Striate Cortex." Journal of Physiology 148 (3): 574–591. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
186 Gazzaniga, Michael S., Joseph E. Bogen and Roger W. Sperry. 1962. "Some Functional Effects of Sectioning the Cerebral Commissures in Man." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 48 (10): 1765–1769. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
187 Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
188 Foucault, Michel. 1966. Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
189 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1960. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr; Ricoeur, Paul. 1990. Soi-même comme un autre. Paris: Seuil. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
190 Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
191 Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1972. What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. New York: Harper & Row. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1972. What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. New York: Harper & Row.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
192 Tulving, Endel. 1972. “Episodic and Semantic Memory.” In Organization of Memory, edited by Endel Tulving and Wayne Donaldson, 381–403. New York: Academic Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
193 Flavell, John H. 1979. "Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring: A New Area of Cognitive-Developmental Inquiry." American Psychologist 34 (10): 906–911. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
194 Marr, David. 1982. Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
195 Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell; and 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
196 Libet, Benjamin, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl. 1983. "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)." Brain 106 (3): 623–642. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
197 Kandel, Eric R. 2001. "The Molecular Biology of Memory Storage: A Dialogue between Genes and Synapses." Science 294 (5544): 1030–1038. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
198 LeDoux, Joseph. 1996. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life. New York: Simon and Schuster. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
199 Crick, Francis and Christof Koch. 1990. "Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness." Seminars in the Neurosciences 2: 263–275. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
200 Hutchins, Edwin. 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge: MIT Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
201 Mercier, Hugo and Dan Sperber. 2011. "Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2): 57–74. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
202 Izutsu, Toshihiko. 1964. God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung. Tokyo: Keio Institute. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
203 Meriç, Cemil. 1974. Bu Ülke. İstanbul: Ötüken; Topçu, Nurettin. 1961. Yarınki Türkiye. İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınları; Duralı, Ş. Teoman. 2006. Felsefe-Bilime Giriş. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
204 Floridi, Luciano. 2019. The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
205 Wang, Binglu, Weixin Liang, Jiahui Xue, Yuhui Zhang, Hancheng Cao, Dashun Wang and Yian Yin. 2026. "Human-AI Collaboration in Science at Scale: A Global Large-scale Randomized Field Experiment." arXiv 2605.24180, 22 Mayıs 2026. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the abstract and archive version were read; 12.55% relative increase in revision probability. Open: the full methods and the quality measure. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Wang, Binglu, Weixin Liang, Jiahui Xue, Yuhui Zhang, Hancheng Cao, Dashun Wang ve Yian Yin. 2026. "Human-AI Collaboration in Science at Scale: A Global Large-scale Randomized Field Experiment." arXiv 2605.24180, 22 Mayıs 2026. Hakemsiz ön baskı.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Özet ve arşiv sürümü okundu; yüzde 12,55 göreli yenileme artışı. Açık: Tam yöntem ve kalite ölçümü kontrolü açık. Erişilen adres.
206 Zhao, C., J. Zhu, J. Liu, W. Zhao and Y. Pang. 2026. "Effectiveness of a generative AI-powered digital tutor integrated with a knowledge graph in anatomy education for nursing students: a randomized controlled trial." BMC Medical Education 26 (1): 1026. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the bibliographic and abstract search view was read; the PubMed page itself supplied no body text. Open: full methods, attrition and blinding were not rechecked in that round. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Zhao, C., J. Zhu, J. Liu, W. Zhao ve Y. Pang. 2026. "Effectiveness of a generative AI-powered digital tutor integrated with a knowledge graph in anatomy education for nursing students: a randomized controlled trial." BMC Medical Education 26 (1): 1026.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Bibliyografik/özet arama görünümü okundu; doğrudan PubMed sayfası gövde vermedi. Açık: Tam yöntem, kayıp ve körleme bu tur yeniden kontrol edilmedi. Erişilen adres.
207 Jain, P., D. Shajit, A. Maini, Y. Shahin and A. Panda. 2026. "Cognitive offloading, critical thinking and attitudes towards artificial intelligence in the era of ChatGPT: a comparative study of artificial intelligence-assisted and manual task performance in young adults." Cognitive Processing, çevrimiçi 30 Haziran 2026. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: bibliographic search view only; the results passage could not be read. Open: full methods, random assignment and results. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Jain, P., D. Shajit, A. Maini, Y. Shahin ve A. Panda. 2026. "Cognitive offloading, critical thinking and attitudes towards artificial intelligence in the era of ChatGPT: a comparative study of artificial intelligence-assisted and manual task performance in young adults." Cognitive Processing, çevrimiçi 30 Haziran 2026.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Bibliyografik arama görünümü; sonuç pasajı okunamadı. Açık: Tam yöntem, rastgele atama ve sonuç açık. Erişilen adres.
208 Zhu, Qiuhan, Xiangnan Li, Yiang Dong, Pengcheng Chang and Mengmeng Fan. 2026. "Not all cognitive offloading is equal: distinguishing dependent and autonomous offloading to generative AI." Frontiers in Psychology, 16 Temmuz 2026. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the three-wave method, participant flow and selected limitations were read. Open: comprehensive validity of the new scales and a complete reanalysis were not carried out. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Zhu, Qiuhan, Xiangnan Li, Yiang Dong, Pengcheng Chang ve Mengmeng Fan. 2026. "Not all cognitive offloading is equal: distinguishing dependent and autonomous offloading to generative AI." Frontiers in Psychology, 16 Temmuz 2026.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Üç dalgalı yöntem, örneklem akışı ve seçilmiş sınırlamalar okundu. Açık: Yeni ölçeklerin kapsamlı geçerliği ve tam analiz yeniden yapılmadı. Erişilen adres.
209 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. Kur'an-ı Kerîm Meâli. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28
210 Karaman, Hayreddin, Mustafa Çağrıcı, İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez and Sadrettin Gümüş. Kur'an Yolu Türkçe Meâl ve Tefsir. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29
211 Sefaria. Miqra according to the Masorah. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
212 Ballot, Paul, Yana van de Sande, Hanna Schraffenberger and Philipp Schmid. 2026. "Chatbots reduce health-related conspiracy beliefs not because of but despite being perceived as AI." Scientific Reports. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the abstract, relevant results and the explanation of selection linked to deception were read. Open: supplements and the whole analysis were not reproduced. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Ballot, Paul, Yana van de Sande, Hanna Schraffenberger ve Philipp Schmid. 2026. "Chatbots reduce health-related conspiracy beliefs not because of but despite being perceived as AI." Scientific Reports 16, 17 Ağustos 2026.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Özet, ilgili sonuçlar ve aldatmaya bağlı seçilim açıklaması okundu. Açık: Ekler ve bütün analiz yeniden üretilmedi. Erişilen adres.
213 METR. 2026. Frontier Risk Report (February to March 2026). Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the report’s summary table, the task-horizon definition and the explanation of invalid successes were read. Open: the entire report and all runs were not audited; the live task-horizon page was not rechecked. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
METR. 2026. "Frontier Risk Report (February to March 2026)." 19 Mayıs 2026. Hakemsiz kurum raporu.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Raporun özet tablosu, görev ufku tanımı ve geçersiz başarı açıklaması okundu. Açık: Raporun tamamı ve tüm çalıştırmalar denetlenmedi; canlı görev ufku sayfası yeni baştan kontrol edilmedi. Erişilen adres.
214 Comsa, Iulia-Maria. 2026. "AI and Consciousness: Shifting Focus Towards Tractable Questions." Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the abstract and version record were opened; the basic research orientation was read. Open: the full argument. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Comsa, Iulia-Maria. 2026. "AI and Consciousness: Shifting Focus Towards Tractable Questions." arXiv 2605.06965, 7 Mayıs 2026. Hakemsiz ön baskı.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Özet ve sürüm kaydı açıldı; temel araştırma yönelimi okundu. Açık: Tam argüman açık. Erişilen adres.
215 Salvi, Romain and Ouri Wolfson. 2026. "Discovering Machine Correlates of Consciousness." Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the abstract, the two-model comparison and the conference publication record were read. Open: full methods, peer review and the interpretation as subjective experience. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Salvi, Romain ve Ouri Wolfson. 2026. "Discovering Machine Correlates of Consciousness." arXiv 2608.28824, 28 Ağustos 2026. Arşiv kaydı bir konferans bildiri kitabında da yayımlandığını belirtir; hakemlik durumu bu sürümde doğrulanmadı.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Özet, iki model karşılaştırması ve konferans yayın kaydı okundu. Açık: Tam yöntem, hakemlik ve öznel yaşantı yorumu açık. Erişilen adres.
216 Reddit, r/artificial. 2026. "Harvard just proved AI tutors beat classrooms, now what?" Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Reddit, r/artificial. 2026. "Harvard just proved AI tutors beat classrooms, now what?" Kamusal tartışma; bir deneyin kamusal dolaşımda genişletilmesi örneği olarak Codex üçüncü sürümünde kaydedilmiştir. Bu denetimde site otomatik erişime kapalı olduğu için içerik yeniden doğrulanamadı.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
217 Public-discourse records withdrawn from earlier versions: four Reddit posts (February, April, June and August 2026), including “One Distinction, Four Sciences” and “Stochastic Parrots in the Chinese Room”. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
218 Mehta, Ashish et al. 2026. "The Dynamics of Delusion: Modeling Bidirectional False Belief Amplification in Human-Chatbot Dialogue." Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2 ↩3
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the archive abstract and version record were read. Open: full methods and all conversation data. Address reached.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Mehta, Ashish ve diğerleri. 2026. "The Dynamics of Delusion: Modeling Bidirectional False Belief Amplification in Human-Chatbot Dialogue." arXiv 2604.25096, 28 Nisan 2026. Hakemsiz ön baskı.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Arşiv özeti ve sürüm kaydı okundu. Açık: Tam yöntem ve tüm konuşma verileri açık. Erişilen adres.
219 Center for Open Science. n.d. “Preregistration.” Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
Inherited scope statement. Accessed 9 October 2026. The sections on preregistration, the distinction between planned and exploratory analysis, and explaining changes of plan were read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Center for Open Science. Tarihsiz. "Preregistration." Erişim 9 Ekim 2026. Ön kayıt, planlı ve keşifsel analiz ayrımı ve plan değişikliğini açıklama bölümleri okundu.
220 Lakens, Daniël. 2022. “Sample Size Justification.” Collabra: Psychology 8 (1): 33267. DOI 10.1525/collabra.33267. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
Inherited scope statement. The introduction and scope sections of the original publisher PDF (full-text access) on sample-size justification, the effect of interest and sensitivity were read; all examples were not recalculated.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Lakens, Daniël. 2022. "Sample Size Justification." Collabra: Psychology 8 (1): 33267. DOI 10.1525/collabra.33267. Özgün yayıncı PDF'sinin (tam metin erişimi) örneklem gerekçesi, önemsenen etki ve duyarlılık yaklaşımına ilişkin giriş ve kapsam bölümleri okundu; tüm örnekler yeniden hesaplanmadı.
221 Lakens, Daniël. n.d. “Equivalence Testing and Interval Hypotheses.” Improving Your Statistical Inferences, chapter 9. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
Inherited scope statement. Accessed 9 October 2026. The explanation that a non-significant result is not absence of an effect, and of an inconclusive result with equivalence bounds, was read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Lakens, Daniël. Tarihsiz. "Equivalence Testing and Interval Hypotheses." Improving Your Statistical Inferences, bölüm 9. Erişim 9 Ekim 2026. Anlamlı olmayan sonucun etki yokluğu olmadığı ve eşdeğerlik sınırlarıyla belirsiz sonuç açıklaması okundu.
222 Chalmers, David J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩1 ↩2
223 Chalmers, David J. 2010. The Character of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
224 Hesselmann, G. 2020. “No conclusive evidence that difficult general knowledge questions cause a ‘Google Stroop effect’. A replication study.” PeerJ 8: e10325, 6 November 2020. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
225 The Open Group. The Open Group Architecture Framework standard, official introductory page. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
Inherited scope statement. Additional access (page read 10 October 2026): official help page. The four domains and the method/view explanation were read there. Open: the main page returned 403 and access to the detailed standard asked for authentication. The full standard and edition are not verified. No conformance or certification claim is made.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
The Open Group. The Open Group Architecture Framework standardı, resmî tanıtım sayfası.
Ek erişim (sayfa okuma tarihi 10 Ekim 2026): resmî yardım sayfası. Resmî yardım sayfasında dört alan ve yöntem/görünüm açıklaması okundu. Açık: Ana sayfa 403; ayrıntılı standarda erişim kimlik doğrulama istedi. Tam standart ve basım doğrulanmadı. Uygunluk veya sertifika iddiası yoktur.
226 Brown, Simon. “The C4 model for visualising software architecture.” Official model description. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. ↩
Inherited scope statement. Additional access (pages read 10 October 2026): c4model.com/diagrams, c4model.com/abstractions/container, c4model.com/diagrams/code. View names, the meaning of container and the scope of the code level were read. The Atlas mappings are neither the official model’s account of mind nor a full application of it. Reading the official description is not official endorsement of the Atlas mapping.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Brown, Simon. "The C4 model for visualising software architecture." Resmî model açıklaması.
Ek erişimler (sayfa okuma tarihi 10 Ekim 2026): c4model.com/diagrams, c4model.com/abstractions/container, c4model.com/diagrams/code. Görünüm adları, kapsayıcı anlamı ve kod düzeyinin kapsamı okundu. Atlas eşlemeleri resmî modelin zihin açıklaması veya tam uygulaması değil. Resmî açıklamanın okunması, atlas eşlemesinin resmî onayı değildir.
· Académie française. 2024. “Conscience.” Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, ninth edition. Access link. Turkish bibliography entry. Unnumbered record, kept under its key.

Inherited scope statements for notes 1–19

These notes sit in the lists of the earlier sections. Their earlier scope statements are gathered here, with the original Turkish records; they report earlier work, not a new reading.

1 Fedorenko, Evelina, Steven T. Piantadosi and Edward A. F. Gibson. 2024. "Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought." Nature 630: 575–586.
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Fedorenko, Evelina, Steven T. Piantadosi ve Edward A. F. Gibson. 2024. "Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought." Nature 630: 575–586.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
3 Kant, Immanuel. 1781/1787. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
Inherited scope statement. Additional reading record, 10 October 2026 (as reported in the audit notice): closed at passage level. Cooperation of sensibility and understanding: context of A51/B75, Meiklejohn’s English translation; not all Kant interpretations. Page read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Kant, Immanuel. 1781/1787. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch. Önceki kayıt korundu; bu tur birincil pasaj yeniden okunmadı.
Ek okuma kaydı (10 Ekim 2026, denetim paketinin bildirimi): Belirli pasaj düzeyinde kapandı. Duyusallık/anlama yetisi iş birliği: A51/B75 bağlamı, Meiklejohn İngilizce çevirisi; bütün Kant yorumları değil. Okunan sayfa.
8 Heidegger, Martin. 1954. Was heißt Denken? Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Inherited scope statement. Edition year and the text covered could not be verified from a primary bibliographic record in this audit; the translator and publisher appear in bookseller and catalogue records.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Heidegger, Martin. 1954. Was heißt Denken? Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. İngilizcesi: What Is Called Thinking? Çeviren Fred D. Wieck ve J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Türkçesi: Düşünmek Ne Demektir? Çeviren Rıdvan Şentürk. İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları (baskı yılı ve kapsadığı metin bu denetimde birincil künyeden doğrulanamadı; çevirmen ve yayınevi kitapçı ve katalog kayıtlarında görüldü).
9 Lee, Hao-Ping (Hank), Advait Sarkar, Lev Tankelevitch, Ian Drosos, Sean Rintel, Richard Banks and Nicholas Wilson. 2025. "The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers." Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems..
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Lee, Hao-Ping (Hank), Advait Sarkar, Lev Tankelevitch, Ian Drosos, Sean Rintel, Richard Banks ve Nicholas Wilson. 2025. "The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers." Proceedings of the 2025 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
16 Teng, Da, Lihua Tan, Qiyuan Cao, Y. Xia, Na Zhang, J. Li and Dan Zhao. 2026. "Impact of AI misinformation on diagnostic accuracy and confidence calibration in novice medical students." npj Digital Medicine 9: 356.
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Teng, Da, Lihua Tan, Qiyuan Cao, Y. Xia, Na Zhang, J. Li ve Dan Zhao. 2026. "Impact of AI misinformation on diagnostic accuracy and confidence calibration in novice medical students." npj Digital Medicine 9: 356.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.
17 Poldrack, Russell A. 2006. "Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2): 59–63. DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004.
Inherited scope statement. The bibliographic record and abstract were read; the full text was not read.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Poldrack, Russell A. 2006. "Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2): 59–63. DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004. Bibliyografik kayıt ve özet okundu; tam metin okunmadı.
18 Searle, John R. 1980. "Minds, Brains, and Programs." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417–457.
Inherited scope statement. Scope record, 9 October 2026: the earlier record is kept; the relevant full text was not reread in that round. Open: source existence, the earlier summary and a new passage check are separate questions.
Original Turkish bibliographic record and scope statement
Searle, John R. 1980. "Minds, Brains, and Programs." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417–457.
Bu turun erişim kapsamı (9 Ekim 2026): Önceki kayıt korunuyor; bu tur ilgili tam metin yeniden okunmadı. Açık: Kaynak varlığı, eski özet ve yeni pasaj denetimi ayrı tutulmalı.

Turkish	dışsal bellek
Ancient Greek	ὑπόμνημα (hypomnēma)
Latin	——
English	external memory
German	externes Gedächtnis
French	mémoire externe
Arabic	الذاكرة الخارجية (modern)

Turkish	benzetim, simülasyon
Ancient Greek	——
Latin	simulatio
English	simulation
German	Simulation
French	simulation
Arabic	مُحَاكَاة (muḥākāt)

Turkish	olasılık, ihtimal
Ancient Greek	τὸ εἰκός (to eikos)
Latin	probabilitas
English	probability
German	Wahrscheinlichkeit
French	probabilité
Arabic	اِحْتِمَال (iḥtimāl)

Turkish	değerleme
Ancient Greek	——
Latin	aestimatio
English	appraisal
German	Bewertung
French	évaluation
Arabic	تَقْيِيم (taqyīm)

Turkish	somatik işaret
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	somatic marker
German	somatischer Marker
French	marqueur somatique
Arabic	العلامة الجسدية (modern)

Turkish	karar
Ancient Greek	κρίσις (krisis), προαίρεσις
Latin	decisio
English	decision
German	Entscheidung
French	décision
Arabic	قَرَار (qarār)

Turkish	eylem
Ancient Greek	πρᾶξις (praxis)
Latin	actio
English	action
German	Handlung
French	action
Arabic	فِعْل (fiʿl)

Turkish	gösterge
Ancient Greek	σημεῖον (sēmeion)
Latin	signum
English	sign
German	Zeichen
French	signe
Arabic	عَلَامَة، دَلِيل (ʿalāma, dalīl)

Turkish	sözdizimi
Ancient Greek	σύνταξις (syntaxis)
Latin	constructio
English	syntax
German	Syntax
French	syntaxe
Arabic	نَحْو (naḥw)

Turkish	iletişim
Ancient Greek	κοινωνία (koinōnia)
Latin	communicatio
English	communication
German	Kommunikation
French	communication
Arabic	تَوَاصُل (tawāṣul)

Turkish	gönderim
Ancient Greek	—— No ancient technical term.
Latin	designatio
English	reference
German	Bezug, Referenz
French	référence
Arabic	إِحَالَة (iḥāla, modern)

Turkish	bağlam
Ancient Greek	——
Latin	contextus
English	context
German	Kontext, Zusammenhang
French	contexte
Arabic	سِيَاق (siyāq)

Turkish	anlatı
Ancient Greek	μῦθος (mythos), διήγησις (diēgēsis)
Latin	narratio
English	narrative
German	Erzählung
French	récit
Arabic	سَرْد (sard)

Turkish	metafor, istiare
Ancient Greek	μεταφορά (metaphora)
Latin	translatio
English	metaphor
German	Metapher
French	métaphore
Arabic	اِسْتِعَارَة (istiʿāra)

Turkish	kanıt, delil
Ancient Greek	τεκμήριον (tekmērion)
Latin	argumentum, probatio
English	evidence
German	Beweis, Beleg
French	preuve
Arabic	دَلِيل، بُرْهَان (dalīl, burhān)

Turkish	gerekçe
Ancient Greek	αἰτία (aitia), λόγος (logos)
Latin	ratio
English	justification
German	Begründung
French	justification
Arabic	حُجَّة، تَعْلِيل (ḥuǧǧa, taʿlīl)

Turkish	hakikat, doğruluk
Ancient Greek	ἀλήθεια (alētheia)
Latin	veritas
English	truth
German	Wahrheit
French	vérité
Arabic	حَقِيقَة (ḥaqīqa)

Turkish	tanıklık
Ancient Greek	μαρτυρία (martyria)
Latin	testimonium
English	testimony
German	Zeugnis
French	témoignage
Arabic	شَهَادَة (šahāda)

Turkish	tümdengelim
Ancient Greek	συλλογισμός (syllogismos)
Latin	deductio
English	deduction
German	Deduktion
French	déduction
Arabic	قِيَاس (qiyās)

Turkish	tümevarım
Ancient Greek	ἐπαγωγή (epagōgē)
Latin	inductio
English	induction
German	Induktion
French	induction
Arabic	اِسْتِقْرَاء (istiqrāʾ)

Turkish	tasavvur
Ancient Greek	ἔννοια (ennoia)
Latin	conceptus, imaginatio
English	conception
German	Vorstellung
French	conception
Arabic	تَصَوُّر (taṣawwur)

Turkish	tasdik
Ancient Greek	συγκατάθεσις (synkatathesis)
Latin	assensus
English	assent
German	Zustimmung
French	assentiment
Arabic	تَصْدِيق (taṣdīq)

Turkish	kuramsal bilgelik
Ancient Greek	σοφία (sophia)
Latin	sapientia
English	theoretical wisdom
German	Weisheit
French	sagesse
Arabic	حِكْمَة نَظَرِيَّة (ḥikma naẓariyya)

Turkish	beyin
Ancient Greek	ἐγκέφαλος (enkephalos)
Latin	cerebrum
English	brain
German	Gehirn
French	cerveau
Arabic	دِمَاغ، مُخّ (dimāġ, muḫḫ)

Turkish	nöron, sinir hücresi
Ancient Greek	νεῦρον (neuron)
Latin	—— No ancient Latin equivalent.
English	neuron
German	Neuron
French	neurone
Arabic	عَصَبُون (ʿaṣabūn, modern)

Turkish	sinaps
Ancient Greek	σύναψις (synapsis: birleşme)
Latin	—— No ancient Latin equivalent.
English	synapse
German	Synapse
French	synapse
Arabic	مَشْبَك (mašbak, modern)

Turkish	hareket
Ancient Greek	κίνησις (kinēsis)
Latin	motus
English	movement
German	Bewegung
French	mouvement
Arabic	حَرَكَة (ḥaraka)

Turkish	metabolizma
Ancient Greek	μεταβολή (metabolē: değişim)
Latin	—— No ancient Latin equivalent.
English	metabolism
German	Stoffwechsel
French	métabolisme
Arabic	الأيض (al-ayḍ, modern)

Turkish	yazı
Ancient Greek	γραφή (graphē), γράμματα (grammata)
Latin	scriptura, litterae
English	writing
German	Schrift
French	écriture
Arabic	كِتَابَة (kitāba)

Turkish	genişletilmiş zihin
Ancient Greek	—— A modern term.
Latin	—— A modern term.
English	extended mind
German	erweiterter Geist
French	esprit étendu
Arabic	العقل الممتد (modern)